41 . Frank, Indira, pp. 313, 320.
42 . Malhotra, Indira Gandhi, p. 126.
43 . Frank, Indira, pp. 327-9; Mallick, Indian Communism, pp. 122-3, 147-8.
44 . vol. 4 ind., ch. 4, pp. 25-6. Mitrokhin’s probably incomplete notes on the sums paid to RERO record payments of 100,000 rupees in 1971, 1974 and 1977, and a payment of 60,000 rupees in 1976.
45 . Kaul, Reminiscences, p. 255.
46 . Gromyko, Memories, pp. 244-5.
47 . Shebarshin identifies his source only as a ‘well-informed acquaintance’ who was banned from maintaining unofficial contacts with foreigners because of his official position. The source must thus have had the status of a KGB ‘confidential contact’ even if he was not a fully recruited agent. Shebarshin, Ruka Moskvy, pp. 72-5.
48 . Ibid., pp. 75-6.
49 . Singh, The Yogi and the Bear, pp. 89-96; Horn, Soviet-Indian Relations, p. 73.
50 . Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 509-10.
51 . vol. 3 pak., ch. 1, p. 1.
52 . Kalugin, Spymaster, pp. 126-7. In 1974 Kalugin became the youngest general in the First Chief Directorate.
53 . vol. 4 ind., ch. 1, p. 5. KGB agents in Indian intelligence in 1978 included GOPAL (who worked in the Chinese department), PROTON (US department), ZINGER (US department), AVAR, KROT and SARDAR; vol. 4 ind., app. 1, items 34-8, 42.
54 . Kalugin, Spymaster, pp. 126-7.
55 . Malhotra, Indira Gandhi, pp. 143ff.
56 . k-24, 239; see above, p. 317.
57 . vol. 4 ind., ch. 5, pp. 30-31; Shebarshin’s codename is given in vol. 3 misc., p. 112.
58 . Frank, Indira, pp. 350-52, 368.
59 . k-24, 239. Mishra’s widow doubtless did not realize this was KGB money.
60 . Kalugin, Spymaster, p. 126.
61 . vol. 4 ind., ch. 6, p. 38.
62 . The only detailed figures noted by Mitrokhin for the funds channelled to the CPI via the KGB cover the period August 1975 to June 1976 and the early months of 1977. They are as follows: August 1975: three separate payments of 404,157, 136,010 and 440,476 rupees; September 1975: 473,010 rupees; October 1975: 876,486 rupees; November 1975: 444,118 rupees; January 1976: 668,824 rupees; March 1976: 300,000 rupees; April 1976: 666,176 rupees; May 1976: 200,000 rupees; June 1976: two payments of 400,000 and 769,120 rupees; January 1977: two payments of 90,676 and 1,354,015 rupees; February 1977: two payments of 441,176 and 600,000 rupees (vol. 4 ind., ch. 3, p. 15).
63 . Ibid. Mitrokhin did not record the date of the fishing trip. The member of the CPI National Council chosen to receive money from the KGB changed in 1975-76 but kept the codename BANKIR; pp. 14-15.
64 . Rao was also briefly CPI general secretary in the early 1950s. In 1977 the All-Indian Congress of Trade Unions received 10,000 Swiss francs and 43,750 US dollars; ibid., p. 14. Its leader, S. A. Dange, then CPI chairman and a committed supporter of the Indira Gandhi regime, was a controversial figure. In 1978 he was expelled from the CPI and founded his own All-India Communist Party after the Party abandoned support for Mrs Gandhi; Mallick, Indian Communism, p. 152.
65 . vol. 3 pak., ch. 5, p. 19; vol. 4, ch. 4, p. 16. A file of 1976 identifies as under KGB control one press agency (TREST), two daily newspapers (RAZUM and VOLNA), eight weekly newspapers (BRIZ, IDEYA, KURYER, PRIBOY, PRILIV, SIGNAL, SVET and ZNANIYE) and four magazines (OVAL, SPEKTR, TRIBUNA and one other). All are identified by name in Mitrokhin’s notes; vol. 4 ind., ch. 4, pp. 16-17.
