The World Was Going Our Way

by Christopher Andrew

  Do not permit anything that would cause complaints about our activity in Chile and Peru.

  Do not force the establishment of liaison with the [intelligence] service in Chile. Arouse their interest by passing them intelligence of a topical nature through LEADER.99

  In the course of 1972 Moscow substantially downgraded its assessment of the prospects of the Allende regime. In July a leading Soviet journal was still maintaining, ‘The record of Chile shows that a number of Latin American countries can adopt a form of socialist construction.’ In October, however, the ‘Truckers’ Strike’, allegedly backed by CIA funding, virtually paralysed the economy for three weeks, providing dramatic evidence of the weakness of the Popular Unity government and the power of its opponents. At a meeting of the CPSU Central Committee in November, Chile was officially said not to be building socialism but merely to be seeking ‘free and independent development on the path of democracy and social progress’. The mounting evidence of chronic economic mismanagement also made Moscow reluctant to provide large-scale support. Allende returned from a visit to Moscow in December with much less than he had hoped for. Simultaneously the Sunday Times published a report by its leading foreign correspondent, David Holden, headlined ‘Chile, Collapse of a Marxist Experiment?’ ‘Allende’s own survival is in doubt’, predicted Holden. ‘. . . Anger, fear and a determination to fight are now more evident on the Right as well as the Left.’ 100

  Andropov was anxious none the less that the KGB should do what it could to prevent the defeat of the Allende regime either at the polls or by military coup. On 25 December 1972 he sent the Politburo a memorandum giving a rather exaggerated impression of the KGB’s ability to influence Chilean politics:

  The KGB maintains confidential relations with Allende and [a left-wing senator], and also with prominent individuals in the Socialist, Radical, and Christian Democratic Parties.

  Parliamentary elections will take place in March 1973.

  Considering the situation during the pre-election period, it is planned to take measures to strengthen relations with the above-mentioned people, and also to make new contacts in government, party, and parliamentary circles, including certain representatives of the right-wing opposition and the extremist organization, the Leftist Revolutionary Movement (MIR).

  Through unofficial contacts with the country’s influential people and other ways, it is planned to concentrate [the KGB’s] efforts on the following: helping to consolidate the forces supporting Chile’s government; creating obstacles to any co-operation between the Christian Democratic and the National parties within the framework of the opposition; exerting an influence on the armed forces in order to prevent them from being used against Popular Unity.

  The KGB also is planning to use its capabilities to carry out a series of active measures in Latin American and other countries for the purpose of exposing the imperialists’ interference in Chile’s internal affairs, and to exert the necessary influence on public opinion, thus inducing the anti-imperialist and progressive elements to support Popular Unity more actively.

  In order to finance these measures, in addition to operations against government and political figures (including influencing some of them through financial means), the sum of $100,000 is required. Part of this money is to be given to Allende for work with his own contacts in political and military circles.

  Approval for the payment of $100,000 from the Council of Ministers reserve fund for KGB ‘special measures’ in Chile was given by the Politburo on 7 February 1973.101 An additional ‘monetary reward’ of $400 was made to Allende for unspecified ‘valuable information’ he had provided.102

  A further report to the Politburo by Andropov in February 1973 gave an optimistic assessment of the KGB’s influence on Allende during his meetings with Kuznetsov:

  Allende set this channel apart from the usual unofficial governmental contacts and used it for handling the most confidential and delicate matters (establishing contact between Chile’s and the USSR’s armed forces, consulting on the use of Chilean atomic raw materials, organizing co-operation between the Chilean and Soviet security services, and other matters) by handing over information and discussing current political issues. [The KGB] is succeeding in exerting a definite influence on Allende. This is aiding, in particular, a more correct understanding on the President’s part of China’s policies, as well as a decision on his part to strengthen contact between the Chilean and Peruvian military for the purpose of exerting a positive influence on the leadership of Chile’s armed forces. In turn, Allende is systematically informing us on the situation in the country and in Popular Unity, on his own personal plans, and so forth.

  Our officer’s meetings with Allende, during which they discussed business matters, were conducted in private. The President invited him to pay a visit at any time - either at work or at his home - without prior notice, whenever there was an urgent necessity for this.

  The strengthening of our officer’s relations with Allende was facilitated by material aid given to him, personal attention, and the fulfilment of his personal requests.

  In order to make more effective and beneficial use of our contact with Allende, the following is suggested:• help in strengthening Allende’s position and authority both within the country and on the Latin American continent through the unofficial channels available to us;

  • broader use of Allende’s ability to assess the situation in Latin American countries, bearing in mind that he can send his own emissaries to several of them;

  • measures to obtain information through Allende on the policies of the Chinese government, including the use of the President’s trusted persons, whom he can send there;

  • material assistance to Allende for his work with contacts in political and military circles, especially during the pre-election period, up to the sum of $50,000 - taken from funds allocated to the KGB via CPSU Central Committee Resolution No. P-78/31, dated 13 February 1973.

