Into the Storm: On the Ground in Iraq sic-1

by Tom Clancy

  But John said no. The CINC wanted to keep our attack coordinated with the Egyptians on our east, and they could not be ready before 1500. When I protested again that we were losing valuable daylight, no was still the answer.

  At this point I was getting mixed signals. Go early, but not too early. Go early, but the coordinated attack — XVIII Corps, VII Corps, Egyptian Corps — still ruled. From all I gathered from the call to John, there was no unusual sense of urgency other than that, for some reason or other, the CINC wanted us to go a bit early. He still wanted us in a coordinated deliberate attack, and all the other pieces of the mission remained unchanged.

  I turned to Stan. "Get the order out," I told him. "We attack according to the same plan, but at 1500 today. Artillery prep starts at 1430 for thirty minutes. I want to cheat with the 2nd ACR and start them at 1430."

  "WILCO."

  The order went out.

  ACTIONS

  Then the weather turned bad. While VII Corps units attacked, there were high winds and rain, which severely reduced visibility in some places to less than 100 meters. Though all this probably helped conceal our attack, and so worked to our benefit, the effect for me personally was to trap me for most of the afternoon at the TAC, where I listened to the radio transmissions of the battle reports. Here is what was happening.

  1st INF Division

  At 1430, an almost 6,000-round prep was fired for thirty minutes. This was fired by the division artillery of the 1st INF, the 42nd Artillery Brigade, 75th Artillery Brigade, 142nd Artillery Brigade, and the Regimental Artillery of the British: a total of over 260 cannons and 60 MLRS; 414 MLRS rockets were fired, and cannon accounted for the rest. It was an awesome display of firepower, and of coordination and soldier-NCO skill in getting it together in such compressed time. From a standing no-notice start at 0930, they had put it all together in five hours. Creighton Abrams, Colonels Mike Dotson, Morrie Boyd, Gunner Laws, 142nd commander Colonel Charles Linch, and Brigadier (UK) Ian Drurie were masterful in their teamwork and leadership.

  Following the prep fires, the 1st INF attacked, with Colonel Bert Maggart's 1st Brigade on the left and Colonel Tony Moreno's 2nd Brigade on the right. Colonel Dave Weisman's 3rd Brigade was in reserve, to be committed when the division expanded the breach head to three-brigade width beyond Phase Line Colorado to New Jersey, at a distance of about forty kilometers.

  The Iraqi defense was laid out like this: First there were wire obstacles, then mines (the wires and mines extended back about five or ten kilometers). Then came bunkers and trenches, extending another ten kilometers. This far west, there were no fire trenches, though they did have them in front of the 1st CAV and perhaps thirty kilometers west of the Wadi al Batin.

  Tension was high as the two brigades attacked. Their mission was to clear the breach zone of not only direct fire that could be placed on the units following them, but also of Iraqi artillery observers who could send indirect fire from Iraqi artillery units. (I didn't want anything left — not artillery, not forward observers, not tanks, not RPGs, not even rifles or machine guns that could cause problems to, say, our 5,000-gallon fuel trucks.) They were also to clear and mark twenty-four lanes through the obstacle system, each wide enough — about four meters — for a tracked vehicle. The Iraqis were in bunkers and trenches behind the minefields and barbed-wire obstacle system. Some of their artillery was still operable, plus heavier weapons such as tanks thickened their defense.

  The breach was to be made slowly, steadily, and deliberately. The 1st INF lead tanks were equipped with mine plows that had been fitted in front of each track to plow up mines and push them to the side. Behind the plows came tanks equipped with heavy rollers in front of each track to set off any mines missed by the plows. To be sure lanes were cleared, a tank with a full track-width blade followed the rollers to scrape the entire width of the lane. This ensured positive clearance for the many fuel trucks that would soon use the lanes.

  Crews in the lead mine-plow tanks were the tip of the attacking VII Corps spear. In those vehicles tensions were way up. They were out front and ready.

