Complete Works of Samuel Johnson

by Samuel Johnson

  The same reason, my lords, naturally made the Dutch unwilling to put these provinces in the hands of Britain; for we, likewise, make a profession of trade, though we do not pursue it with the same ardour, or, to confess the truth, with the same success: it was not, however, to be imagined, that there would not be found among us some men of sagacity to discern, and of industry to improve the opportunities which the new dominions would have put into our hands of vending our manufactures in parts where, at present, they are very little known. Nor was this the only danger to be feared from such an increase of dominion: the Dutch have not yet forgotten, that though we at first rescued them from slavery, patronised the infancy of their state, and continued our guardianship till it was grown up to maturity, and enabled to support itself by its own strength, yet we afterwards made very vigorous attempts to reduce it to its original weakness, and to sink it into pupillage again; that we attempted to invade the most essential part of its rights, and to prescribe the number of ships that it should maintain. They know, likewise, my lords, that by the natural rotation of human affairs, the same counsels may in some future reign be again pursued, or that some unavoidable conflict of interest may produce a contest that can be decided only by the sword; and then it may easily be perceived how much they would be endangered, by the neighbourhood of British garrisons, and of countries, where we might maintain numerous armies at a very small expense. It is, therefore, no subject of wonder, that a nation much less subtile than the Dutch should find out how much it was their interest, that we should be confined within the limits of our own island; and that we should not have it in our power to attack them with armies as well as fleets, and at once to obstruct their commerce and invade their country.

  There remained, therefore, my lords, no power but the emperour to whom these provinces could be consigned; and to him, therefore, they were given, but given only in trust for the joint advantage of the whole confederacy; he, indeed, enjoys their revenues on condition that he shall support the garrisons necessary to their defence; but he cannot transfer them to any other power, or alienate them to the detriment of those nations who concurred in acquiring them.

  It may not be improper, my lords, to observe, that on this contract depends the justice of our conduct with regard to the company established at Ostend for carrying on a trade to the East Indies. These provinces were granted to the confederate powers, and consigned to the emperour to be enjoyed by him for the common benefit: it was, therefore, plainly intended by this contract, that he should use none of the advantages which these new dominions afforded him, to the detriment of those powers by whose gift he enjoyed them; nor could it be supposed that the Dutch and Britons debarred each other from those opportunities of trade only to enable the emperour to rival them both.

  The towns, therefore, my lords, were at this time determined by the senate to be the general property of all the confederate powers, acquired by their united arms, and to be preserved for their common advantage, as the pledge of peace, and the palladium of Europe. If, therefore, it should at any time happen, that they should be endangered either by the weakness or neglect of any one of those powers, the rest are to exert their right, and endeavour their preservation and security; nor is there any new stipulation or law necessary for this; since, with respect to the confederates, it is implied in the original stipulation, and with regard to the senate of Britain, in the approbation which was bestowed upon that contract, when it was made.

  The time, my lords, in which this common right is to be exerted, is now arrived; the queen of Hungary, invaded in her hereditary dominions, and pressed on every side by a general combination of almost all the surrounding princes, declares herself no longer able to support the garrisons of the barrier, and informs us, that she intends to recall her troops for the defence of their own country. What, then, is more apparent, my lords, than that either these towns must fall again into the hands of the French, and that we shall be obliged to recover them, if they can ever be recovered, at the expense of another ten years’ war, or that either we or the Dutch must send troops to supply the place of those which the necessities of their sovereign oblige her to withdraw.

  That the towns of Flanders should be resigned gratuitously to France, that the enemies of mankind should be put in possession of the strongest bulwarks in the world, surrounded by fields and pastures able to maintain their garrisons without expense, will not be proposed by any of this assembly. But it may easily and naturally be objected, that the Dutch ought to garrison these towns, as more nearly interested in their preservation, and more commodiously situated for their defence; nor can it be, indeed, denied, that the Dutch may be justly censured for their neglect, as they appear to leave the common cause to our protection, and to prefer their commerce and their ease to their own safety and the happiness of the world.

  This, my lords, has been very warmly asserted in their own assemblies, nor have there been wanting men of spirit and integrity amongst them who have despised the gold and promises, and detected the artifices of France; who have endeavoured by all the arts of argument and persuasion to rouse their countrymen to remembrance of their former danger, and to an inquiry into their real interest; who have advised the levy of new forces, and the establishment of a new confederacy; who have called upon the state to face danger while it is yet distant, and to secure their own country by pouring their garrisons into the towns and citadels by which their frontiers are protected. If their arguments, however just, have not yet attained their end, it is to be imputed to the constitution, embarrassed by the combination of different interests, which must be reconciled, before any resolution can be formed. A single town, my lords, can, by refusing its consent, put a stand to the most necessary designs, and it is easily to be imagined, that by a monarch equally crafty and rich, a single town may sometimes be bribed into measures contrary to the publick interest.

