Into the Storm: On the Ground in Iraq sic-1

by Tom Clancy

  Here is what I was seeing. The 1st INF was approaching Highway 8, and their axis of advance had them moving northeast rather than the more due east I had ordered earlier. Third AD was into Kuwait and also approaching Highway 8, attacking east-southeast. Looking at the map, it appeared we might have to do something to change their directions or establish a limit of advance, or else they would run into each other. First AD also was approaching Highway 8, to the north of 3rd AD.

  I left the TAC and walked outside to clear my head. Not much else I could do right now. We had the corps attacking due east against the RGFC, the 1st CAV committed for a first-light attack, and the 2nd ACR (in reserve) also committed to follow the 1st INF, then attack north inside them to Hawk. I also had my one remaining Apache battalion in our 11th Aviation Brigade in reserve for deep attacks, although that appeared unlikely, given the cramped space deep. I walked around, ate some MREs, then relaxed for a few minutes and smoked a cigar in the small tent the troops had put up for me, about twenty feet from the TAC entrance.

  At about 1845, when I went back inside the canvas enclosure of the TAC, Stan pointed out to me that the 3rd AD attacks had, in fact, taken them so far east and southeast that if the Big Red One were to keep its current axis of attack, then 3rd AD might run into them. Since all we had to go on was the friendly situation we had posted on our map, this information was not certain enough for me to make a decision to adjust. Figuring how long it takes to get orders out and executed, and wary of map postings not current, I told Stan to confirm the information and, if correct, to give 3rd AD a limit of advance, and to redirect the 1st INF attack farther east (and toward the blue as I had ordered early that morning), then north once they were across Highway 8.

  But at 1900, when the call went to the 1st INF Division, it was interpreted as an order to stop. And so they ordered a halt to their movement, and came to a stop sometime later, at around 2200 to 2300 (although unit moves and combat actions continued most of the night).

  What I had wanted them to do was to cease their northeast movement and continue due east toward the Gulf. Then, once they were across Highway 8, I wanted them to turn north. They never got the part of the order that told them to resume attacking east.

  Meanwhile, their cavalry squadron, by now far forward and out of radio contact with division and the lead or second brigade, knew of my intent from earlier that day and kept attacking east. In the best example of initiative in accordance with the commander's intent that I knew of in the war, Lieutenant Colonel Bob Wilson and the 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry (known all over the Army as the quarter horse for 1/4 CAV) moved across and cut Highway 8 at around 1900. Afterward, his squadron was inundated with prisoners. His small unit had to handle almost 5,000 of them, which overwhelmed his capability. But by the early evening of 27 February, we had control of Highway 8.

  At least that arm of the envelopment was working.

  I did not find out until two days later that the 1st INF had interpreted the order from the TAC to stop completely. That was my fault. If an order can be misunderstood, it will be, as the old Army saying goes. After I learned of it, I asked Tom Rhame, "Who the hell ordered you to stop?"

  "We thought you did," he said.

  "Damn," I said, then explained what I had intended.

  G+3… THE REST OF THE THEATER

  In the west, on the afternoon of the twenty-seventh, XVIII Corps changed its orientation from north toward the Euphrates to east toward Basra, and then moved to close the by-now-expanding gap with VII Corps. The 3rd ACR, now under operational control of the 24th MECH, was the first XVIII Corps unit to make the turn.

  Meanwhile, the airfield at Umm Hajul (which straddled the east-west boundary with VII Corps, a few kilometers north of al-Busayyah, and thirty kilometers south of the more important Iraqi airfield at Jalibah) was converted by elements of the 101st Airborne into FOB (Forward Operating Base) Viper. From this base, 101st Apaches attacked 145 kilometers farther east into what was called EA (Engagement Area) Thomas and shot up with Hellfires, rockets, and chain gun rounds everything that moved between Viper and Thomas. EA Thomas was a kill box directly north of Basra through which ran the highway north that was thought to be a major exit route for Iraqi armor. As it happened, four hours of continuous attack by 101st Apaches destroyed personnel carriers, multiple rocket launchers, antiaircraft guns, trucks, and grounded helicopters, yet no tanks were found to be moving through EA Thomas.

  The next morning, the 101st commander, General Peay, planned to air-assault his 1st Brigade into Thomas. If they could get forces on the ground to cut the highway north out of Basra, it was thought they would strangle the last escape route of the Republican Guards. The cease-fire put a stop to this plan.

