The World Was Going Our Way

by Christopher Andrew

  36 . vol. 3 ban., ch. 1, para. 416.

  37 . Politburo resolution No. N 76/VIII OP, 2 Feb. 1973; vol. 3 ban., ch. 3, para. 434.

  38 . vol. 3 ban., ch. 2, paras. 430-31.

  39 . Mitrokhin noted no file on the foundation of BAKSAL.

  40 . vol. 6, ch. 2, part 3. Mitrokhin’s notes do not identify the dates of their recruitment or give any information on the operations against the United States in which they were involved.

  41 . vol. 3 ban., ch. 2, para. 432; ch. 3, paras. 437-9, 442-3.

  42 . vol. 3 ban., ch. 3, para. 444.

  43 . Raza, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Pakistan, p. 226.

  44 . vol. 3 pak., ch. 5, para. 104.

  45 . Ibid., para. 120.

  46 . Ibid., para. 109.

  47 . Ibid., para. 111.

  48 . Ibid., para. 109.

  49 . Ibid., para. 107.

  50 . Ibid., para. 108.

  51 . Ibid., para. 103.

  52 . Raza, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Pakistan, pp. 250-51, 232-4.

  53 . Politburo resolution No. P 30/49 of 20 Oct. 1976, ‘On our position regarding the proposal of Pakistan that a top-level conference of developing countries be held’; vol. 3 pak., ch. 5, para. 115.

  54 . vol. 3 pak., ch. 5, paras. 115-18.

  55 . Anwar, The Terrorist Prince, p. 27.

  56 . vol. 3 pak., ch. 5, para. 119.

  57 . Zafarullah (ed.), The Zia Episode, pp. 127-9, 133-5.

  58 . vol. 3 ban., ch. 3, para. 444.

  59 . Ibid., para. 446.

  60 . Ibid., para. 441.

  61 . Ibid., paras. 448-51.

  62 . Ibid., para. 452.

  63 . Ibid., para. 453.

  64 . Zafarullah (ed.), The Zia Episode, pp. 154-6, 164 n. 1.

  65 . Arif, Working with Zia, pp. 313-14, 412.

  66 . Gates, From the Shadows, pp. 146-8. The Carter administration had secretly decided to give non-military support to the mujahideen in July 1979.

  67 . vol. 3 pak., ch. 5, para. 1; Arif, Working with Zia, p. 315.

  68 . vol. 3 pak., ch. 5, para. 127.

  69 . Gates, From the Shadows, pp. 147-8.

  70 . vol. 3 pak., ch. 5, paras. 127-45. In operation SARDAR-5, for example, carried out on the evening of 14 to 15 March, a further series of Service A leaflets purporting to come from ‘a group of young officers’ were distributed by KGB officers in Islamabad, Rawalpindi and Karachi. Other leaflets were distributed by post. All denounced Zia and demanded his overthrow.

  71 . vol. 3 pak., ch. 5, paras. 127-45.

  72 . vol. 3 pak., ch. 7, para. 254.

  73 . vol. 3 pak., ch. 5, para. 127.

  74 . Ibid., para. 144.

  75 . Ibid., para. 129.

  76 . Bradsher, Afghan Communism and Soviet Intervention, pp. 181-4; Urban, War in Afghanistan, p. 17.

  77 . Arif, Working with Zia, pp. 337-8. In October 1980 Arif visited CIA headquarters at Langley for talks on Afghanistan.

  78 . Barron, KGB Today, pp. 45-6. Mitrokhin did not note any file dealing with the expulsion.

  79 . vol. 3 pak., ch. 5, para. 128.

  80 . Anwar, The Terrorist Prince, p. 60.

  81 . vol. 1, ch. 7; Mitrokhin, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, p. 140.

  82 . Anwar, The Terrorist Prince, pp. 43-5, 63-4.

  83 . vol. 1, ch. 7; Mitrokhin, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, p. 140.

  84 . On the KGB and KHAD, see below, pp. 408-9.

  85 . Although on occasion Murtaza spoke mysteriously about possible Russian connections, it is possible that this derived from his habit of unsubstantiated boasting rather than any conscious contact on his part with the KGB; Anwar, The Terrorist Prince, p. 75.