  But, my lords, the negligence of the Dutch is a motive which ought to incite us to vigour and despatch; since it is not for the sake of the Dutch but ourselves, that we desire the suppression of France. If the Dutch are at length convinced of the ease of slavery, and think liberty no longer worth the labour of preserving it, — if they are tired with the task of labouring for the happiness of others, and have forsaken the stand on which they were placed, as the general watch of the world, to indulge themselves in tranquillity and slumber, — let not us, my lords, give way to the same infatuation; let not us look with neglect on the deluge that rolls towards us till it has advanced too far to be resisted. Let us remember, that we are to owe our preservation only to ourselves, and redouble our efforts in proportion as others neglect their duty. Let us show mankind, that we are neither afraid to stand up alone in defence of justice and of freedom, nor unable to maintain the cause that we have undertaken to assert.

  But if it should be thought by any of this noble assembly, that the concurrence of the Dutch is absolutely necessary to a prospect of success, it may be reasonably answered, that by engaging in measures which can leave no doubt of either our power or our sincerity, the concurrence of the Dutch is most likely to be obtained. By this method of proceeding, my lords, was formed the last mighty confederacy by which the house of Bourbon was almost shaken into ruins. The Dutch then, as now, were slow in their determinations, and perhaps equally diffident of their own strength and our firmness; nor did they agree to declare war against France, till we had transported ten thousand men into Flanders, and convinced them that we were not inviting them to a mock alliance; but that we really intended the reduction of that empire which had so long extended itself without interruption, and threatened in a short time to swallow up all the western nations.

  Thus, my lords, it appears, that the measures which have been pursued are just, politick, and legal; that they have been prescribed by the decrees of former senates, and therefore cannot be censured as arbitrary; and that they have a tendency to the preservation of those territories which it was once thought so much honour to acquire: and it may be yet farth
er urged, that though they are to be considered only as the first tendencies to secure greater designs, they have already produced effects apparently to the advantage of the common cause, and have obliged the French to desist from their pursuit of the queen of Hungary, and rather to inquire how they shall return home than how they shall proceed to farther conquests.

  In condemnation of these measures, my lords, it has indeed been urged, that a moderate conduct is always eligible; and that nothing but ruin and confusion can be expected from precipitation and temerity. Moderation, my lords, is a very captivating sound; but I hope it will have now no influence on this assembly; because on this occasion it cannot properly be employed. I have always been taught, that moderation is only useful in forming determinations or designs, but that when once conviction is attained, zeal is to take place; and when a design is planned, it ought to be executed with vigour.

  The question is not now, my lords, whether we shall support the queen of Hungary, but in what manner she shall be supported; and, therefore, it cannot be doubted, but that such support should be granted her as may be effectual; and I believe it will not be thought, that we can assist her without exerting an uncommon degree of vigour, and showing, that we consider ourselves as engaged in a cause which cannot be abandoned without disgrace and ruin.

  If the noble lord had, before he entered upon his encomium on moderation, considered what effects could be promised from his favourite virtue, he would have had no inclination to display his eloquence upon it. By moderation, my lords, uninterrupted moderation of more than twenty years, have we become the scorn of mankind, and exposed ourselves to the insults of almost every nation in the world. By moderation have we betrayed our allies, and suffered our friendship to lose all its value; by moderation have we given up commerce to the rapacity of an enemy, formidable only for his perseverance, and suffered our merchants to be ruined, and our sailors to be enslaved. By moderation have we permitted the French to grasp again at general dominion, to overrun Germany with their armies, and to endanger again the liberties of mankind; and by continuing, for a very few years, the same laudable moderation, we shall probably encourage them to shut up our ships in our harbour, and demand a tribute for the use of the Channel.

  I need not observe to your lordships, that all the great actions that have, in all ages, been achieved, have been the effects of resolution, diligence, and daring activity, virtues wholly opposite to the calmness of moderation. I need not observe, that the advantages enjoyed at present by the French are the consequences of that vigour and expedition, by which they are distinguished, and which the form of their government enables them to exert. Had they, my lords, instead of pouring armies into the Austrian dominions, and procuring, by the terrour of their troops, the election of an emperour, pursued these measures of moderation which have been so pathetically recommended, how easily had their designs been defeated?

  Had they lost time in persuading the queen of Hungary by a solemn embassy to resign her dominions, or attempted to influence the diet by amicable negotiations, armies had been levied, and the passes of Germany had been shut against them; they had been opposed on the frontiers of their own dominions, by troops equally numerous and warlike with their own, and instead of imposing a sovereign on the empire, had been, perhaps, pursued into their own country.

