This proposal, however contrary to the opinion of the ministers, I take the liberty of recommending to the consideration of the house, as, in my opinion, the most effectual method of preserving the remains of the greatness of the house of Austria. It is well known, that these troops are hired at a rate which they never expected before, that levy-money is paid for forces levied before the commencement of the bargain, that they are paid for acting a long time before they began to march, and that, since they appeared to consider themselves as engaged in the quarrel, their march has been their whole performance, a march not against the enemy, but from him; a march, in which there was nothing to fear, nor any thing to encounter; and, therefore, I think it cannot be denied, that the publick treasure might have been better employed.
The same sum remitted to the queen of Hungary, will enable her to hire a much greater number of troops out of her own dominions, troops of whose courage she can have no doubt, and whose fidelity will be strengthened by common interest and natural affection; troops that will fight like men, defending their wives and their children, and who will, therefore, bear fatigue with patience, and face danger with resolution; who will oppose the French as their natural enemies, and think death more eligible than defeat.
Thus shall we assert the rights of mankind, and support the faith of treaties, oppose the oppressors of the world, and restore our ancient allies to their former greatness, without exhausting our own country; for it is not impossible, that by the proper use of this sum, the queen may obtain such advantages in one campaign, as may incline the French to desert the king, and content themselves with the peaceable possession of their own territories; for it is to be remembered, that they are now fighting only for a remote interest, and that they will not hazard much; a firm resistance will easily incline them to wait for some more favourable opportunity, and there will be then leisure for forming our measures in such a manner, that another opportunity may never be offered them.
But of the present scheme, what effect can be expected but ignominy and shame, disgrace abroad, and beggary at home? to this expense what limits can be set? when is there to be an end of paying troops who are not to march against our enemies? as they will at all times be of equal use, there will be at all times the same reason for employing them, nor can there ever be imagined less need of idle troops, than in a time of war.
I am, therefore, afraid, that in a short time the Hanoverians may consider Britain as a tributary province, upon which they have a right to impose the maintenance of sixteen thousand men, who are to be employed only for the defence of their own country, though supported at the expense of this. I am afraid that we shall be taught to imagine, that the appearance of the Hanoverians is necessary in our own country, perhaps to check the insolence of the sons of freedom, who, without fear, border upon treason. I am afraid, that his majesty or his successour may be advised by sycophants and slaves to trust the guard of his person to the trusty Hanoverians, and advised to place no confidence in the natives of Britain.
For my part, I think it a very wise precept by which we are directed to obviate evils in the beginning; and therefore, since, in my opinion, the influence of Hanover must be destructive to the royal family, and detrimental to those kingdoms, I shall endeavour to obviate it by voting against any provision for these useless mercenaries, and declaring that I shall more willingly grant the publick money to any troops than those of Hanover.
Lord PERCIVAL spoke next as follows: — Sir, I look upon the question now under your consideration, to vary very little in reality from that which was debated here the first day of this session. The principal point in the debate of that day, was the same with that which is more regularly the debate of this, whether the Hanoverian forces should be taken into British pay?
Sir, I should then have offered my sentiments upon this question, if so many other gentlemen had not delivered my sense in so much a better manner than I thought myself able to do, that it would have appeared a great presumption in me, and would have given the house an unnecessary trouble. The same reason had induced me to have been silent also upon this occasion, if the temper of the times, the little indulgence shown by gentlemen to one another, when they happen to differ in political opinions, and the popular circumstance in which I stand, did not in some sort oblige me to protect the vote I then gave, and that which I now intend to give, by the reasons that induce me to give it.
Sir, there are three principal considerations in this question; first, whether we are to assist the house of Austria and balance of power at all, aye or no? then, whether we ought to do it with our whole force? and lastly, whether the Hanoverian troops should be made a part of that force?
As to the first consideration, a new doctrine has been taught and inculcated for some months past, that it is of no importance to this nation what may happen on the continent; that this country being an island intrenched within its own natural boundaries, it may stand secure and unconcerned in all the storms of the rest of the world. This doctrine, inconsistent as it is with all sense and reason, contrary as it is to the universal principles of policy by which this nation hath been governed from the conquest to this hour, is yet openly professed and avowed by many without these walls; and though no man has yet ventured to own this opinion publickly and directly in this house, yet some gentlemen even here, in effect maintain it, when they argue, that in no case this nation ought to assist or support the balance of power without the concurrence of the Dutch. This tends inevitably to produce the same fatal effect; it reduces this country to depend upon Holland, to be a province to Holland; and France would then have no more to do to become mistress of all Europe, than to gain over one single town of the United Provinces, or to corrupt a few members of the States; it is, therefore, a doctrine of the greatest danger. The only solid maxim is, that whoever becomes master of the continent, must in the end obtain the dominion of the sea. To confirm this, I may venture to cite an old example, nor can I be accused of pedantry in doing of it, since it is an instance drawn from the last universal monarchy to which the world submitted. The Romans had no sooner divided, broken and subdued those powers upon the continent of Europe, who had given a diversion in the great attempt they had long intended, than they attacked the Carthaginians, a maritime power, potent in arms, immensely opulent, possessed of the trade of the whole world, and unrivalled mistress of the sea. Yet these people, who enjoyed no wealth, pursued no commerce, and at the commencement of their quarrel were not masters of a single ship, at length prevailed against this enemy upon their proper element, beat and destroyed their fleets, invaded their dominions, and subdued their empire. From whence, sir, I must conclude, that we cannot wholly rely upon our situation, or depend solely on our naval power; and I may venture to reason upon this axiom, that this nation must contribute to support the house of Austria and the balance of power in some degree.
