The Venetian reaction was swift. Captain Mestrovich, at the head of detachments of Gendarmes and Cacciatori del Sile, before whom the raiders quickly withdrew, without doing a great deal of damage. They did so, carrying the body of Brüll. Lieutenant Jastzembski, in the retreat, fell into the water and would have drowned from exhaustion, but was saved by Corporal Ludwig Tomaszevski.65 Besides the captain dead, five men had been wounded. The defenders had about 15 casualties, including one Cacciatori killed, and a Gendarme wounded. Six guns had been spiked by the raiders, but four of these were back in action during the day.66
After this action, the weight of the bombardment was much lessened, as the attackers considered the next step. Certainly, the robust nature of the defence had been underestimated. It was noted that the effectiveness of the shelling was diminished by the extreme range at which many of the exchanges were fought, a factor which favoured the defence, which was required only to maintain the status quo. In addition, it had been shown that in some cases, too heavy a weight of fire had been placed on some targets, actually reducing the results.67
Conversely, on July 14th, another explosion and fire took place in the main powder mill, injuring 11 people, some badly burned. Although this, too, was brought under control, the shortage of powder was becoming acute. The batteries were using supplies much faster than it was being made. Far from building up reserves, there was a serious risk that not enough could be manufactured to keep up with daily usage.
Inactivity of the Fleet
A great worry for President Manin had always been maritime affairs. He had noted the marked improvements in the Imperial Navy, under the guiding hand of Admiral Dahlerup. If not spectacularly, warships had taken part in the conquest of Ancona the previous month. Slow progress was being made. The same could not be said of his own fleet.
While the small craft were taking a full part in the defence of the city, the big ships remained idle. Also the previous month, Admiral Bucchia had been appointed to shake things up in the fleet. There was little evidence of this happening. Shortages of essentials were not, as yet, acute, and no great pressure had been placed on the fleet commander to take action.
Balloons
One novel concept that was first tried on Venice was that of aerial attack. The idea was conceived by two artillery officers – brothers – who considered it possible to drop bombs on the city, using balloons to carry them. Lieutenants Franz and Josef Uchatius, on the 2nd of July, released two balloons from the mainland, which the wind carried away. On the 25th, another attempt was made, with two more balloons being released from the deck of the steamer Vulcano, each carrying a bag of 500 lead shot. In 23 minutes, they were observed to climb to around 1,500 metres, and travel some 6,000 metres from the vessel, and to finally explode, between the Lido and Fort San Andrea. At the same time, other balloons were also put aloft from Mestre, also to explode harmlessly.68
Bombardment – Cannon Tilted at 45°
A great deal more successful, though perhaps not as potentially far-sighted, alternative was an alteration in the angle of fire of some guns, a method suggested by FML Baron Augustin, who had remembered an article from a journal about Napoleon having used the method at Toulon in 1799. Special wooden wedges were constructed, and placed under the barrels of two Piedmontese 30 pounder cannon, and of six 24 pounders. These frames were attached to lugs on the barrels. These weapons were emplaced on San Giuliano. Two others were in place at the western end of the Viaduct. These frames tilted the barrels to an angle of 45°.
Fire was opened, in the presence of Count Thurn, and the Artillery Director, Baron Stwrtnik, at Midnight, on July 29th. The range achieved from San Giuliano with solid shot was found to be some 5,300 metres. For shells, this was around 3,800 metres. Since the range from the batteries to the city’s edge was about 3,200 metres, this meant that around 2,100 metres of the inner city could be covered by round shot, and 600 by shells.
The round shot and shell fired by the cannon with the new apparatus could now reach about two-thirds of the urban area of the city, and the island of Murano, from a very considerable height. Some rounds reached almost to St. Mark’s Square, and the bombardment caused a mass migration to the eastern parts of the city. From then, until the 22nd of August, on average, 400 24 pounder cannon shot, 130 shells, and 400 mortar bombs were expended against the city almost every day.69 Another possibility to cause more damage was to heat the shot, but this had limited value, since in flight for these distances, the projectile cooled somewhat. Even so, fires were caused by this method. At long last, the attackers had found a way to hurt the city.