  86 . Ibid., pp. 87-8. Though Mitrokhin’s reference to discussions between Murtaza and Najibullah do not specifically mention these terrorist attacks, there can be little doubt that they were agreed between them since KHAD provided the bombs used.

  87 . vol. 1, ch. 7; Mitrokhin, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, p. 140.

  88 . Anwar, The Terrorist Prince, pp. 95-8.

  89 . vol. 1, ch. 7; Mitrokhin, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, p. 140.

  90 . Anahita Ratebzad, codenamed SIMA, appears on a list which Mitrokhin compiled from KGB files of Afghan ‘agents and confidential contacts’; vol. 1, app. 1. Unusually, however, the list fails to distinguish between the two categories. On Ratebzad, see below, p. 407.

  91 . Anwar, The Terrorist Prince, pp. 103-5. On Karmal’s background as a KGB agent, see below, pp. 387, 403-4.

  92 . Anwar, The Terrorist Prince, pp. 107-9.

  93 . vol. 1, ch. 7; Mitrokhin, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, p. 140.

  94 . Anwar, The Terrorist Prince, pp. 112-16. Colonel Qaddafi went back on an earlier agreement to allow the hijackers to force the crew to fly the plane to Tripoli.

  95 . vol. 1, ch. 7; Mitrokhin, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, p. 145.

  96 . vol. 1, ch. 7; Mitrokhin, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, p. 143. At the suggestion of Najibullah, the KGB recruited Agent FURMAN, on whom no further details are available, to select agents posing as refugees to target Afghan refugee communities in Pakistan and Iran; vol. 1, app. 1. Though Mitrokhin noted no further examples, the KGB doubtless recruited other agents with the same mission as FURMAN.

  97 . vol. 3 pak., ch. 5, para. 145. On KGB active measures to disrupt mujahideen operations, see below, pp. 409-10.

  98 . vol. 1, ch. 7; Mitrokhin, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, p. 143.

  99 . See below, pp. 409-10.

  100 . Kryuchkov to Andropov, no. 155/796, 18 April 1981; vol. 3 pak., ch. 5, para. 150.

  101 . vol. 3 pak., ch. 5, para. 195.

  102 . Ibid., para. 143.

  103 . Anwar, The Terrorist Prince, pp. 130-37. Anwar’s sources include both the terrorists who had attempted to shoot down Zia’s plane with SAM-7 missiles. In 1992 Murtaza Bhutto declared in a newspaper interview, ‘I had two attacks carried out against General Zia. Once the computer of the missile fired at him malfunctioned, and the second time he had a hair’s breadth escape.’ Mitrokhin’s brief notes on KHAD/KGB dealings with Murtaza Bhutto unfortunately do not go beyond the 1981 hijack.

  104 . After a series of abysmally planned, unsuccessful operations in 1984 (none of which seems to have benefited from KHAD support), and with most of Al-Zulfikar’s members in jail, Murtaza announced its dissolution in the following year. His stormy career came to a violent end in September 1996 when he was shot dead by Pakistani police outside his Karachi house while his estranged sister, Benazir, was Prime Minister. Anwar, The Terrorist Prince, chs. 12-16.

  105 . Ziring, Pakistan in the Twentieth Century, p. 459.

  106 . vol. 3 pak., ch. 5, para. 264.

  107 . See above, ch. 18.

  108 . vol. 3 pak., ch. 5, paras. 281-9. Mitrokhin’s notes do not give details of the award to the resident.

  109 . Talbot, Pakistan, pp. 249-50.

  110 . Arif, Working with Zia, pp. 318-19, 334-5, 342.

  111 . Though the Pakistan air force board of enquiry found that ‘the most probable cause’ of the air crash was sabotage, a USAF accident-investigation team concluded that the most likely explanation was mechanical failure. Talbot, Pakistan, pp. 284-5.

  112 . Arif, Working with Zia, p. 319.

  20. Islam in the Soviet Union

  1 . No single chapter, probably no single volume, can do justice to the complexity of the Soviet Union’s Muslim populations, especially in the Caucasus, one of the most ethnically and linguistically diverse areas in the world. Islam and the struggle against Russian and Soviet rule, however, proved strong unifying factors within the predominantly Muslim areas. Gammer, ‘Unity, Diversity and Conflict in the Northern Caucasus’.