  The flaws in Andropov’s report were characteristic of many similar documents. Its chief purpose was to impress the Politburo with the KGB’s ability to gain clandestine access to a foreign leader and exert influence on him. Characteristically, it avoided mentioning any problems which might take the gloss off the KGB’s success. Privately, the Centre was increasingly worried about Allende’s prospects of survival. Andropov, however, gave no hint of those concerns to the Politburo. His memorandum, including the request for additional funding, was duly approved.103

  Privately, the Centre was worried by the deficiencies of Allende’s security and intelligence system, which increased his vulnerability to a military coup. Once again, it gave the political leadership a rose-tinted view of the improvements which were under way. The Centre reported to Brezhnev that on 17 February 1973 the KGB operations officer responsible for liaison with the Chilean security services (not identified in Mitrokhin’s notes) met Allende secretly at a villa in the suburbs of Santiago:

  Allende expressed certain of his views regarding the reorganization of the security services. According to his plan, an efficient apparatus with both intelligence and counter-intelligence functions would be created to report directly to him. As the basis for this apparatus, he planned to use one component of the Servicio de Investigaciones [the Chilean security service] and recruit reliable personnel from the Socialist and Communist parties. The main efforts of this organ would be directed at uncovering and suppressing subversive activity on the part of Americans and local reactionary forces, and in organizing intelligence work within the armed forces, since the position taken by the armed forces was a decisive factor that would determine the fate of the Chilean revolutionary process.

  Allende is very much counting on Soviet assistance in this matter.104

  The attempted reorganization achieved little. The Servicio de Investigaciones successfully intimidated some of the regime’s opponents and gained a reputation for turning the cellars at its headquarters into torture chambers. Nathaniel Davis, the US ambass
ador, noted, however, that the Servicio ‘was consumed by personal squabbles between the Socialists and the Communists’. Any attempt to strengthen the civilian intelligence community faced an almost impossible dilemma. The measures necessary to forestall a coup - in particular, any attempt to gather intelligence on plotting within the armed services - were likely to provoke the military into the very action they were designed to prevent.105

  In the March congressional elections Allende’s Unidad Popular won 44 per cent of the vote as compared with the opposition’s 56 per cent. Nathaniel Davis summed up the result as ‘discouraging for both sides . . . Unidad Popular found itself a continuing minority for the foreseeable future, and the opposition found its majority insufficient to force legitimate change’ .106 There is no evidence that the KGB tried to explain to the Politburo why its ‘confidential relations’ with leading Chilean politicians across the political spectrum had failed to produce the UP victory which it had led the Politburo to expect three months earlier. Preferring as usual to concentrate on its successes, it emphasized instead the President’s willingness to provide further assistance to its operations. Andropov wrote to Brezhnev to request approval for funding intelligence collection by Allende in other South American countries on the KGB’s behalf:

  Our officer had a discussion with [Allende] about receiving information on Latin America by enlisting the President’s assistance. Allende showed an interest in this matter and expressed several specific ideas of his own. In particular, he expressed a willingness to send his own trusted people to Latin American countries, where they would be able to establish contacts with his friends and political supporters, and obtain useful information from them.

  In the near future the President will be able to send his emissary to Venezuela for the purpose of ascertaining the situation in that country on the eve of the presidential elections coming up in November of this year. Among his trusted personal contacts, Allende named [Luis] Beltrán Prieto [Figueroa], the leader of the progressive Venezuelan party called the People’s Election Movement [Movimento Electoral del Pueblo].

  In addition, the President is willing to co-operate in obtaining information on Argentina and Ecuador, where the situation is characterized by complexities and contradictions.

  Brezhnev wrote ‘Approved’ at the bottom of Andropov’s request. 107

  Andropov, however, was increasingly pessimistic about Allende’s prospects of survival. One day in the spring of 1973, he made an unexpected visit to FCD headquarters at Yasenevo. According to Nikolai Leonov:

  He summoned everyone who had anything to do with Latin America and put a single question to us: How did we view the Chilean case? Did it have a chance or not? Should we commit all our resources, or was it already too late to risk them? The discussion was quite profound . . . We came to the conclusion that the measure being planned for making a cash loan - I believe 30 million US dollars was being talked about - would be unable to rescue the situation in Chile. It would be like putting a patch on a worn-out tyre. In the KGB’s view, Allende’s fundamental error was his unwillingness to use force against his opponents. Without establishing complete control over all the machinery of the state, his hold on power could not be secure. ‘All our sympathies were with [Allende’s] experiment’, recalls Leonov, ‘. . . but we did not believe in its success. ’108 Over the next few months the Santiago residency reported what it considered ‘alarming signs of increased tension’. 109