  Meanwhile, the heaviest punch out of XVIII Corps, the 24th MECH, attacked and captured Jalibah airfield, and moved eastward along Highway 8 at about 1300. By 1000, the airfield, which was defended by an Iraqi armored battalion, was secure. The battalion had lost all of its vehicles, and fourteen MiG fighters, abandoned by the Iraqi air force, also were destroyed.

  Not far from Jalibah, the division ran into huge logistics and ammunition storage sites; the area just beyond that was defended by scattered elements of RGFC divisions — the al-Faw, the Nebuchadnezzar, and the Hammurabi (the first two were infantry divisions, the last armored). Though Iraqi artillery tried to lay fires down on the rapidly advancing columns, they didn't do any damage. That afternoon, the 24th took more than 1,300 Iraqi ammunition bunkers and captured more than 5,000 Iraqi soldiers.

  In Kuwait, the Marines had come close to completing their mission. While Tiger Brigade cut the highway out of Al Jahrah, and the land route north toward Iraq, the 2nd Division had halted on Mutlah Ridge. And at 0600 the morning of the twenty-seventh, elements of the 1st Division made the final assault on the international airport. It wasn't long before they took down the Iraqi colors and raised the U.S. and Kuwaiti flags (the U.S. flag soon came down, for the sake of diplomatic decorum).

  By 0900, Kuwaiti forces, supported by Egyptian armor and other Arab forces, entered Kuwait City.

  Coalition forces found a city that had been sacked. Many of its citizens had been tortured (with acid baths, electric drills, and electric prods), killed (dismemberment, shooting, or beating to death were frequent methods), or raped.

  Some Iraqi looting had been systematic — a million ounces of gold from the Kuwait Central Bank, jewels from the gem market, marine ferries, shrimp trawlers, baggage-handling equipment, airliners, runway lights, granite facing from skyscrapers, thousands of plastic seats from the university stadium, and grave-digging backhoes, to name a few. Most government and public buildings had been looted and pillaged — many were burned. So too were hotels, department stores, and telephone exchanges. Other looting had been more opportunistic — rugs, drapes, toilets, sinks, light fixtures, lightbulbs, most of the country's cars, buses, and trucks, and books from libraries. The Iraqis sabotaged all but a few of the country's 1,330 oil wells and twenty-six gathering stations. Every day, something approaching 11 million barrels of crude escaped from these broken wells. About half of those 11 million barrels burned up. The rest made vast crude oil lakes. Ships were scuttled, to block channels through the harbor. Water and electrical utilities were sabotaged.

  Scattered along the so-called Highway of Death, littered around the ruined — and mostly stolen — cars and trucks, was a partial "inventory" of the loot from Kuwait City — television sets, washing machines, carpets, scuba gear, jewelry.

  After the Arabs took the city, the Marines entered. When they did, the Kuwaitis came out like Parisians in August 1944. "God bless Bush!" they cried. "Thank you, U.S.A.! Thank you! Thank you! Thank you!"

  By evening in Riyadh, momentum was growing in Washington for a cease-fire. And at 2100 (1300 in Washington), General Schwarzkopf gave the live, televised "mother of all briefings" that, in essence, declared victory. Although he allowed that armored battles were still going on, the CINC indicated that he would happ
ily stop fighting if the order came to do that.

  He did not have long to wait.

  CHAPTER FOURTEEN

  Cease-Fire

  The next twelve hours brought an end to the war for VII Corps.

  On into the night, we continued to fight a series of close battles. Following the decisions to adjust the 1st INF and 3rd AD axes of advance, I continued to focus on making adjustments in these fights in a way that would allow us to complete the double envelopment sometime the next day.

  That evening, I got a quick update on the Iraqi units left in our sector and a look at our own situation. From the reports of the commanders I had visited earlier and from my own observations, it was clear to me that we had the Iraqis on the floor. A short briefing from Bill Eisel, G-2 at the TAC, confirmed it: The Iraqi intent was to continue to defend with what they had while attempting to withdraw their remaining units from the theater over pontoon bridges they were constructing over the Shatt al Arab[53] and the Euphrates. Since both these areas were outside VII Corps sector, and had been since late on 25 February, there was nothing we could do to stop the units leaving by that route. Meanwhile, the Iraqis we were facing no longer appeared capable of any kind of coordinated defense — battalion-sized actions, but not much more. We estimated that the Hammurabi Division and what was left of the Medina (by this time only a brigade) would defend around the Rumaila oil fields, or our Objective Raleigh (and about thirty kilometers from where the 1st CAV was now). It was still not clear to me how much of the Hammurabi was left in our sector, and whether they were joining the retreat, or were part of the defense. Other Iraqi military options in our sector were extremely limited at this point.