66 . vol. 7 ind., ch. 7, p. 51; vol. 3 pak., ch. 5, p. 19. In 1973 the KGB also claimed to have published twenty-eight books and pamphlets in India; Mitrokhin noted no statistics for later years. It is, of course, possible that some journalists extracted money from the KGB for anti-American articles they would have written anyway.
67 . In Italy, for example, according to KGB statistics, it planted forty-eight press articles in 1975 and sixty-three in 1976; Andrew and Mitrokhin, The The Sword and the Shield, p. 659 n. 172 .
68 . k-12, 388; vol. 4 ind., app. 1, items 45, 117. During the late 1940s, Indira Gandhi’s husband Feroze had been director of the National Herald; Rau later complained of his ‘ignorance, inexperience and adventurism’. Frank, Indira, pp. 201-2. Rau’s books include India: Portrait of a People (published by the Ministry of External Affairs in 1981), History of Indian Journalism, The Press in India and Nehru for Children.
69 . Dhar, Indira Gandhi, the ‘Emergency’, and Indian Democracy, p. 235.
70 . Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 506-7.
71 . Volkogonov, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Empire, p. 281. In 1973 (the only year for which Mitrokhin noted the statistics) the KGB claimed to have organized five demonstrations in India; vol. 3 pak., ch. 1, para. 104.
72 . vol. 4 ind., ch. 4, p. 17.
73 . vol. 4 ind., ch. 8, p. 72.
74 . Cf. above, pp. 17, 21, 94.
75 . Shebarshin, Ruka Moskvy, pp. 91-3.
76 . vol. 4 ind., ch. 8, p. 72.
77 . Interview with Shebarshin, Daily Telegraph, 1 Dec. 1992.
78 . vol. 4 ind., ch. 8, p. 72.
79 . Malhotra, Indira Gandhi, pp. 163, 291; Frank, Indira, pp. 368, 374-5. On Allende’s death, see above, p. 85.
80 . Malhotra, Indira Gandhi, pp. 155-6.
81 . Moynihan, A Dangerous Place, p. 41.
82 . vol. 4 ind., ch. 8, p. 71.
83 . Ibid., pp. 72-3.
84 . Malhotra, Indira Gandhi, p. 167.
85 . Frank, Indira, ch. 16.
86 . vol. 4 ind., ch. 5, p. 32.
87 . Mallick, Indian Communism, p. 149.
88 . vol. 4 ind., ch. 5, p. 32. According to KGB files, the number of articles which it planted in the Indian press none the less declined in 1976 to 1,980, presumably as a result of press censorship during the emergency; vol. 4 ind., ch. 7, pp. 50-51.
89 . Frank, Indira, pp. 388-9. The conspiracy theory that the CIA was behind the murder of Mujibur Rahman was vigorously promoted by the KGB; see below, p. 351. Mrs Gandhi also sent one of her personal assistants to ask Shebarshin whether he thought the Chinese were involved in the coup. Shebarshin said he thought not; Shebarshin, Ruka Moskvy, pp. 94-5.
90 . Ibid., pp. 95-7.
91 . vol. 4 ind., ch. 4, pp. 17-18.
92 . Bakshi, Russia and India, p. 140.
93 . vol. 4 ind., ch. 5, p. 32.
94 . Bakshi, Russia and India, p. 140; Dhar, Indira Gandhi, the ‘Emergency’, and Indian Democracy, p. 329.
95 . Frank, Indira, pp. 393-5; Dhar, Indira Gandhi, the ‘Emergency’, and Indian Democracy, pp. 325-9. A hand-written note of 27 July 1976 from Mrs Nehru to Dhar about Sanjay’s interview is reproduced on pp. 326-8.
96 . vol. 4 ind., ch. 4, p. 19.
97 . vol. 4 ind., ch. 5, p. 33.
98 . Bakshi, Russia and India, p. 142; Singh, The Yogi and the Bear, pp. 133-4.
99 . vol. 4 ind., ch. 5, p. 33.
100 . vol. 4 ind., ch. 3, p. 15.