  While mine-clearing tanks did their work, the rest of 1st Brigade and 2nd Brigade kept up relentless suppressive fires on Iraqi positions, forcing the defending Iraqis either to die in their bunkers or to surrender. And 1st INF artillery continued to fire on Iraqi positions just in front of advancing tanks and Bradleys, as well as deeper, to silence the remaining Iraqi artillery. Apache helicopters joined the fight by firing deep over the top of the attacking brigades to destroy Iraqi tanks. It was a masterful coordinated combined-arms fight by those lead brigades and the division to get all the combat power of the division into operation.

  The Iraqis never had a chance. The Iraqi 26th Division had been defending with two brigades forward, the 110th and 434th, each on a fifteen-kilometer front. They were surprised and stunned by the speed and violence of the 1st INF attack, and rapidly cracked. Though there was return fire, mostly small arms and some heavier weapons that were quickly silenced, the Iraqis could not effectively coordinate their defense; pre G-Day artillery raids had knocked out much of their telephone wire and they feared getting on radios, in the belief that U.S. forces would use the transmissions as a source to target. Their third brigade was to the north, refusing the western flank, and could not assist.

  The Iraqi trenches were anywhere from two to six feet deep, and the bunkers had two feet or more of sandbag cover overhead. The Iraqis would come out of the deeper bunkers to man the trenches, and interspersed among their positions were heavier vehicles such as tanks and BMPs. Mortars and artillery fired sporadically. One of the units to receive mortar fire was Company C, 2nd Battalion, 34th Armor, and it quickly became involved in a typical situation. U.S. engineers and mortars fired smoke in an attempt to blind the Iraqi defense, and some of the smoke blew back on the attacking units, making progress difficult, although more of the smoke fell in front of the Iraqis and was helpful. Meanwhile, the mine plows tried to keep at a speed of five mph or less, and on line to clear the mines evenly in the twenty-four lanes, while other units fired over them to suppress Iraqi defenders.

  Rather than send our own troops into the bunker systems when we got there, we had decided to put tanks with bulldozer blades on each side of the fortifications and run them alongside the trenches, burying whatever was in there under a wall of sand. The Iraqis were given the opportunity to surrender, and some of them did; others were buried. It was their choice. It made no sense for our troops to get tangled in the Iraqi trenches and bunkers.

  The battle was sharp and violent, with a high sustained tempo of fire and movement from our side. This was just as Tom Rhame and the Big Red One wanted it to be.

  Once on the Iraqi side, the fighting was sporadic. Faced with this overwhelming force, many Iraqis surrendered, yet some fought back the best they could. They returned fire. Some of them died in their bunkers. But it was no use.

  At about 1630, the weather cleared enough to permit flight, and I went forward to see Tom Rhame at his TAC CP, which was still in Saudi Arabia at that point. When I met him, Tom was ecstatic over the success of his division and the courage of his troops. I told Tom I was proud of them and what they had done so far. I was also relieved that we had seen no chemical attacks. We were all so highly sensitized to the possibility that I listened for any indications, and I almost could not believe that the Iraqis had not used them yet.

  After I left Tom, I flew into Iraq to link up with Colonel Don Holder and the 2nd ACR Command Group. By now it was about 1715. We flew over attacking 1st INF units, stretching back as far as I could see. Some were moving forward through newly cleared lanes; others were waiting to pass through. When we reached the border, we headed northwest over the 3rd AD, which was now crossing the border and making its way through the berm (we could also see part of the 1st AD). The vehicle movement visible to me was slow, and many vehicles were stopped — but that was not that unusual in a large unit movement and attack. After we passed o
ver the 3rd AD, we flew over nothing but empty desert until we reached the 2nd ACR.

  From 1015, when I'd last talked to Don, the regiment had seen some action against the deep brigade of the Iraqi 26th Division, about twenty kilometers from the line of departure. The Iraqi division commander had had to fight the Big Red One and the 2nd ACR simultaneously from two directions, with few workable communications. The 2nd ACR was continuing to attack while I visited with Don.

