A history of Russia
Page 16
The last view introduces another key factor in the problem of the Muscovite rise: the role of the rulers of Moscow. Moscow has generally been considered fortunate in its princes, and in a number of ways. Sheer luck constituted a part of the picture. For several generations the princes of Moscow, like the Capetian kings who united France, had the advantage of continuous male succession without interruption or conflict. In particular, for a long time the sons of the princes of Moscow were lucky not to have uncles competing for the Muscovite seat. When the classic struggle between "the uncles" and "the nephews" finally erupted in the reign of Basil II, direct succession from father to son possessed sufficient standing and support in the principality of Moscow to overcome the challenge. The princedom has also been considered fortunate because its early rulers, descending from the youngest son of Alexander Nevskii and thus representing a junior princely branch, found it expedient to devote themselves to their small appanage instead of neglecting it for more ambitious undertakings elsewhere.
It is generally believed that the policies of the Muscovite princes made a major and massive contribution to the rise of Moscow. From Ivan Kalita to Ivan III and Basil III these rulers stood out as "the gatherers of the
Russian land," as skillful landlords, managers, and businessmen, as well as warriors and diplomats. They all acted effectively even though, for a long time, on a petty scale. Kliuchevsky distinguishes five main Muscovite methods of obtaining territory: purchase, armed seizure, diplomatic seizure with the aid of the Golden Horde, service agreements with appanage princes, and the settlement by Muscovite population of the lands beyond the Volga. The relative prosperity, good government, peace, and order prevalent in the Muscovite principality attracted increasingly not only peasants but also, a fact of great importance, boyars, as well as members of other classes, to the growing grand princedom.
To be sure, not every policy of the Muscovite rulers contributed to the rise of Moscow. For example, they followed the practice of the appanage period in dividing their principality among their sons. Yet in this respect too they gained by comparison with other princedoms. In the Muscovite practice the eldest son of a grand prince received a comparatively larger share of the inheritance, and his share grew relatively, as well as absolutely, with time. Thus, Dmitrii Donskoi left his eldest son one-third of his total possessions, Basil II left his eldest one-half, and Ivan III left his eldest three-fourths. Furthermore, the eldest son became, of course, grand prince and thus had a stronger position in relation to his brothers than was the case with other appanage rulers. Gradually the right to coin money and to negotiate with foreign powers came to be restricted to the grand prince.
The development of the Muscovite state followed the pattern mentioned earlier in our general discussion of the northeast: in a relatively primitive society and a generally fluid and shifting situation, the prince became increasingly important as organizer and owner as well as ruler - with little distinction among his various capacities - while other elements of the Kievan political system declined and even atrophied. We know, for instance, that Basil Veliaminov, the last Muscovite tysiatskii, died in 1374 and that thenceforth that office was abolished. The Muscovite "gathering of Russia," while it was certainly a remarkable achievement, also reflected the trend of the time. The very extent of the division of Russia in the appanage period paved the way for the reverse process, because most principalities proved to be too small and weak to offer effective resistance to a centralizing force. After Moscow triumphed in the northeast, in the old principality of Vladimir-Suzdal, it had to deal with only two other major Russian lands, those of Novgorod and of Riazan, the rest having already been absorbed by the expanding Lithuanian-Russian state.
To appreciate better the success of the princes of Moscow, it is necessary to give special attention to one aspect of their policy: relations with the Mongols. In their dealings with the Golden Horde, the Muscovite rulers managed to eat the proverbial cake and to have it too. The key to their
remarkable performance lay in good timing. For a long time, while the Mongols retained their strength, the princes of Moscow demonstrated complete obedience to the khans, and indeed eager co-operation with them. In this manner they became established as grand princes after helping the Mongols to devastate the more impatient and heroic Tver and some other Russian lands to their own advantage. In addition, they collected tribute for the Mongols, thus acquiring some financial and, indirectly, judicial authority over other Russian princes. "The gathering of the Russian land" was also greatly facilitated by this connection with the Golden Horde: Liubavsky and other historians have stressed the fact that the khans handed over to the Muscovite princes entire appanages which were unable to pay their tribute, while, for that reason, rulers of other principalities preferred to sell their lands directly to Moscow in order to save something for themselves. But, as the Golden Horde declined and the Muscovite power rose, it was a grand prince of Moscow, Dmitrii Donskoi, who led the Russian forces against the Mongol oppressors on the field of Kulikovo. The victory of Kulikovo and the final lifting of the Mongol yoke by Ivan III represented milestones in the rise of the princedom of Moscow from a northeastern appanage principality to a national Russian state.
