34 Le Masson, Campagne de Novare, p. 105.
35 Letter of 12th April 1853, from Friedrich Engels to Joseph Wedemeyer, quoted in Marx and Engels, Collected Works, Volume 39, p 303.
36 Sporschil, p. 165.
37 Vimercati, p. 232.
38 See Anon, Processo del generale Ramorino, 1849.
39 Schneidawind, Feldzug, p. 787.
40 Kriegsbegebenheiten, 1849, Part 1, p. 59.
41 41. Raccolta per ordine cronologico, Vol. V, pp. 33-34.
42 Fea, pp. 63-67.
21
The Siege of Venice
The coming of the New Year found the Field Marshal’s main army on the frontiers of Piedmont, whilst the II Reserve Corps still occupied Venetia, and maintained the blockade of Venice. Radetzky wished a more aggressive stance to be taken against the city. The Venetians were fully aware of what awaited them in the Spring, and had, as related, been preparing for it. However, Radetzky’s attention was abruptly pulled to the west after Carlo Alberto’s denunciation of the Salasco Armistice on March 12th.
Minor Operations in the South of the Lagoon
News that hostilities by the Piedmontese were to be resumed on the 20th reached Venice on the 14th, being brought by the Piedmontese steamer Goito. The city’s morale rose immeasurably. In a typical knee-jerk reaction, General Pepe moved his staff south to Chioggia, with a view to advancing on Rovigo, to link up with Colonel Mezzocapo’s Roman force of 8,500 infantry, 600 cavalry, and 16 guns, and from there perhaps strike across the Po.1
At Conchè, on the mainland, some 10 kilometres north-west of Chioggia, a post had been established by the Venetians, as a trip-wire for the defences of the city. It was held by 150 Lombard Bersaglieri, and 50 sappers. After some prior patrolling, on March 21st, Major-General Landwehr sent a force of three and a half companies of Landwehr/IR Prince Emil, together with a troop of dragoons to attack it. The advance was made along both sides of the River Brenta. These were joined by a further two and a half companies, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Taizon, Two guns were later committed. A long exchange of fire took place in this swampy terrain, with the Lombards finally being compelled to withdraw. Austrian casualties numbered one dead and four wounded. Two Italians were killed, and two wounded, one of whom was captured.2
Burning with a desire to avenge themselves, the troops appealed to be able to retake the position. General Pepe allowed a further expedition, which reoccupied Conche on the 24th. The potential importance of this area, in relation to operations elsewhere, however was about to diminish rapidly.
Venice Alone Once Again
FML Haynau sent a summons of surrender to President Manin on March 27th, informing him of the battle at Novara, and Carlo Alberto’s subsequent abdication. For five days, Manin kept this information secret, but upon receiving full confirmation of these facts, he placed them before the Assembly on April 2nd. The news of Novara, and the consequent abdication of the King, came as a great blow to morale, shattering many illusions about prolonging resistance.
Venice Lagoon
A further complication for President Manin was the beginning of a resurgence of the Imperial Navy. On the 17th of March, a Danish naval officer, Hans Birch Dahlerup, was appointed Vice-Admiral, and placed in command. A month after taking command, after the departure of Adniral Albini’s ships, he imposed a blockade on the Lagoon. Manin, in a letter to a friend, wrote about the,”…radical transformation…” of the Austrian fleet.3 In reality, it was far too early to talk of such an occurrence, but it showed that Manin was already aware that things were changing. On April 25th, Dahlerup himself had his first sight of Venice, and also his first brush with the Venetian Navy.
Early that morning, I gave the signal for facilitate and went, under sail with both frigates, and the steamer Vulcano. The wind was weak and not until 13:00 or 14:00 in the afternoon – did we sight the city. I had shoved off from Pirano without instructing the ship commanders, due the fact that I found this unnecessary, as the waters were narrow and a separation thus not likely, and as to the Blockade, the instructions for its reinstatement, made several references to previous year’s rules of engagement. I wanted to see the coastline myself, before making any decisions regarding how to blockade the city from the sea. As the wind lessened, I had Vulcano tow Bellona and approached the coast at Lido, in order to run down along the coastline before sunset, past Malamocco and Chioggia. An English brig, Koffardi, was hailed and turned away. As we came closer to shore, we noticed Republican flags from all the towers, citadels and ships, as if on a holiday, and, somewhat belatedly, my officers informed me that it was St. Mark’s Day, the most important day of celebration to the Venetians.
