A history of Russia

by Riazanovsky

  forcing foreign diplomatie representatives to vacate their domiciles in Minsk), and, albeit in his own way pro-Russian, was regarded with much suspicion by the Russians.

  In the cases of the Baltic countries, Kazakhstan and most other successor states, the Russian government was not concerned with their historical past or their ethnic and cultural closeness to the Russians, but only with how these obviously foreign entities treated their ethnically Russian subjects. Yet tensions were raised by the possibility that a change in the Russians' approach might lead to their claiming on ethnic grounds territories all the way from a strip along the Estonian border to the entire northern Kazakhstan. Nor is the issue of "the treatment" of Russians in the succession republics an easy one. It pivots on requirements for citizenship and especially on how quickly and how well Russian inhabitants must learn the official language of their republic to qualify for citizenship, although sometimes when the candidates for citizenship or their families moved into the area also matter. And the languages in question range from difficult to very difficult. Still, some adjustments and compromises have been made, and the attitude of the Russian government on this entire issue deserves to be considered on the whole reasonable, unless one is to assume that it has no right at all to be concerned with the fate of Russians outside Russia.

  The Soviet government and the Red Army also gave up Eastern Europe, including East Germany, and in fact evacuated it, in general, in a remarkably precipitous and total way. During the years that followed, the countries in that area underwent different experiences, some of them like and others unlike those of Russia, ranging from the absorption of East Germany into a larger Germany, and Vaclav Havel's liberal regime in Czechoslovakia to strong residual communism and neo-communism in such states as Rumania, Bulgaria, and even to some extent Poland. Yet throughout Eastern Europe the period preceding the collapse of 1989 was regarded as that of Russian, as well as communist, oppression, and, once the oppression ended, the inhabitants of the area were at best indifferent to the Russians and their fate. In fact, as debates about the expansion of N.A.T.O. and other evidence indicated, East European countries could be considered as much enemies as friends of Russia. A greater sympathy awaited new Russia in central and western Europe and in the United States. Following Gorbachev's example, Yeltsin maintained excellent personal relation with Western leaders, such as Chancellor Kohl and President Clinton. In January 1996 Russia was admitted to membership in the Council of Europe. In general Clinton and West European leaders and states, including Germany, strongly supported Yeltsin and his limping program of democracy and modernization, although, to be sure, no Marshall Plan was established for Russia, and although Russians felt deceived in their expectations of a much larger sponsorship. The Russian Federation also tried to maintain good relations with other neighbors as well as more distant countries, in spite of such serious hindrances as its inability to settle the issue of the sovereignty of certain of the Kurile islands with Japan.

  Some significant conroversies and conflicts did arise. Perhaps especially important in that regard was the official invitation issued by N.A.T.O. on July 8, 1997, to Poland, the Czech Republic (Slovakia had Seceded from Czechoslovakia), and Hungary to join the alliance by 1999. (The three countries became members of N.A.T.O. on March 19, 1999). Judged, with some reason - especially with a view to a still further future expansion of N.A.T.O. - to be anti-Russian as well as unnecessary by the Russians, this move produced a strong negative reaction in Russia, mitigated to some extent by certain "special arrangements" instituted between the Russian Federation and N.A.T.O. Russia disagreed with the United States and other Western countries on many issues. This, however, no longer represented the dreaded confrontation of the communist and the free worlds. Indeed, in numerous matters, whether related to Bosnia or to Iraq, France, for example, often stood closer to Russia than to the United States.

