The Gamble: General Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq

by Thomas E. Ricks

  192 “The quality of life in Jisr Diuala”: Grigsby’s comment was made in a briefing with Pentagon reporters, 14 May 2008.

  193 “synchronization of ISR/HUMINT/SIGINT”: This is from “Ironhorse OIF 06-08,” an undated operations report by the 1st Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division.

  195 “by not emphasizing population protection”: Maj. Gen. Stone’s analysis was offered in his undated memorandum “Task Force 134: From Strategic Risk to Strategic Advantage.” The survey data in this and the following paragraph are from an untitled Task Force 134 PowerPoint briefing on the demographics and views of the detainee population.

  197 “Of the twenty-seven hundred Iraqi security forces”: Lt. Col. Miska was quoted in the Washington Post, 4 September 2007.

  Chapter 7: Signs of Life in Baghdad

  200 “Now that the Sunnis are all gone”: Capt. Wink was quoted in the Washington Post, 16 July 2007.

  202 “Use minimum force”: Lt. Coppock’s “Counterinsurgency Cliff Notes: Techniques for the Conventional Rifle Platoon, in Layman’s Terms” was posted on the Small Wars Journal website in April 2008.

  206 “It’s like raising a crocodile”: Al-Muttalibi’s simile appeared in the Washington Times, 23 July 2007.

  206 “those terrorist elements”: The United Iraqi Alliance’s statement was quoted in the Washington Post, 3 October 2007.

  206 “a coalition of gangsters, tribal leaders and opportunists”: Professor Porter’s characterization was posted on the “Kings of War” blog, 16 July 2008.

  207 “If Jack Bauer doesn’t negotiate with terrorists”: Spec. Horton posed this question on his blog, “Army of Dude,” 24 July 2007.

  207 “We’re going after al Qaeda”: Lt. Col. Kuehl recounted this statement by an Iraqi fighter in the Washington Post, 9 June 2007.

  207 “These guys looked like a military unit”: Capt. Wilbraham’s comment is in the same Post article cited above.

  209 “Iraq obeys only force”: Col. al-Zobaie’s assertions were quoted in the Washington Post, 24 March 2008.

  210 “There were almost 600 fighters in our sector”: The diary entries were quoted in the Washington Post, 10 February 2008. Some additional quotes are from documents released the same day by the U.S. military in Iraq under the title “Daily Diary of al Qaeda Sector Leader Called Abu Tariq.”

  210 The insurgent who loved Titanic: Most of the information in this section came from interviews conducted by e-mail with Capt. Cook, but it also relies on his written “Patrol Debriefs” and some other material.

  213 “You know that your jihad”: This and subsequent quotations from Col. Ismael and Sarhan are from a transcript of a recording of their meeting in January 2008.

  215 “knew where the [arms] caches were”: Capt. Galvach was quoted in the Washington Post, 9 August 2007.

  215 “one more step toward the fragmentation”: Malkasian expresses this concern in his article “A Thin Blue Line in the Sand,” DemocracyJournal.org, Summer 2007.

  216 “embraced auxiliary tribalism”: Long’s observation is in “The Anbar Awakening,” Survival magazine, April 2008.

  216 “several ministries are so controlled”: The untitled study, written in September 2007 by the staff of the U.S. embassy in Baghdad, to my knowledge has never been released.

  217 “We did not fail”: Col. Gentile’s article, “Our troops did not fail in 2006,” was carried in the International Herald Tribune, 24 January 2008.

  219 “Just let them drive through”: This is quoted in the report of the “Theater Operations Detachment” for the Center for Army Lessons Learned at Fort Leavenworth,” 13 January 2008.

  219 “a potential disaster”: Capt. Press’s comment is in his article “After Action Report: Working with the Awakening in Central Anbar,” CTC Sentinel, September 2008, published by the Combating Terrorism Center, U.S. Military Academy, West Point, N.Y.

  224 “The tribal strategy”: Long’s comments are in “The Anbar Awakening,” Survival magazine, April 2008.

  225 “fragmenting at a remarkable rate”: Professor Lynch made this comment on his website, AbuAardvaark.typepad.com.

  Chapter 8: The Domestic Opposition Collapses

  232 Barbero, who had been thinking about the Middle East: Barbero’s monograph, titled “Iran-Iraq War of Exhaustion: The result of the paradoxical trinity,” was published by the School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, 15 May 1989.

