54 . k-22, 46.
55 . k-12, 160.
56 . Miller, Soviet Relations with Latin America, 1959-1987, p. 128.
57 . k-22, 368. Though Mitrokhin’s notes do not specify Kuznetsov’s cover on this occasion, on other missions he operated as a Novosti correspondent; k-22, 343.
58 . k-22, 368.
59 . k-22, 110.
60 . Davis, The Last Two Years of Salvador Allende, p. 4.
61 . Haslam, The Nixon Administration and the Death of Allende’s Chile, pp. 2-3.
62 . k-12, 160.
63 . Davis, The Last Two Years of Salvador Allende, pp. 48-53; Quirk, Fidel Castro, p. 685.
64 . k-22, 368.
65 . Gustafson, ‘CIA Covert Action and the Chilean Coup’, ch. 4.
66 . Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only, pp. 370-72; Davis, The Last Two Years of Salvador Allende, pp. 4-5.
67 . k-12, 160.
68 . Ulianova and Fediakova, ‘Algunos aspectos de la ayuda financiera del Partido Comunista de la URSS al comunismo chileno durante la guerra fría’. Mitrokhin’s notes detail some of the complexities in transmitting the secret subsidies. In 1965, for example, at least $100,000 of the subsidy was transmitted via the KGB residency in Montevideo; t-7, 90.
69 . Politburo decision No. P-170/31 of 27 July 1970; k-12, 160. Mitrokhin’s notes resolve a conundrum posed by the records of payments to foreign Communist parties in the archives of the CPSU Central Committee. According to one document, in 1970 the Chilean Communist Party received the fourth highest of the secret subsidies given to fraternal parties. The list of 1970 allocations, however, puts the Chilean Party in sixth place (Ulianova and Fediakova, ‘Algunos aspectos de la ayuda financiera del Partido Comunista de la URSS al comunismo chileno durante la guerra fría’). The discrepancy is explained by the additional payment to the Chilean Communist Party authorized by the Politburo on 27 July 1970.
70 . The Chilean Communist Party leader, Luis Corvalán, records in his memoirs that Allende had asked the Party to request $100,000 from Moscow for him to use in his presidential election campaign. Corvalán adds, ‘The reply, which was negative, seemed to us so terrible and unpresentable to our candidate [Allende] that we decided to use our own reserves to provide him with US$100,000 . . . in the name of the Soviet Communists.’ Corvalán was clearly unaware that Allende also received $50,000 from Moscow via the KGB. Corvalán, De lo vivido y lo peleado, p. 108; Ulianova and Fediakova, ‘Algunos aspectos de la ayuda financiera del Partido Comunista de la URSS al comunismo chileno durante la guerra fría’.
71 . k-22, 41.
72 . Mitrokhin notes simply, ‘A report signed by Andropov, under reference No. 2591-A of 23 September 1970, informed the CPSU Central Committee of the part played by the KGB in the electoral campaign and of the outcome. ’ The fact that Andropov chose to report on the role of the KGB in the election, however, undoubtedly means that he did so in positive terms; k-12, 160.
73 . k-12, 160. Allende’s KGB file, DOR No. 90526, fills three volumes for the period up to his election.
74 . Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only, pp. 270-71; Gustafson, ‘CIA Machinations in Chile in 1970’.
75 . k-22, 368.
76 . The US economic offensive against the Allende government was conducted not in Chile itself but through attempts to influence international lending markets and the Paris club of major creditor nations. Falcoff, Modern Chile 1970-1989, pp. 217-30; Gustafson, ‘CIA Covert Action and the Chilean Coup’. On Allende’s economic mismanagement, see Haslam, The Nixon Administration and the Death of Allende’s Chile, ch. 5.
77 . k-22, 344. In reality, Davis opposed a request by the Santiago CIA station for more funds for covert action in February 1973, and tendered his resignation over CIA covert action in Angola in 1975. Davis, The Last Two Years of Salvador Allende, pp. 308, 387-8. Kuznetsov also gave Allende the names of seventeen other real or alleged CIA officers in Chile.
78 . k-22, 341.
79 . k-22, 362, 366, 371. In two of these notes from KGB files, Miria Contreras Bell is incorrectly referred to as ‘Miria de Ropert’, no doubt as a result of her previous marriage to the Socialist Party militant, Enrique Ropert Gallet, some details of whose career were published in the Santiago journal El Periodista, vol. 2, no. 44, 14 September 2003. The third reference gives her name as ‘Maria [sic] Contreras Ropert’. There was some confusion in KGB files when recording Spanish names as a result of the Spanish and Latin American system of giving the Christian forename, then the patronym, followed by the mother’s surname, but omitting the last in shorter versions.
80 . Davis, The Last Two Years of Salvador Allende, p. 50.
81 . k-22, 366.
82 . See below, p. 77.