  2 . Taheri, Crescent in a Red Sky, pp. ix, xiv, 92.

  3 . Flemming, ‘The Deportation of the Chechen and Ingush Peoples’; Smith, Allah’s Mountains, pp. 58-67; Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield, pp. 101-2.

  4 . According to a report in 1973 by the leading Sovi
et expert in ‘scientific atheism’, V. G. Pivovranov, 52.9 per cent of Chechens (undoubtedly a considerable underestimate) were religious believers, as compared with only 11.9 per cent of ethnic Russians. Bennigsen and Broxup, The Islamic Threat to the Soviet State, pp. 33-4; Dunlop, Russia Confronts Chechnya, pp. 81-2.

  5 . Taheri, Crescent in a Red Sky, p. xiv.

  6 . Lewis, After Atheism, p. 149.

  7 . vol. 5 isl., ch. 8, p. 39.

  8 . On KGB policy to the Orthodox Church, see Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield, ch. 28.

  9 . vol. 5 isl., ch. 3, pp. 8, 12; ch. 4.

  10 . Olcott, ‘Islam and Fundamentalism in Independent Central Asia’, p. 24.

  11 . vol. 5 isl., app. 1, pp. 42-3.

  12 . Bennigsen and Wimbush, Mystics and Commissars, pp. 2, 43-4.

  13 . Bennigsen and Broxup, The Islamic Threat to the Soviet State, pp. 104-5.

  14 . vol. 5 isl., ch. 4, p. 17.

  15 . Bennigsen and Broxup, The Islamic Threat to the Soviet State, p. 106.

  16 . vol. 5 isl., ch. 4, p. 17.

  17 . vol. 5 isl., ch. 3, para. 38.

  18 . vol. 5 isl., ch. 4, p. 16.

  19 . Olcott, ‘Islam and Fundamentalism in Independent Central Asia’, p. 21.

  20 . vol. 5 isl., ch. 8, p. 39.

  21 . Ibid., pp. 37-8.

  22 . Bennigsen and Wimbush, Mystics and Commissars, chs. 1, 2. On the Sufi response to the Tsarist advance in the north Caucasus, see Zelkina, In Quest for God and Freedom. The Qadiriya had been brought to the north Caucasus in the 1850s by Sheikh Kunta Haji. The KGB, like the rest of the Soviet bureaucracy, referred to the Qadiriya as the ‘Kunta Haji’, and it is so described in the files noted by Mitrokhin. As Yaacov Ro’i has argued, much more research is needed to establish the degree to which the Sufi brotherhoods were responsible for the tenacity of Muslim religious practice; Ro’i, ‘The Secularisation of Islam and the USSR’s Muslim Areas’, p. 13.

  23 . vol. 5 isl., ch. 8, p. 30. Auaev (whose first name was not noted by Mitrokhin) was described in KGB files as leader of the ‘Kunta Haji sect’.

  24 . Bennigsen and Wimbush, Mystics and Commissars, p. 31.

  25 . Mitrokhin’s notes do not record the date of Gaziev’s death, but the context suggests a date in the mid-1960s.

  26 . vol. 5 isl., ch. 8, p. 30.

  27 . Ibid., pp. 32-5.

  28 . Ibid., p. 35. For examples of similar operations elsewhere in the Soviet bloc, see Andrew and Mitrokhin,The Sword and the Shield, chs.15,16.

  29 The real names of the illegals were as follows: AKBAR: Makhmudzhen Ariudzhanov (k-24, 245); STELLA: real name not recorded by Mitrokhin, but trained with AKBAR in 1970-76; the two operated as a married couple (vol. 2, app. 1, p. 70; k-24, 25); SABIR: Mutalim Agaverdioglu Talybov (k-27, 400; vol. 2, ch. 3, p. 26): ALI: Sebukh Apkaryan (k-5, 115; k-27, 37); STRELTSOV: Murmon Iosivovich Lokhov (vol. 2, ch. 3, p. 25; k-20, 197); MARK: identity uncertain but probably Vyacheslav Petrovich Makarov (k-16, 379) - MARK was one of the commoner KGB codenames used at various times to refer to several different illegals; RAFIEV: no identifying details recorded in Mitrokhin’s notes; DEREVLYOV and DEREVLYOVA: Oleg Petrovich and Zinaida Nikiforovna Buryen (vol. 8, ch. 8, p. 33); KHALEF: Shamil Abdullazyanovich Khamsin (vol. 10, ch. 2); BERTRAND: Georgi Ivanovich Kotlyar (k-21, 17; vol. 6, ch. 5, p. 154).29. Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield, pp. 312-13.

