23 . One of the illegals in the JIMMY residence, VASILIEV, an ethnic Chinese Soviet citizen, who was operating under cover as a university student, refused to return from Tokyo, apparently because of his wish to marry a Japanese woman; k-12, 416; k-16, 238; k-27, 35.
24 . k-27,360. KOCHI was recruited in 1962. There is no indication in Mitrokhin’s brief notes on his file that he was able to provide classified documents. According to KOCHI’s file, the quality of his intelligence declined significantly after 1967. In 1975, a year after he gave up most of his journalism, he was removed from the agent network.
25 . t-7, 247.
26 . t-7, 248.
27 . Of the 100,000 convertible rubles allocated to the JSP in 1972, 60,000 went to individuals to assist their careers in the Diet and elsewhere, and to promote their roles as agents of influence; 10,000 to strengthen links between the JSP and the CPSU; 20,000 for active measures to damage Japan’s relations with the USA and PRC; 10,000 for active measures to prevent any alignment of the JSP with the other main opposition parties, the Clean Government Party (Komeito) and the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP). t-7, 250-51.
28 . t-7, 248; k-23, 58. GAVR, whose real name is not included in Mitrokhin’s notes, has been identified by Levchenko as Seiichi Katsumata; Barron, KGB Today, p. 174. The payment recorded in Mitrokhin’s brief note of his file was doubtless not an isolated one. GAVR was regarded by the KGB as the leader of the centrist faction in the JSP; k-23, 58.
29 . t-7, 249, 260. ATOS, whose real name is not included in Mitrokhin’s notes, has been identified by Levchenko as Tamotsu Sato; Barron, KGB Today, p. 174. Mitrokhin’s brief note of his file records a payment to Sato of 400,000 yen, apparently in October 1973, for the publication of articles in JSP periodicals; t-7, 260. There were doubtless other payments.
30 . t-7, 249, 260. Mitrokhin noted another payment to ALFONS (doubtless one of a number) of 150,000 yen for the publication of material in Shakai Shimpo; t-7, 260.
31 . t-7, 249; k-23, 60.
32 . t-7, 249.
33 . JACK (DZHEK in Cyrillic) was recruited in 1973; k-23, 57.
34 . GRACE was probably recruited in 1975; k-8, 600. Though his real name is not included in Mitrokhin’s notes, he has been identified by Levchenko as Shigeru Ito. Levchenko also refers to two other JSP agents, RAMSES and TIBR, not mentioned in Mitrokhin’s notes (at least by these codenames) on whom no other information is available. Barron, KGB Today, pp. 173-4; Levchenko, On the Wrong Side, p. 110.
35 . k-23, 29.
36 . Barron, KGB Today, pp. 99-105.
37 . k-23, 56.
38 . k-8, 600; k-23, 29.
39 . k-23, 20.
40 . The JSP deputy and KGB confidential contact KERK also had a leading role in the Association; k-23, 56.
41 . k-8, 600; k-23, 54. Hara, Japanese-Soviet/Russian Relations since 1945, p. 131. Levchenko, On the Wrong Side, pp. 89-90; Barron, KGB Today, pp. 79-80, 120.
42 . Asahi Shimbun, 4 Sept. 1973; Levchenko, On the Wrong Side, pp. 89-90; Barron, KGB: The Hidden Hand, pp. 79-80.
43 . Date of Ishida’s recruitment in k-8, 600; k-23, 54. Levchenko identifies Pronnikov as his recruiter; On the Wrong Side, p. 90; Barron, KGB Today, p. 79.
44 . The budget for Seventh Department residencies in 1973, in convertible rubles, was as follows: Japan: 203,100; India: 204,600; Pakistan: 54,800; Laos: 19,000; Thailand: 32,500; Cambodia: 26,700; Singapore: 22,600; Malaysia: 23,600; Indonesia: 72,800; Burma: 35,300; Nepal: 12,200; Sri Lanka: 30,600; Bangladesh: 52,900; Reserve: 3,000 (k-18, 65). India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Burma, Sri Lanka and Nepal later became the responsibility of a new Seventeenth Department; Laos and Cambodia were moved to the Sixth Department. See Appendix D.
