by Unknown
“Pip” Roberts, probably the youngest but most experienced tank commander. I knew Pip Roberts from North Africa, where he had led the tank brigade of the famous 7th Armored Division. His I lth Armored Division, on the other hand, was newly formed and inexperienced.
As almost always with the British, they carried out their tank attacks without accompanying infantry; as a result, they were unable to eliminate at once any little antitank nests that were lying well camouflaged in woodland or behind hedges. The main attack broke down under our defensive fire, although on the flank British “Operation Goodwood,” 18/19 July 1944 189 and Canadian infantry were able to force their way into the western part of Caen. Our front still held.
As announced by Feuchtinger, my combat group was considerably strengthened at the beginning of July: Tiger Battalion 503 was transferred to my sector. Because of its dreaded “eighty-eight” and its heavy armor, the Tiger was regarded as invulnerable and superior to all enemy tanks.
Major Becker, with all five companies of his Assault-gun Battalion 200, was attached to me and was to work closely with the grenadiers.
I was given the remaining battalion of our panzer regiment the other battalion had been transferred to Germany to reequip with the Panzer V “Panther”).
A detachment of rocket-launchers was attached to me.
A battalion of the Luftwaffe's Field Division No.16 came under my command, to form a weak line in front of my positions.
As Feuchtinger had told me, on and behind the hills at Bourgebus three antitank sections with 8.8cm guns were being brought into position. Added to these was the division's artillery.
My two Battalions 1/125 and II/125 were posted to the left and right behind the Luftwaffe's field units in so-called “block positions,” from which they could either launch a counterattack or set up a defensive front. With them were Major Becker's companies.
We thus set up a graduated defense about 15 kilometers in depth, which would be able, sooner or later, to bring any enemy attack to a standstill.
Despite intensive aerial reconnaissance, the British failed to detect this echeloned defense in depth. As we discovered later, they reckoned on a depth of only 7 kilometers. From captured maps we f,)und that the British had assumed there were at least two if not three German panzer divisions in the sector of their attack. This overestimate may have been the reason for their cautious advance later.
In spite of strong protests from the corps commander, an infantryman, the two panzer battalions were placed close behind the most forward positions. It would have been better to have held them further back in readiness for counterattacks. This decision was later to prove disastrous.
In the late afternoon of 14 July, I was summoned to the HQ of Obergruppenfuehrer Sepp Dietrich, our recently appointed corps commander. Sepp Dietrich knew me from the time I had asked him for advice about my problem of marriage to Dagmar. He had received the curious answer from Hitter's HQ for his part with sheer disbelief, and so had promised to make direct representations. Owing to the heavy fighting that set in, this remained unfortunately only an intention.
Also at the corps command post, where Sepp Dietrich greeted me, was Feuchtinger.
“Luck,” said Dietrich, "in the six weeks since the landing you have led your combat group with distinction and prevented an early breakthrough by the British on our threatened eastern flank. Your commander has put you in for the Knigbt's Cross.
I "I know also that tomorrow is your birthday and that your flanc,6e works in Paris. To give you a few days' rest, I have decided to send you instead of one of my staff officers oh a special mission to Paris.
“You will leave tonight and return early on the 18th. I wish you happy days.”
“Obergruppenfuehrer,” I cried, “I can't accept this, tempting though it is. I can't leave my men on their own in this critical situation. I reckon the British will try their next breakout, or even breakthrough, in my sector. Thank you for the offer, but let me stay here, please.”
“Luck,” replied Sepp Dietrich, “according to our information there's little likelihood of a fresh attack for the next ten to fourteen days. After their costly”Epsom' offensive, the British will first have to regroup and build up appropriate supplies, so it's all right to go." I finally let myself be persuaded, after prompting also from Feuchtinger. The prospect of seeing Dagmar again was too enticing.
When I returned to my command post, I went to I Battalion and told its commander to take over leadership of the combat group during my absence.
