Accessory to War

by Neil DeGrasse Tyson

  182. North Atlantic Military Committee, “Final Decision on MC 14/2 (Revised): A Report by the Military Committee to the North Atlantic Council on Overall Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Area,” declassified, May 23, 1957, 9[289], 13[293], in Gregory W. Pedlow, ed., “NATO Strategy Documents 1949–1969,” NATO International Staff Central Archives, n.d., www.bits.de//NRANEU/nato-strategy/MC14-2.pdf (accessed Apr. 27, 2017).

  183. Burns and Siracusa, Global History, 377.

  184. This assessment comes from Thomas Graham Jr., an attorney and disarmament diplomat who served with the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency from 1970 to 1997. Burns and Siracusa, Global History, 426, 431.

  185. LaFeber, America, Russia, 208–12, 223–24; Burns and Siracusa, Global History, chap. 14, “Reagan, Gorbachev, and Nuclear Arms: Ending the Cold War,” 413–45.

  186. Michael S. Gerson, “No First Use: The Next Step for U.S. Nuclear Policy,” Int. Security 35:2 (Fall 2010), 7; US Air Force, Nuclear Operations: Air Force Doctrine Document 3-72, May 7, 2009 (incorporating Change 2, Dec. 14, 2011), 17–18, www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/usaf/afdd/3-72/afdd3-72_2011.pdf; US Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report, Apr. 2010, v, www.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/defenseReviews/NPR/2010_Nuclear_Posture_Review_Report.pdf (accessed Apr. 27, 2017).

  187. “Trump Repeats Call for US Nuclear Supremacy,” BBC News, Feb. 24, 2017, www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-39073303 (accessed Apr. 27, 2017).

  188. James E. Cartwright and Bruce G. Blair, “End the First-Use Policy for Nuclear Weapons,” op-ed, New York Times, Aug. 14, 2016.

  189. Michael Krepon, “Not Just Yet for No First Use,” blog post, Arms Control Wonk: Leading Voices on Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, July 31, 2016, www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/1201722/not-just-yet-for-no-first-use/ (accessed Apr. 27, 2017). Krepon argued here that although there were almost no good arguments against US adoption of a no-first-use policy, one argument—timing—had some merit. He wrote that the actions of Soviet leader Vladimir Putin and the statements of candidate Donald Trump as of mid-2016 made it a bad time to pressure President Obama to declare, before the end of his term in office, an American commitment to no first use.

  190. NATO, “Defence and Deterrence: Clause 17,” Active Engagement, Modern Defence: Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Nov. 19–20, 2010, 14, www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_publications/20120214_strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf. Re global developments, see, e.g., Perspectives on the Evolving Nuclear Order, ed. Toby Dalton, Togzhan Kassenova, and Lauryn Williams (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2016), carnegieendowment.org/files/NuclearPerspectives_final.pdf; “Pakistan: Nuclear,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, Apr. 2016, www.nti.org/learn/countries/pakistan/nuclear/ (accessed Aug. 22, 2016); Rick Gladstone, “A Treaty Is Reached to Ban Nuclear Arms. Now Comes the Hard Part,” New York Times, July 7, 2017; UN General Assembly, “Draft Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons,” A/CONF.229/2017/L.3/Rev.1, limited distribution, July 6, 2017, www.undocs.org/en/a/conf.229/2017/L.3/Rev.1 (accessed Aug. 7, 2017).

  191. Ramesh Thakur, “Why Obama Should Declare a No-First-Use Policy for Nuclear Weapons,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Aug. 19, 2016, thebulletin.org/why-obama-should-declare-no-first-use-policy-nuclear-weapons9789 (accessed Aug. 21, 2016). Thakur is a co-convener of the Asia Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament.