45 . Politburo resolution No. P 100/U1 of 16 Aug. 1973; t-7, 200.
46 . t-7, 200.
47 . On Tanaka’s visit to Moscow, see Hara, Japanese-Soviet/Russian Relations since 1945, ch. 3.
48 . k-18, 90.
49 . When Mitrokhin saw FEN’s file in either 1974 or 1975, his cultivation, which had begun in 1972, was still continuing but had made sufficient progress for plans to be made for his recruitment in 1975; k-8, 260. FEN is almost certainly identical with the fully recruited LDP agent identified by Levchenko after his defection in 1979 as FEN-FOKING; Barron, KGB Today, p. 174.
50 . k-23, 16.
51 . McCargo, Contemporary Japan, pp. 106-9; Buckley, Japan Today, pp. 37-9.
52 . k-5, 74.
53 . k-14, 208.
54 . k-6, 159.
55 . k-27, 454.
56 . k-23, 55.
57 . k-23, 24. It seems likely, though not certain, that ROY was the agent later identified by Levchenko as ARES (Levchenko, On the Wrong Side, pp. 119-27, 154-5). ROY, like ARES, was a journalist recruited in the mid-1960s, run for a time by Line KR, who worked solely for money and had important intelligence connections but was less productive in the mid-1970s after the suspicions of Japanese counter-intelligence had been aroused. Discrepancies between Mitrokhin’s notes on ROY and Levchenko’s recollection of ARES are probably due chiefly to the fact that Mitrokhin did not see his file after 1977. Levchenko recalls that, from approximately that moment, ARES ‘became productive again’.
58 . k-14, 208. Mitrokhin’s notes identify a further journalist agent, FET (or FOT), but give no additional information; k-18, 87.
59 . The print journalists working as KGB agents in 1979 identified by Levchenko were KANT and DAVEY of the Sankei Shimbun, KAMUS of the Tokyo Shimbun and VASSIN, a former JCP member who ran a newsletter (Barron, KGB Today, pp. 174-5; Levchenko, On the Wrong Side, p. 111). It is possible that two of these agents may be among those identified in files noted by Mitrokhin under different codenames.
60 . Barron, KGB Today, pp. 139-42, 174; Glaubitz, Between Tokyo and Moscow, p. 165.
61 . Recollection of a retired Western intelligence officer stationed in Japan in the 1970s.
62 . Glaubitz, Between Tokyo and Moscow, pp. 143-57; Berton, ‘Two Decades of Soviet Diplomacy and Andrei Gromyko’, pp. 79-81.
63 . k-27, 27.
64 . Braddick, Japan and the Sino-Soviet Alliance, p. 237.
65 . Hasegawa, ‘Japanese Perceptions of the Soviet Union and Russia in the Postwar Period’, pp. 274-86.
66 . k-16, 523; k-2, 319, 320; k-18, 88; k-14, 484.
67 . k-27, 284.
68 . MISHA was recruited after a quarrel with LANDYSH (of which no details are given in Mitrokhin’s notes) threatened to compromise him; k-2, 321. The probability is that MISHA subsequently worked for money.
69 . In an interview with Christopher Andrew in Washington in November 1987, Stanislav Levchenko confirmed that NAZAR had been recruited in the 1970s. Since the interview took place eight years before Andrew first saw the Mitrokhin archive, however, it was impossible during the interview to discuss other evidence which tends to identify MISHA as NAZAR.
70 . Levchenko, On the Wrong Side, p. 150; Barron, KGB Today, pp. 158-9.
71 . Two other Foreign Ministry recruitments during the 1970s identified in files noted by Mitrokhin are the diplomat MARCEL and an assistant military attaché, codenamed KONUS, recruited with MARCEL’s assistance; k-2, 317-18.
72 . Buckley, Japan Today, ch. 3.
73 . Ibid.; McCargo, Contemporary Japan, ch. 3.