Omen accipio!, I thought, and already the following day was I to find a sign of my good luck from this omen.
Of the blockade division, there was not a single ship in sight. After sunset I had, from time to time, had my ship firing a round, shooting of flares etc. Later, they were answered around us, and around mid-night we could see the ships of the light division gather around us. The night was light and there was almost no wind.
Around 2 o’clock in the morning I came aboard the Vulcano, being joined there by the Squadron adjutant Count Hadik, and my personal man-servant. At the time, we were lying between Chioggia and Punta Maestra, and as it began to dawn, I had Vulcano start steaming towards Chioggia, and from there, to run close to the coastline all around the bay in order to find a place to get ashore. From there I wanted to go to the Headquarters of Haynau. I gave Karolyi the order to have my flag carried by the breeze, and keeping the squadron together, crossing with the coastline in sight. The Venetian ships stayed in the harbour, close to the city, having no plans to make a run for it. All our ships were together when I left them, except for the frigate Venere, which, during the night, had stayed back. It was however shortly after spotted in a northerly direction, approximately 3 to 4 miles from Malamocco. Close to it, we noticed a Kofarddi brig, which I assumed to be the English brig we had shunned the night before. Both ships were lying still – later they caught the breezes, and headed for shore.
With Vulcano I ran around the bay and passed Chioggia at a distance of half a Danish mile. The Venere seemed to have caught sight of the Squadron, and steered South East, while the brig Koffardi, which had hoisted a Greek flag, ran towards the entry to Malamocco. At the same time, a steamer was seen coming out of Malamocco – heading towards us. I was told that it was the re-christened merchant steamer Mariana, approximately the same size as the Vulcano and armed the same, with a 48 pound Paixhans Cannon amidships and one astern. I had no reason to engage it in combat – it would have been silly to risk the one steamer we had in our squadron – alone and close to enemy shore, where any mishap could render me impossible to move, on the other hand I could not have the Koffardi brig break the blockade right under my nose.
Fort Marghera, early May 1849
The Greek Koffardi brig had to be cut out, and the course I ordered in this regard, brought us stern to stern with the Venetian vessel, which with all flags running came towards us. I ordered full battle stations, while the Venetian, followed at a distance by a smaller steamer, kept coming at us at a gun shot’s range. Our ship’s Captain, Fautz, who stood on the bridge above the wheelhouse, shouted to me through his loud-speaker:
‘What course does Your Excellency order that I should steer?’ My answer was, ‘Steady as she goes!’ I had recently been up on the bridge and talked to him; this sudden question therefore puzzled me a bit; it was as if out of nowhere a sudden fright of the courageous “responsiveness” by the Venetian, and I could not suppress a question of doubt about the truth of what he had recently told me; namely that he had ever so often chased the Marianna – but that it always managed to out-sail the Vulcano.4
Fort Marghera
After his great victory at Novara, Radetzky again narrowed his focus on the capture of Venice. For this to be undertaken, the first step must be to reduce and occupy Fort Marghera, and its supporti
ng works, on the mainland. To this end, in the heavy Spring Rains, a siege corps was brought into existence on April 8th, commanded by Baron Haynau. It was composed of:
On the Right Flank – Division Perglas
Brigade Coronini
7th Feld-Jäger Battalion
III/IR Haynau (Nr. 57)
I/2nd Banal Grenz IR (Nr.11), four companies
15th 6 Pounder Foot Artillery Battery
One troop, Boyneburg Dragoon Regiment (Nr. 4)
Brigade Kerpan
I & II/1st Banal Grenz IR (Nr. 10)
II/IR Prince Emil (Nr. 54)
I/Romaner Banat Battalion
2nd Styrian Schützen Battalion
14th 6 Pounder Foot Artillery Battery
One troop, Boyneburg Dragoon Regiment (Nr. 4)
On the Left Flank – Division Simbschen
Brigade Macchio
I, II, & III/IR Grand Duke of Baden (Nr. 59)
I & II/Illyrian Banat Grenz IR (Nr. 14)