  The 2nd ACR had captured some officers, he reported, engaged enemy armored vehicles with their aviation and close air support, and their helos had taken some fire. From 1430 until later that evening (a report I got after returning to the TAC), Troop L on the regiment's eastern flank had fought nine engagements over a space of twenty kilometers against T-55s, BMPs, infantry, and bunkers. They had destroyed one T-55, a BMP, and a PT 76 (a Soviet-built light amphibious tank), and taken approximately 300 prisoners. They had also refueled twice and gotten some fifteen ammo tractors stuck in the soft sand.

  I gave Don the status of the 1st AD and 3rd AD behind him since I had just flown over them. I figured it would take them most of the night to close in behind the regiment, even unopposed. Don and I talked about the wisdom of his continuing the attack that night. Though I wanted to continue, I was aware of the growing gap between the now-fast-advancing regiment and the rest of the divisions. It was now at least twenty kilometers, and the gap was about to grow, since the regiment was now in full deployment and moving, while the divisions were in the process of squeezing themselves through the berm and getting into their formations.

  Based on the rapid movement of the regiment, and their success this day, Don's recommendation was to continue aviation and artillery throughout the night but to stop forward ground movement. In that way, the divisions could close up behind the regiment and remain concentrated for our closure on Phase Line Smash, another fifty to seventy-five kilometers ahead, the next day.

  Phase Line Smash, about 150 kilometers from our starting point on the Saudi-Iraqi border, was the last reference line we had drawn before we anticipated significant combat with the RGFC. It was a control measure for me to get the corps into whatever attack configuration I decided on to attack the Guards. Smash was named deliberately, because that is where we anticipated "smashing" into the RGFC. It was like a line of departure for our attack, and by the time we reached it, I wanted us to be rolling through it without stopping. Because I had Smash there, I was able to meter the movement of units so that they would reach Smash at about the same time for a concentrated attack.

  What Don said made sense, and I told him I'd let him know later, but for now I wanted him to slow his rate and continue aviation and artillery attacks well forward to keep the Iraqis off balance. What I wanted to do in the meantime was check the progress of the 1st INF to see if they were getting any artillery fire from the Iraqis and if they might be vulnerable by not continuing to move.

  Meanwhile, all the Iraqis had seen so far was a cavalry regiment and two brigades of the 1st INF. That meant that the RGFC still did not know what was bearing down on them. The less the Iraqis knew about the size of the force descending on them, the less would be their sense of urgency to organize a fortified defensive line. I wanted to stay hidden from them for as long as possible. If I continued moving the 2nd ACR forward, and in so doing tipped off a larger force to their presence, and if I could not then bring my own larger force into a coordinated attack before the Iraqis got big units in the way, it would make for some tougher going.

  In addition, on 19 February, I had told Don Holder that if he was successful on Smash and found a soft spot in the Iraqi defenses, he should not be surprised if I blitzed him directly to Objective Denver on Highway 8. In my mind that possibility still remained for the following day. I wanted the regiment fresh for it.

  I left and was back at the TAC just at dark.

  When I got there, I got a quick, informal update of our situation:

  The 1st INF Division had reached Phase Line Colorado, which meant they were halfway through the breach mission, or about twenty kilometers deep. At this point, Tom had two brigades abreast, with the rest of the division strung behind, all the way back into Saudi. To make room for the British, we had planned to expand the breach head another twenty kilometers north, to Phase Line New Jersey, and also expand it west and east. That would allow the 1st INF to move all its vehicles through the lanes and into this expanded area. To get that much area required three brigades on line, which meant Tom had to bring the 3rd Brigade through the cleared but not yet marked lanes, then attack forward with the two lead brigades northeast and northwest so that they could open up the middle for the 3rd Brigade. That was no easy maneuver, especially in contact with the enemy, and especially at night, but it was necessary, both to ensure that the area was totally secured and free of any artillery in range of the breach, and to finish passing the Big Red One through the breach and make room for the 1st UK.