  The Kosovo tragedy, however, and in particular the aerial assault on Yugoslavia, beginning on the twenty-fourth of March, by the United States and other members of N.A.T.O., came as a tremendous shock to the Russians who were outraged by that unexpected attack on a sovereign, Orthodox and Slavic state. The liberals, who had put their trust in the West, were probably even more upset than the nationalists, the conservatives and the communists. A notable exception were the people of Islamic background inhabiting the Russian federation, such as the Tartars, who came out strongly in support of the victimized Moslem Albanians of Kosovo. In line with the popular outcry, the Russian government denounced the N.A.T.O. aggression and highlighted its opposition by such gestures as Primakov's turning back in the air on the way to a conference in Washington, once N.A.T.O. bombs began to fall, and a refusal of Russia to attend as a guest the celebration by N.A.T.O. of its fiftieth anniversary. Still, Yeltsin and his government maintained essential ties with the West, and indeed tried to borrow as much more money as they could from the International Monetary Fund. Moreover, continuous aerial bombardment as well as quite possibly Russian efforts at negotiation made Milosevic finally give in to N.A.T.O., and peace was established in Kosovo in the second half of June. Russia went on to participate - not without new tensions - in the occupation and the restoration of the devastated area. On the whole its international position improved because of its role in the Kosovo tragedy, with, in particular, promises of more Western financial help. And it had a new government, headed by another veteran of the establishment, Sergei Stepashin. Many observers believed that Yeltsin dismissed Primakov because he found the prime minister too popular and too independent.

  Society, Religion, Culture

  The years of Yeltsin's presidential rule, so obviously transitional in economics and politics, were no less fluid and even chaotic in social terms. Some of the

  major changes that then occurred are probably irreversible. Thus, in direct contrast to the former command economy, some 80 per cent of industry and business became privatized. Privatization, aptly stigmatized by the Russians as prikhvatization (privatizatsiia-prikhvatizattsiia the latter word meaning snatching, or grabbing), together with certain other developments mentioned above, led to a sudden appearance of an extremely rich upper layer of Russian society. And, although such "oligarchs" as Berezovsky or Gusinsky were few, they constituted the uppermost level of the newly thriving class of bankers, speculators, and businessmen, with their attendant staffs and followers. It has been estimated that as much as one-third of the inhabitants of Moscow had already switched to the new capitalist key. Elsewhere in Russia this advance of capitalism was in general much slower, but it could be at least detected, and to it, presumably, belonged the future. The new entrepreneurs proceeded to discover rich opportunities and to prosper, even when the bulk of the population suffered. Yet the financial collapse in August 1998 put them too and their prospects in question.

  Below them everything went almost unremittingly badly. As already emphasized, the government failed to pay its employees in offices, schools, hospitals, and even in the army and in the prison system, as well as the pensioneers, with the arrears mounting. People survived by moonlighting, frequently holding several jobs at the same time, cultivating garden plots for food, selling what little they had at markets and street corners, and obtaining when possible help from relatives. Industrial workers and miners could not collect their pay and were further threatened by the obsolescence and likely closure or at least revamping and streamlining of their factories and mines. In contrast, for example, to communist China, and plagued by the weakness of the related infrastructure and communication networks, an individualistic peasantry failed to develop. Crime, alcoholism, and illnesses took their toll. In fact, corruption and mafia-style crime have been highlighted by many observers as main obstacles to a successful economic and social evolution of Russia. And throughout the Yeltsin years the country was losing its citizens, often the ablest ones, whether mathematicians or ice hockey players, to a massive migration abroad.

  One institution that profited enormously from the fal
l of communism and has continued to grow and prosper has been the patriarchal Russian Orthodox Church. Of course, all religions and all denominations had reason to celebrate the end of communism, which intended to exterminate them. Whereas only Albania and the Campuchea of the Khmer Rouges declared that program accomplished, other communist states, the Soviet Union very much included, could not be faulted for not trying. Recently available sources underline Lenin's personal hatred for and desire to destroy Orthodox priests and other proponents of the Church, quite in accord with the official ideology and attitude to be continued by his successors. Religion as such was the main enemy, and it is impossible to decide whether the massacre of the Russian priests or of the Buddhist lamas in Outer Mongolia, formally not even part of the Soviet Union, was more horrible.