My Mercedes was brought forward and loaded with the treasures of Normandy. Via the army telephone system I had myself “Operation Goodwood,” 18/19 July 1944 191 I switched into the local civilian network in Paris and told Dagmar and the femme de chambre of my coming.
It was with mixed feelings that I left my command post. For security reasons, and to keep an eye on the air"I took a driver with me. Before me lay three days in Paris!
Alter I had completed my “mission” and paid a short visit to our “Special HQ Paris,” I was free for Dagmar and my friends.
Dagmar and I were more in love than ever, even though the fool regulations and racial laws prevented us from marrying. We promised to wait for each other until after the war and then marry.
The foodstuffs I had brought with me, a total of about 50 kilograms, caused great delight all around, but especially the two kilos of coffee, for it was no longer obtainable in Paris.
“We live here on ersatz,” said J.B. “We've borrowed that wretched word from you.” Despite the pleasure of our reunion, I was uneasy. I telephoned division every day. “All quiet here, pretty normal, no noticeable change in the situation,” I was told each time. I talked over again with Dagmar and my friefids what was to be done if Paris should be threatened. Dagmar wanted to stay to the last possible moment, so as to be near me.
In the evening of 17 July we all sat together again over a bottle of champagne. On 18 July, I set off while it was still dark, in order to reach my command post before dawn, before the Spitfires and Hurricanes arrived. The journey took longer than expected, because of the nightly supply traffic. It was not until just before nine that I was on the hills east of my combat sector. Only a few kilometers now separated me from my command post. I stopped and we searched the sky for fighters, It was very hazy over the area of operations. Everything seemed to be in order.
Shortly after nine, I arrived at my command post and was looking forward to a Normandy breakfast, after which I intended changing from my uniform of the day into combat attire.
The commander of I Battalion greeted me briefly. I sensed that something was not right, for all the men at the command post Then came the report that almost took my breath away.
“Since five o'clock this.morning the British have been bombing our sector, especially the area of I Battalion, endlessly with thousands of bombers. This bombing was followed by a creeping barrage from the artillery. The firing stopped barely half an hour ago.” seemed nervous.
“How are things with your I Battalion, have you any news?” was my first question.
“Not yet, we've no radio contact,” came the answer.
“How about the Tigers and the panzer battalion of our regiment?” Answer: “No radio contact. I don't know how things look there.”
“And II Battalion? Major Becker's assault-guns? Have you told division?” My questions became more and more pressing, but it was clear that nothing had been done.
This was of course the renewed attempt at a breakout. Yet nothing, nothing at all, had been done! My deputy appeared to be in shock. He seemed absolutely helpless. I ordered him to be at my disposal. After a few days I instructed my adjutant to go in person to Army Personnel and demand that the commander be relieved. This was granted at once.
I had become the richer by experience: I had witnessed anew how officers and NCOS, who in peacetime had been outstandin instructors, popular with their superiors and comrades, lost their nerve in an emergency and were unable t
o cope with reality. General Pip Roberts, as he told me later, had undergone the same experience. For the same reasons as mine with the battalion commander, he had been forced to have the commanders of a brigade and a regiment relieved. The experience had shown, moreover, that the relief had to be made at once, if the unit was not to be affected and demoralized.
So there I was at my command post. No one knew what had happened, lthough it was obvious that the enemy was mounting a decisive attack.
I dismissed all thought of a good breakfast and my combat clothes. I ran to a radio Panzer IV that the panzer regiment had put at my disposal, offered the driver a cigarette and said, “Let's go! Take the main road to Caen.” To my adjutant I shouted, “I'll call you as we go along. Make contact with division at once, even if you have to go there in person. Tell them what's happened and ask for reserves so that we can stop the British. Send an officer to the tanks.” Slowly and without interference I approached the village of Cagny, which lay exactly in the middle of my sector and was not occupied by us. The eastern part as far as the church was undamaged; the western part had been flattened. When I came to “Operation Goodwood,” 18/19 July 1944 193 western edge of the village, I saw to my dismay about 25 to 30 British tanks, which had already passed southward over the main road to Caen, which ran from east to west.
