by Unknown
"Unhindered we moved forward in wide formation, my company in the lead.
“Suddenly, when we had got to about 1,000 meters from the villages on the hills, we came under concentrated fire from 'eightyeights.” Within seconds about 15 of our tanks were stationary and on fire. All attempts to turn aside to left or right failed. By late afternoon I had only a few tanks left that were still intact. The other company fared no better. We had to break off our advance and withdraw. Shortly after came the order from Brigade to suspend hostilities for the day. New orders followed next day." After the arrival of the reconnaissance battalion I felt I had stabilized my right flank to some extent. I had still not had time to change, let alone have something to eat. For the next few hours everything hung on the flak battery at Cagny. I got into my tank again and rolled cautiously into the village. By the church I stopped the tank and ran to the four guns, where an almost indescribable sight met my eyes: The 8.8cm cannons were firing one salvo after the other. One could see the shots flying through the corn like torpedoes. The men on the guns were proud of their first engagement as an antitank unit. All four guns were intact and had not been attacked.
In the extensive cornfields to the north of the village stood at least 40 British tanks, on fire or shot up. I saw how the tanks that had already crossed the main road were slowly rolling back.
Becker's assault-guns had also joined in the battle. From the right flank they shot up any tank that tried to bypass the village.
The young captain came up to me. I congratulated him. "A platoon from my staff company will be here in a few minutes to protect you from surprise attacks. I repeat my orders of this morning: you will hold your position for as long as you can and oppose the enemy tank attack. As soon as the situation becomes critical, destroy your guns and retreat with the grenadiers to my command post.,, With that I left this battery, which had played such a decisive part on that 18 July.
Back at my command post I made contact with Feuchtinger. I described the situation as it appeared to me at about midday on 18 July, and ended, “General, I believe that the whole British attack has come to a standstill, thanks to the engagement of all elements of my combat group, and thanks not least to a Luftwaffe 8.8cm battery that I found by chance at Cagny and put to use in the ground fighting. I see a great danger, however, on my right wing. If the British were to move up their infantry things would look pretty bad for my rather thin defensive front. For the moment it's all right still, but reserves ought to arrive in the course of the afternoon.”
"Congratulations, Luck, on this successful defense. I can give you good news: the Ist SS Panzer Division has orders to move up to us at once from Falaise and strengthen our defense, especially on the Bourgebus hills. The 12th SS Panzer Division also has orders to support us on our right, hence your flank, and prevent a breakthrough to the southeast.
“The Ist SS will arrive today in the late afternoon, the 12th SS not before midday tomorrow. We must hold till then.” In the late afternoon Feuchtinger came through again, “The first elements of the Ist SS have arrived. Together with them we have knocked out a lot of tanks. With, your tally the British have probably lost at least 200 tanks. I am reassured that you can hold out on the right flank. Convey my appreciation to Kurz commander of II Battalion).” In the afternoon I finally changed and at once felt better. The Tiger battalion sent word that about ten Tigers were again operational, and that they would be mounting an attack on the enemy's left flank.
“Operation Goodwood,” 18/19 July 1944 199 Lieutenant (as he then was) Freiherr von Rosen, commander of a Panzer VI (Tiger) company, has given' the following account: "The bombardment early in the morning of 18 July was the worst we had ever experienced in the war. Although we were in foxholes under our tanks, we had a lot of casualties. Some of the 62-ton machines lay upside down in bomb craters 30 feet across; they had been spun through the air like playing cards.
Two of my men committed suicide; they weren't up to the psychological effect. Of my 14 Tigers not one was operational.
All had been covered in dust and earth, the guns disadjusted, the cooling systems of the engines out of action. Yet by early afternoon a few of my Tigers were ready for battle. I was to use them to attack westward in the flank of the British tank attack." From captured maps and operational plans we knew that the guards were supposed to attack in a southeasterly direction, the 7th Armored Division in the center southward, and the leading I Ith Armored Division to the southwest.