101 . vol. 4 ind., ch. 4, p. 19.
102 . Frank, Indira, pp. 413-14.
18. The Special Relationship with India Part 2
1 . vol. 4 ind., ch. 5, p. 33.
2 . Ibid., pp. 33-4.
3 . Dhar, Indira Gandhi, the ‘Emergency’, and Indian Democracy, pp. 355-6. Frank, Indira, pp. 413-14.
4 . vol. 4 ind., ch. 3, p. 12. Mitrokhin’s notes give no examples of the ‘important information’ obtained from the CPM leadership in West Bengal.
5 . Singh, The Yogi and the Bear, p. 134.
6 . vol. 4 ind., ch. 4, p. 21.
7 . FCD directive approved by Politburo resolution No. P 50/72 dated 24 March 1977; vol. 4 ind., ch. 7, p. 51.
8 . Bakshi, Russia and India, p. 145.
9 . Politburo resolution No. 1638-A/OV (of special importance), 2 Aug. 1977; vol. 4 ind., ch. 4, p. 21.
10 . vol. 4 ind., ch. 7, p. 51.
11 . vol. 4 ind., ch. 8, pp. 69-70.
12 . vol. 7 ind., ch. 7, p. 58.
13 . Frank, Indira, pp. 431-2.
14
. Singh, The Yogi and the Bear, pp. 141-2.
15 . vol. 4 ind., ch. 5, p. 34.
16 . Frank, Indira, p. 432.
17 . vol. 4 ind., ch. 5, pp. 34-5.
18 . vol. 4 ind., ch. 4, para. 31.
19 . Singh, The Yogi and the Bear, p. 173.
20 . vol. 4 ind., ch. 5, p. 36. The Delhi main residency did, however, report that Mrs Gandhi was favourably impressed by the fact that the chief Soviet delegate to the CPI Twelfth Congress in 1982, Eduard Shevardnadze, was a candidate rather than a full member of the Politburo.
21 . Singh, The Yogi and the Bear, p. 174.
22 . Malhotra, Indira Gandhi, p. 260.
23 . Bakshi, Russia and India, p. 157.
24 . vol. 4 ind., ch. 8, p. 86.
25 . Malhotra, Indira Gandhi, p. 235.
26 . vol. 4 ind., ch. 8, para. 16.
27 . vol. 4 ind., ch. 7, pp. 57-8.
28 . The congratulations, approved by Kryuchkov, were signed on 5 May 1982 by the head of the FCD Seventeenth Department, Gennadi Afanasyevich Vaulin, who had preceded Lysenko as main resident in Delhi from 1977 until early in 1982 (vol. 4 ind., app. 3, item 59; k-24, 252).
29 . vol. 4 ind., ch. 7, pp. 58-9.
30 . FCD memorandum No. 155/2351, signed by Kryuchkov on 30 Oct. 1982 and approved by Andropov soon afterwards; vol. 3 pak., ch. 5, pp. 46-7.
31 . vol. 4 ind., ch. 8, p. 71; Singh, The Yogi and the Bear, p. 300 n. 101.
32 . Singh, The Yogi and the Bear, pp. 199-200. The Soviet Union was also mentioned once, by implication, in a section of the summit communiqué dealing with the responsibilities of the industrialized nations to the developing world.
33 . Singh, The Yogi and the Bear, pp. 200-201, 308 n. 83.
34 . Ibid., pp. 220-21.
35 . vol. 4 ind., ch. 7, p. 60.
36 . Frank, Indira, ch. 21.
37 . See, e.g., Yajee, CIA, pp. 97-9.
38 . Gates, From the Shadows, pp. 357-8.
39 . US Department of State, Soviet Influence Activities; US Information Agency, Recent Appearances of Soviet Disinformation; Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 630.
40 . Bakshi, Russia and India, pp. 165-93.
41 . US Department of State, Soviet Influence Activities; US Information Agency, Recent Appearances of Soviet Disinformation; Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 630-31.
42 . Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 629.
43 . Bakshi, Russia and India, pp. 200-201.
19. Pakistan and Bangladesh
1 . Gromyko, Memories, pp. 246-7.