  240 “By the end of 2007, less sophisticated forms of IEDs”: The report by Catherine Dale of the Congressional Research Service is “Operation Iraqi Freedom: Strategies, Approaches, Results, and Issues for Congress,” 22 February 2008.

  241 “The surge hammered us at first”: The soldier’s quote, subsequent quotes from other soldiers, and the data here are all from “Mental Health Advisory Team (MHAT) V/Operation Iraqi Freedom 06-08: Iraq/Operation Enduring Freedom 8: Afghanistan,” 14 February 2008, Office of the Surgon, Multi-National Force-Iraq, and Office of the Command Surgeon—[deleted], and Office of the Surgeon General, United States Army Medical Command.

  242 “the systematic misuse of official institutions”: The study by the International Crisis Group is “Where Is Iraq Heading? Lessons from Basra,” 25 June 2007.

  244 “the handwriting is on the wall”: Senator McConnell’s comment appeared in the Washington Post, 27 May 2007.

  244 “By the time we get to September”: Representative Boehner’s prediction was made on Fox News Sunday, 6 May 2007, and quoted the following day in the Washington Post.

  245 “Many of us had hoped this summer”: This is from Gen. Petraeus’s letter to the troops, issued 7 September 2007.

  249 Between June and December: The data in this paragraph are from a briefing I attended at Camp Liberty, Iraq, on 31 January 2008, and from accompanying slides titled “MND-B Operations & Intelligence Briefing.”

  254 The best evidence for that new hands-off attitude: The data on television news coverage of the war in this paragraph appear in “Iraq war disappears as TV story,” by David Bauder, the Miami Herald, 17 March 2008.

  254 “It seems like a bad dream”: George’s comment was quoted in the American Journalism Review, April/May 2008.

  Chapter 9: The Twilight Zone

  259 “progress”: Lt. Freeze’s comment is from his online memoir, “Notes from Down Range,” carried on the Army website Platoon Leader.

  261 “I don’t think there is something”: Salih’s comment appeared in the Washington Post, 10 August 2007.

  263 “The longer the Iraqi government”: White’s comment appeared in the Pocono Record, 4 May 2008.

  263 “a good guy”: This is quoted in the report of the “Theater Operations Detachment” for the Center for Army Lessons Learned at Fort Leavenworth,” 13 January 2008.

  265 “They are like mercenaries”: The Associated Press report was carried by the wire service on 29 June 2008.

  265 “Despite the repeated assurances”: Professor Hanna’s article ran on the website of World Politics Review, 10 July 2008.

  266 “Oh people of Iraq”: Guardian, 10 November 2007.

  266 “Many times he had”: Capt. Cosper was quoted in the Los Angeles Times, 29 June 2008.

  266 “they’ve grown into a much more organized”: This is from Horton’s blog, “Army of Dude,” 24 July 2007.

  267 “deeply troubled”: Moore’s article ran in the New York Times, 23 February 2008.

  269 “Our mission is to protect”: Starr was quoted in the Washington Post, 20 September 2007.

  269 “The Iraqis despised them”: Degn was quoted in the same Washington Post, article above.

  270 “It had every indication”: Lt. Col. Tarsa’s observation is in the Washington Post, 12 October 2007, as is Capt. Cherry’s comment that, “This was uncalled for.”

  Chapter 10: Big Wasta

  This chapter relies in part on “The Battle for Basra,” by Marisa Cochrane, Institute for the Study of War, 23 June 2008.

  273 “You know, we al
l feel much older”: Petraeus said this on CNN, 19 March 2008.

  274 “brazenly challenging”: Barnett’s article, in the April 2008 issue of Esquire, was titled “The Man Between War and Peace.”

  275 “General Odierno has experienced”: Herrington was quoted in the Washington Post, 16 February 2008.

  277 “By late 2007, the British position”: Cordesman’s comment is in his study “Iraqi Force Development 2008,” published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C.

  277 “I’m not going to go into details”: Marston’s comments on the frustration of British officers were made at a symposium on counterinsurgency at the National Press Club, Washington, D.C., 22 July 2008.

  287 “Nothing succeeds with the American public like success”: Petraeus’s dissertation is titled “The American military and the lessons of Vietnam: A study of military influence and the use of force in the post-Vietnam era” (Princeton University, 1987).