While the guards=it was their very first enpgement-felt their way forward cautiously and were beaten back time and again with heavy losses in tanks, the 7th Armored Division had not as yet put in an appearance. It was not until the late afternoon of 18 July that it was able to pass through the small number of gaps in the mine field.
The British offensive, for 18 July, had come to a halt. The gain in territory was not as yet very great; of a breakout or a breakthrough there could be no question. We were certain, however, that the British would be preparing themselves for the next day. The question remained whether, with our depleted forces, we would again be able to stop the attack.
The morning of 19 July remained surprisingly quiet. In the course of individual tank thrusts a number of British tanks were again knocked out. But then, in the early afternoon, Monty took the field with all three tank divisions, supported by infantry and artillery, which had been brought up in the meantime.
While the guards division operated vety cautiously for lack of experience, we discovered to our surprise that the 7th Armored Division was doing the same. It was going through the same experience that we had been through: it was oyer-experienced and for that reason operated with extreme caution. We managed to fight off all attacks on the right wing and in so doing inflicted heavy losses on the two British divisions. For that we had to thank the skillful engagement of my 11 Battalion under Major Kurz, as well as the panzer reconnaissance battalion and Beeker's assault-guns.
A liaison officer came to me from the reconnaissance battalion.
"Major, I have to report that by our own counterattacks we have forced the enemy to retreat again and again. For a while there was a British field dressing station behind our lines.
“An hour ago a British tank appeared with a white flag and brought back some of our wounded. We thanked them at once.” That was true fairness!
From division and from Becker's two batteries now operating alone on my left flank we heard that the Ilth Armored Division, with grenadiers and supported by tanks and heavy artillery, had mounted an attack about four o'clock against two villages on the northern edge of the Bourgebus hills, which were defended by elements of the Ist P anzer Division.
Shortly after came the following report from one of the assaultgun batteries: “Both villages have been taken by the enemy, but further attack halted. Our two batteries have arrived fightingsometimes parallel to the British-without loss on the hills.” Now things became critical; but the British attack was not continued and again came to a halt. It was astonishing that the attack in my sector should be so hesitant. The shock from our 8.8cm antitank guns, the few Tigers, and Becker's assault-guns seemed to have struck deep among the British. With only about 400 grenadiers left we had to hold the long front in the east.
That was too few to withstand a vigorous attack.
Finally, about five o'clock, the first elements of the 12th SS Panzer Division arrived. A general-staff officer made contact with me, “The division has been through a costly march. We were shot up time and again by British fighters and forced into cover. The bulk of the division will be here in the course of the night. How do things look with you?” I put him in the picture and learned that my combat group was to be relieved by this division. Shortly after came the order from my own division: “in the course of the night von Luck's combat group will disengage from the enemy and hand over to the 12th SS Division. You will take up a defensive position on either side of Troarn on the east bank of the flooded Dives. Rauch's combat group will also b
e relieved and stationed east of the Dives.” The relief went through without difficulty. I hoped to be able to give the thoroughly overtired and battle-weary men a little rest. By “Operation Goodwood,” 18/19 July 1944 201 the late evening of 19 July it was possible to, see what the British had managed or failed to do: The little bridgehead had been extended by about 9 kilometers; Caen had now been fully occupied. But the breakthrough in the direction of Falaise had not been made.
Monty was to maintain later that more was not supposed to have been achieved, that
“Operation Goodwood” had had as its objective the tying down of as many German panzer divisions as possible to make it easier for the Americans to break out as planned further West.
Others besides me have had doubts about this version of events and for the following reasons: (I) captured Canadians told us that shortly before the attack Monty had called out to them: “To Falaise, boys, we're going to march on Paris”; (2) anyone who knew Monty and his ambition, and had analyzed his operations in North Africa, would have taken it for granted that he would not have been content with a mere “tying down of German panzer divisions” and an “extension of the bridgehead.” Be that as it may, “Cqieration Goodwood” cost the British about 450 tanks. It was a masterpiece of preparation and logistics.