74 . t-2, 77.
75 . TANI’s file records that his S&T met the requirements of the foremost authorities (instantsii), in effect the Politburo, one of the highest accolades. In addition to his S&T on semi-conductors, he provided important intelligence on integrated circuits for military radar systems; k-2, 82.
76 . k-2, 363.
77 . The other thirteen Line X agents in senior positions identified in Mitrokhin’s notes on KGB files together with their main S&T fields were: ARAM (radio-physics, k-2, 419); ARGUS (radio engineering, k-14, 754); BRAT (scientific research at Tokyo University, t-2, 105); EYR (aerospace R&D, k-14, 755); KANDI (microbiology, k-14, 101); KARI (university physicist, t-2, 80); KIS
I (university aerospace research, k-14, 477); RIONI (Hitachi, t-2, 79); SAK (Mitsubishi, k-6, 159); SOT (technology exports, k-12, 363); TAIR (infra-red spectroscopy, k-19, 452); TONI (electronic engineering, t-2, 82); and UTI (nuclear physics, k-18, 224).
78 . Levchenko, On the Wrong Side, p. 104.
79 . Ibid., p. 105.
80 . On S&T operations against the United States, see Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield, pp. 186-9, 215-20.
81 . In 1980 a total of 3,396 Soviet R&D projects were assisted by S&T. Ibid., pp. 215-20; Brook-Shepherd, The Storm Birds, p. 260; Hanson, Soviet Industrial Espionage; US Government, Soviet Acquisition of Militarily Significant Western Technology: An Update.
82 . k-8, 338.
83 . Levchenko, On the Wrong Side, p. 102; Glaubitz, Between Tokyo and Moscow, pp. 186-7.
84 . Levchenko, On the Wrong Side, p. 104.
85 . Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield, p. 216; Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 622.
86 . Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield, pp. 556-8.
87 . Levchenko, On the Wrong Side, pp. 157-65.
88 . The only two cases of agents put on ice as a result of Levchenko’s defection which were noted by Mitrokhin were those of DENIS (k-23, 29) and YAMAMOTO (k-23, 20), neither of whom had been personally handled by Levchenko. There were undoubtedly a substantial number of similar cases not noted by Mitrokhin. It is clear from the accounts of Levchenko’s career in Tokyo by himself and John Barron that he knew the names or identifying details of at least a score of KGB agents. The damage-limitation exercise would necessarily have been implemented on the cautious assumption that his knowledge might have been even more extensive. There is, for example, no evidence that Levchenko knew the existence of DENIS, with whom the KGB none the less broke contact.
89 . k-27, 27.
90 . Ibid.
91 . Kimura, ‘Japanese-Soviet Political Relations from 1976-1983’, p. 97.
92 . Glaubitz, Between Tokyo and Moscow, p. 88.
93 . Haslam, ‘The Pattern of Soviet-Japanese Relations since World War II’, p. 35. On Gorbachev’s visit to Tokyo, see Hara, Japanese-Soviet/Russian Relations since 1945, ch. 4.
94 . Asahi Evening News, 11 Dec. 1982; Glaubitz, Between Tokyo and Moscow, pp. 164-5.
95 . See above, pp. 131-2.
96 . Glaubitz, Between Tokyo and Moscow, pp. 188-9.
97 . Ibid., p. 198.
98 . Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), Instructions from the Centre, pp. 17, 20-21.
99 . Chernyaev, My Six Years with Gorbachev, p. 28.
100 . Haslam, ‘The Pattern of Soviet-Japanese Relations since World War II’, p. 3.
101 . Glaubitz, Between Tokyo and Moscow, p. 78; Levchenko, On the Wrong Side, pp. 102-3.
17. The Special Relationship with India Part 1
1 . Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 504.
2 . Gorev, Jawaharlal Nehru, pp. 48-9, 54.
3 . Mullik, The Chinese Betrayal, p. 110.