  But, my lords, whether moderation was not recommended to them by such powerful oratory as your lordships have heard, or whether its advocates met with an audience not easily to be convinced, it is plain that they seem to have acted upon very different principles, and I wish their policy had not been so strongly justified by its success. By sending an army into Germany, my lords, when there were no forces ready to oppose them, they reduced all the petty princes to immediate submission, and obliged those to welcome them as friends, who would gladly have united against them as the inveterate enemies of the whole German body; and who, had they been firmly joined by their neighbours, under a general sense of their common danger, would have easily raised an army able to have repelled them.

  This, my lords, was the effect of vigour, an effect very different from that which we had an opportunity of experiencing as the consequence of moderation; it was to no purpose that we endeavoured to alarm mankind by remonstrances, and to procure assistance by entreaties and solicitations; the universal panick was not to be removed by advice and exhortations, and the queen of Hungary must have sunk under the weight of a general combination against her, had we not at last risen up in her defence, and with our swords in our hands, set an example to the nations of Europe, of courage and generosity.

  It then quickly appeared, my lords, how little is to be expected from cold persuasion, and how necessary it is, that he who would engage others in a task of difficulty, should show himself willing to partake the labour which he recommends. No sooner had we declared our resolution to fulfil our stipulations, and ordered our troops to march for the relief of the queen of Hungary, than other princes discovered that they had the same dispositions, though they had hitherto thought it prudent to conceal them; that they, equally with ourselves, hated and feared the French; that they were desirous to repress their insolence and oppose their conquests, and only waited for the motions of some power who might stand at the head of the confederacy, and lead them forwards against the common enemy. The liberal promises of dominion made by the French, by which the sovereigns of Germany had been tempted to concur in a design which they thought themselves unable to oppose, were now no longer regarded; they were considered only as the boasts of imaginary greatness, which would at last vanish into air; and every one knew, that the ultimate design of Europe was to oppress equally her enemies and friends; they wisely despised her offers, and either desisted from the designs to which they had been incited by her, or declared themselves ready to unite against her.

  This, my lords, has been the consequence of assembling the army, which, by the motion now under our consideration, some of your lordships seem desirous to disband, an inclination of which I cannot discover from whence it can arise.

  For what, my lords, must be the consequence, if this motion should be complied with? what but the total destruction of the whole system of power which has been so laboriously formed and so strongly compacted? what but the immediate ruin of the house of Austria, by which the French ambition has been so long restrained? what but the subversion of the liberties of Germany, and the erection of an universal empire, to which all the nations of the earth must become vassals?

  Should the auxiliary troops be disbanded, the queen of Hungary would find what benefit she has received from them by the calamities which the loss of them would immediately bring upon her. All the claims of all the neighbouring princes, who are now awed into peace and silence, would be revived, and every one would again believe, that nothing was to be hoped or feared but from France. The French would again rush forward to new invasions, and spread desolation over other countries, and the house of Austria would be more weakened than by the loss of many battles in its present state.

  The support of the house of Austria appears not, indeed, much to engage the attention of those by whom this motion is supported. It has been represented as a house equally ambitious and perfidious with that of Bourbon, and equally an enemy both to liberty and to true religion; and a very celebrated author has been quoted to prove, that it is the interest of the Germans themselves to see a prince at their head, whose hereditary dominions may not incite him to exert the imperial power to the disadvantage of the inferiour sovereigns.

  In order to the consideration of these objections, it is necessary to observe, my lords, that national alliances are not like leagues of friendship, the consequences of an agreement of disposition, opinions, and affections, but like associations of commerce, formed and continued by no similitude of any thing but interest. It is not, therefore, necessary to inquire what the house of Austria has deserved from us or from mankind; because interest, not gratitude, engages us to support it. It is useless to urge, that it is equally f
aithless and cruel with the house of Bourbon, because the question is not whether both shall be destroyed, but whether one should rage without control. It is sufficient for us that their interest is opposite, and that religion and liberty may be preserved by their mutual jealousy. And I confess, my lords, that were the Austrians about to attain unlimited power by the conquest or inheritance of France and Spain, it would be no less proper to form confederacies against them.

  The testimony which has been produced of the convenience of a weak emperour, is to be considered, my lords, as the opinion of an author whose birth and employment had tainted him with an inveterate hatred of the house of Austria, and filled his imagination with an habitual dread of the imperial power. He was born, my lords, in Sweden, a country which had suffered much by a long war against the emperour; he was a minister to the electors of Brandenburgh, who naturally looked with envy on the superiority of Austria, and could not but wish to see a weaker prince upon the imperial throne, that their own influence might be greater; nor can we wonder, that a man thus born and thus supported should adopt an opinion by which the pride of his master would be flattered, and perhaps the interest of his own country promoted.

  It is likewise, my lords, to be remarked, that there was then no such necessity for a powerful prince to stand at the head of the Germans, and to defend them with his own forces till they could unite for their own preservation. The power of France had not then arrived at its present height, nor had their monarchs openly threatened to enslave all the nations of Europe. The princes of the empire had then no oppression to fear, but from the emperour; and it was no wonder, that when he was their only enemy, they wished that his power was reduced.