  30 . vol. 5 isl., ch. 8, p. 35.

  31 . Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield, p. 512.

  32 . vol. 5 isl., ch. 8, pp. 36-7.

  33 . Ibid., p. 39.

  34 . Lieven, Chechnya, p. 28.

  35 . Bennigsen and Wimbush, Mystics and Commissars, p. 117. The pilgrims referred to were clearly associated with Qadiris rather than the Naqshbandis. The Naqshbandi zikr (‘remembrance’ of God) was a silent collective prayer.

  36 . vol. 5 isl., ch. 6, p. 21.

  37 . vol. 5 isl., ch. 3, p. 11.

  38 . Bennigsen and Broxup, The Islamic Threat to the Soviet State, p. 115.

  39 . See above, p. 186.

  40 . Bennigsen and Broxup, The Islamic Threat to the Soviet State, pp. 116-17.

  41 . Bennigsen and Wimbush, Mystics and Commissars, p. 108.

  42 . For example, the Khorzhem district in Uzbekistan and Kurgan-Tube in Tajikistan; vol. 5 isl., ch. 3, p. 14.

  43 . vol. 5 isl., ch. 6, p. 22.

  44 . Politburo resolution No. P 29/27 of 25 Sept. 1981; vol. 5 isl., ch. 5, p. 19.

  45 . vol. 5 isl., ch. 5, pp. 19-20.

  46 . For details of the annual votes in the UN General Assembly, see Rogers, The Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan, part II.

  47 . See below, pp. 417-18.

  48 . Bennigsen and Broxup, The Islamic Threat to the Soviet State, pp. 113-15.

  49 . Liakhovskii, Plamia Afgana, pp. 591-2; ‘More East-Bloc Sources on Afghanistan’, p. 270.

  50 . Two such conference successes by ‘a particularly highly regarded agent of the Azerbaijan KGB’ are noted in vol. 5 isl., ch. 6, p. 23.

  51 . vol. 5 isl., ch. 4, p. 17. It is not suggested that Babakhanov was a KGB agent.

  52 . Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), Instructions from the Centre, p. 7.

  53 . Hosking, A History of the Soviet Union, pp. 445-6; Taheri, Crescent in a Red Sky, p. 130.

  54 . Remnick, Lenin’s Tomb, pp. 180-81; Taheri, Crescent in a Red Sky, pp. 148, 170.

  55 . vol. 1, app. 3.

  56 . vol. 5 isl., app. 2, p. 50.

  57 . Taheri, Crescent in a Red Sky, pp. 147, 154; Remnick, Lenin’s Tomb, p. 190.

  58 . k-25, 32.

  59 . vol. 5 isl., app. 2, p. 61.

  60 . Vaisman, ‘Regionalism and Clan Loyalty in the Political Life of Uzbekistan’, p. 116.

  61 . Remnick, Lenin’s Tomb, pp. 182, 187, 194; Taheri, Crescent in a Red Sky, pp. 149-50.

  62 . Vaisman, ‘Regionalism and Clan Loyalty in the Political Life of Uzbekistan’, p. 121 n. 38.

  63 . Taheri, Crescent in a Red Sky, pp. 149-50. Rashidov later made a posthumous return to political popularity. In independent Uzbekistan he is widely regarded as a wily Uzbek patriot who succeeded in outwitting the supposedly more sophisticated Russians. In 1992 a large statue of him was erected in Tashkent and one of the main avenues, formerly Lenin Prospekt, was named after him (Carlisle, ‘Geopolitics and Ethnic Problems of Uzbekistan’, pp. 82-3; Stephen Kinzer, ‘Free of Russians but Imprisoned in Cotton’, Uzbekistan Journal, 20 Nov. 1997).