  Our own situation was excellent. In the southern part of our sector, the British were racing toward Highway 8, with by now only scattered resistance, and the 1st INF was also in a pursuit, after having cracked through the Iraqi defense the night before and early that morning. Our biggest remaining future fights were going to be in the north, with what remained of the Hammurabi in Objective Raleigh. I figured that with the distance to Raleigh, that fight would take place late the next morning, 28 February, somewhere west of the Rumaila oil fields, and it would be over before the evening — very much like the Medina fight with 1st AD. Thus, I figured that by 1800 the next day, our double envelopment would be complete, and 1st CAV and the 1st INF would have accomplished their linkup somewhere north of Safwan on Highway 8, and we would have trapped the remainder of the Iraqi forces in our sector. By that time, we would have run out of both room to maneuver and Iraqi units to attack.

  From there we could always continue north toward Basra, but that would take intervention and new orders from Third Army, and we had none. Nor did we have any new orders for finishing the current fight other than the ones we were trying to execute — i.e., our own double envelopment.

  By then, I'd had VII Corps attacking for almost four days straight. Soon we would be at the limit of soldier and leader endurance. But we were not there yet.

  I left the TAC and went outside to smoke a cigar.

  When I returned at around 2130, Stan had been talking to John Landry at the main. There was talk of a cease-fire in the morning.

  Total surprise. It was the second of the two great surprises of the war for me personally. The other was the order to attack early. Both were friendly actions. No warning order, no questions, no real evidence from the battlefield.

  Cease-fire! "Who the hell's idea is that?" I wanted to know.

  I called John Yeosock right away, and John confirmed the news. "There's talk about a possible 'cessation of offensive operations' effective tomorrow," he told me. "Nothing's definite yet," he added. "But in the light of that development, don't do operations that will unnecessarily cost any more casualties."

  I repeated that our situation was a combination of pursuit and hasty attack. Another twenty-four hours or so would finish it. "Why now? Why not give us tomorrow? We have them where we want them. There is less and less organized resistance, but we are not done yet."

  John agreed. "I already told the CINC we needed another day," he told me. "But I'll try to get all this clarified." Meanwhile, he directed us to put out a warning order for a possible cessation of offensive operations in the morning.

  I was stunned.

  But we put out the warning order. None of my commanders came back on the radio to protest stopping.

  This was the third set of orders given to the corps that day. First had been the double envelopment. Second had been the adjustment based on Ron Griffith's radio call, our orders to keep 3rd AD and 1st INF from running into each other, and the postponement of the 1st CAV attack based on Ron Griffith's late call. Now this. We would issue two more orders before the cease-fire the next day. It was not the kind of battle rhythm pace I liked when issuing orders to an attacking corps of 146,000 soldiers and 50,000 vehicles — in fact, it was the kind of pace that I had been used to when I was a captain with 137 soldiers and fifty vehicles.

  As I let it all sink in, many things went through my mind. My initial thoughts were ones of frustration: We had not yet finished the mission. We had the Iraqis on the floor. Let's finish it. Run right through the finish line at full speed.

  Yet if someone knew something I did not, and if he thought we had reached our strategic goals, I was glad that our troops were done and there would be no more casualties. The corps was tired. In maybe another twenty-four hours, I would have had to start rotating units in and out to generate some fresh combat power.

  I asked myself if I had been forceful enough in painting the local tactical picture to John Yeosock, and decided I had. We had been especially attentive to it since his earlier reports of the CINC's "concerns," and John got reports from not only me directly, but from Colonel Dick Rock and Colonel Carl Ernst, who had been at my 27 February morning planning session. Third Army had as precise a picture of our situation and the enemy's then as at any time in the war. As for CENTCOM, I had no idea what they knew, but I had to assume that it was whatever Third Army knew.

  I did not bypass John Yeosock and call General Schwarzkopf directly to protest. I trusted Yeosock. He knew mounted operations and, even though he was in Riyadh, he had a great feel for what still needed to be done tactically in our sector of attack. I had made my case with him and that was it. At the same time, I trusted that the senior leadership knew what they were doing. We were not yet done tactically, but if there were other considerations that made a cease-fire a wise strategic choice, then OK, we would execute.

  When I let the TAC know, their reaction was not unlike mine. First, they had questions: "Is this right?" Then, like me, they asked, "Why now?" Then, when the end appeared inevitable, there was a noticeable sign of physical letdown. With the adrenaline gone, the momentum and charged atmosphere of only a few moments earlier went away. I knew it would be like that all over the corps as the word got out.