A glance then to the north, to where my I Battalion ought to be, or had been, in combat positions. The whole area was dotted with British tanks, which were slowly rolling south, against no opposition“My God,” I thought, “the bombing and artillery barrage destroyed the battalion.” It was quite clear: the British, with a bombing of unprecedented extent, were trying to break through our positions on the narrowest of fronts. How could I plug this gap? Perhaps with an attack by the superior Tiger Mark VIS?
So, back to the command post, to try to organize countermeasures.
As I was driving past the church of Cagny, which lay in the undamaged part of the village, I saw to my surprise a Luftwaffe battery with its four 8.8c in antiaircraft guns, all pointing to the sky.
“What are they doing here?” went through my mind. “I didn't see them on my way here.” Under a tree I called a halt, “bailed out,” and ran to the battery.
A young captain came up to me. “Major,” he said, “can you tell me what's going on here?”
“My God, what are you doing here? Have you any idea what's happening over there to the left of you?” He answered calmly, “I belong to an air-defense ring to protect the factories and city of Caen against air raids. At the moment I'm waiting for the next raid.”
“Man,” I replied as calmly as I could, "you've already been bypassed by enemy tanks. North of here it's absolutely swarming with tanks. You will move into position at once with your four guns on the northern edge of Cagny and attack the advancing tanks. Don't worry about tanks that are already going south.
Hit the enemy from the flank. In that way you'll force bhe advance to a halt.“ His reply came just as calmly, ”Major, my concern is enemy planes, fighting tanks is your job. I'm Luftwaffe.“ He was about to turn away. At that I went up to him, drew my pistol (which we had to carry for trips to Paris), leveled it at him and said, ”Either you're a dead man or you can earn yourself a medal.“ The young captain realized that I was in earnest. ”I bow to force. What must I do?" I took him by the hand and undercover of the hedges and trees ran with him to the northern edge of the village.
“Here, place your four guns in this apple orchard. The corn over there is so high that you will be well protected and just have a field of fire across it. Shoot every tank you see. I'll see if I can send you a platoon of grenadiers to guard you against surprise attacks. Should the situation become critical for you, destroy your guns and withdraw to the south. I hope our Tiger battalion will soon be able to mount a counterattack from the right flank. With them and wit you we should be able to beat back the enemy attack, especially as it's not accompanied by infantry as far as I can tell, Listen, I'll be back in half an hour. All clear?” He still seemed to be undecided, but finally nodded. “Okay, Major.” Back at my command post I realized the full extent of the preparatory carpet bombing.
My orderly officer reported that the Tiger battalion had been thoroughly saturated by the heaviest American bombers. He himself had seen some of the 62-ton colossi upside down; craters 30 feet across had made the whole terrain almost impassable; there could be no question of using the Tigers in the next few hours. The fate of the Panzer IV Battalion had been much the same. my command post, had made Major Becker, who was now at contact with his batteries.
“One battery has been completely knocked out by bombs,” he reported. “Two batteries on the left flank are intact and will support the grenadiers of I Battalion, who have gone into action against the British infantry. The other two batteries will be going into action at any minute on the right flank, where Major Kurz, without first waiting for orders, has set up a defensive front with his II Battalion.” Captain Liebeskind, my adjutant, came back from division. To stop the gap on my left flank there were no reserves, was the message from Feuchtinger. However, I was to be sent the reconnaissance battalion to secure my weak right flank; Captain Brandt would be reporting to me. My orders were: To prevent without fail any attempt by the enemy to break through to the east on the open right flank.
Captain Brandt reported that same morning. “Major, I am again ”Operation Goodwood,“ 18/19 July 1944 195 under your command, lying with the reconnaissance battalion about 7 kilometers east of Troarn. Since 6 July we have been lying in reserve south of Caen and have to some extent been replenished with men and materiel. We could see the terrible air attacks early this morning. Has your combat group been badly hit?” I put Brandt briefly in the picture. "On my left wing there's a yawning gap to Caen and Regiment 192, which I can't fill. But three antitank sections with 8.8cm cannons are in place on the hills of Bourgebus. They should in fact be able to stop any tank advance, so long as the British don't employ infantry. But there's also a very dangerous gap between my command post here and Major Kurz's 11 Battalion. If the British were to push through it, the way to the southeast would be open to them.
