by Riazanovsky
These and other similar contemporary accounts seem to give a convincing picture of the devastation of the Mongol invasion even if we allow for possible exaggeration.
The Mongol occupation of the southern Russian steppe deprived the
Russians for centuries of much of the best land and contributed to the shift of population, economic activity, and political power to the northeast. It also did much to cut Russia off from Byzantium and in part from the West, and to accentuate the relative isolation of the country typical of the time. It has been suggested that, but for the Mongols, Russia might well have participated in such epochal European developments as the Renaissance and the Reformation. The financial exactions of the Mongols laid a heavy burden on the Russians precisely when their impoverished and dislocated economy was least prepared to bear it. Rebellions against the Mongol taxes led to new repressions and penalties. The entire period, and especially the decades immediately following the Mongol invasion, acquired the character of a grim struggle for survival, with the advanced and elaborate Kievan style of life and ethical and cultural standards in rapid decline. We learn of new cruel punishments established by law, of illiterate princes, of an inability to erect the dome of a stone cathedral, and of other clear signs of cultural regression. Indeed, certain historians have estimated that the Mongol invasion and domination of Russia retarded the development of the country by some 150 or 200 years.
Constructive, positive contributions of the Mongols to Russian history appear, by contrast, very limited. A number of Mongolian words in the fields of administration and finance have entered the Russian language, indicating a degree of influence. For example, the term iarlyk, which means in modern Russian a trademark or a customs stamp, comes from a Mongol word signifying a written order of the khan, especially the khan's grant of privileges; similarly the Russian words denga, meaning coin, and dengi, money, derive from Mongolian. The Mongols did take a census of the Russian population. They have also been credited with affecting the evolution of Russian military forces and tactics, notably as applied to the cavalry. Yet even these restricted Mongol influences have to be qualified. The financial measures of the Mongols together with the census and the Mongol roads added something to the process of centralization in Russia. Yet these taxes had as their aim an exaction of the greatest possible tribute and as such proved to be neither beneficial to the people nor lasting. The invaders replaced the old "smoke" and "plough" taxes with the cruder and simpler head tax, which did not at all take into account one's ability to pay. This innovation disappeared when Russian princes, as intermediaries, took over from the Mongol tax collectors. Thinking simply in terms of pecuniary profit, the Mongols often acted with little wisdom: they sold the position of grand prince to the highest bidder and in the end failed to check in time the rise of Moscow. Rampant corruption further vitiated the financial policy of the Mongols. As to military matters, where the invaders did excel, the fact remains that Russian armies and tactics of the appanage period, based on
foot soldiers, evolved directly from those of Kiev, not from the Mongol cavalry. That cavalry, however, was to influence later Muscovite gentry horse formations.
Similarly, the Mongols deserve only limited credit for bringing to Russia the postal service or the practice of keeping women in seclusion in a separate part of the house. A real postal system came to Russia as late as the seventeenth century, and from the West; the Mongols merely resorted to the Kievan practice of obligating the local population to supply horses, carriages, boats, and other aids to communication for the use of officials, although they did implement this practice widely and bequeath several words in the field of transportation to the Russians. The seclusion of women was practiced only in the upper class in Russia; it probably reflected the general insecurity of the time to which the Mongols contributed their part rather than the simple borrowing of a custom from the Mongols. The Mongols themselves, it might be added, acquired this practice late in their history when they adopted the Moslem faith and some customs of conquered peoples.
Turning to the more far-reaching claims made, especially by scholars of the Eurasian school, on behalf of the Mongols and their impact on Russia, one has to proceed with caution. Although numerous and varied, Eurasian arguments usually center on the political role of the Mongols. Typically they present the Muscovite tsar and the Muscovite state as successors to the Mongol khan and the Golden Horde, and emphasize the influence of the Mongols in transforming weak and divided appanage Russia into a powerful, disciplined, and monolithic autocracy. Institutions, legal norms, and the psychology of Muscovite Russia have all been described as a legacy of Jenghiz Khan.