August
Sortie from Chioggia of 1st August
Lieutenant-Colonel Sirtori mounted a large sortie from Chioggia on the night of August 1st, in search of provisions, once again in the area of Conchè. It was a considerable success, driving back the Austrian outposts, and returning with 200 flints, munitions, a flag, 200 oxen, and wine.
The Bombardment Continues
As the month of August began, the city itself remained under fire, day and night, from the 10 ‘angled’ guns, and seven mortars. Equally, the defences on and around the western edges of Venice also continued to be hit by the other batteries. Indeed, one man was wounded on the 1st, and another the following day, when a man was also killed. The powder situation was also worsening, with no apparent way of altering it. Besides these military matters, there was also cholera in the city, and the beginning of a food shortage.
The Action of Cavallino, 2nd August
On the night of August 2nd, another sortie was undertaken by the Venetians, led by Lieutenant-Colonel Radaelli. Radaelli, with about 700 men, embarked for another raid on Cavallino, on the mainland east of Venice. Landing at Treporti, the force moved towards Cavallino, Advancing along the canal of that name, at 02:00 the next morning, they encountered outposts, with whom an immediate action developed.
These pickets were soon reinforced by the remainder of the command of Major Tursky, of the Warasdiner St. George Grenzer. Tursky had a total of 100 men, with a rocket launcher, which came into the action. He also had the support of a number of watch vessels which also fired upon the raiders. He withdrew foot by foot, until, at about 05:00, reinforced by Captain Lippe, of the same regiment, with another 80 men and an additional rocket launcher. Tursky now counter-attacked, and pushed Radaelli all the way back to his ships, whence he re-embarked, and sailed for Venice. Radaelli had lost two killed, and four wounded, and Tursky, three wounded.70
Garibaldi prevented from Reaching Venice
Three months later than anticipated, Giuseppe Garibaldi made his attempt to reach Venice. Although the material benefit of he and his followers’ presence in the city would be minimal, the psychological impact would not. After leaving Rome, he had been chased through central Italy, losing followers on the way. Finally, he was able to set sail, with his remaining men, in a fleet of small boats. However, his flotilla was intercepted by Austrian ships, as related by Admiral Dahlerup:
August 4th became a most interesting day for me. Early in the morning a cadet came onboard from the Po Station, with a message from Scopinich. He had succeeded in cutting of Garibaldi’s escape to Venice, whereby he had sought to bring the remains of his army, remains not without means. Having wandered about for a few months in the mountains, having abandoned Rome, his 3,000 man corps had been pursued relentlessly by the Emperor’s troops. He had, in the end, with 5 or 6 hundred men, moved down into the valley of Po region, and tried to sneak his way into Venice, and had he succeeded it would undoubtedly have given new courage to the Venetians.
With a vigilant outlook and daring, Scopinich had had the luck of surprising Garibaldi on the run and with 100 Bragozzi, and with some cannon-shots to chase him away, after they had tried to capture the brig.
Garibaldi was a determined person, he was equally capable at sea and on land, and he has afterwards actually upheld his reputation in shipping in Indian and American Waters, so entering a brig would have
been no problem for him, but to his detriment, his fellow shipmates, Chiozzoter, were cowards, and decided to run away in the boats.
Scopinich pursued them in the brig and his armed boats, and he succeded in taking 162 men prisoner, including a Colonel Forbes (English) and 5 officers. Garibaldi, together with his brave wife, a priest, a doctor, a few of his staff officers, and a small number of soldiers (probably less than 100) managed to get ashore, and hide in nearby forests. In one of the boats we found Garibaldi’s officer’s jacket, very dressy and colourful, which I handed to Hadik as a trophy; there were quite a few letters and other papers, and after reading these, I sent them on to Radetzky, as some of them seemed to refer to the state of St Marino. The loot was several hundred rifles, ammunition, and the prisoners were of many countries: Italians, Tiroleans, Hungarians, French, and English. I sent them all on to Pola.
This was good to send on to Radetzky, as it proved the navy not to be idle, but to be vigilant, and doing its duty. As the current feelings were in Venice, I have no doubt the arrival of Garibaldi would have prolonged its ability to hold out, for how long is impossible to guess, but if only for a few weeks, we would have seen the arrival of the September storms, and we would not have been able to hold up our siege as effectively, allowing new food etc to enter and enhance their will to resist.