Two rocket tubes, Rocket Battery Nr. 8
One troop, Boyneburg Dragoon Regiment (Nr. 4)
Brigade Thun
I & II/IR Archduke Carl
Landwehr/IR Hoch und Deutschmeister (Nr. 4)
1st Feld-Jäger Battalion, four companies
(Independent) Brigade Wocher
I & II, & Landwehr/IR Koudelka (Nr. 40)
Landwehr/IR Schönhals (Nr. 29)
8th Feld-Jäger Battalion
One troop, Boyneburg Dragoon Regiment (Nr. 4)
Siege of Fort Marghera, May 1849
Technical Troops
Artillery – 500 men
Pioneers – three companies
Sappers – 40 men
Miners – ½ company
Flotillen Corps – one company
Transport Corps – 73rd Transport Division
The Defences of the Bridgehead
The objectives of this force were the main fort itself, and the other supporting works, Forts Manin and Rizzardi, the Five Arches Battery, and those of the Speranza and the Covered Way.5 The Venetians were to be finally driven from any foothold on the mainland.
Fort Marghera
Fort Marghera was originally constructed between 1808 and 1810, on the orders of the Emperor Napoleon. Built on the site of an earlier redoubt, it had not been altered since then. It possessed an outer and an inner fortified perimeter. The inner was pentagonal. The shorter side of the polygon faced Mestre, and set at a right angle to the military Canal. Its length was 100 metres. Its two adjoining sides were approximately 240 metres long, and those facing the lagoon, approximately 100 metres each. The shortest side was strengthened by a tenaille work. The four other faces had bastions. The bastion curtains facing the lagoon were crossed by the military canal, and so the bastion opposite the tenaille work is separate from the main body of the fort. The four bastions were numbered, from left to right, I, II, III, and IV. The detached work was known as Ravelin X.
This outer wall, a crown work, comprised four bastions, numbered V, VI, VII, and VIII, with three corresponding curtain walls. These cover the inner wall, from the abutment angle of Bastion V to the abutment angle of Bastion VIII. These bastions also have two counterguards, numbered XI and IX. The left counterguard had a ditch on its right side.
Outside the outer wall were sited three lunettes, each sited in the middle of a curtain wall, some 90 metres from the moat’s counterscarp. These were, like the bastions and curtains, surrounded by a moat. From left to right, they were numbered XII, XIII, and XIV. The entire outer wall, approximately 1,000 metres in length, was surrounded by the covered way, at the top of the glacis. Lunettes XII and XIII also had covered ways. Lunette XIV did not possess one, as the ground to its front was low and very swampy. Two gates, with drawbridges, stood between the first and second walls, with gates between the second wall and the lunettes.
Fort Rizzardi
Fort Rizzardi, some 500 metres to the left rear of the main work, was constructed during 1848, as the railway embankment blocked fire in that direction from Marghera. It had the form of a redoubt, its longer side facing the railway. It was named after the Venetian, General Rizzardi. Between Fort Marghera and Fort Rizzardi were two supporting four gun batteries; these were the Speranza and Covered Way Batteries.
The Five Arches Battery
Along the railway itself, on the site of a five-arched bridge, a battery was established. Appropriately named the Five Arches Battery, its purpose was to enfilade the rail line itself.
Fort Manin
About .8 of a kilometre east of Fort Malghera, along the Osellino Canal stood a six pointed star shaped work, originally known as Fort Eau. This was soon changed to Fort Manin. It was supported by two small ravelins for riflemen.
In none of these fortifications were there scarps or counterscarps, with brick facing. Fort Marghera had two casemates, two powder magazines, and six small underground rooms. There were also four brick barrack blocks in the fort. Each of the detached works also had a powder magazine.
Haynau’s Preparations
On April 18th, FML Haynau established his headquarters at the Casa Papadopoli, a house some nine kilometres north of Mestre, on the Treviso Road. It had been intended to open the first siege works on the 20th, but the continuing heavy rain precluded this. Nevertheless, some preliminary works were begun, albeit with painfully slow progress.