Yet these claims can hardly stand analysis. As already mentioned, the Mongols kept apart from the Russians, limiting their interest in their unwilling subjects to a few items, notably the exaction of tribute. Religion posed a formidable barrier between the two peoples, both at first when the Mongols were still pagan and later when the Golden Horde became Moslem. The Mongols, to repeat a point, were perfectly willing to leave the Russians to their own ways; indeed, they patronized the Orthodox Church.
Perhaps a still greater significance attaches to the fact that the Mongol and the Russian societies bore little resemblance to each other. The Mongols remained nomads in the clan stage of development. Their institutions and laws could in no wise be adopted by a much more complex agricultural society. A comparison of Mongol law, the code of Jenghiz Khan, to the Pskov Sudebnik, an example of Russian law of the appanage age, makes the difference abundantly clear. Even the increasing harshness of Russian criminal law of the period should probably be attributed to the conditions
of the time rather than to borrowing from the Mongols. Mongol influence on Russia could not parallel the impact of the Arabs on the West, because, to quote Pushkin, the Mongols were "Arabs without Aristotle and algebra" - or other cultural assets.
The Eurasian argument also tends to misrepresent the nature of the Mongol states. Far from having been particularly well organized, efficient or lasting, they turned out to be relatively unstable and short-lived. Thus, in 1260 Kublai Khan built Peking and in 1280 he completed the conquest of southern China, but in 1368 the Mongol dynasty was driven out of China; the Mongol dynasty in Persia lasted only from 1256 to 1344; and the Mongol Central Asiatic state with its capital in Bukhara existed from 1242 until its destruction by Tamerlane in 1370. In the Russian case the dates are rather similar, but the Mongols never established their own dynasty in the country, acting instead merely as overlords of the Russian princes. While the Mongol states lasted, they continued on the whole to be rent by dissensions and wars and to suffer from arbitrariness, corruption, and misrule in general. Not only did the Mongols fail to contribute a superior statecraft, but they had to borrow virtually everything from alphabets to advisers from the conquered peoples to enable their states to exist. As one of these advisers remarked, an empire could be won on horseback, but not ruled from the saddle. True, cruelty, lawlessness, and at times anarchy, in that period characterized also the life of many peoples other than the Mongols, the Russians included. But at least most of these peoples managed eventually to surmount their difficulties and organize effective and lasting states. Not so the Mongols, who, after their sudden and stunning performance on the world scene, receded to the steppe, clan life, and the internecine warfare of Mongolia.
When the Muscovite state emerged, its leaders looked to Byzantium for their high model, and to Kievan Russia for their historical and still meaningful heritage. As to the Mongols, a single attitude toward them pervades all Russian literature: they were a scourge of God sent upon the Russians for their sins. Historians too, whether they studied the growth of serfdom, the rise of the gentry, or the nature of princely power in Muscovite Russia, established significant connections with the Russian past and Russian conditions, not with Mongolia. Even for purposes of analogy, European countries stood much closer to Russia than Mongol states. In fact, from the Atlantic to the Urals absolute monarc
hies were in the process of replacing feudal division. Therefore, Vernadsky's affirming the importance of the Mongol impact by contrasting Muscovite with Kievan Russia appears to miss the point. There existed many other reasons for changes in Russia; and, needless to say, other countries changed during those centuries without contact with the Mongols.
It is tempting, thus, to return to the older view and to consider the Mongols as of little significance in Russian history. On the other hand, their destructive impact deserves attention. And they, no doubt, contributed something to the general harshness of the age and to the burdensome and exacting nature of the centralizing Muscovite state which emerged out of this painful background. Mongol pressure on Russia and its resources continued after the end of the yoke itself, for one of the authentic legacies of Jenghiz Khan proved to be the successor states to the Golden Horde which kept southeastern Russia under a virtual state of siege and repeatedly taxed the efforts of the entire country.