  290 “Iraq is a badge of honor”: This quote appeared in the Washington Post, 12 June 2006.

  Chapter 11: After the Surge

  297 “As Nouri al-Maliki has become more capable”: Kahl’s comment was made in a press briefing on Iraq given by the Center for New American Security, 13 August 2008.

  297 “a totalitarian regime”: Barzani’s comment appeared in “Kurd-Arab Tensions May Threaten Iraq Calm,” Reuters, 13 November 2008.

  297 “the land the surge forgot”: This is the title of a report by Michael Knights issued by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 30 October 2008.

  297 “the war waiting”: McCaffrey’s assertion is in an After Action Report on his visit to Iraq and Kuwait in October and November 2008.

  297 provoking the Kurds’ Barzani to issue an ultimatum: In an interview with Ashard Alawsat, available at http://www.asharq-e.com, 3 September 2008, Barzani stated that “never, we will not relinquish Kirkuk whatever the circumstances are.”

  297 “The Iraqi army’s campaign in Diyala”: Hilterman’s analysis appeared on the website Abu Aardvark under the title “Kurds See the Future and Don’t Like It,” 1 September 2008.

  298 “The surge may have bought transitory successes”: Simon’s analysis is in “The Price of the Surge: How U.S. Strategy Is Hastening Iraq’s Demise,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2008.

  299 “rubber-stamping”: Obama made his remarks to Terry Moran of ABC’s Nightline, 21 July 2008.

  304 Some 50,000 soldiers now have prescriptions: This was reported by Gregg Zoroya in USA Today, 21 October 2008, as was the information about the 509th Engineer Company.

  304 The quality of recruits: The information in this paragraph about recruiting problems is from an article by Josh White in the Washington Post, 23 January 2008.

  305 The military also has been admitting more recruits with criminal records: This and the other data in this paragraph about conduct waivers are from an article by Ann Scott Tyson that ran in the Washington Post, 22 April 2008.

  305 “incredible stress”: This and the other statements by Gen. Cody appeared in an article by Tyson in the Washington Post, 2 April 2008.

  Chapter 12: Obama’s War

  307 “We’re not looking at doing things fast”: Col. Johnson’s comment was made during a Pentagon roundtable with defense bloggers, 12 August 2008.

  307 “The Vietnam War had drawn to a close when I was fairly young”: Sen. Obama made this observation on the CNN television show Fareed Zakaria GPS, 13 July 2008. During that same interview he also made the comments about not abandoning Iraq that are quoted at the end of this paragraph.

  309 “My 16-month time line, if you examine everything I’ve said”: Obama’s statement was reported widely, including in the Washington Post, 4 July 2008.

  310 “a unified democratic country or to a fractured sectarian one”: Janabi’s analysis, “The Importance of Iraq’s Provincial Elections,” was published by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy on 26 September 2008.

  311 “One particularly ominous aspect of Anbari politics”: Lt. Cdr. Lindsay’s observation in his essay “Does the ‘Surge’ Explain Iraq’s Improved Security?,” carried in the MIT Center for International Studies’ “Audit of the Conventional Wisdom,” September 2008.

  Epilogue: The Long War

  314 On the phrase Wolfowitz used, see for example my book Fiasco, p. 98, where he is quoted as saying, “it is hard to conceive that it would take more forces to provide stability in post-Saddam Iraq than it would take to conduct the war itself and to secure the surrender of Saddam’s security forces and his army—hard to imagine.”

  314 See, for example, Klein’s discussion of the failures of imagination by both sides in the 1973 downing of a Libyan airliner by Israeli fighter jets, in chapter 5 of Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions (Boston: MIT Press, 2001).

  315 “History provides countless warnings”: Cordesman’s observation in his essay “Grand Strategy and Iraq’s Uncertain Future,” published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 31 October 2008.

  315 “there has never been a successful counterinsurgency that took less than 10 years”: Kilcullen said this on the Charlie Rose television show, 5 October 2007.

  316 “This mission will be long”: Biddle’s estimate is in his article “Patient Stabilized?,” National Interest, March-April 2008.

  317 “only a decades-long American occupation”: Col. Gentile’s prediction is in “A (Slightly) Better War: A Narrative and Its Defects,” World Affairs, Summer 2008.