Yet another major factor in that rise was the role of the Church. To estimate its significance one should bear in mind the strongly religious character of the age, which was similar to the Middle Ages in the West. Moscow became the seat of the metropolitan and thus the religious capital of Russia in 1326 or 1328, long before it could claim any effective political domination over most of the country. It became, further, the city of St. Alexis and especially St. Sergius, whose monastery, the Holy Trinity-St. Sergius Monastery north of Moscow, was a fountainhead of a broad monastic movement and quickly became a most important religious center, rivaled in all Russian history only by the Monastery of the Caves near Kiev. Religious leadership, very valuable in itself, also affected politics. St. Alexis, as we saw, acted as one of the most important statesmen of the princedom of Moscow; and the metropolitans in general, linked to Moscow and at least dimly conscious of broader Russian interests, favored the Muscovite "gathering of Russia." Their greatest service to this cause consisted probably in their frequent intervention in princely quarrels and struggles, through advice, admonition, and occasionally even excommunication; this intervention was usually in favor of Moscow.
Judgments of the nature and import of the rise of Moscow are even more controversial than descriptions and explanations of that process. Most pre-revolutionary Russian historians praised it as a great and necessary achievement of the princes of Moscow and of the Russian people, who had to unite to survive outside aggression and to play their part in history. Soviet his-
torians came to share the same view. On the other hand, some Russian doubters, for example, Presniakov, together with many scholars in other traditions, such as the Polish, the Lithuanian, or the nationalist Ukrainian, have argued on the other side: they have emphasized in particular that the vaunted "gathering of Russia" consisted, above all, in a skillful aggression by the Muscovite princes against both Russians, such as the inhabitants of Novgorod and Pskov, and eventually various non-Russian nationalities, which deprived them of their liberties, subjugating everyone to Muscovite despotism. As is frequently the case in major historical controversies, both schools are substantially correct, stressing as they do different aspects of the same complicated phenomenon. Without necessarily taking sides on this or other related issues, we shall appreciate a little better the complexity and the problems of the period after devoting some attention to the economic, social, and cultural life of appanage Russia.
XII
APPANAGE RUSSIA: ECONOMICS, SOCIETY, INSTITUTIONS
Thus our medieval boyardom in its fundamental characteristics of territorial rule; the dependence of the peasants, with the right of departure; manorial jurisdiction, limited by communal administration; and economic organization, characterized by the insignificance of the lord's own
economy: in all these characteristics our boyardom represents an institution of the same nature with the feudal seigniory, just as our medieval rural commune represents, as has been demonstrated above, an institution of the same essence with the commune of the German Mark.
PAVLOV-SILVANSKY
… the "service people" was the name of the class of population obligated to provide service (court, military, civil) and making use, in return, on the basis of a conditional right, of private landholdings. The basis for a separate existence of this class is provided not by its rights, but by its obligations to the state. These obligations are varied, and the members of this class have no corporate unity.
VLADIMIRSKY-BUDANOV
Here, of course, you have in fact the process of a certain feudalization of simpler state arrangements in their interaction and mutual limitation.*
STRUVE
Whereas the controversy continues concerning the relative weight of commerce and agriculture in Kievan Russia, scholars agree that tilling the soil represented the main occupation of the appanage period. Rye, wheat, barley, millet, oats, and a few other crops continued to be the staples of Russian agriculture. The centuries from the fall of Kiev to the unification of the country under Moscow saw a prevalence of local, agrarian economy, an economic parochialism corresponding to political division. Furthermore, with the decline of the south and the Mongol invasion, the Russians lost much of their best land and had to establish or develop agriculture in forested areas and under severe climatic conditions. Mongol exactions further strained the meager Russian economy. In Liubavsky's words: "A huge parasite attached itself to the popular organism of northeastern Russia; the parasite sucked the juices of the organism, chronically drained its life forces, and from time to time produced great perturbations in it."
* Italics in the original. Struve's statement refers to a particular development during the period, but I think that it can also stand fairly as the author's general judgment on the issue of feudalism in Russia.
The role of trade in appanage Russia is more difficult to determine. While it retained great importance in such lands as Galicia, not to mention the city and the principality of Novgorod, its position in the northeast, and notably in the princedom of Moscow, needs further study. True, the Moscow river served as a trade route from the very beginning of Moscow's history, and the town also profited commercially from its excellent location on the waterways of Russia in a more general sense. Soviet historians stress the ancient Volga trade artery, made more usable by firm Mongol control of an enormous territory to the east and the southeast; and, as already indicated, they also link closely the expansion of the Muscovite principality to the growth of a common market. In addition to the Volga, the Don became a major commercial route, with Genoese and Venetian colonies appearing on the Black Sea. Around 1475, however, the Turks established a firm hold on that sea, eliminating the Italians. The Russians continued to export such items as furs and wax and to import a wide variety of products, including textiles, wines, silverware, objects of gold, and other luxuries. Yet, although the inhabitants of northeastern Russia in the appanage period did retain some important commercial connections with the' outside world and establish others, and although internal trade did grow in the area with the rise of Moscow, agricultural economy for local consumption remained dominant. Commercial interests and the middle class in general had remarkably little weight in the history of the Muscovite state.