I X
LORD NOVGOROD THE GREAT
The Italian municipalities had, in earlier days, given signal proof of that force which transforms the city into the state.
BURCKHARDT
The men of Novgorod showed Knyaz * Vsevolod the road. "We do not want thee, go whither thou wilt." He went to his father, into Russia.
"the chronicle of novgorod"
(r. michell's and n. forbes's translation)
Novgorod or, to use its formal name, Lord Novgorod the Great stands out as one of the most impressive and important states of appanage Russia. When Kievan might and authority declined and economic and political weight shifted, Novgorod rose as the capital of northern Russia as well as the greatest trading center and, indeed, the leading city of the entire country. Located in a lake area, in the northwestern corner of European Russia, and serving throughout the appanage period as a great Russian bulwark against the West, it came to rule enormous lands, stretching east to the Urals and north to the coast line. Yet, for the historian, the unusual political system of the principality of Novgorod and its general style of life and culture possess even greater interest than its size, wealth, and power.
The Historical Evolution of Novgorod
Novgorod was founded not later than the eighth century of our era - recent excavations and research emphasize its antiquity and its connection with the Baltic Slavs - and, according to the Primary Chronicle, it was to Novgorod that Riurik came in 862 at the dawn of Russian history. During the hegemony of Kiev, Novgorod retained a position of high importance. In particular, it served as the northern base of the celebrated trade route "from the Varangians to the Greeks," and also as a center of trade between the East and the West by means of the Volga river. The city seems to have remained outside the regular Kievan princely system of succession from brother to brother. Instead, it was often ruled by sons of the grand princes of Kiev who, not infrequently, themselves later ascended the Kievan throne; although some persons not closely related to the grand
* Knyaz means "prince."
prince also governed in Novgorod on occasion. St. Vladimir, Iaroslav the Wise, and Vladimir Monomakh's son Mstislav all were at some time princes of Novgorod. Iaroslav the Wise in particular came to be closely linked to Novgorod where he ruled for a number of years before his accession to the Kievan throne; even the Russian Justice has been considered by many scholars as belonging to the Novgorodian period of his activities. And Novgorod repeatedly offered valuable support to the larger ambitions and claims of its princes, for example, to the same Iaroslav the Wise in his bitter struggle with Sviatopolk for the Kievan seat.
The evolution of authority and power within Novgorod proved to be even more significant than the interventions of the Novgorodians on behalf
of their favorite princes. While we know of a few earlier instances when Novgorod refused to accept the prince allotted to the city - in one case advising that the appointee should come only if he had two heads - it is with the famous expulsion of a ruler in 1136 that the Novgorodians embarked upon their peculiar political course. After that date the prince of Novgorod became in essence a hired official of the city with strictly circumscribed authority and prerogatives. His position resembled that of the podesta in Italian city-states, and it made some historians refer to Novgorod as a "commercial republic." In 1156 Novgorod obtained virtual independence in religious administration too by seizing the right to elect its own archbishop. To be exact, under the new system the Novgorodian veche selected three candidates for the position of archbishop; next, one of the three was chosen by lot to fill the high office; and, finally, he was elevated to his new ecclesiastical rank by the head of the Russian Church, the metropolitan.
The emergence of Novgorod as an independent principality formed a part of the general process of collapse of the Kievan state accompanied by the appearance of competing regional entities which were frequently mutually hostile. For Novgorod the great rivals were the potentates of the northeast, notably the princes of Suzdal, who controlled the upper reaches of the Volga and thus the Volga trade artery and who - the most important point - could cut the grain supply of Novgorod. Moreover, for centuries vast and distant lands in northeastern Russia remained in contention between the city of Novgorod and the princes of the northeast, at times owing allegiance to both. In 1216 the Novgorodians, led by the dashing prince Mstislav of Toropets, scored a decisive victory over their rivals at Lipitsa. But, although Novgorod also acquitted itself well in subsequent struggles, the troublesome issues remained to be resolved finally only with the destruction of the independence of Novgorod and its absorption into the Muscovite state.