  317 “power sharing is always a prelude to violence”: McCreary’s analysis appeared in his NightWatch e-mail report of 11 September 2008.

  318 “If the Americans leave”: Staff Sgt. Benavides was quoted in an article by Sam Dagher in the Christian Science Monitor, 3 July 2008.

  318 “a colossus with feet of clay”: Visser’s description is in his essay “The Sadrists of Basra and the Far South of Iraq,” published by the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, May 2008.

  319 “the Sadrists are Tehran’s historical main enemy”: Visser noted this in “The Sadrists, the Bush Administration’s Narrative on Iraq, and the Maysan Operations,” posted on www.historiae.orgon 3 July 2008.

  320 “it is our friends who will come to power”: Khatami said this to Nasr, who included it in a draft of a study on “The Implications of Military Confrontation with Iran” and permitted me to quote it here.

  322 “The Iraqi army is a predominantly Shia institution”: This is from the same “Operational Leadership Experiences” interview with Sgt. Maj. Clemens that is quoted in Chapter 6.

  323 “watching The Sopranos or watching The Godfather”: This is from the “Operational Leadership Experiences” interview with Maj. Voorhies cited in Chapter 2.

  323 “they wanted to go back to the old way underneath Saddam”: Maj. Arnold stated this in his official “Operational Leadership Experiences” interview, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 16 January 2008.

  323 “Saddam Hussein taught them how to do that”: This is from Maj. Whitney’s “Operational Leadership Experiences” interview, quoted in Chapter 2.

  323 “They’re going to be ruthless”: Maj. Burr’s prediction appears in his official “Operational Leadership Experiences” interview, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 13 April 2007.

  324 “the whole notion of democracy and representative government in Iraq was absolutely ludicrous”: Maj. Quayle states this in his official “Operational Leadership Experiences” interview, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 19 September 2008.

  324 the story of a Turkmen Shia police chief: Capt. Gorkowski recounted this episode in “After Action Report: Assessing Acceptable Corruption in Iraq,” CTC Sentinel, published by the Combating Terrorism Center, U.S. Military Academy, West Point, N.Y., August 2008.

  325 “America will have bequeathed a highly unstable state”: Dodge’s warning is in “Iraq and the Next American President,” Sur
vival, October-November 2008.

  ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

  First, I want to thank my wife, inspiration and fellow writer, Mary Kay Ricks.

  I also am endebted to my children, who are always interesting.

  Scott Moyers, who has guided my writing career, even went so far as to suggest the title of this book. I am grateful also to my new editor, Ann Godoff. Also at Penguin Press, Lindsay Whalen and Abigail Cleaves were a pleasure to work with.

  I particularly want to thank my editors at the Washington Post who supported this project: Susan Glasser, Len Downie, Carlos Lozada, Rajiv Chandrasekaran, and Bill Hamilton. Many colleagues at the Post also helped me: Steve Fainaru, Karen Deyoung, Walter Pincus, Dana Priest, Robin Wright, Joby War-rick, Ann Scott Tyson, Amit Paley, Josh Partlow, and, most notably, Josh White and Sudarsan Raghavan.

  I am indebted to Kurt Campbell and Michèle Flournoy, and everyone at the Center for a New American Security, the wonderful think tank Kurt and Michele founded. This is the second book I have done under Kurt’s auspices, and I have come to believe that in another life he was a very successful publisher. My researcher at CNAS, Michael Zubrow, helped every day to increase both the accuracy and scope of the book. I deeply appreciate his tireless work.

  I want to thank Gen. David Petraeus, Gen. Raymond Odierno, and their staffs and subordinate units for their openness and tolerance on a series of trips I made to Iraq in 2007 and 2008. I appreciate the work of Lt. Col. Joe Yoswa and Col. Steve Boylan in facilitating my visits. I also want to thank Lt. Col. James Hutton, Maj. Joseph Edstrom, and Maj. Brian Tribus for their help on my last trip to Baghdad for this book.

  I also appreciate the help provided by dozens of soldiers who shared everything from letters and personal e-mails to PowerPoint summaries of their operations. I also am especially obliged to several officers who went out of their way to help me understand key phases of the war or important aspects of it: Col. Sean MacFarland, Lt. Col. Pete Kilner, Lt. Col. Joe Rice, Capt. Samuel Cook, and several members of the 1st Cavalry Division.