Complete Works of Samuel Johnson

by Samuel Johnson

  But these inquiries, my lords, however proper or necessary, are to be made by us not in solemn assemblies but in our private characters; and therefore I shall not now lay before your lordships what I have heard from those whom I have consulted for the sake of obtaining information on this important question, or shall at least not offer it as the opinion of the commons, or pretend to add to it any influence different from that of reason and truth.

  The arguments which have been offered in this debate for the motion, are, indeed, such as do not make any uncommon expedients necessary; they will not drive the advocates for the late measures to seek a refuge in authority instead of reason. They require, in my opinion, only to be considered with a calm attention, and their force will immediately be at an end.

  The most plausible objection, my lords, is, that the measures to which your approbation is now desired, were concerted and executed without the concurrence of the senate; and it is, therefore, urged, that they cannot now deserve our approbation, because it was not asked at the proper time.

  In order to answer this objection, my lords, it is necessary to consider it more distinctly than those who made it appear to have done, that we may not suffer ourselves to confound questions real and personal, to mistake one object for another, or to be confounded by different views.

  That the consent of the senate was not asked, my lords, supposing it a neglect, and a neglect of a criminal kind, of a tendency to weaken our authority, and shake the foundations of our constitution, which is the utmost that the most ardent imagination, or the most hyperbolical rhetorick can utter or suggest, may be, indeed, a just reason for invective against the ministers, but is of no force if urged against the measures. To take auxiliaries into our pay may be right, though it might be wrong to hire them without applying to the senate; as it is proper to throw water upon a fire, though it was conveyed to the place without the leave of those from whose well it was drawn, or over whose ground it was carried.

  If the liberties of Europe be really in danger, if our treaties oblige us to assist the queen of Hungary against the invaders of her dominions, if the ambition of France requires to be repressed, and the powers of Germany to be animated against her by the certain prospect of a vigorous support, I cannot discover the propriety of this motion, even supposing that we have not found from the ministers all the respect that we have a right to demand. As a lawful authority may do wrong, so right may be sometimes done by an unlawful power; and surely, though usurpation ought to be punished, the benefits which have been procured by it, are not to be thrown away. We may retain the troops that have been hired, if they are useful, though we should censure the ministry for taking them into pay.

  But the motion to which our concurrence is now required, is a motion by which we are to punish ourselves for the crime of the ministers, by which we are about to leave ourselves defenceless, because we have been armed without our consent, and to resign up all our rights and privileges to France, because we suspect that they have not been sufficiently regarded on this occasion by our ministers.

  Those noble lords who have dwelt with the greatest ardour on this omission, have made no proposition for censuring those whom they condemn as the authors of it, though this objection must terminate in an inquiry into their conduct, and has no real relation to the true question now before us, which is, whether the auxiliaries be of any use? If they are useless, they ought to be discharged without any other reason; if they are necessary, they ought to be retained, whatever censure may fall upon the ministry.

  I am, indeed, far from thinking, that when your lordships have sufficiently examined the affair, you will think your privileges invaded, or the publick trepanned by artifice into expensive measures; since it will appear that the ministry in reality preferred the most honest to the safest methods of proceeding, and chose rather to hazard themselves, than to practice or appear to practice any fraud upon their country.

  When it was resolved in council to take the troops of Hanover into the pay of Britain, a resolution which, as your lordships have already been informed, was made only a few days before the senate rose, it was natural to consider, whether the consent of the senate should not be demanded; but when it appeared upon reflection, that to bring an affair of so great importance before the last remnant of a house of commons, after far the greater part had retired to the care of their own affairs, would be suspected as fraudulent, and might give the nation reason to fear, that such measures were intended as the ministers were afraid of laying before a full senate. It was thought more proper to defer the application to the next session, and to venture upon the measures that were formed, upon a full conviction of their necessity.

  This conduct, my lords, was exactly conformable to the demands of those by whom the court has hitherto been opposed, and who have signalized themselves as the most watchful guardians of liberty. Among these men, votes of credit have never been mentioned but with detestation, as acts of implicit confidence, by which the riches of the nation are thrown down at the feet of the ministry to be squandered at pleasure. When it has been urged, that emergencies may arise, during the recess of the senate, which may produce a necessity of expenses, and that, therefore, some credit ought to be given which may enable the crown to provide against accidents, it has been answered, that the expenses which are incurred during the recess of the senate, will be either necessary or not; that if they are necessary, the ministry have no reason to distrust the approbation of the senate, but if they are useless, they ought not to expect it. And that, instead of desiring to be exempted from any subsequent censures, and to be secured in exactions or prodigality by a previous vote, they ought willingly to administer the publick affairs at their own hazard, and await the judgment of the senate, when the time shall come, in which their proceedings are laid before it.