Admiral Bucchia forced to Act
As the relentless shelling continued, along with the spread of cholera, and the increasing food shortage, doubts about continuing resistance inevitably began to surface. It was widely known that no relief was at hand, although, inevitably, rumour and gossip continued to circulate, and, in the short term, a helpful lie is sometimes as useful as a false one.
It was clearly vital for the navy to finally act, as this was the only possible way to alter the situation. In these circumstances, Admiral Bucchia set sail on the morning of August 8th, with the following vessels:
Corvettes – Lombardia, Admiral Bucchia, Veloce, Lieutenant-Commander Gogola, Independenza, Lieutenant-Commander Mazuccheli, and Civica, Lieutenant-Commander Lettis
Brigs – San Marco, Lieutenant-Commander Paiti, Il Crociato, Lieutenant-Commander Zurowsky, Pyllade, Lieutenant-Commander Rossi, Feniche, Lieutenant-Commander Martinich
Steamer – Pio IX, Lieutenant-Commander Rota
10 Trabbacoli, Lieutenant Liaprichi, one steam tug, and minor vessels.71
By the morning of the 10th, the squadron was in the south of the Lagoon, near Chioggia. Moving against Bucchia, was Admiral Dahlerup, with his squadron.
On the 10th, in the morning, a suddenly arisen breeze had enabled me to gather all the ships of the squadron. Curtatone and Vulcano had joined us during the night, and Fautz had sent his report; more on this later; Curtatone’s one wheel had been damaged and sunk a few inches, which reduced its speed to no more than 4-5 knots; he therefore needed to go to Trieste for repairs; the enemy was located some 2-3 miles off the coast; between Piove and Chioggia; but in the mist could not be seen from the squadron. I had the commanders come to me – told them what I thought of their lack of back-bone and explained my plan – to let the two frigates engage the two heaviest enemy corvettes, the other ships should just engage whomsoever they first came across, and most importantly, to stop the enemy from retreating into the harbour. I also suggested that they should “sneak” in on the Trabaccoli, in order to shoot down on their crews.
Now, there was a beautiful little south-easterly breeze, we set all sail we could, and steered towards Chioggia. At around 2-3 AM, we saw the enemy, lying in battle order, across from Chioggia, with a light breeze in their sails, approximately 1 Danish mile (7.5 kilometres) off the coast. As soon as he saw us, he immediately set course for Malamocco and around 5 in the morning he ran in to his former place around Diga. As he had been chased inside – I had the two steamers take up their old places of blockade – and after dark – sent out the two brigs in opposite directions, to look for smugglers. As it was assumed that the break-out attempt was made in connection with an agreed plan to come to the aid with provisions from our own opposite placed shores; as it was well known that all towns there; in particularly Capo d’Istria, Pirano and Rovigno were sympathetic to the Venetians, and had ships at the ready with supplies of all sorts, to be sent across at short notice, should it become possible. This I had warned our Government about, and asked them to keep a sharp eye out for such moves. Even in Trieste – Venetia had a lot of friends, keeping them informed as to our every move. Also, after darkness set in, I sent Oreste back to Punta Maëstra to learn what had happened around there on shore, and to see if the enemy had succeeded in making a landing, or get provisions from there. The rest of the squadron was kept under sail.
On the 11th, Custoza returned, and I now had Curtatone leave for Trieste for repairs. I sent a message to the Minister of War and also reported to Radetzky and Thurn about what had occurred. I likewise reported to Sandeisky, and the town of Trieste to calm down fears. In the afternoon we finally got long needed help from a steamer from Trieste, namely the Lloyds steamer Arciduca Ludovico, a midsized ship in length and power. I had Alfons Wissiak, who had returned from his trip to Malta, over to take command. The little steamer Arciduchessa Sophia was sent to Trieste with despatches.72
A small aside to these operations occurred on the night of the 10th. At around 23:45, the frigate Venere, Captain Bendaj, off Chioggia was approached by what turned out to be a fire ship. The vessel was able to set fire to Venere, and then escape in the darkness. The fire was put out, and the damage repaired the following day.73
After these farcical moves, Bucchia was able to return to Venice, his cholera-ridden crews in a state of mutiny. A further attempt on June 16th achieved nothing. The fleet would not be the city’s saviour. Dahlerup’s force was not in much better shape, and the Admiral himself requested two additional steamers to allow him to maintain the blockade.
