Generals of the Army

by James H. Willbanks

  MacArthur returned to the Philippines as commander of the Military District of Manila in October 1922. By this time his old Filipino friend Manuel Quezon was playing a prominent role in Filipino independence initiatives. As speaker of the Philippine House of Representatives, Quezon impressed MacArthur greatly. His relationship with Quezon would prove critical for MacArthur when he returned in 1935.37

  He became a major general in January 1925 and served as commander of the 23rd Infantry Brigade before his return to the United States.38 He also served in various regional commands in the United States and completed another assignment in the Philippines. One of MacArthur’s most unpleasant duties during this period was serving as a member of Billy Mitchell’s court-martial board. He described the duty as “distasteful,” and he found it difficult to be objective. MacArthur believed Mitchell’s message, but the latter was not convicted for his beliefs; he was on trial for insubordination. Ironically, he concluded “that a senior officer should not be silenced for being at variance with his superior in rank and with accepted doctrine. I have always felt that a country’s interest was paramount, and that when a ranking officer, out of purely patriotic motives, risked his own personal future in such opposition, he should not be summarily suppressed. Superior authority can, of course, do so if it wishes, but the one thing in this world that cannot be stopped is a sound idea.” MacArthur foreshadowed his own future when he concluded, “The individual may be martyred, but his thoughts live on.”39

  Following the Mitchell court-martial, MacArthur headed the 1928 U.S. Olympic Team. It was an unusual assignment, but MacArthur approached it as he would any major military operation. Given his personal emphasis on athletics, MacArthur was a great choice. He was determined not only to win, but to win decisively. The U.S. team led the medal count. General Summerall applauded MacArthur’s accomplishment.40 After his success in Amsterdam, MacArthur returned to Manila. As department commander, he argued for stronger Filipino defenses, but Washington was unresponsive. On the positive side, MacArthur became friends with Henry Stimson, the governor general. He also renewed his contact with the future Filipino president Manual Quezon during this short tour.41

  In July 1929 President Herbert Hoover offered MacArthur the position of chief of Engineers. MacArthur was flattered, but he declined because accepting the position would have taken him out of the line. The following year MacArthur succeeded Summerall as chief of staff. His patience had paid off, but MacArthur preferred to stay in the field. His mother, however, convinced him to take the job. Douglas MacArthur became Army chief of staff on November 21, 1930.42

  MacArthur and the Army faced significant challenges in the early 1930s. The most substantial was the failing national economy. The Great Depression restricted funding for the near future. Despite MacArthur’s persistent attempts to squeeze more national defense dollars from Congress, he was largely unsuccessful. MacArthur, “usually assessed by historians as one of the few senior leaders who had the courage to take Congress to task for lack of resources, … came very close to insubordination in at least one speech before he became chief of staff.”43 Courage and persistence could not overcome financial shortfalls. MacArthur had hoped to make a broad plan for American defense, but he could not fund his vision.44 Following significant post closures and congressional threats to reduce the officer corps, MacArthur’s best efforts could do little to fulfill the security aims he envisioned. Although he stopped the proposed officer reduction, created a General Headquarters for the Air Force, and opened the Command and General Staff College to lieutenants, MacArthur lacked the means to achieve his broad security goals.45

  From left: General Douglas MacArthur, Mamie Eisenhower, President Quezon, and Lieutenant Colonel Eisenhower. (U.S. Army, 64-484)

  According to MacArthur, the “most poignant episode” of his tour as chief of staff was the infamous Bonus March of 1932, spearheaded by World War I veterans (many of them disabled and nearly all down on their luck) hoping to redeem early their $1,000 bonus certificates that were not due to be paid until 1945. From his perspective, the Bonus Marchers constituted an “army of disillusioned and lost men.”46 MacArthur ultimately blamed Communists and pacifists for the incident. As tensions increased over the summer, MacArthur advised against Army intervention into what he saw as a domestic affair. On July 28, 1932, however, the Bonus March reached a critical moment. A mob 5,000 to 7,000 strong engaged local law enforcement. Gunfire ensued, and the situation went beyond police control. A request for federal troops went to the president. Hoover placed Secretary of War Patrick Hurley in charge. Hurley issued orders to MacArthur to use 600 soldiers under Brigadier General Perry Miles to clear Pennsylvania Avenue of the marchers. MacArthur accompanied Miles, along with Majors Dwight D. Eisenhower and George Patton. Unfortunately for MacArthur, press reports of his association with the Bonus Marcher dispersal were not always flattering, and they did not see the threat the same way he did. The accounts that appeared in the newspapers were, from MacArthur’s perspective, “the most extravagant of distortions of what happened.”47 Regardless of the means employed, the Bonus March episode came to an abrupt albeit controversial end after troops evicted the marchers and used tear gas to force stragglers across the Eleventh Street Bridge.48