  Such have hitherto been the sentiments of the most zealous advocates for the rights of the people; nor did I expect from any man who desired to appear under that character, that he would censure the ministry for having thrown themselves upon the judgment of the senate, and neglected to secure themselves by any previous applications, for having trusted in their own integrity, and exposed their conduct to an open examination without subterfuges and without precautions. I did not imagine, my lords, that a senate, upon whose decision all the measures which have been taken, so apparently depend, would have been styled a senate convened only to register the determinations of the ministry; or that any of your lordships would think his privileges diminished, because money was not demanded before the use of it was fully known. If we lay aside, my lords, all inquiries into precedents, and, without regard to any political considerations, examine this affair only by the light of reason, it will surely appear that the ministry could not, by any other method of proceeding, have shown equal regard to the senate, or equal confidence in their justice and their wisdom. Had they desired a vote of credit, it might have been justly objected that they required to be trusted with the publick money, without declaring, or being able to declare, how it was to be employed; that either they questioned the wisdom or honesty of the senate; and, therefore, durst undertake nothing till they were secure of the supplies necessary for the execution of it. Had they informed both houses of their whole scheme, they might have been still charged, and charged with great appearance of justice, with having preferred their own safety to that of the publick, and having rather discovered their designs to the enemy, than trusted to the judgment of the senate; nor could any excuse have been made for a conduct so contrary to all the rules of war, but such as must have dis-honoured either the ministers or the senate, such as must have implied either that the measures intended were unworthy of approbation, or that they were by no means certain, that even the best conduct would not be censured.

  These objections they foresaw, and allowed to be valid; and, therefore, generously determined to pursue the end which every man was supposed to approve, by the best means which they could discover, and to refer their conduct to a full senate, in whic
h they did not doubt but their integrity, and, perhaps, their success, would find them vindicators. Instead of applying, therefore, to the remains of the commons, a few days before the general recess; instead of assembling their friends by private intimations, at a time when most of those from whom they might have dreaded opposition, had retired, they determined to attempt, at their own hazard, whatever they judged necessary for the promotion of the common cause, and to refer their measures to the senate, when it should be again assembled.

  The manner in which one of the noble lords, who have spoken in support of the address, has thought it necessary that they should have applied to us, is, indeed, somewhat extraordinary, such as is certainly without precedent, and such as is not very consistent with the constituent rights of the different powers of the legislature. His lordship has been pleased to remark, that the crown has entered into a treaty, and to ask why that treaty was not previously laid before the senate for its approbation.

  I know not, my lords, with what propriety this contract for the troops of Hanover can be termed a treaty. It is well known that no power in this kingdom can enter into a treaty with a foreign state, except the king; and it is equally certain, that, with regard to Hanover, the same right is limited to the elector. This treaty, therefore, my lords, is a treaty of the same person with himself, a treaty of which the two counterparts are to receive their ratification from being signed with the same hand. This, surely, is a treaty of a new kind, such as no national assembly has yet considered. Had any other power of Britain than its king, or in Hanover any other than the elector, the right of entering into publick engagements, a treaty might have been made; but as the constitution of both nations is formed, the treaty is merely chimerical and absolutely impossible.

  Had such a treaty, as is thus vainly imagined, been really made, it would yet be as inconsistent with the fundamental establishment of the empire, to require that before it was ratified it should have been laid before the senate. To make treaties, as to make war, is the acknowledged and established prerogative of the crown. When war is declared, the senate is, indeed, to consider whether it ought to be carried on at the expense of the nation; and if treaties require any supplies to put them in execution, they likewise fall properly, at that time, under senatorial cognizance: but to require that treaties shall not be transacted without our previous concurrence, is almost to annihilate the power of the crown, and to expose all our designs to the opposition of our enemies, before they can be completed.

  If, therefore, the troops of Hanover can be of use for the performance of our stipulations, if they can contribute to the support of the house of Austria, the ministry cannot, in my opinion, be censured for having taken them into British pay; nor can we refuse our concurrence with the commons in providing for their support, unless it shall appear that the design for which all our preparations have been made is such as cannot be executed, or such as ought not to be pursued.

  Several arguments have been offered to prove both these positions; one noble lord has asserted, that it is by no means for the advantage either of ourselves or any other nation, to restore the house of Austria to its ancient elevation; another, that it is, by the imperial constitutions, unlawful for any of the princes of Germany to make war upon the emperour solemnly acknowledged by the diet. They have endeavoured to intimidate us, by turning our view to the difficulties by which our attempts are obstructed; difficulties which they affect to represent as insuperable, at least to this nation in its present state. With this design, my lords, has the greatness of the French power been exaggerated, the faith of the king of Sardinia questioned, and the king of Prussia represented as determined to support the pretensions of the emperour; with this view has our natural strength been depreciated, and all our measures and hopes have been ridiculed, with wantonness, not very consistent with the character of a British patriot.