  192. “Timeline,” Bull. Atomic Scientists, thebulletin.org/timeline; Science and Security Board, “It is two and a half minutes to midnight: 2017 Doomsday Clock Statement,” Bull. Atomic Scientists, Jan. 26, 2017, thebulletin.org/sites/default/files/Final%202017%20Clock%20Statement.pdf (accessed Apr. 27, 2017); Science and Security Board, “Statement from the President and CEO: It Is Now Two Minutes to Midnight,” Bull. Atomic Scientists, Jan. 25, 2018, thebulletin.org/2018-doomsday-clock-statement (accessed Jan. 25, 2018).

  193. Bruce M. DeBlois, “The Advent of Space Weapons,” Astropolitics 1:1 (Spring 2003), 36.

  194. Mizin, “Non-Weaponization of Outer Space,” 58.

  195. Johnson-Freese, Heavenly Ambitions, 35; see also 119–32.

  196. See, e.g., Outer Space, ed. Arbatov and Dvorkin, 72–110: Oznobishchev, “Codes of Conduct,” 72–73; Alexei Arbatov, “Preventing an Arms Race in Space,” 79–102; Alexei Arbatov and Vladimir Dvorkin, “Conclusion,” 103–10.

  197. See the presentation of the treaty, preceded by a lengthy discussion of issues from the US point of view, at www.congress.gov/105/cdoc/tdoc28/CDOC-105tdoc28.pdf (accessed Sept. 29, 2016).

  198. See Mary Beth D. Nikitin, “Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Background and Current Developments,” Congressional Research Service RL-33458, Sept. 1, 2016, www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL33548.pdf (accessed Sept. 29, 2016); “Senate Holds First Hearing on Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Since 1999,” FYI: The AIP Bulletin of Science Policy News 106, Sept. 8, 2016; “UN Resolution on Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Spurs Debate on Treaty’s Merits,” FYI: The AIP Bulletin of Science Policy News 120, Sept. 27, 2016. As of early 2018, India, North Korea, and Pakistan have neither signed nor ratified the CTBT; China, Egypt, Iran, Israel, and the United States have signed but not ratified.

  199. Bruce Cumings interviewed by Amy Goodman, “On Asia Trip, Trump Met by Protests Calling on U.S. to Open Diplomatic Relations with North Korea,” Democracy Now!, Nov. 10, 2017, transcript at www.democracynow.org/2017/11/10/on_asia_trip_trump_met_by (accessed Mar. 6, 2018).

  200. Lewis, It Can’t Happen Here, 7, 9.

  8. SPACE POWER

  1. George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 1949), Kindle loc. 3747–52; Kimiko de Freytas-Tamura, “George Orwell’s ‘1984’ Is Suddenly a Best-Seller,” New York Times, Jan. 25, 2017. Three weeks later, the book was still number one on Amazon’s lists of both classic and contemporary literature and fiction, political fiction, satire, and dystopian science fiction. Former president George W. Bush weighed in on the nature of power in February 2017 on national TV, one month into the Trump presidency, as the new administration began to ignore long-standing practices of press access and freedom and to repeatedly vilify journalism as “fake news” and an “enemy of the people”: “We need the media to hold people like me to account. I mean, power can be very addictive and it can be corrosive and it’s important for the media to call to account people who abuse their power, whether it be here or elsewhere.” Peter Baker, “Former President George W. Bush Levels Tacit Criticism at Trump,” New York Times, Feb. 27, 2017.

  2. Commission on the Future of the United States Aerospace Industry, Anyone, Anything, Anywhere, Anytime: Final Report, Dec. 2002, 3–1, history.nasa.gov/AeroCommissionFinalReport.pdf (accessed Dec. 17, 2016).