Other leading occupations of the period were hunting, fishing, cattle raising, and apiculture, as well as numerous arts and crafts. Carpentry was especially well developed, while tannery, weaving, work in metal, and some other skills found a wide application in providing for the basic needs of the people. Certain luxurious and artistic crafts sharply declined, largely because of the poverty characteristic of the age, but they survived in some places, principally in Novgorod; with the rise of Moscow, the new capital gradually became their center.
The Question of Russian Feudalism
The question of the social structure of appanage Russia is closely tied to the issue of feudalism in Russian history. Traditionally, specialists have considered the development of Russia as significantly different from that of other European countries, one of the points of contrast being precisely the absence of feudalism in the Russian past. Only at the beginning of this century did Pavlov-Silvansky offer a brilliant and reasonably full analysis of ancient Russia supporting the conclusion that Russia too had experienced a feudal stage. Pavlov-Silvansky's thesis became an object of heated controversy in the years preceding the First World War. After the Revolution, Soviet historians proceeded to define "feudal" in extremely broad terms
and to apply this concept to the development of Russia all the way from the days of Kiev to the second half of the nineteenth century. Outside the Soviet Union, a number of scholars, while disagreeing with Pavlov-Silvansky on important points, nevertheless accepted at least a few feudal characteristics as applicable to medieval Russia.
Pavlov-Silvansky argued that three traits defined feudalism and that all three were present in appanage Russia: division of the country into independent and semi-independent landholdings, the seigniories; inclusion of these landholdings into a single system by means of a hierarchy of vassal relationships; and the conditional quality of the possession of a fief. Russia was indeed divided into numerous independent principalities and privileged boyar holdings, that is, seigniories. As in western Europe, the vassal hierarchy was linked to the land: the votchina, which was an inherited estate, corresponded to the seigniory; the pomestie, which was an estate granted on condition of service, to the benefice. Pavlov-Silvansky, it should be noted, believed that the pomestiia, characteristic of the Muscovite period of Russian history, already represented a significant category of landholding in the appanage age. The barons, counts, dukes, and kings of the West found their counterparts in the boyars, service princes, appanage princes, and grand princes of medieval Russia. Boyar service, especially military service, based on free contract, provided the foundation for the hierarchy of vassal relationships. Special ceremonies, comparable to those in the West, marked the assumption and the termination of this service. Appanage Russia knew such institutions as feudal patronage, commendation - personal or with the land - and the granting of immunity to the landlords, that is, of the right to govern, judge, and tax their peasants without interference from higher authority. Vassals of vassals appeared, so that one can also speak of sub-infeudation in Russia.
Pavlov-Silvansky's opponents, however, have presented strong arguments on their side. They have stressed the fact that throughout the appanage period Russian landlords acquired their estates through inheritance, not as compensation for service, thus retaining the right to serve whom they pleased. The estate of an appanage landlord usually remained under the jurisdiction of the ruler in whose territory it was located, no matter whom the landlord served. Furthermore, numerous institutions and even entire aspects of Western feudalism either never developed at all in Russia, or, at best, failed to grow there beyond a rudimentary stage. Such was the case, for example, with the extremely complicated Western hierarchies of vassals, with feudal military service, or with the entire phenomenon of chivalry. Even the position of the peasants and their relationship with the landlords differed markedly in the East and in the West, for serfdom became firmly established in Russia only after the appanage period.
In sum, it would seem that a precise definition of feudalism, with proper
attention to its legal characteristics, would not be applicable to Russian society. Yet, on the other hand, many developments in Russia, whether we think of the division of power and authority in the appanage period, the economy of large landed estates, or even the later pomestie system of state service, bear important resemblances to the feudal West. As already indicated, Russian social forms often appear to be rudimentary, or at least simpler and cruder, versions of Western models. Therefore, a number of scholars speak of the social organization of med
ieval Russia as incipient or undeveloped feudalism. That feudalism proved to be particularly weak when faced with the rising power of the grand princes and, especially, of the autocratic tsars.
Soviet historians require an additional note. Starting from the Marxist emphasis on similarities in the development of different societies and basing their periodization on economic factors, they offered an extremely broad definition of feudalism in terms of manorial economy, disregarding the usual stress on the distribution of power and legal authority. Thus, they considered Russia as feudal from the later Kievan period to the second half of the nineteenth century. The Soviet approach, it may be readily seen, did little to differentiate between the appanage period of Russian history and the preceding and succeeding epochs.
Appanage Society and Institutions
The social structure of appanage Russia represented, of course, a continuation and a further evolution of the society of the Kievan period, with no sharp break between the two. The princes occupied the highest rung on the social ladder. The already huge Kievan princely family proliferated and differentiated further during the centuries which followed the collapse of a unitary state. The appanage period naturally proved to be the heyday of princes and princelings, ranging from grand princes to rulers of tiny principalities and even to princes who had nothing to rule and were forced to find service with their relatives. It might be added that in addition to the grand princes "of Moscow and all Russia," grand princes emerged in several other regional centers, notably Tver and Riazan, where the lesser members of a particular branch of the princely family paid a certain homage to their more powerful elder. The expansion of Moscow ended this anarchy of princes, and with it the appanage period.