And yet we were able to prevent the enemy from making a breakthrough.
Only now did we hear that on the day before “Operation Goodwood”-the start of the offensivur own Field Marshal Erwin Rommel had been severely wounded in a fighter-bomber attack on his individual car. We could hardly take it in; to us Rommel had always seemed invulnerable.
Nevertheless, the deep defensive front set up by Rommel had held against Montgomery's attack. As late as 15 and 17 July he had checked this defense in the area of our corps. It is probably true to say that with this Rommel had denied his constant adversary the way to Paris, his last military success.
During the night of 19/20 July, torrents of rain set in, which made our relief more difficult. I shall never forget on our night march to the north the stink of the dead cows, lying in the fields. On 20 July, moreover, there was a further heavy thunderstorm, which turned the battlefield into a swamp. The British air force had to stay on the ground.
Late in the evening of 20 July we learned-fir-st through leaflets dropped by the British, then also from our own radio stationf the attempt on Hitler's life. The older ones among us had mixed feelings; the younger were angry, “It's a stab in the back to us here at the front.” My own thoughts went back inevitably to my talks with Rommel in North Africa in 1943 and in France in 1944. “An attempt on Hitler's life would create a 'stab-in-the-back' legend. As soon as a second front has been established and the end is in sight, we must force him to abdicate, to avoid further losses and to concentrate on the war in the cast.” Next day a war correspondent appeared at my command post.
Hans Von Luck - Panzer Commander
“Major, what do you say here at the front about the assassination attempt on the Fuehrer?” My answer was prompt. “Listen, we've been engaged in heavy defensive fighting here for weeks; we haven't had time to give it a thought. Come back when the situation has calmed down a bit.” An offhand, risky answer, but what was the use?
Worth noting is a piece of information that came to me only recently, from a reliable source. When our corps commander, Obergruppenfuehrer Sepp Dietrich, of Army Group B, was told of the attempt on Hitler's life, his first question was, “Who was it, the SS or the Army?” Although the RAF launched endless attacks and the guards division, with strong patrols, tried to find a gap to the east, the days that followed seemed to us almost like a holiday.
Owing to the heavy downpours of rain the flooded River Dives had become even more impassable. For me the important thing was to recreate I Battalion, which had been almost wiped out by the bombing on 18 July.
At the division's field replacement section a new battalion, built up from remaining cadres and well-trained replacements from home, with factory-fresh SPWS (armored personnel carriers), was brought to operational level in only a few days. We marveled at the logistics by which, time and again, replacements, ammunition, and vehicles were brought up to the front.
After only a week in our defensive “resting” position the division was pulled out, to be restored to strength. We all hoped for a few days' peace to lick our wounds.
But signs of the next British offensive, which they called “Bluecoat,” began to appear and put an end to the respite.
After only two days the division was transferred to the area south of Villers Bocage on the important road No.175 south of Bayeux. Together with the “Operation Goodwood,” 18/19 July 1944 203 brave 21st Panzer Reconnaissance Battalion we managed to hold the front.
The men were tired, our body heavy. We had been in action now for eight weeks without a break, longer, therefore, than any other division. But in spite of that morale was high. The men fought until they dropped. Then, however, on 25 July, after a four-hour aerial bombardment, the Americans managed to break through at the Panzer Lehr Division. We pulled back our front a little and now held a line from Avranches-St. Lb to south of Caen.
Then, on 31 July, came news that General George S. Patton, probably the most flexible of the Allied tank commanders, had broken through at Avranches, near the famous Mont St. Michel With that the way to the French interior, to Paris and Reich territory, seemed to be open. Hitler reacted at once: He threw General Eberbach on Avranches with a hastily assembled panzer group, in order to cut Patton's lines of communication.