  3. Kevin Pollpeter, Eric Anderson, Jordan Wilson, and Fan Yang, China Dream, Space Dream: China’s Progress in Space Technologies and Implications for the United States (Washington, DC: IGCC/US–China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2015), 5, 7, and generally 1–7 for China’s approach to power, www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/China%20Dream%20Space%20Dream_Report.pdf (accessed Nov. 18, 2016). Also see James Clay Moltz, “China’s Space Technology: International Dynamics and Implications for the United States,” testimony at US–China Economic and Security Review Commission hearing, May 11, 2011, www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/5.11.11Moltz.pdf (accessed Nov. 21, 2016). Re white papers, see Information Office of the State Council, People’s Republic of China, “China’s Space Activities in 2006—Preface,” Oct. 2006, www.china.org.cn/english/features/book/183672.htm; Information Office of the State Council, People’s Republic of China, “China’s Space Activities in 2011—Preface,” Dec. 2011, news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2011-12/29/c_131333479.htm; Information Office of the State Council, People’s Republic of China, “China’s Military Strategy—I. National Security Situation,” May 20
15, China Daily, www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2015-05/26/content_20820628.htm (accessed Dec. 16, 2016); State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, “China’s Space Activities in 2016—Preamble,” Global Times/Xinhua, Dec. 27, 2016, www.globaltimes.cn/content/1025893.shtml (accessed Jan. 8, 2017).

  4. John F. Kennedy, “Address at Rice University on the Nation’s Space Effort,” transcript, Sept. 12, 1962, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/MkATdOcdU06X5uNHbmqm1Q.aspx (accessed Apr. 29, 2017).

  5. Robert C. Seamans Jr., Project Apollo: The Tough Decisions, Monographs in Aerospace History 37, SP-2005-4537 (Washington, DC: NASA History Division, 2007), 45, history.nasa.gov/monograph37.pdf (accessed Apr. 29, 2017).

  6. Richard W. Orloff, Apollo by the Numbers: A Statistical Reference (Washington, DC: NASA History Division, 2005), history.nasa.gov/SP-4029/Apollo_18-16_Apollo_Program_Budget_Appropriations.htm. The 1961 budget for the Apollo Moon landing program was $1 million; the next year it jumped to $160 million and then quadrupled in both of the next two years (accessed Apr. 29, 2017). In constant 2010 dollars NASA funding has reached $20 billion three times since the 1970s: 1991–93. See “Appendix C: A Half Century of NASA Spending 1959–2010: NASA Outlays in Relation to Total U.S. Federal Government Outlays and to GDP,” in Neil deGrasse Tyson, Space Chronicles: Facing the Ultimate Frontier, ed. Avis Lang (New York: W. W. Norton, 2012), 331–32. During the George W. Bush and Barack Obama presidencies (2001–16), NASA’s funding amounted to about a third less than the allocation to the Department of Energy and about twice that to the Environmental Protection Agency. For details on funding by agency, see Office of Management and Budget, “Table 4.1—Outlays by Agency: 1962–2022” and “Table 4.2—Percentage Distribution of Outlays by Agency: 1962–2022,” n.p., in ‘”Introduction to the Historical Tables: Structure, Coverage, and Concepts,” www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/budget/fy2018/hist.pdf (accessed Aug. 13, 2017).

  7. Space Foundation, The Space Report 2013: The Authoritative Guide to Global Space Activity (Colorado Springs: Space Foundation, 2013), 1; Space Report 2016, 37; Space Report 2017, 16. See Exhibit “Global Space Activity Revenues and Budgets” in Space Reports 2013 through 2016 and “A Snapshot: The Global Space Economy in 2016—Total $329.306 B,” in Space Report 2017, 16. See also Space Report 2010, 50; Space Report 2011, 55. For years prior to 2010 the estimates for non-US military space spending are based on fewer sources and do not include China; for more recent years, China is included, but the dollar amounts are estimates, as China does not make exact figures public. Nevertheless, it is worth noting the Space Foundation’s statement that in 2008 an estimated “95% of the worldwide government spending on defense-related space programs occurred in the United States” (Space Report 2010, 50).

  8. Formerly it was common for documents and institutions to pair space with air, suggesting a continuum, as in Air and Space Power in the New Millennium, ed. Daniel Gouré and Christopher M. Szara (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic & International Studies, 1997), or the Smithsonian National Air and Space Museum.