The Surrender of the City
On August 10th, Count Gorczkowski replaced Count Thurn in command of operations in Venetia. Under Thurn, the siege had been relentlessly pursued and brought first, to the city’s doorstep, and then the city itself. As the artillery bombardment continued, the Venetians’ plight increased, hunger becoming acute.
On the 12th, a cholera outbreak occurred in the Army. This was a major blow, and one that appeared to be insoluble. The 15th of August was to prove another milestone in the spread of the disease. 270 deaths and 402 new cases were reported. William Sparks, the American Consul, died of the disease on August 18th. His successor, Edmund Flagg, would write a comprehensive work on the events of this period.
On August 18th, the news reached Venice of the surrender of the main Hungarian army to Russian forces, commanded by General Ivan Paskievich.74 Although this had never been realistic, there was now absolutely no hope of outside intervention. Ten days earlier, the Venetian Assembly had granted Manin the power to surrender when he considered it a necessity. He realised that the time had come.
As the cannonade continued, General Cavedalis accepted terms from Count Gorczkowski. The white flag was raised on the morning of August 23rd, 1849. That same day, as if to highlight the desperation of the situation, mutiny broke out in units of the army. The surrender terms were remarkably lenient. There were to be no reprisals. 40 persons were to be exiled, including Manin, Pepe, and Ulloa. Marshal Radetzky made his formal entrance to Venice on August 30th. His triumph was complete.
The victors had paid a very high price. Between the beginning of November, 1848 and the end of August, 1849 the number of dead, wounded, and missing in action, in II Reserve Corps, was as follows:
Dead
Nine Officers and 207 Men
Wounded
12 Officers and 425 Men
Missing
23 Men
Total
21 Officers and 655 Men
By contrast, admitted to the various military hospitals in Italy between October 1848 and the end of August 1849, were a staggering 62,300 men, of whom some 7,000 died;
more than ten times the number of battle casualties.75 Of course, the great majority of these men were in units outside II Reserve Corps, and many would have been ill in any case. Even allowing for these factors, however, the totals involved are illuminating. For the defenders, the cost was also high, and naturally included many civilians. At least for now, though, the fighting was over.
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1 Anon., Austria and Italy, pp 31-32., & Prybila, Geschichte der k.u.k. Wehrmacht, p. 81.
2 Kriegsbegebenheiten, 1849, pp. 33-38, and Jäger, pp. 288-289. Flagg, Vol II, P. 205, states that a ‘Company of Romans’ was also present.
3 Manin was greatly overstating the issue.
4 Dahlerup, pp. 53-56.
5 The details of these works are from Carrano, pp. 124-128.
6 Private Luigi Castellan, killed by an Austrian rocket, Jäger, pp. 388-389, & Carrano, p. 131.
7 Debrunner, pp. 180-181.
8 Paolucci had formerly been an Austrian officer and his father and father-in-law remained loyal to the Imperial service. Ulloa himself described Paolucci’s removal as a calumny, Vol. II, p. 217.
9 Ulloa, Vol. II, p.212, & Noaro, p. 216. Of the artillery, 18 officers and 127 men were in the Bandiere e Moro corps.
10 Kriegsbegebenheiten, 1849, Part 3, pp. 53-54.
11 Carrano, pp. 128-129, and Ulloa, Vol. II, pp. 211-212. Note, however, that Carrano states that Fort Marghera had only one 8 pound howitzer, and one 5, one 7, and one 2 pound mortars, instead of Ulloa’s three 12 pound mortars. The latter mortar type appears most likely. Ulloa also refers to the thirty 6 pounders as ‘16’ pounders, and omits mentioning the four 12 pounders at all, the former almost certainly a printing error.
12 Jäger, pp. 388-389, Kriegsbegebenheiten, 1849, Part 3, pp. 67-68.
13 Ulloa states that two companies of the Lombard Bersaglieri took part, Vol. II, p. 241. Carrano, p. 150, says one.
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