Once again it was the people at Bletchley Park, who were cracking our codes, and the U-.S. air force that nipped our attack in the bud. Worse still, however, was the fact that all our divisions engaged in the west were now threatened with encirclement, since Patton would obviously be able to continue his eastward thrust unchecked.
Then everything happened very quickly. We had to fall back; for our decimated, exhausted divisions would not have been able to withstand another big push.
Retreat to Germany" August-November 1944 It took a further two weekf delaying actions and continual evading movements to the southeastfore we reached the area of Falaise, south of Caen. With that the whole Contentin Peninsula, with its important harbor of Cherbourg, was finally lost.
Montgomery, meanwhile, had also emerged from the bridgehead enlarged by “Operation Goodwood” and with the 4th Canadian Division and a Polish tank division was pressing forward into the area northeast of Falaise. Monty's attack from the northwest and Patton's thrust from the southwest threatened to envelop almost the whole of the German Normandy front in one vast pocket.
On 17 August both the Canadian division and the Polish tank division pushed through and split our division in two: Rauch's combat group, with Regiment 192, Reconnaissance Battalion 21, and the last eight tanks, fell into the pocket that was forming; my combat group and divisional HQ remained just outside.
From now on Allied bombers swooped down without a break on our retreating divisions. The excellent American artillery covered all roads and routes with heavy fire day and night.
Worse off were the infantry divisions, which, with their horsedrawn units, struggled east on foot and blocked all the roads. Appalling scenes took place: the tanks, armored elements, and motorized supply units ruthlessly forced their way through to the east. On and beside every road and track leading east shot-up vehicles had broken down; the cadavers of horses lay around. Even ambulances, packed with wounded, stood burning by the side of the road. Valiant officers tried to bring a little order into the chaos, but usually without success.
With my combat group I received orders to set up a defensive block fronting to the west, to prevent any further advance by the Polish and Canadian divisions. From the heights west of Vimoutiers, where Rommel had been severely wounded on'17 July, I had a wide view into the great valley. There, enemy planes were swooping down uninterruptedly on anything that moved. I could see the mushroom clouds of exploding bombs, burni
ng vehicles, and the wounded, who were picked up by retreating transports.
The scenes Retreat to Germany, August-November 1944 205 that had to be enacted in the pocket were indescribable, and we could do nothing to help.
“Man, horse, and truck by the Lord were struck.” This saying, from a poem on the battles of the Crusaders in Pajestine in about 1213, had come to my mind twice before: in December 1941 by Moscow and in 1943 in North Africa. I The jaws of the pocket had not yet quite closed: further south, near the little village of Chambois on the River Dives, there was still a gap, as yet unfilled by the Americans and Montgomery's two divisions. This was probably because, on the one hand, we had managed time and again to hold up the Polish tank division, and on the other, because Patton no longer seemed to be interested in exploiting his advantage, but in pushing on fast to the Seine east of Paris. A certain animosity on Patton's part toward Monty helped us after all to rescue sizable elements from the pocket, though without their materiel.
Colonel Rauch and Major Brandt, commander of the panzer reconnaissance battalion, were to report later under what adventurous circumstances they had managed to extricate themselves from the encirclement. Together with the remnants of some SS panzer divisions, which forced a breach in the closing pocket, and held open the way to the east, Rauch's combat group was able to ford the River Dives by night under heavy artillery fire.
Corporal Korfluer, commander of one of the last Panzer IVS of No.4 Company, has given the following account. “On 19 August came the order”Every man for himself." With a second Panzer IV we set out on the way to the east. At the sight of naked, half-burned tank-men we promised ourselves that we would not let ourselves be finished off in the pocket. It was a hellish journey. In bypassing a horse-drawn column we skidded so badly that we had to abandon our tanks. We continued on foot. During the 'night we slipped past the enemy, some of whom looked at us in bewilderment.