4 . Mullik, My Years with Nehru, pp. 60-61. During Khrushchev’s visit to India late in 1955, Nehru made clear in private talks that he was aware of ‘personal links’ between leading Indian Communists and Soviet officials (though he did not mention the KGB by name). These links do not, however, seem to have diminished the warm official welcome given to the Soviet leader. Fursenko (ed.), Prezidium TsK KPSS. 1954-1964, p. 909 n. 7.
5 . vol. 4 ind., app. 1, item 11.
6 . Ibid., item 13; there is no indication in Mitrokhin’s notes of the nature of the intelligence provided by RADAR.
7 . Ibid., item 12.
8 . Decrypts were filed in the archives of the KGB Eighth (and later the Sixteenth) Directorate, to which Mitrokhin did not have access.
9 . vol. 4 ind., ch. 3, p. 12. There is no independent corroboration for the KGB conclusion that Promode Das Gupta was an IB agent. In 1964 he became a leading member of the hard-line breakaway CPI (M).
10 . vol. 4 ind., ch. 3, para. 12.
11 . See below, p. 321.
12 . vol. 4 ind., ch. 6, p. 37.
13 . vol. 4 ind., ch. 3, p. 13.
14 . Fursenko (ed.), Prezidium TsK KPSS. 1954-1964, pp. 72-5. Khrushchev’s trip, on which he was accompanied by Marshal Nikolai Bulganin, also took in Burma and Afghanistan. He also proposed that decorations and possible salary increases be given to the pilots who had flown him on his travels.
15 . Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 504-5.
16 . Gromyko, Memories, p. 243.
17 . CPSU Central Committee resolution No. ST 23/26-s of 16 May 1962; vol. 4 ind., ch. 5, p. 28.
18 . Arora, Krishna Menon, pp. 210-11.
19 . CPSU Central Committee resolution of 15 Nov. 1962; vol. 4 ind., ch. 5, p. 28.
20 . The KGB paid Menon’s election expenses totalling 733,000 rupees. vol. 4 ind., ch. 5, p. 28.
21 . Ibid., p. 29.
22 . Ibid.
23 . Frank, Indira, pp. 265-6; Arora, Krishna Menon, pp. 273-5.
24 . vol. 4 ind., ch. 5, p. 29.
25 . Frank, Indira, p. 290. Mrs Gandhi’s KGB codename is given in vol. 4, ch. 5, p. 30.
26 . vol. 4 ind., ch. 5, p. 30.
27 . Gandhi (ed.), Two Alone, Two Together, pp. 592-4.
28 . Frank, Indira, pp. 238-9.
29 . Malhotra, Indira Gandhi, p. 93.
30 . Mallick, Indian Communism, p. 92.
31 . vol. 4 ind., ch. 5, p. 29; k-24, 239. Shebarshin describes Mishra in his memoirs as ‘extremely influential’, though not of course identifying him as a Soviet agent; Ruka Moskvy, p. 82. See below, pp. 322-3.
32 . k-8, 121.
33 . vol. 4 ind., ch. 5, p. 30.
34 . Press reports of speech to parliament by Home Minister Y. B. Chavan on 13 Dec. 1967, revealing Modin’s part in publicizing the forgeries. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 505-6.
35 . Barron, KGB, p. 237.
36 . vol. 4 ind., ch. 5, p. 30.
37 . Frank, Indira, p. 308. Kamaraj had returned to parliament after winning a by-election; though he remained head of the Syndicate, he was no longer Congress President.
38 . Mallick, Indian Communism, pp. 123-4, 147. Congress Forum for Social Action codename in vol. 4 ind., ch. 4, p. 16.
39 . Frank, Indira, p. 317.
40 . Ibid., pp. 313-15. The Intelligence Bureau (IB), which had hitherto run both internal and foreign intelligence, was divided in two: the IB, which remained in charge of internal intelligence, and the newly formed Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), which ran foreign intelligence. Revenue Intelligence, hitherto part of the Finance Ministry, was also brought under the direct control of the Prime Minister’s Secretariat, headed by Haksar. Malhotra, Indira Gandhi, p. 125.
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