  But because of its importance, size, and geographic extent, Russian Orthodoxy was the greatest sufferer, with uncounted martyrs. It survived, as outlined in preceding chapters, because of the unexpectedly strong support of the faithful, because when total destruction failed, the government instituted a certain compromise accepted by the patriarchal Church, because of the national rally during the Second World War, and other special circumstances. With the fall of communism the Church suddenly emerged from what has been described as the greatest religious persecution in human history to a central and privileged position. At present the Church is favored by Yeltsin and by almost all political parties and groupings, with even Zyuganov and his communists proclaiming that they no longer opposed religion. Its expanding membership includes perhaps one-third of the Russian people, although many of them do not regularly attend services. What is more, repeated polls indicate that the population has a higher regard for and more confidence in the Church than in anything else in the country, be it the government, the armed forces, or the political parties. The Russian Orthodox Church has a fine position and excellent prospects, but it also has many problems.

  One of the problems stems from the persecution and aggressive de-Christianization of the Soviet period. The Church is short of everything, and the large-scale construction and restoration of church buildings represents only a portion of the most visible part of its needs. At times the Church seems to operate as a missionary establishment rather than one that recently celebrated a thousand years of its existence. Another complex problem is that of ecclesiastical jurisdiction in newly independent states, such as Ukraine and the Baltic republics. Within the Church there exists a strong and extreme Right wing, characterized among its other qualities by anti-Westernism, anti-Semitism, and isolationism, and headed until his death in 1995 by the second-ranking hierarch of the Church, the Metropolitan of St. Petersburg John. Patriarch Alexis II managed to contain Metropolitan John and his followers and to continue a rather moderate and flexible policy, but the issue between the two points of view has by no means been resolved. There were also problems in relations with the state. As already mentioned, Yeltsin, his government, and most other politicians treated the Church very favorably. Yet the state remained secular, while the Church wanted to play a greater role in education and in general to have Orthodoxy recognized more formally and fully as the religion of Russia. On September 19, 1997, the Duma passed a revised version of what has been described as a religious protection bill, passed soon after unanimously by the Federation Council and signed by Yeltsin, which declared Orthodoxy, Islam, Judaism, and Buddhism as the established religions of Russia, and made it more difficult for other religious groups to operate in the country, especially where they had not been previously entrenched over a period of time. Enjoying vast popular support as a proper measure against evangelical Christians, as well as Mormons, Hare Krishnas, and other religious groups which seemed to have flooded Russia in

  search of converts after the fall of communism, the bill was internationally denounced as an infraction of the freedom of religion. Its application in practice has been and will be watched closely in many quarters.

  It is too early to discuss with any degree of finality and even precision the structure of post-communist Russian culture or its defining traits. One can only mention the immediate impact of the collapse of communism as sweeping in its own way in culture as in politics, economics or foreign policy. Marxism-Leninism disappeared from sight - whatever its underground residue - both as a massive presence in schools and other academic institutions and as the guiding doctrine there and everywhere else. Its teachers turned to more traditional philosophy or history, or switched professions. Instead Russia became immediately open to every conceivable idea and doctrine, with Russian intellectuals reveling in the latest Western views and teachings, but also in the accomplishments of their own Silver Age, continued in emigration by such philosophers as Nicholas Berdiaev. Unfortunately, the new intellectual richness coincided with a diminishing support from the state and general economic decline and even disaster.

  In literature, too, of course, old structures, prescriptions, and controls vanished. Regrettably, so did state support. Some observers were disappointed that priceless novels did not appear from their places of hiding once communism had collapsed. But then there was only one Tolstoy and one Dostoevsky. More generally Russian intellectuals complained that once unrestricted commercialism prevailed, the public went after pornography or simply trash, while poets and other writers lost their former positions as centers of attention and inspiration to everything from television to comics. Yet few of them would prefer a return to the former programmed and closed society. Indeed, today Russian literature is already varied, interesting, and rich, and its future looks bright, especially if it is granted a modicum of political stability and economic support. Musicians and other artists have been in a position similar to that of writers, although perhaps favored by their proclivity to travel and by the fact that their languages need no translators.