  I was pleased with the operation so far. But I also knew the risk of moving a brigade in between two others and attacking forward twenty kilometers at night from Colorado to New Jersey without any preparation or warning. And so I was beginning to question the wisdom of continuing the attack at night… Once again, the wasted minute. We could have gone earlier than 1500. I would not have been in this situation if we had. But that was past. I had to deal with now.

  Meanwhile, 1st INF aviation ranged far beyond Colorado into Iraqi depths, and 1st INF artillery fires also were striking deep. By 1800, the 1st INF had reported more than 1,000 prisoners, a rough count, as no one was particularly worried about statistics at this point. The division so far reported no losses of its own.

  Things had gone far better than we had expected. Better still, the Iraqis had still not used chemical or bio.

  I got an equally encouraging report from 1st AD. Ron Griffith reported that their cavalry squadron had crossed the Iraqi border at 1434, following the 2nd ACR. By 1500, sixteen D-7 combat engineer bulldozers had cut 250 eight-meter-wide lanes through the border berm (they had been working for ten hours). The division was passing through. At this point, Ron had the division in a wedge formation, with one brigade at the tip and two following on each side. By 1800, the lead elements of their brigades had moved about fifteen kilometers into Iraq, and they were continuing to move. Their cavalry squadron had actually moved sixty kilometers into Iraq that day.

  Third AD movements also were continuing. Butch Funk (still corps reserve at this point) moved his column of brigades behind 2nd ACR. As his elements streamed north into Iraq, Butch had his division band at the border berm playing cavalry music. So far, the division had reported some minor enemy contact and had taken some prisoners bypassed by 2nd ACR.

  When I called John Yeosock at 1810, I reported all this, and I also advised him we would more than likely suspend offensive operations for the night, but would continue other combat operations, such as aviation and artillery, as well as finish the passage of the remainder of the two armored divisions across the berm and into Iraq. We would then resume offensive operations at first light. He concurred without discussion. John usually said that tactical decisions were up to me, since I was closer to the action, and then he supported them. My report was quick, with little deliberation: a routine affair, and then I went on to other duties.

  I called Don Holder and confirmed that I wanted him to cease offensive movement, but to continue artillery fires and aviation attacks forward.

  A few minutes later, Ron Griffith, who had monitored the order to the 2nd ACR to cease forward movement, called me at the TAC to ask if the order also applied to him. I told him yes.

  I did not actually think that decision through as well as I had Don's. As it happened, I could just as easily have ordered Ron to continue… even though elements of 2nd ACR were in front of him, and he could not have gone far. To allow 1st AD to continue to move toward al-Busayyah and Objective Purple, I would have had to order Don Holder to uncover in front of 1st AD tonight (s
ince 2nd ACR had moved their elements forward all that day, by about 2000 many of their ground elements were actually out from in front of 1st AD; 2nd ACR aviation, however, was still operating there). Yet since I figured it would take most of the night to get all that done and would possibly cause some fratricide, I told Ron to stop. I really did not think we would net any advance time by uncovering and advancing that night, and I also knew that Ron would continue to move his division forward through the border berm well into the night, refuel, get orders out, and continue the attack at first light. Besides, our intelligence indicated little reaction from the RGFC.

  We had one disappointment that day. The 11th Aviation Brigade reported that they could not execute CONPLAN Boot that night. When we had gotten the word to go early, we had caught them moving both FAARPs (Forward Arm And Refuel Points, temporary fuel and ammo sites meant to be set up and broken down quickly) and aircraft forward, in anticipation of attacking the following night. There was no way they could go tonight. Too bad. The weather was still good, and that attack really would have helped on the east.

  Our casualties so far were one soldier KIA and one WIA in the 1st INF, three soldiers WIA in 1st AD, and two soldiers WIA in the 2nd ACR from the DPICM incident earlier, when they had run over our own munitions. These were our first, but regretfully not the last, casualties from our own unexploded ammunition on the battlefield as we advanced.