One argument more, I beg leave to mention, and it is of great weight. Admit that the sums raised upon the subject might be greater in the one case than the other, the sums remitted out of the kingdom would be infinitely less. Whatever is remitted to the queen of Hungary, is buried in the remotest parts of Germany, and can never return to us; whereas in a war carried on by troops in our own pay on this side, by much the greater part of the expense returns to us again, in part by the pay of officers, by the supply of provisions and necessaries in a country exhausted by armies, ammunition, ordnance, horses, clothing, accoutrements, and a multitude of other articles, which I need not enumerate, because experience, which is the soundest reasoner, fully proved it in the example of the last war, at the conclusion of which, notwithstanding the prodigious sums expended in it, this nation felt no sensible effect, from a diminution of its current specie.
Sir, I was prepared to have spoken much more largely to this subject, but my discourse has already been drawn to a greater length than I imagined, in treating upon the argument thus far. I shall, therefore, avoid troubling you any farther upon it at this time; I shall only observe, that in my humble opinion, it is sufficiently proved, first, that we must assist the house of Austria, and that we must do it with all our force; next, that we cannot do it with money only, but in part with a land army, and that this land army cannot be conveniently (I may say possibly) composed, at this time, without the Hanoverian troops. This question, therefore, can, I think, be no longer debated, but upon the foot of popular prejudices and insinuations of an improper connexion of Hanoverian and British interests; but as I could not enter into this subject without concern and indignation, and as it is a very delicate point for me in particular to debate upon, I shall leave this part of the question to other gentlemen, who can engage in it both with less inconvenience, and with more ability, than it is possible for me to do.
To which Mr. George GRENVILLE replied in substance: — Sir, though I am far from thinking myself able to produce, without study or premeditation, a complete answer to the elaborate and artful harangue which you have now heard, yet as I cannot be convinced of the reasonableness of the measures which have been defended with so much subtilty, I shall at least endeavour to show, that my disapprobation is not merely the effect of obstinacy, and that I have at least considered the proposals of the ministry, before I have ventured to condemn them.
Whether we ought to think ourselves indispensably obliged to maintain, at all events, the balance of power on the continent, to maintain it without allies, to maintain it against a combination of almost all Europe, I shall not now inquire; I will suppose it, for once, our duty to struggle with impossibility, and not only to support the house of Austria when it is attacked, but to raise it when it is fallen; fallen by our own negligence, and oppressed with the weight of all the surrounding powers; and shall, therefore, at present, only inquire by what means we may afford that assistance with most benefit to our allies, and least danger to ourselves.
With regard to our ally, that assistance will be apparently most advantageous to her, by which her strength will be most increased, and therefore it may, perhaps, be more useful to her to find her money than troops; but if we must supply her with troops, I doubt not but it will readily appear, that we may easily find troops which may be of more use and less expense than those of Hanover.
It has been observed, with regard to the convenient situation of those troops, that it cannot now be denied, since they are acting in Flanders in conjunction with the British forces. This is an assertion to which, though it was uttered with an air of victorious confidence, though it was produced as an insuperable argument, by which all those who intended opposition were to be reduced to silence and despair, many objections may be made, which it will require another harangue equally elaborate to remove.
That the troops of Hanover are now acting in conjunction with the Britons, I know not how any man can affirm, unless he has received intelligence by some airy messengers, or has some sympathetick communication with them, not indulged to the rest of mankind. None of the accounts which have been brought hither of the affairs of the continent have yet informed us of any action, or tendency to action; the Hanoverians have, indeed, been reviewed in conjunction with our forces, but have, hitherto, not acted; nor have the armies yet cemented the alliance by any common danger, or shown yet that they are friends otherwise than by sleeping and eating together, by eating at the expense of the same nation.
Nor am I at present inclined to grant, that either army is situated where it may be of most use to the queen of Hungary; for they now loiter in a country which no enemy threatens, and in which nothing, therefore, can be feared; a country very remote from the seat of war, and which will probably be last attacked. If the assistance of the queen of Hungary had been designed, there appears no reason why the Hanoverians should have marched thither, or why this important conjunction should have been formed, since they might, in much less time, and with less expense, have joined the Austrians, and, perhaps, have enabled them to defeat the designs of the French, and cut off the retreat of the army which was sent to the relief of Prague. But this march, though it would have been less tedious, would have been more dangerous, and would not have been very consistent with the designs of those who are more desirous of receiving wages than of deserving them; nor is it likely, that those who required levy-money for troops already levied, and who demanded that they should be paid a long time before they began to march, would hurry them to action, or endeavour to put a period to so gainful a trade as that of hiring troops which are not to be exposed.
This conduct, however visibly absurd, I am very far from imputing either to cowardice or ignorance; for there is reason to suspect, that they marched into Flanders only because they could not appear in any other place as the allies of the queen of Hungary, without exposing their sovereign to the imperial interdict.