  An interesting phenomenon during the Yeltsin years has been the return of dissenters and other emigres for a visit, a few performances, or more permanently. Many will never forget Vladimir Horowitz in St. Petersburg playing the piano in the very hall where he began his professional career, or - certainly the most celebrated returner and return of all - Alexander Solzhenitsyn coming back to his native land in the summer of 1994 to denounce at close range the new Russia, as he had so effectively denounced its Soviet predecessor.

  BIBLIOGRAPHY

  Alliluyeva, Svetlana Isosifovna (1926-) Stalin's daughter. Works include Twenty Letters to a Friend.

  Armstrong, John A. (1922-) American political scientist. Works include The Politics of Totalitarianism: The Communist Party of the Soviet Union from 1934 to the Present; The Soviet Bureaucratic Elite: A Case Study of the Ukrainian Apparatus; Ukrainian Nationalism, 1939-1945; The European Administrative Elite; Ideology, Politics and Government in the Soviet Union; Nations before Nationalism.

  Baumgarten, Nicolas Pierre Serge von (1887-1939) Russian historian. Works include "Aux origines de la Russie," Orientalia Christiana Analecta 119 (1939); "Chronologie ecclesiastique des terres russes du Xe au XIIIe siecle," Orientalia Christiana (January 1930); "Genealogies des branches regnantes des Rurikides russes du XIIIe au XVIe siecle," Orientalia Christiana (June 1934); "Genealogies et mariages occidentaux des Rurikides russes du Xe au XIIIe siecle," Orientalia Christiana (May 1927).

  Bayer, Gottlieb Siegfried (1694-1738) German historian who worked in Russia under Empress Anne. Works include De Russorum prima expeditione Constantinopolitana; De Varagis; Geographia Russiae… ex Constantino Porphyrogenneta; Geographia Russiae ex Scriptoribus Septentrionalibus; Origines Russicae.

  Baykov, Alexander (1899-) Russian-British economist. Works include The Development of the Soviet Economic System: An Essay on the Experience of Planning in the USSR; Soviet Foreign Trade.

  Berdiaev, Nikolai Aleksandrovich (1878-1948) Russian cultural philosopher. Works include Istoki i smysl russkogo kommunizma (The Origin of Russian Communism); The Russian Revolution: Two Essays on its Implications in Religion and Psychology; Russkaia ideia: Osnovnye problemy russkoi
mysli XIX veka i nachala XX veka {The Russian Idea).

  Bereday, George Z. F. (1920-) American specialist on Soviet education. Works include The Changing Soviet School: The Comparative Education Society Field Study in the U.S.S.R. (ed. with William W. Brickman and Gerald H. Read); The Politics of Soviet Education (ed. with Jaan Pennar); "Education: Organization and Values since 1917," in Transformation of Russian Society (ed. ?. ?. Black).

  Bergson, Abram (1914-) American economist. Works include The Real National Income of Soviet Russia since 1928; The Structure of Soviet Wages: A Study in Socialist Economics; Soviet Economic Growth: Conditions and Perspectives (ed.).

  Berlin, Sir Isaiah (1909-1997) British intellectual historian. Works include The Hedgehog and the Fox, An Essay on Tolstoy's View of History; Karl Marx: His Life and Environment; "Russia and 1848," Slavonic and East European Review (April 1948); "The Marvelous Decade," Encounter (June, November, December 1955; May 1956); "The Silence in Russian Culture," Foreign Affairs (October 1957); "Tolstoy and Enlightenment," Encounter (February 1961); Russian Thinkers.

  Black, Cyril E. (1915-1989) American historian. Works include Twentieth-Century Europe: A History (with E. ? Helmreich); Rewriting Russian History: Soviet Interpretations of Russia's Past (ed.); The Transformation of Russian Society: Aspects of Social Change since 1861 (ed.); The Modernization of Japan and Russia (with others);