83 . Beatriz (commonly known as ‘Taty’) followed her Cuban husband, Luis Fernández Oña, to Havana after the 1973 coup, and committed suicide four years later, apparently suffering from depression. Pérez, ‘Salvador Allende, Apuntes sobre su Dispositivo de Seguridad’; Horne, Small Earthquake in Chile, p. 352; Miller, Soviet Relations with Latin America, 1959- 1987, p. 142; Quirk, Fidel Castro, p. 664.
84 . Interview with senior CIA officer who has requested anonymity; cited in Gustafson, ‘CIA Covert Action and the Chilean Coup’.
85 . See above, p. 22.
86 . k-22, 372.
87 . k-22, 367.
88 . k-22, 363.
89 . The Politburo resolved: ‘1. Adopt the proposal of the KGB, as stated in Memorandum No. 3075-A/L, dated 7 December 1971. 2. Approve the plan in the USSR Council of Ministers Resolution to allocate the KGB the necessary funds for carrying out special measures (attached).’ Council of Ministers Resolution No. 2691-RS, dated 20 December 1971, decreed: ‘Via the State Bank of the USSR, allocate to the USSR Council of Ministers Committee on State Security [KGB] $130,000 to carry out special measures, charged to expenses designated by the USSR State Bank’s foreign currency plan.’ k-22, 367.
90 . k-22, 344.
91 . k-22, 245.
92 . k-22, 370. On Basov, see Davis, The Last Two Years of Salvador Allende, pp. 391-2.
93 . k-22, 373.
94 . k-22, 341. According to Mitrokhin’s notes, while in the sanatorium, the Kuznetsovs were ‘involved in an operation [probably an influence operation] ’ against the Allendes.
95 . k-22, 377.
96 . k-22, 92. Andropov’s memorandum was a response to a report of 5 January 1972 by Sergei Kondrashev, Deputy Head of the FCD, on the work of the Second (Latin American) Department. Mitrokhin did not note Kondrashev’s report.
97 . k-22, 92.
98 . Mitrokhin notes that contact with Torres was ‘formalized in the USSR [presumably during a visit by Torres] in November-December 1975’, but gives no further details. KGB contact with Torres was maintained by B. P. Kolomyakov, V. Y. Ryabov and V. I. Denisyuk; k-2, 94.
99 . k-22, 92.
100 . Miller, Soviet Relations with Latin America, 1959-1987, p. 132; Horne, Small Earthquake in Chile, pp. 345-6. On evidence of CIA funding for the Truckers’ Strike, see Haslam, The Nixon Administration and the Death of Allende’s Chile, p. 171.
101 . k-22, 375.
102 . k-22, 365.
103 . k-22, 377.
104 . k-22, 77.
105 . Davis, The Last Two Years of Salvador Allende, pp. 192, 236.
106 . Ibid., ch. 6.
107 . Memorandum No. 687-A, 27 March 1973; k-22, 348. As well as being leader of the Venezuelan Movimento Electoral del Pueblo, Beltrán Prieto was a distinguished educationalist and prolific author, publishing more than seventy books on topics ranging from politics to poetry.
108 . Leonov, ‘La inteligencia soviética en América Latina durante la guerra fría’; Leonov, Likholet’e, pp. 125-6.
109 . k-22, 110.
110 . Ibid.
111 . Davis, The Last Two Years of Salvador Allende, pp. 171-5; Horne, Small Earthquake in Chile, pp. 347-8. Pinochet became army commander on 23 August.
112 . Horne, Small Ea
rthquake in Chile, pp. 346-7.
113 . Davis, The Last Two Years of Salvador Allende, pp. 172-4, 204.
114 . k-22, 108.
115 . The other members of the junta were General Gustavo Leigh of the air force, Admiral José Toribio Merino of the navy and General César Mendoza of the Carabineros; Constable and Valenzuela, A Nation of Enemies, p. 53.
116 . k-22, 110.
117 . Davis, The Last Two Years of Salvador Allende, pp. 171-5; Horne, Small Earthquake in Chile, chs. 10-11.
118 . Horne, Small Earthquake in Chile, pp. 353-7.
119 . k-22, 82.
120 . Leonov, ‘La inteligencia soviética en América Latina durante la guerra fría’.
121 . k-22, 82.
122 . Amnesty International, The Case of General Pinochet.
123 . The full text of the 2004 Chilean government report is accessible at http://www.comisiontortura.cl/.
124 . vol. 5, sec. 12; k-8, 533.
125 . Horne, Small Earthquake in Chile, p. 361. In 1976 the New York Times published only three articles referring to human rights abuses in Cuba.
126 . The text in the Appendix is an English translation of the Russian version copied by Mitrokhin. He did not note the Spanish text of the forgery.
5. Intelligence Priorities after Allende
1 . k-22, 116.
2 . Ibid. It is unclear from Mitrokhin’s notes whether or not this is a quotation from the Politburo minutes.