It is, therefore, not only certain, that these troops, these boasted and important troops, have not yet been of any use; but probable, that no use is intended for them, and that the sole view of those who have introduced them into our service, is to pay their court by enriching Hanover with the spoils of Britain.
That this is in reality their intention, appears from the estimates to which an appeal has been so confidently made, but which, if they are compared with a contract made for the troops of the same nation in the last war, will show how much their price has risen since their sovereign was exalted to this throne; though I cannot find any proof that their reputation has increased, nor can discover, from their actions in Flanders, any reason to believe that their services will be greater.
It is now to little purpose to inquire, whether there are any other troops that could have been more properly employed, since it is certain, that whatever may be the general character, or the late conduct of other nations, it is the interest of Britain to employ rather any troops than these, as any evil is rather to be chosen than animosities between our sovereign and our fellow-subjects; and such animosities must inevitably arise from this detestable preference of the troops of Hanover.
[The question was carried by 67, the Ayes being 260; Noes 193. This affair was again debated with vehemence upon the report on Monday, December 13, 1742, upon a question, whether the levy-money should stand part of the general question, which was carried by 53; Ayes 230, Noes 177.]
HOUSE OF LORDS, FEBRUARY 1, 1742-3.
The order of the day for taking into consideration the several estimates of the charge of the forces in the pay of Great Britain was read, upon which lord STANHOPE rose up, and spoke in substance as follows: —
My lords, I have always understood, that the peculiar happiness of the British nation consists in this, that nothing of importance can be undertaken by the government, without the consent of the people as represented by the other house, and that of your lordships, whose large possessions, and the merits either of your ancestors or yourselves, have given you the privilege of voting in your own right in nat
ional consultations.
The advantages of this constitution, the security which it confers upon the nation, and the restraint which it lays upon corrupt ministers, or ambitious princes, are in themselves too obvious to admit of explanation, and too well known in this great assembly, by whose ancestors they were originally obtained, and preserved at the frequent hazard of life and fortune, for me to imagine, that I can make them either more esteemed or better understood.
My intention, my lords, is not to teach others the regard which the constitution of our government, or the happiness of the nation demands from them, but to show how much I regard them myself, by endeavouring to preserve and defend them at a time when I think them invaded and endangered.
Upon the examination of the estimates now before us, I cannot but think it necessary, my lords, that every man who values liberty, should exert that spirit by which it was first established; that every man should rouse from his security, and awaken all his vigilance and all his zeal, lest the bold attempt that has been now made should, if it be not vigorously repressed, be an encouragement to the more dangerous encroachments; and lest that fabrick of power should be destroyed, which has been erected at such expense and with such labour; at which one generation has toiled after another, and of which the wisdom of the most experienced and penetrating statesmen have been employed to perfect its symmetry, and the industry of the most virtuous patriots to repair its decays.
The first object which the estimates force upon our observation is a numerous body of foreign troops, for the levy and payment of which a very large sum is demanded; and demanded at a time when the nation is to the last degree embarrassed and oppressed, when it is engaged in a war with a powerful empire, and almost overwhelmed with the debts that were contracted in former confederacies; when it is engaged in a war, not for the recovery of forgotten claims, or for the gratification of restless ambition, not for the consumption of exuberant wealth, or for the discharge of superfluous inhabitants; but a war, in which the most important interests are set to hazard, and by which the freedom of navigation must be either established or lost; a war which must determine the sovereignty of the ocean, the rights of commerce, and the state of our colonies; a war, in which we may, indeed, be victorious without any increase of our reputation; but in which we cannot be defeated without losing all our influence upon foreign powers, and becoming subject to the insolence of petty princes.
When foreign troops are hired, at a time like this, it is natural to expect that they have been procured by contracts uncommonly frugal; because no nation can be supposed to be lavish in a time of distress. It is natural, my lords, to expect that they should be employed in expeditions of the utmost importance; because no trifling advantage ought to incite a people overburdened with taxes, to oppress themselves with any new expense; and it may be justly supposed, that these troops were hired by the advice of the senate; because no minister can be supposed so hardened in defiance of his country, in contempt of the laws, and in disregard of the publick happiness, as to dare to introduce foreigners into the publick service, in prosecution of his own private schemes, or to rob the nation which he professes to serve, that he may increase the wealth of another.
But upon consideration of this estimate, my lords, all these expectations, however reasonable in themselves, however consistent with the declarations of the wisest statesmen, and the practice of former times, will be disappointed; for it will be found that the troops, of which we are now to ratify the provisions for their payment, are raised at an expense never known on the like occasion before, when the nation was far more able to support it; that they have yet been employed in no expedition, that they have neither fought a battle, nor besieged a town, nor undertaken any design, nor hindered any that has been formed by those against whom they are pretended to have been raised; that they have not yet drawn a sword but at a review, nor heard the report of fire-arms but upon a festival; that they have not yet seen an enemy, and that they are posted where no enemy is likely to approach them.