The next question that occurs, is, in what degree we ought to do it, and whether we should do it with our whole force? Taking, therefore, our footing here upon this axiom, that we must contribute to it in some degree, and taking farther to our aid the reasoning of those gentlemen, who think it a work of such extreme danger, and almost desperate, the natural and evident conclusion can be only this, that as we must do it, so we must do it with the utmost vigour, and with our whole force.
We come now to consider, whether the Hanoverian troops should be made part of that force? There are several considerations previous to the decision of this question. First, whether they are as cheap as any other forces we can hire? Then, whether they are as good? Next, whether they are as properly situated? And whether they are as much to be depended upon? If, as to every one of these particulars, the answer must be made in the affirmative, I think it will go very far to determine the question now before you.
As to the first, that they are as cheap, nay, upon the whole, much cheaper, the estimates now upon your table, notwithstanding any cavil, do sufficiently demonstrate.
That they are as good, what man can
doubt, who knows the character of the German nation? What man can doubt, who knows the attention of his majesty to military discipline? Those gentlemen can least pretend to doubt it, who sometimes do not spare reflections upon that attention which they insinuate to be too great.
That these troops are not properly situated, will be hardly asserted at this time, when they are actually now in Flanders, and now acting in conjunction with our troops. Let any man consider the map of Europe, let him observe the seat of the war, and he must evidently see, that whether their service may be required in Flanders, whether upon the Rhine, or in the heart of Germany, in every one of these cases, the Hanoverian forces are as properly circumstanced and situated as any troops in Europe.
It remains in the last place to examine, whether any other troops can be better depended upon; and sure nothing can be more obvious than that we may rely with more security on these than any other. They are subjects of the same prince, and of a prince indulgent to all his subjects, and accused by those who differ in other points from me, of being partial against the interest of his German dominions. Unless, therefore, we arraign the first principle upon which a free government can be supported, and without which every exercise of arbitrary power would be warranted, we must allow that such a people will be faithful to such a prince, will defend him with a strict fidelity, and support his quarrel with the utmost zeal; with a zeal which can never be expected from the mercenary troops of any other foreign power.
This naturally leads us to inquire what other troops we can depend upon; the answer to this inquiry is short and positive; that as affairs now stand abroad, we can depend upon none but these; let us carry this consideration with us in a survey of all Europe; shall we take into our pay sixteen thousand of the Dutch? Would this be the means of bringing Holland into alliance with us? Would they act at their own expense, would they exert their own proper force? Would they pay their own troops in aid of the common cause, when they found this nation ready to do it for them? They would act like madmen if they did. Shall we hire Danes? Is there a gentleman in this house, who is not convinced that this power has been warped, for some time past, towards the interest of France? When we hired these troops in the last instance, did they not deceive us? Did they not even refuse to march? nay, farther, are they not in all appearance now upon the point of being employed in a quarrel of their own? a quarrel in which they will have need of all their force. Shall we then hire Saxons? An honourable gentleman seemed to think that there may be some possibility of this, and perhaps there may hereafter, when the king of Prussia’s views are known, and the part he shall resolve to act; but Saxony is certainly now too much exposed to, and cannot fail to be alarmed at his growing power; at the great augmentation of his armies, and the secret and vast designs which he seems to meditate. This measure, therefore, is not practicable in the present conjuncture; that electorate cannot hazard its own security in these precarious circumstances, by lending out so great a body of its troops. Would gentlemen advise the hire of Prussian troops to serve us in this conjuncture? They who do advise it, must forget strangely the part so lately acted by that prince, and the variety of his conduct with regard to his different allies within the space of the two last years. I shall guard myself in my expressions, and maintain a proper respect in discoursing of so great a character; but I must say thus much, that the ministry would act with great imprudence, to put the safety of the British troops, and to risk the fate of this army, upon the event of such a measure. I need not say more; for it is not yet proved to us, that this prince would (I wish there was no reason to believe he would not) lend us this body of his men, though we should be disposed to take them into pay. The Swiss cantons, therefore, now alone remain; and indeed from them we probably might procure a greater number; but I leave it to the judgment of any man of sense and candour, whether any minister of this nation could warrant the employment of sixteen thousand Swiss in this service? For when we reflect upon the situation of these provinces, and compare it with that of our British troops who are now in Flanders, it is visible that they must pass four hundred miles upon the borders of the Rhine, flanked by the strong places of France, during their whole march, exposed to the garrisons and armies upon that frontier, by whom it can never be supposed that they would be suffered to pass unmolested, when France must so well know the intention of their march to be for no other end, but to make a conjunction with other troops in the British pay, in order afterwards to invade, or at least to interrupt the views of that kingdom with their united force.