This gap is where I'm putting you. Keep contact on your right with Kurz and on your left with me. One of Major Becker's batteries with their 7.5cm antitank guns (long) will be under your orders to combat enemy tanks. Send a liaison officer to me here. Good luck to you, Brandt, we've got to survive the day." From official reports, messages from my units, and the state,ments of prisoners, a gloomy picture of the situation emerged. Accounts that I have been able to see since the -war have confirmed the situation at the time.
Montgomery had decided to launch a general attack out of the little bridgehead and thrust into the French hinterland in the direction of Faiaise. With matchless logistics and in the greatest secrecy the following were assembled for the purpose: ne tank corps, with the II th Armored Division, the Guards Armored Division, and the 7th Armored Division, well known to me from North Africa; to protect each flank, one Canadian infantry division (on the right) and one British infantry division (on the left); over 1,000 guns of every caliber, plus naval artillery;
the 6th Airborne Division and the 51st Highland Division, who were to remain in the bridgehead to protect it; to prepare the attack, the biggest aerial armada so far assembled in the war, made up of about 2,500 British and American bombers. Over a width of about 4 kilometers and a depth of 196 PANZER COMMANDER about 7, the strips of attack were to be so saturated that virtually no one would be able to survive the bombardment; the air attack was to be followed by a creeping barrage from the 1,000 guns, plus the naval artillery, behind which the first waves of tanks were to advance in quick succession; the initial goal: the hills at Bourgebus, about 15 kilometers from the starting line.
“No one will survive this inferno. We need only march in with our tanks to open the way to Paris.” That was the unanimous opinion of the Allies engaged in the attack. “How very wrong we were was soon to appear,”
was what I heard after the war from many commanders in the British tank corps.
Since all the units had to squeeze through cleared passages in the mine fields, one division followed the other, to advance after the breakout on a wide front toward the hilly terrain near Bourgebus.
My one hope was that the 8.8cm battery at Cagny and the two 7.5cm assault-gun companies would delay the enemy long enough for reserves to be brought up. These were the lst SS Panzer Division and the 12th SS Panzer Division of
“Hitlerjugend.” Both had recently been taken out of the front to be restored to strength in the Falaise and Lisieux area, where they now were.
Late in the morning of 18 July, reports came in from two of Becker's batteries, which were in action with I Battalion on the left flank: "Individual companies of I Battalion have taken up the fight against the following infantry. We gave support as far as possible.
"A second wave of British tanks had turned west after the disaster at Cagny and was advancing toward the Bourgebus hills.
We gradually had to disengage, therefore, to avoid being encircled." Major Becker was at my command post. I called him over.
“Listen, Becker, I need your batteries more urgently than ever, since for the moment the two panzer battalions are out of action owing to the bombardment. All the batteries, especially those isolated on the left flank, must operate on their own responsibility, cover the grenadiers for as long as possible and above all attack the advancing British tanks from the flank. We must bring the tank thrust to a halt.” Major Bill Close, British, who led one of the tank companies of the regiment in the II th Armored Division that had veered west, “Operation Goodwood,” 18/19 July 1944 197 today a good friend of mine. As he was to tell me later, "We had warned the Guards Armored Division coining after us about Cagny. In spite of that they pushed on and within seconds lost about 20 tanks at Cagny.
We could see how the front regiment tried to avoid the fire from Cagny. In so doing several tanks were again knocked out, this time from woodland in the east. The attack came to a standstill. We were glad we had been able to turn off to the west and so escape the fire of your damned 'eighty-eights." We pushed forward to the south across the Paris-Caen road. We saw fire$ buming here and there in Caen, lying on our right, and in front of us, about 5 kilometers to the south, the Bourgebus hills, our first objective, which we should have reached early that morning.