But this, my lords, is not the circumstance which ought, in my opinion, most strongly to affect us; troops may be raised without being employed, and money expended without effect; but such measures, though they ought to be censured and rectified, may be borne without any extraordinary degree of indignation. While our constitution remains unviolated, temporary losses may be easily repaired, and accidental misconduct speedily retrieved; but when the publick rights are infringed, when the ministry assume the power of giving away the properties of the people, it is then necessary to exert an uncommon degree of vigour and resentment; it is as necessary to stop, the encroachments of lawless power, as to oppose the torrent of a deluge; which may be, perhaps, resisted at first, but from which, the country that is once overwhelmed by it, cannot be recovered.
To raise this ardour, my lords, to excite this laudable resentment, I believe it will be only necessary to observe, that those troops were raised without the advice or the consent of the senate; that this new burden has been laid upon the nation by the despotick will of the ministers, and that the demands made for their support may be said to be a tax laid upon the people, not by the senate, but by the court.
The motives upon which the ministry have acted on this occasion are, so far as they can be discovered, and, indeed, there appears very little care to conceal them, such as no subject of this crown ever dared to proceed upon before; they are such as the act of settlement, that act to which our sovereign owes his title to this throne, ought for ever to have excluded from British councils.
I should proceed, my lords, to explain this new method of impoverishing our country, and endeavour to show the principles from which it arises, and the end which it must promote. But some sudden indisposition obliges me to contract my plan, and conclude much sooner than I intended, with moving, “that an humble address be presented to his majesty, to beseech and advise his majesty, that considering the excessive and grievous expenses, incurred by the great number of foreign troops now in the pay of Great Britain, (expenses so increased by the extraordinary manner, as we apprehend, of making the estimates relating thereunto, and which do not appear to us conducive to the end proposed,) his majesty will be graciously pleased, in compassion to his people, loaded already with such numerous and heavy taxes, such large and growing debts, and greater annual expenses than this nation, at any time, ever before sustained, to exonerate his subjects of the charge and burden of those mercenaries who were taken into our service last year, without the advice or consent of parliament.”
Lord SANDWICH spoke next in support of the motion to the following effect: — My lords, though I heard the noble lord with so much pleasure, that I could not but wish he had been able to deliver his sentiments more fully upon this important affair; yet I think the motion so reasonable and just, that though he might have set it yet more beyond the danger of opposition, though he might have produced many arguments in defence of it, which, perhaps, will not occur to any other lords; yet I shall be able to justify it in such a manner, as may secure the approbation of the unprejudiced and disinterested; and, therefore, I rise up to second it with that confidence, which always arises from a consciousness of honest intentions, and of an impartial inquiry after truth.
The measures, my lords, which have given occasion to this motion, have been for some time the subject of my reflections; I have endeavoured to examine them in their full extent, to recollect the previous occurrences by which the ministry might have been influenced to engage in them, and to discover the certain and the probable consequences which they may either immediately, or more remotely produce; I have laboured to collect from those who are supposed to be most acquainted with the state of Europe, and the scheme of British policy which is at present pursued, the arguments which can be offered in favour of these new engagements; and have compared them with the conduct of former ages upon the like occasions; but the result of all my searches into history, all my conversation with politicians of every party, and all my private meditati
ons, has been only, that I am every hour confirmed, by some new evidence, in the opinion which I had first formed; and now imagined myself to know what I at first believed, that we are entangled in a labyrinth of which no end is to be seen, and in which no certain path has yet been discovered; that we are pursuing schemes which are in no degree necessary to the prosperity of our country, by means which are apparently contrary to law, to policy, and to justice; and that we are involved in a foreign quarrel only to waste that blood, and exhaust that treasure, which might be employed in recovering the rights of commerce, and regaining the dominion of the sea.
To prosecute the war against Spain with that vigour which interest and resentment might be expected to produce, to repress that insolence by which our navigation has been confined, and to punish that rapacity by which our merchants have been plundered, and that cruelty by which our fellow-subjects have been enslaved, tortured, and murdered, had been an attempt in which every honest man would readily have concurred, and to which all those who had sense to discern their own interest, or virtue to promote the publick happiness, would cheerfully have contributed, however loaded with taxes, oppressed with a standing army, and plundered by the vultures of a court: nor is the ancient spirit of the British nation so much depressed, but that when Spain had been subdued, when our rights had been publickly acknowledged, our losses repaired, and our colonies secured; when our ships had again sailed in security, and our flag awed the ocean of America, we might then have extended our views to foreign countries, might have assumed, once more, the guardianship of the liberties of Europe, have given law to the powers of the continent, and superintended the happiness of mankind. But in the present situation of our affairs, when we have made war for years without advantage, while our most important rights are yet subject to the chance of battle, why we should engage in the defence of other princes more than our stipulations require, I am not able to discover; nor can I conceive what motive can incite us, after having suffered so much from a weak enemy to irritate a stronger.
Complete Works of Samuel Johnson Page 280