  The first attempt to overthrow the regime was made by activists of the extreme right-wing Patria y Libertad movement, who hatched a plot with disaffected officers of the Second Armoured Regiment to kidnap Allende on 27 June. The Santiago residency informed the Centre that it had obtained intelligence on plans for the coup and warned Allende.110 Its achievement, however, was rather less impressive than it probably appeared in Moscow. The security of the coup plotters was so poor that their plans leaked and the coup planned for the 27th was postponed. On the 29th, however, three combat groups of tanks and armoured cars with about a hundred troops left their barracks and headed for the centre of Santiago. The coup petered out in farce. As Nathaniel Davis noted, ‘the column obeyed all the traffic lights and at least one tank stopped to fill up at a commercial gas station’. The most significant aspect of the failed coup was the apathetic response to it by Chilean workers, the supposed bedrock of Allende’s support. Allende broadcast an appeal for ‘the people . . . to pour into the centre of the city’ to defend his government. They did not do so. That highly significant fact was duly noted by the Army Chief of Staff, General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte.111

  The next ten weeks were a period of continuous political, economic and military crisis. Since Allende’s election in 1970, Chile’s currency had been devalued on the open market by the staggering figure of 10,000 per cent. David Holden headlined a report from Santiago, ‘Chile: Black Market Road to Socialism’, and reported that, ‘Anyone who can afford the time to queue for petrol legally can become a rich man by selling his daily intake at 30 times the official price . . . To an outsider, it seems a mighty peculiar road to Socialism - or to anywhere else for that matter.’112

  In his unsuccessful appeal to Chilean workers on 29 July to come to the defence of the regime, Allende had declared, ‘If the hour comes, the people will have arms’ - his first public statement that he would mobilize left-wing paramilitary groups if faced with military revolt. During August the armed forces mounted an increasingly intensive search for illegal arms dumps - predictably concentrating on those held by the left.113 The KGB later complained that Allende paid too little attention to its warnings of an impending coup.114 When Pinochet and a military junta launched the coup in the early hours of 11 September,115 Corvalán and the Communist leadership, who had also been kept informed by the KGB,116 were better prepared than Allende. The Communist Party newspaper that morning carried the banner headline, ‘Everyone To His Combat Post!’ ‘Workers of city and countryside’ were summoned to combat ‘to repel the rash attempt of the reactionaries who are determined to bring down the constitutional government’. While Corvalán and the leadership moved underground, Communist factory managers began to mobilize workers in the industrial belt.

  Allende, however, failed to live up to his promise six weeks earlier to summon the people to arms to defend his regime. When the coup began on 11 September, instead of seeking support in the working-class areas of Santiago, he based himself in the presidential offices in La Moneda, where he was defended by only fifty to sixty of his Cuban-trained GAP and half a dozen officers from the Servicio de Investigaciones. Allende’s lack of preparation to deal with the coup partly derived from his preference for improvisation over advance planning. His French confidant, Régis Debray, later claimed that he ‘never planned anything more than forty-eight hours in advance’. But Allende was also anxious to avoid bloodshed. Convinced that popular resistance would be mown down by Pinochet’s troops, he bravely chose to sacrifice himself rather than his followers. Castro and many of Allende’s supporters later claimed that he was gunned down by Pinochet’s forces as they occupied La Moneda. In reality, it seems almost certain that, faced with inevitable defeat, Allende sat on a sofa in the Independence Salon of La Moneda, placed the muzzle of an automatic rifle (a present from Castro) beneath his chin and blew his brains out. 117

  Allende, wrote David Holden, was ‘instantly canonized as the western world’s newest left-wing martyr’, becoming overnight ‘the most potent cult figure since his old friend, Che Guevara’. Devotees of the Allende cult quickly accepted as an article of faith Castro’s insistence that, instead of committing suicide, Allende had been murdered in cold blood by Pinochet’s troops. The Guardian declared on 17 September, ‘For Socialists of this generation, Chile is our Spain . . . This is the most vicious Fascism we have seen in generations.’ Pinochet’s regime was as loathed in the 1970s as Franco’s had been in the 1930s.118

  As well as doing what it could to promote the Allende cult, KGB active measures also sought
to establish a secondary cult around the heroic figure of the Communist leader Luis Corvalán, who had been captured after the coup and, together with some of Allende’s former ministers, imprisoned in harsh conditions on Dawson Island in the Magellan Straits. As well as seeking to promote international appeals for Corvalán’s release, the KGB also tried to devise a method of rescuing him and other prisoners from Dawson Island by a commando raid organized by the FCD Special Actions Directorate V, which was approved in principle by Andropov on 27 March 1974. 119 Satellite photographs were taken of Dawson Island and used by Directorate V to construct a model of the prison. The rescue plan eventually devised was for a large commercial cargo vessel to enter the Magellan Straits with three or four helicopters concealed beneath its hatches. When the vessel was fifteen kilometres from Dawson Island, the helicopters would take off carrying commandos who would kill the relatively small number of prison guards, rescue Corvalán and other prisoners, and transfer them to a submarine waiting nearby. The helicopters would then be destroyed and sunk in deep water, thus leaving no incriminating evidence to prevent the Soviet cargo vessel continuing on its way. The rescue plan, however, was never implemented. According to Leonov: ‘When this plan was presented to the leadership, they looked at us as if we were half-crazy, and all our attempts to persuade them to study it in greater detail proved fruitless, although the military did agree to provide the means to carry it out.’120