3 . Leonov, ‘La inteligencia soviética en América Latina durante la guerra fría’.
4 . Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 515.
5 . k-19, 389.
6 . k-22, 106. Mitrokhin’s notes include no reference to participation by Méndez Cominches in any conference of Soviet bloc intelligence chiefs before 1973. Since these notes are not comprehensive, however, the possibility that he took part in an earlier conference cannot be excluded.
7 . Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 514.
8 . k-22, 106. A list of DGI residencies in 1977 noted by Mitrokhin mentions New York, Ottawa, Montreal, Toronto, Mexico, Peru, Venezuela, Guyana, Panama, Jamaica, Britain, France, West Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Japan and thirteen African cities not individually listed by Mitrokhin; k-22, 161. This list, however, appears to be slightly incomplete. A note by Mitrokhin on a 1976 file mentions a DGI residency in Ecuador; k-22, 6.
9 . k-20, 345.
10 . k-22, 6, 161.
11 . k-22, 8, 149.
12 . k-20, 62.
13 . k-20, 345.
14 . For details of KGB SIGINT operations during the Cold War, see Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield, ch.21; details of running costs for the major radio intercept stations in KGB residencies are given on p. 670.
15 . Ball, ‘Soviet Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)’, pp. 27-9; Rosenau, ‘A Deafening Silence’, pp. 723-5.
16 . vol. 6, ch. 7, part 4.
17 . k-22, 146, 106.
18 . k-19, 528.
19 . k-19, 526.
20 . k-19, 529.
21 . k-19, 530.
22 . k-19, 532.
23 . k-18, 527.
24 . Izvestia, 9 Feb. 1974.
25 . t-7, 182.
26 . k-19, 267.
27 . vol. 6, ch. 8, part 4.
28 . Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 556-7. Though the CIA provided covert funding for UNITA against the MPLA, in the aftermath of the Vietnam War Washington had no stomach for a serious challenge to the Cuban military presence in Africa.
29 . Balfour, Castro, pp. 129-30.
30 . Westad, ‘Moscow and the Angolan Crisis, 1974-1976’, pp. 26-8.
31 . k-19, 389.
32 . k-19, 390.
33 . k-22, 150. The DGI carried out a similar operation, at the request of the KGB, against the Venezuelan embassy in Havana.
34 . k-19, 386.
35 . k-19, 388.
36 . See below, ch. 6.
37 . Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 559-60.
38 . Quirk, Fidel Castro, pp. 776-9.
39 . ‘Russian and East German Documents on the Horn of Africa, 1977-78’, pp. 93-4.
40 . k-19, 391.
41 . k-22, 37.
42 . k-22, 89. Posing as the representative of Sovfilmeksport and using the alias Sergei Sergeyevich Konstantinov, Tolstikov had been deputy resident in Argentina from 1955 to 1960 and resident in Mexico from 1962 to 1966; k-22, 376.
43 . Miller, Soviet Relations with Latin America, 1959-1987, p. 155.
44 . k-22, 89.
45 . k-14, 710, 711. On Gelbard and the financing of the Argentinian Communist Party see Gilbert, El Oro de Moscu, ch. 12.
46 . k-22, 78.
47 . Milenky, Argentina’s Foreign Policies, pp. 154-5.
48 . k-22, 115.
49 . Milenky, Argentina’s Foreign Policies, pp. 155-7; Miller, Soviet Relations with Latin America, 1959-1987, pp. 154-6.
50 . Miller, Soviet Relations with Latin America, 1959-1987, pp. 149, 156-8.
51 . k-22, 115.
52 . In 1974-75 the Lima residency tried to stem the right-wing shift by collecting ‘compromising material’ on General Javier Tantaleán Vanini, whom it identified as an important right-wing influence on Velasco; k-22, 186, 189. Tantaleán’s movement, La Misión, allied with Morales Bermúdez in the 1975 coup; McClintock, ‘Velasco, Officers and Citizens’, p. 281.
53 . k-22, 200.
54 . k-22, 185.
55 . k-22, 184.
56 . k-22, 8.
57 . k-22, 9. On the origins of the Departamento de América, see above, p. 56.
58 . k-8, 525; k-14, 383; k-22, 48, 101, 118.
59 . Miller, Soviet Relations with Latin America, 1959-1987, pp. 181-2; Smith, ‘Mexico since 1946’, p. 367. Though these episodes do not appear in Mitrokhin’s notes, it would have been wholly out of character if the KGB had failed to claim credit for them.
60 . k-22, 101; k-8, 522. Mitrokhin’s notes also mention the use for active measures of a Mexican publication identified only by its codename VESTNIK (‘Herald’).
61 . Kalugin, Spymaster, pp. 191-2.
62 . vol. 6, ch. 14; vol. 6, app. 1, part 22. Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield, pp. 230 - 1.
63 . vol. 6, app. 1, pp. 610a, b.
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