  9. US Air Force, Space Operations: Air Force Doctrine Document 2-2, Nov. 27, 2006, 1, 6, 35, www.globalsecurity.org/jhtml/jframe.html#http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/usaf/afdd/2-2/afdd2-2-2006.pdf|||AFDD%202-2:%20Space%20Operations (accessed Apr. 29, 2017) .

  10. US Air Force, Counterspace Operations: Air Force Doctrine Document 2-2.1, Aug. 2, 2004, vii, 27, 33–34, 40, www.globalsecurity.org/jhtml/jframe.html#http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/usaf/afdd/2-2-1/afdd2-2-1.pdf|||AFDD%202-2.1:%20Counterspace%20Operations (accessed Apr. 29, 2017).

  11. US Air Force, Space Operations, 7; Joint Chiefs of Staff, “The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2015,” June 2015, 3, www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Publications/2015_National_Military_Strategy.pdf; Tyrone C. Marshall Jr., “Officials Update Congress on Military Space Policy, Challenges,” American Forces Press Service, DoD News, Mar. 12, 2014, archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=121826; Jim Garamone, “Stratcom Chief: U.S. Must Maintain Space Dominance,” DoD News, Feb. 6, 2015, archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=128130 (accessed Nov. 13, 2016).

  12. General John E. Hyten, “Space Mission Force: Developing Space Warfighters for Tomorrow,” white paper, US Air Force Space Command, June 29, 2016, 2–3, 5, www.afspc.af.mil/Portals/3/documents/White%20Paper%20-%20Space%20Mission%20Force/AFSPC%20SMF%20White%20Paper%20-%20FINAL%20-%20AFSPC%20CC%20Approved%20on%20June%2029.pdf?ver=2016-07-19-095254-887 (accessed Apr. 29, 2017).

  13. Marcia S. Smith, “Top Air Force Officials: Space Now Is a Warfighting Domain,” SpacePolicyOnline.com, May 17, 2017, www.spacepolicyonline.com/news/top-air-force-officials-space-now-is-a-warfighting-domain. See also US Government Accountability Office, “DOD Space Acquisition Management and Oversight: Information Presented to Congressional Committees,” GAO-16-592R, July 27, 2016, www.gao.gov/assets/680/678697.pdf (accessed Nov. 21, 2017).

  14. Council of the European Union, “Implementation Plan on Security and Defence,” Nov. 14, 2016, 14, 30; “Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe—A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy,” June 2016, 4, 44; both at www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/11/14-conclusions-eu-global-strategy-security-defence/ (accessed Apr. 29, 2017).

  15. European Commission, “Space Strategy for Europe,” COM(2016) 705, Oct. 26, 2016, 5, 11, ec.europa.eu/docsroom/documents/19442 (accessed Apr. 29, 2017).

  16. Michael Sheehan, International Politics of Space (London: Routledge, 2007), 72–90; Joan Johnson-Freese, Space as a Strategic Asset (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 169–96.

  17. European Defence Agency, “Latest News: EU and US Government Defense Spending,” news release, Jan. 25, 2012, www.eda.europa.eu/info-hub/press-centre/latest-news/12-01-25/EU_and_US_government_Defence_spending; Zoe Stanley-Lockman and Katharina Wolf, “European Defence Spending 2015: The Force Awakens,” European Union Institute for Security Studies—Brief Issue 10 (Mar. 2016), 1–2, www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Brief_10_Defence_spending.pdf (accessed Apr. 29, 2017). In 2015, when the EU countries’ military spending totaled just over €203 billion, Asia spent €277 billion.

  18. See, e.g., Glenn Kessler, “Fact Checker: Trump’s Claim That the U.S. Pays the ‘Lion’s Share’ for NATO,” Washington Post, Mar. 30, 2016; Michael R. Gordon and Niraj Chokshi, “Trump Criticizes NATO and Hopes for ‘Good Deals’ with Russia,” New York Times, Jan. 15, 2017.