These reasons, sir, prove invincibly to me, that if we are to assist the house of Austria by an army, we must, of prudence, nay, of necessity, in part, compose that army of the Hanoverian troops.
But yet there is another state of this question, an alternative of which some gentlemen seem very fond, whether it would not be better to assist the queen of Hungary with money only?
This opinion at first sight is extremely plausible; if the queen of Hungary has been able to do so much with an aid of 500,000 l. what might she not be able to do with a million more? Sir, a million more would by no means answer in the same proportion. When a sum is given her, which with the best economy can suffice barely to put her troops in motion, when the enemy is at her very gates, her all at an immediate stake, there can be no room for a misapplication of it. But a sum so immense as that of a million and a half, would dazzle the eyes of a court so little used to see such sums; and as an honourable gentleman, [Mr. Horace WALPOLE,] long versed in foreign affairs, and well acquainted with these matters, told you in a former debate, would be much of it squandered among the Austrian ministers and favourites. I make no scruple to add to this, that some small part might fall to the share of ministers elsewhere. But there is another danger which gentlemen who contend for this measure do not consider: can they who profess a distrust of all ministers, and particularly those who are now employed at home; they who have ever argued against all votes of credit, upon this principle, that it affords an opportunity to ministers of defrauding the service, and of putting large sums into the purse of the crown, or into their private pockets; can they now argue for this measure, which I may be bold to say, would be in effect the most enormous vote of credit that was ever given in the world? Gentlemen insinuate, that the taking the Hanoverian forces into British pay, is a criminal complaisance, calculated only to confirm an infant and a tottering administration. But how much greater means for such a purpose, would an alternative like this afford? Suppose a minister, unfirm in his new-acquired power, to ingratiate himself with his prince, should propose a scheme to replenish the coffers of an exhausted civil list, squandered in such vile purposes, that no man could have the hardiness to come to parliament, or dare to hope a supply for it by any regular application to this house? What method could be devised by such a minister himself, to do the job more excellent than this? For who can doubt that (guard it how you will) the queen of Hungary might be induced, in the condition in which she now stands, to accept a million, and to give a receipt in full for the whole sum? How could you prevent an understanding of this kind between two courts? and how easy, therefore, might it be to sink 500,000 l. out of so vast a grant? Sir, I will suspect no minister, but I will trust none in this degree; and I wonder other gentlemen do not suspect, if I do not. From hence, therefore, I consider this as a proposition both fallacious and unsafe; for though it be a fact, that the same sum of money might maintain in Austria double the number of troops; yet, if no more than half that money should be applied (as I have shown great reason to believe that it would not) to the uses of the war, it is evident that you would deceive yourselves, and would have but an equal number of raw, irregular, undisciplined, and much worse troops for it.
But, sir, there is yet a stronger argument against the supply in money only. What are our views in supporting the queen of Hungary? Our views are general and particular; general, to save the house of Austria, and to preserve a balance of power; particular, to prevent the French from making any farther ac
quisitions on this side of Flanders. The first might possibly be answered in a good degree, by giving that princess an equivalent in money; but the second cannot be securely provided against, without an army on this side of Europe in the British pay. Sir, is it not natural for every one of us to guard our vital parts, rather than our more remote members? Would not the queen of Hungary (stipulate and condition with her as you please) apply the greatest part of these subsidies in defence of her dominions in the heart of Germany? Might it not even induce her to enlarge her views, and to think of conquests and equivalents for what she has already lost, which it might be vain and ruinous for us to support her in? Would she not leave Flanders to shift for itself, or still to be taken care of by the Dutch and Britain? In such a case, if France should find it no longer possible to make any impression on her territories on the German side, what must we expect to be the consequence? I think it very visible she would on a sudden quit her expensive and destructive projects on that quarter, and there only carry on a defensive war, while she fell with the greater part of her force at once upon the Low Countries, which would by this measure be wholly unprovided; and she might there acquire in one campaign, before any possibility of making head against her, (which the Dutch would hardly attempt, and could certainly not alone be able to effect,) all that she has been endeavouring for the last century to obtain, and what no union of powers could be ever capable of regaining from her. All this will be effectually prevented by an army paid by us on this side of Europe; an army ready to march to the borders of her country, and to intercept her succours and supplies for the German war; an army, ready to protect the petty states, whose interest and inclination it apparently must be to declare for us, and to join their forces with us, when they no longer fear the power of France; an army, which may possibly give courage and spirit to greater powers, who may still doubt, without these vigorous measures, (after what they have formerly experienced,) whether they could even yet depend upon us; an army, (if the posture of affairs should make it necessary,) able to cause a powerful diversion to the French forces, by an attack upon Lorrain and Champagne, and still within distance to return upon its stops in time, to prevent the French from carrying any point of consequence in Flanders, should they then attempt it.
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