Novgorod's defense of Russian lands from foreign invasions, stemming from its location in the northwestern corner of Russia, might well have had a greater historical significance than its wars against other Russian principalities. The most celebrated chapter of this defense is linked to the name of Prince Alexander, known as Alexander Nevskii, that is, of the Neva, for his victory over the Swedes on the banks of that river. Alexander became the prince of Novgorod and later the grand prince of Russia at a particularly difficult time in the history of his country. Born in 1219 and dying in 1263, Alexander had to face the Mongol invasion and the imposition of the Mongol yoke on Russia, and he also was forced to deal with major assaults on Russia from Europe. These assaults came from the Swedes and the Teutonic Knights, while neighboring Finnish and especially strong Lithuanian tribes applied additional pressure. The German attack
was the most ominous: it represented a continuation and extension of the long-term German drive eastward which had already resulted in the Ger-manization or extermination of many Baltic Slavic and western Lithuanian tribes and which had spread to the Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian neighbors of Russia. A forcible conversion of all these peoples to Roman Catholicism, as well as their subjugation and Germanization, constituted the aims of the Teutonic Knights who had begun as a crusading order in the Holy Land and later transferred their activities to the Baltic area.
In the year in which Kiev fell to the Mongols, 1240, Alexander seized the initiative and led the Novgorodians to a victory over the advancing Swedes on the banks of the Neva River. The chronicles tell us that Alexander himself wounded the Swedish commander Birger, who barely escaped capture. In the meantime the Teutonic Knights had begun their systematic attack on northwestern Russian lands in 1239, and they succeeded in 1241 in capturing Pskov. Having defeated the Swedes and settled some differences with the Novgorodians, Alexander Nevskii turned against the new invaders. In short order he managed to drive them back and free Pskov. What is more, he carried warfare into enemy territory. The crucial battle took place on April 5, 1242, on the ice of Lake Chud, or Peipus, in Estonia. It became known in Russian historical tradition as "the massacre on the ice" and has been celebrated in song and story - more recently in Prokofiev's music and Eisenstein's brilliant film Alexander Nevskii. The massed force of mailclad and heavily armed German knights and their Finnish allies struck like an enormous battering
ram at the Russian lines; the lines sagged but held long enough for Alexander Nevskii to make an enveloping movement with a part of his troops and assail an enemy flank; a complete rout of the Teutonic Knights followed, the spring ice breaking under them to aid their destruction.
Alexander Nevskii's victories were important, but they represented only a single sequence in the continuous struggle of Novgorod against its western and northwestern foes. Two Soviet specialists have calculated that between 1142 and 1446 Novgorod fought the Swedes twenty-six times, the German knights eleven times, the Lithuanians fourteen times, and the Norwegians five times. The German knights then included the Livonian and the Teutonic orders, which merged in 1237.
Relations with the Mongols took a different turn. Although the Mongol invasion failed to reach Novgorod, the principality together with other Russian lands submitted to the khan. In fact, the great warrior Alexander Nevskii himself instituted this policy of co-operation with the Mongols, becoming a favorite of the khan and thus the grand prince of Russia from 1252 until his death in 1263. Alexander Nevskii acted as he did because of a simple and sound reason: he considered resistance to the Mongols hopeless. And it was especially because of his humble submission to the
khan and his consequent ability to preserve the principality of Novgorod as well as some other Russian lands from ruin that the Orthodox Church canonized Alexander Nevskii.
Throughout the appanage period Novgorod remained one of the most important Russian principalities. It played a significant role in the rivalry between Moscow and Tver as well as in the struggle between Moscow and Lithuania. As Moscow successfully gathered other Russian lands, the position of Novgorod became increasingly difficult. Finally in 1471 the city surrendered to Ivan III of Moscow. Trouble followed several years later and in 1478 the Muscovites severely suppressed all opposition, exiling many people, and incorporated the city organically into the Moscow state.