  19. European Commission, “Space Strategy for Europe.”

  20. European Commission, “New Commission Space Policy Puts Focus on Improving People’s Daily Lives and Boosting Europe’s Competitiveness,” fact sheet/press release, Oct. 26, 2016, europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-3531_en.htm (accessed Apr. 30, 2017).

  21. See, e.g., European Space Agency (ESA), “Ministerial Council 2016: What Is Space 4.0?” www.esa.int/About_Us/Ministerial_Council_2016/What_is_space_4.0; ESA, “Media Backgrounder: ESA’s Ministerial 2016 in Lucerne,” press release, Nov. 14, 2016, www.esa.int/For_Media/Press_Releases/Media_backgrounder_ESA_s_Ministerial_2016_in_Lucerne; Jan Wörner, “ ‘Space 4.0’ Can Help EU Overcome Its Challenges,” Parliament Magazine, Mar. 4, 2016, www.theparliamentmagazine.eu/articles/opinion/space-40-can-help-eu-overcome-its-challenges; ESA, “Council Meeting Held at Ministerial Level on 1 and 2 December 2016: Resolutions and Main Decisions,” Dec. 2, 2016, esamultimedia.esa.int/docs/corporate/For_Public_Release_CM-16_Resolutions_and_Decisions.pdf (accessed Apr. 30, 2017).

  22. US Central Command, “Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm: Executive Summary,” July 11, 1991, 1–2, nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB39/document6.pdf. During the first night of Desert Storm, a total of 668 aircraft attacked Iraq, 530 of which were from the US Air Force and another 90 from US Navy carriers and the US Marine Corps. Britain contributed two dozen aircraft to the attack, France and Saudi Arabia one dozen each. See Air
power Research Institute: College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education, “Airpower in the Gulf War,” Essays on Air and Space Power, vol. II (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1997), 69, 72. See also Everett C. Dolman, Astropolitik: Classical Geopolitics in the Space Age (London: Frank Cass, 2002), 152; Steven J. Bruger, “Not Ready for the ‘First Space War,’ What About the Second?” Operations Department, Naval War College, May 17, 1993, 1, ii, www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a266557.pdf; Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress, Apr. 1992, 18, 227–28, 642–61 [reprint pagination], www.ssi.army.mil/!Library/Desert%20Shield-Desert%20Storm%20Battle%20Analysis/Conduct%20of%20the%20Persian%20Gulf%20War%20-%20Final%20Rpt%20to%20Congress.pdf (accessed Apr. 30, 2017).

  23. US Space Command, “Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm: Assessment,” Jan. 1992, 2, nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB39/document10.pdf (accessed Apr. 30, 2017).

  24. Sir Peter Anson and Dennis Cummings, “The First Space War: The Contribution of Satellites to the Gulf War,” RUSI Journal 136:4 (Winter 1991), 45; US Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, 26.

  25. Prior to Iraq’s 1990 invasion and temporary annexation of Kuwait, which triggered the 1991 attack by the US-led Coalition, Iraq had attempted “aggressive, provocative campaigns to attach Kuwait to Iraq” in 1938–41 and 1961–63; see Robert G. Landen, “Review: Kuwait and Iraq: Historical Claims and Territorial Disputes, by Richard Schofield,” Middle East Studies Association Bulletin 26:2 (Dec. 1992), 221–22. For a fuller historical account, see Peter Sluglett, “The Resilience of a Frontier: Ottoman and Iraqi Claims to Kuwait, 1871–1990,” Int. History Rev. 24:4 (Dec. 2002), 783–816.

  26. See GPS.gov, “GPS Accuracy,” www.gps.gov/systems/gps/performance/accuracy/; “Augmentation Systems,”www.gps.gov/systems/augmentations/. In late April 2016, Aerospace Corp. recorded the most accurate positioning to date: thirty-eight centimeters, or fifteen inches. Julius Delos Reyes, “GPS Registers Most Accurate Signal Yet,” US Air Force News, www.af.mil/News/ArticleDisplay/tabid/223/Article/757533/gps-registers-most-accurate-signal-yet.aspx (accessed Oct. 29, 2016).