All of the materiel for the construction of the batteries, planking, fascines, gabions, and sacks, as well as bedding material, was brought forward to Mestre over the next few days, and depots established, some 1,900 metres from the lunettes of the fort. On the night of the 27th, work began on the two approaches to what would become the Support Parallel, the first from the Capuchin Tower in Mestre, between the Mestre Canal and the railway, and the second between from the point where the Padua Road crosses the Verze Canal and the railway embankment was sufficiently advanced.
The troops defending the labour units, 1,000 men strong, because of the obstructed terrain, advanced in four detachments along the right side of the dyke of the Mestre Canal, then along the railway, the Via Orlando, and the Verze Canal, over the Parallel that was to be constructed, deployed pickets and remained quiet, lying on the ground until dawn. Of the trench workers, consisting of men of different regiments, 1,100 were deployed on the left wing, and 750 on the right wing, after being summoned to their tools before night had fallen.
Without serious interference from the defenders, the work was done at night, with an approach trench of 364 metres along the Mestre Canal on the left wing, and a half parallel with a length of 190 metres, which was constructed as a protection for the Support Parallel.
Also, the Support Parallel itself was begun, as were the other approaches, and an additional approach of 152 metres was advanced against Marghera, in which a hook of 66 metres was dug for a battery of long howitzers. A constant bickering fire from both sides continued throughout these operations, a particularly difficult problem for the Venetians, whose ammunition and powder resources were limited. On the 26th, a soldier of the Cacciatori del Sile became the first defender to be killed during the siege.6
Finally, at 02:00 on the 29th, work on the Parallel itself, began. The boggy nature of the ground, together with regular inundations, both natural and enemy induced, made the work infinitely difficult, as it would remain for the whole of the campaign against Venice. Regardless of the cost in effort and lives, however, the work went on, trenches and batteries being constructed. A bombardment was scheduled for May 4th. The Swiss Captain Debrunner, at Marghera, wrote that, “Every morning it was possible to see the almost magical appearance of a new line of trenches.”7
Defensive Measures
The increasing build up against Marghera coincided with a crisis of leadership at the fort itself. General Paolucci, short of powder and ammunition, and knowing this to be an important consideration, forbade any further pointless firing at the advancing enemy works. The decision, though cogent, was deeply resented b
y the garrison, and the general became the butt of scurrilous rumours, some actually accusing him of treachery. These accusations were then taken up by elements of the populace at large, to such an extent that President Manin himself was required to speak in defence of the General.8 This was undertaken too late, however, and Manin was forced to replace him, provisionally on the 29th, and formally on May 2nd.
Such was the uproar that it was actually deemed unsafe to bring the unfortunate Paolucci into the city, and he was quietly rowed to the French steamer Pluto, where he spent the remainder of the siege. Colonel Ulloa, of General Pepe’s staff, took command, and immediately set to work on the defences, pausing to write a brief report to Pepe on the morning of the 3rd, stating his certainty that an attack was imminent, outlining his needs and requirements, and expressing his own determination. Part of it read,
The garrison is animated by the best spirit; the artillery is active and intelligent. Will they resist a strong cannonade and bombardment by the enemy? I hope so; and so far as is in my power, I shall keep the garrison as firm and resolute as possible. There is still much to do, for which reason I dedicate all the hours of the day to insure the success of the defence.
The able and energetic Ulloa was unquestionably the man for the impending crisis, and had the full confidence of his men, which Paolucci certainly did not. It is ironic that the right decision was taken for the wrong reasons. It is also unfortunate that Manin had been forced to submit to the mob; something which would be remembered by the latter. Once more, indiscipline in the Army had won a reward, rather than punishment.
At this stage, the garrison of the fort and the supporting works numbered 2, 744.9 These were:
Staff:
Commandant: Colonel Ulloa
Chief of Staff: Major Seismit-Doda
Commander, Artillery: Major Mezzacapo
Commander, Engineers: Captain Merlo
Commander, Artillery in the zone of attack: Major Cosenz
Radetzky's Marches Page 49