  When the corps command post first received word of the anticipated cessation of hostilities, all of the brigades in the corps were in heavy contact with the enemy and the 1st Cavalry Division anticipated action. As the time of the cease-fire changed, units continued to attack forces in Kuwait and Iraq. The 1st INF was heading "toward the blue."

  It is here that human factors come into play in a large combat unit.

  By 1800 that evening, I was using the combat power of the corps at full throttle, with maneuvers set in motion that would complete our mission in another twenty-four hours. We had four divisions committed, with a fresh division in the 1st CAV. The troops and commanders, while tired, were still capable of continuing the attacks at a peak level of intensity, stimulated both by the continuation of the attack and the prospects of victory. They were driving on. Yet if ever the momentum got interrupted, it would be hell getting it started again. It is a fact of soldier and unit behavior. When you're operating at close to endurance limits and pushing yourself and your soldiers to stay at that level, you must keep going. Any halt means a precipitous drop in energy lev
el, because the stimulus is removed. Without that stimulus of movement and action, units fall idle very fast, like dropping off a cliff. After that, it is damn near impossible to rouse them to previous levels. I had seen it happen many times in training and in combat in Vietnam.

  So when we confirmed the rumors of a cease-fire, the air went out of the balloon. When we put the order out just before midnight, we could just feel the corps attack momentum come to a halt.

  VII CORPS ACTIONS

  While all this was going on, actions in VII Corps continued.

  First INF units had had almost four days of nonstop actions, accompanied by constant adjustment to retain unit integrity — to make sure the right units were in the right combination. These adjustments were especially frequent at night, when the units could easily become separated. One of those units was the 3rd Battalion, 66th Armor, an M1A1 tank battalion in the 2nd Armored Division Forward, which had been one of the two lead brigades in Tom Rhame's night attack toward Objective Norfolk on the previous night. By now they had attacked and moved all day and were approaching Highway 8.

  On 27 February, according to an account by Captain Tim Ryan and Captain Bill Rabena, "the afternoon sun was setting as the brigade snaked its way down a valley leading from the Kuwaiti central plateau to the coastal plain [the troops would call it the "Valley of the Boogers," because of the severely broken terrain and the hidden Iraqis]. The dense black smoke from the burning oil wells twenty miles away made it seem several hours later. Captain Tim Ryan, the D Company, 3/66 Armor commander, had just finished issuing orders to his company for yet another brigade night attack when the change of mission from Lieutenant Colonel Jones came over the radio." Because Taylor Jones, the battalion commander, did not want to lose any howitzers to attacks by bypassed Iraqi units known to be still in the area, Jones ordered Ryan to go back to the rear and escort the howitzer batteries of 4/3 Field Artillery battalion forward so that they could safely get in better position to support the attack. Ryan decided to use only two tanks, his and that of Staff Sergeant Stringer, for the mission. "As Ryan and Stringer turned their tanks around for the return trip," after one successful escort, "Staff Sergeant Stringer identified and reported approximately ten dismounted Iraqi soldiers through the tank's thermal sights. The enemy squad was well armed, their light machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades clearly evident at that close range." Ryan wanted to let them surrender and fired warning shots over their heads. "As the tracers from the warning burst of machine-gun fire from Ryan's tank arched through the black sky twenty feet over the enemy's head, a hail of bullets from Stringer's tank slashed through the formation. Several enemy soldiers dropped in their tracks… Meanwhile, the remaining soldiers ran for cover behind a previously unnoticed Iraqi T-62 tank approximately 400 meters away from both Ryan and Stringer." Several minutes passed, as an Iraqi soldier made his way to Stringer's tank to ask for medical care for their wounded. Meanwhile, Ryan's tank loader, Pfc. Berthold, was keeping an eye on the remainder of the Iraqis and the T-62. When he noticed that some of the Iraqi infantry were mounting the tank and others were running away, he alerted his commander, and Ryan went into action. "Ryan immediately slewed his tank's turret back in the direction of the enemy tank, identified the fleeing enemy through his sights, and squeezed the trigger once again, sending machine-gun bullets through the dark. None of the enemy soldiers was moving when he traversed his turret back to the enemy tank… Before he had come to let the thought sink in, Sgt. Jones [his gunner] reported that the T-62's turret was traversing… Ryan ordered Jones to fire, and the resulting impact of the main gun round on the T-62's turret blew it completely off the hull." Ryan and Stringer would go on to destroy another tank and a BMP and capture an Iraqi infantry squad before they completed their artillery escort mission (at 0230, 28 February). At 0430, they got the mission to resume the attack at 0600 28 February.