2 . vol. 3 pak., ch. 4, p. 13.
3 . The earliest amount of the annual subsidy to the SPC recorded by Mitrokhin was for $20,000; his notes, however, do not mention the date. The SPC received $30,000 in 1974, and $25,000 in 1975 and 1976. The larger sum in 1974 is probably to be explained by the SPC in that year asking for an additional sum to found a bi-monthly newsletter in London; vol. 3 pak., ch. 4, p. 13.
4 . vol. 3 ban., ch. 2, p. 96.
5 . vol. 3 pak., ch. 4, p. 18.
6 . Ibid., p. 14.
7 . vol. 3 pak., ch. 2, p. 3.
8 . Ibid., p. 6; vol. 6, ch. 3.
9 . vol. 3 pak., ch. 2, p. 5. Mitrokhin’s notes give no indication of the intelligence GREM supplied.
10 . Ibid., p. 3. Mitrokhin’s notes give no indication of the intelligence that Hasan supplied. The fact that he had at least five successive FCD controllers (L. V. Shebarshin, N. V. Mardoniyev, G. V. Lazarev, A. V. Korneyev and S. P. Kuznetsov) strongly suggests that his material was of real significance. While Hasan was stationed in Saudi Arabia, where there was no legal KGB residency, the illegal KHALEF and a KGB Fifth Directorate officer masquerading as a pilgrim on the Haj were sent to make contact with him.
11 . On the Eighth and Sixteenth Directorates, see Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield, ch. 21. Mitrokhin did not have access to their archives.
12 . ALI’s other controllers included Leonid Shebarshin; vol. 3 misc., p. 115.
13 . Shebarshin later concluded, possibly incorrectly, that Bhutto had been speaking with the approval of Ayub Khan; Shebarshin, Ruka Moskvy, pp. 34-6.
14 . vol. 3 pak., ch. 7, pp. 55-6.
15 . Raza, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Pakistan, p. 237.
16 . vol. 3 pak., ch. 7, paras. 240-47.
17 . Shebarshin, Ruka Moskvy, pp. 62-3. The resident’s codename is given in vol. 3 pak., ch. 7, para. 245. Shebarshin refers to him only as Vasili B.
18 . Raza, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Pakistan, pp. 5-7.
19 . Ibid.; Talbot, Pakistan, pp. 179-84.
20 . vol. 3 pak., ch. 6, para. 205.
21 . vol. 3 pak., ch. 7, paras. 246-9.
22 . vol. 3 pak., ch. 6, paras. 206-24.
23 . Kolbenev, ‘Kak Pakistan raskololsia na dva gosudarstva’, p. 75.
24 . There is, however, no KGB file noted by Mitrokhin which says so explicitly.
25 . vol. 3 pak., ch. 7, paras. 248-9. The ‘Agartala conspiracy’ trial turned into a public relations disaster for Ayub Khan. Evidence emerged that Pakistani police had tortured the alleged conspirators, and one of the defendants was murdered while in custody. The trial also offered Mujib a welcome opportunity to publicize the cause of the Awami League. The trial was never completed and charges were dropped as a precondition to meetings between opposition leaders and Ayub early in 1969. Ziring, Pakistan in the Twentieth Century, pp. 310-11.
26 . This strategy may be safely deduced from the active-measures operations designed to discredit all the main opponents of the PPP and the Awami League.
27 . vol. 3 pak., ch. 5, para. 101.
28 . Kolbenev, ‘Kak Pakistan raskololsia na dva gosudarstva’, p. 79.
29 . Raza, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Pakistan, pp. 251-4; Ziring, Pakistan in the Twentieth Century, p. 408.
30 . Raza, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Pakistan, pp. 250-51.
31 . Ziring, Bangladesh, pp. 88-9.
32 . Mascarenhas, Bangladesh, p. 28.
33 . Ziring, Bangladesh, pp. 84-9.
34 . vol. 3 ban., ch. 1, para. 415.
35 . Ibid.; Directorate of National Security codename in vol. 3 ban., ch. 3, para. 441.
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