  Most of these arguments, my lords, have been already answered, and answered in such a manner as has, I believe, not failed of convincing every lord of their insufficiency, unless, perhaps, those are to be excepted ty whom they were offered. It has with great propriety been observed, that the inconsistency imputed to his majesty in opposing the emperour for whom he voted, is merely imaginary; since it is not a necessary consequence, that he for whom he voted is, therefore, lawfully elected; and because his majesty does not engage in this war for the sake of dethroning the emperour, but of supporting the Pragmatick sanction; nor does he oppose him as the head of the German body, but as the invader of the dominions of Austria.

  With regard to the propriety of maintaining the Austrian family in its present possessions, and of raising it, if our arms should be prosperous, to its ancient greatness, it has been shown, that no other power is able to defend Europe either against the Turks on one part, or the French on the other; two powers equally professing the destructive intention of extending their dominions without limits, and of trampling upon the privileges and liberties of all the rest of mankind.

  It has been shown, that the general scheme of policy uniformly pursued by our ancestors in every period of time, since the increase of the French greatness, has been to preserve an equipoise of power, by which all the smaller states are preserved in security. It is apparent, that by this scheme alone can the happiness of mankind be preserved, and that no other family but that of Austria is able to balance the house of Bourbon.

  This equipoise of power has by some lords been imagined an airy scheme, a pleasing speculation which, however it may amuse the imagination, can never be reduced to practice. It has been asserted, that the state of nations is always variable, that dominion is every day transferred by ambition or by casualties, that inheritances fall by want of heirs into other hands, and that kingdoms are by one accident divided at one time, and at other times consolidated by a different event; that to be the guardians of all those whose credulity or folly may betray them to concur with the ambition of an artful neighbour, and to promote the oppression of themselves, is an endless task; and that to obviate all the accidents by which provinces may change their masters, is an undertaking to which no human foresight is equal; that we have not a right to hinder the course of succession for our own interest, nor to obstruct those contracts which independent princes are persuaded to make, however contrary to their own interest, or to the general advantage of mankind. And it has been concluded by those reasoners, that we should show the highest degree of wisdom, and the truest, though not the most refined policy, by attending steadily to our own interest, by improving the dissensions of our neighbours to our own advantage, by extending our commerce, and increasing our riches, without any regard to the happiness or misery, freedom or slavery of the rest of mankind.

  I believe I need not very laboriously collect arguments to prove to your lordships that this scheme of selfish negligence, of supine tranquillity, is equally imprudent and ungenerous; since, if we examine the history of the last century, we shall easily discover, that if this nation had not interposed, the French had now been masters of more than half Europe; and it cannot be imagined that they would have suffered us to set them at defiance in the midst of their greatness, that they would have spared us out of tenderness, or forborne to attack us out of fear. What the Spaniards attempted, though unsuccessfully, from a more distant part of the world, in the pride of their American affluence, would certainly have been once more endeavoured by France, with far greater advantages, and as it may be imagined, with a different event.

  That it would have been endeavoured, cannot be doubted, because the endeavour would not have been hazardous; by once defeating our fleet, they might land their forces, which might be wafted over in a very short time, and by a single victory they might conquer all the island, or that part of it, at least, which is most worth the labour of conquest; and though they should be unsuccessful, they could suffer nothing but the mortification of their pride, and would be in a short time enabled to make a new attempt.

  Thus, my lords, if we could preserve our liberty in the general s
ubjection of the western part of the world, we should do it only by turning our island into a garrison, by laying aside all other employment than the study of war, and by making it our only care to watch our coasts: a state which surely ought to be avoided at almost any expense and at any hazard.

  To think that we could extend our trade or increase our riches in this state of the continent, is to forget the effects of universal empire. The French, my lords, would then be in possession of all the trade of those provinces which they had conquered, they would be masters of all their ports and of all their shipping; and your lordships may easily conceive with what security we should venture upon the ocean, in a state of war, when all the harbours of the continent afforded shelter to our enemies. If the French privateers from a few obscure creeks, unsupported by a fleet of war, or at least not supported by a navy equal to our own, could make such devastations in our trade as enabled their country to hold out against the confederacy of almost all the neighbouring powers; what, my lords, might not be dreaded by us, when every ship upon the ocean should be an enemy; when we should be at once overborne by the wealth and the numbers of our adversaries; when the trade of the world should be in their hands, and their navies no less numerous than their troops.

  I have made this digression, my lords, I hope not wholly without necessity, to show that the advantages of preserving the equipoise of Europe are not, as they have been sometimes conceived, empty sounds, or idle notions; but that by the balance of one nation against another, both the safety of other countries and of our own is preserved; and that, therefore, it requires all our vigilance and all our resolution to establish and maintain it.

  That there may come a time in which this scheme will be no longer practicable, when a coalition of dominions may be inevitable, and when one power will be necessarily exalted above the rest, is, indeed, not absolutely impossible, and, therefore, not to be peremptorily denied. But it is not to be inferred, that our care is vain at present, because, perhaps, it may some time be vain hereafter; or that we ought now to sink into slavery without a struggle, because the time may come, when our strongest efforts will be ineffectual.