  In 1934 President Franklin D. Roosevelt extended MacArthur’s tenure as chief of staff. By 1935 MacArthur had completed five years, and he was ready to move on. The Commonwealth of the Philippines achieved semi-independent status that same year. The Filipino president, Manuel Quezon, then asked MacArthur if he would lead the establishment of a national army. MacArthur became a field marshal in the Filipino military in 1936 while serving as the chief military adviser to the Philippines as a U.S. Army officer. By law MacArthur had reverted from his four-star rank to his permanent rank of major general when he left the chief of staff position. The dual assignment was a highly unusual arrangement, but it served both the American and Filipino needs. Accompanied by his ailing mother, a thirty-seven-year-old socialite named Jean Marie Faircloth, and a small staff that included Eisenhower, MacArthur sailed from San Francisco and began his fifth tour in the Philippines in late 1935.49

  His return to the Philippines began an extraordinary sixteen-year journey that saw MacArthur’s greatest accomplishments as a commander and military strategist. Unfortunately, it began with personal tragedy. Two months after he arrived, his beloved mother passed away. Pinky MacArthur had supported her son well beyond the call of duty. Her death left a huge void that would soon be filled by Jean Faircloth. The couple married in New York on April 30, 1937. The following February the MacArthurs had their first and only child, a son named Arthur IV.50

  MacArthur served as military adviser until 1937, when he retired from active service. After thirty-eight years as a professional soldier, MacArthur had done as much as any American could in the early twentieth-century American Army. He had held every officer rank with the exception of lieutenant colonel, which he skipped during World War I, and lieutenant general, which he would hold briefly at the outbreak of World War II. He had attained the one position that eluded his famous father, Army chief of staff. The fifty-seven-year-old general had little left to prove as a professional soldier.

  As military adviser, MacArthur inherited a simple Filipino defense plan. The Swiss citizen-soldier system of conscription was the organizational model. Unfortunately, the Filipino military budget was too small to develop, equip, and sustain an adequate Filipino defense force. The plan’s goal was to train 40,000 men per year, but only about 20,000 Filipinos were ready by 1937. That same year, MacArthur and President Quezon traveled to Japan, Mexico, and the United States to assess the strategic environment and to bolster island defenses. Their efforts to get the War Department and Congress to increase funding and support for the Filipino defenses were unsuccessful. Their only success came from the Navy Department, which offered to develop a new naval vessel that became the famous PT boat. When MacArthur retired on December 31, 1937, he remained Quezon’s
adviser. His trusty aide, Eisenhower, returned to the States in 1939. Lieutenant Colonel Richard K. Sutherland became MacArthur’s new chief of staff and remained at the general’s side throughout World War II.51

  The Nazi invasion of Poland in September 1939 marked the beginning of World War II in Europe. The Japanese invasion of China in 1937 triggered hostilities in Asia. Most Western nations, however, remained aloof from the challenges presented by Japanese aggression. The mounting threat from Germany after the ill-fated Munich Conference was a greater menace to European peace and security. MacArthur and Quezon were well aware of the potential Japanese threat to the Philippines, but they could do little to prepare for a possible invasion, given the resource limitations and the low security priority afforded the islands.

  In late May 1941 the Army’s chief of staff, General George C. Marshall, provided guidance to MacArthur regarding the growing Asian security concerns. Because of MacArthur’s Philippine experience, Marshall and Secretary of War Henry Stimson believed he was “the logical choice for Army Commander for the Far East should the situation approach a crisis.” On July 27, 1941, MacArthur became the commanding general of U.S. Army Forces in the Far East. He was recalled to active duty as a lieutenant general.52 Once in command, MacArthur immediately expedited the strengthening of the forces available to defend the islands. MacArthur would have to accelerate his original ten-year defense program.

  MacArthur had insufficient assets to repel any Japanese invasion, and his situation did not improve significantly before the Japanese assault on the Philippines on December 8, 1941. Airpower was one concern. There was an overwhelming need for light and heavy bombers and protective fighters. He also appreciated airpower doctrine’s demand for a strong bomber force and the importance of air’s operational reach, given the Pacific theater’s geography.53

  MacArthur also understood the Philippines’ strategic significance. The supply lines to sustain any Japanese expansion radiated from the Home Islands to Australia, the Dutch East Indies, Malaya, Mindanao, and Manila.54 The greatest strategic challenge was how to exploit time and space. If the Japanese delayed their attack, he might be able to shift from a defensive posture to an offensive one. This offensive mindset guided MacArthur’s planning and strategy throughout the war. Unfortunately, he simply could not consider offensive operations without adequate defensive capabilities. These did not exist in 1941, and even with Washington’s promises of support, there was not enough to save the islands when the Japanese attacked late in the year.

  By December the available operational air forces in the Philippines consisted of only thirty-five bombers and seventy-two pursuit planes. The defense plan called for twice the number of each. Moreover, MacArthur lacked sufficient airfields, accessories, and munitions to support the planes he did have. His ground component was equally insufficient. MacArthur possessed about 12,000 U.S. troops, 12,000 Filipino Scouts, and 110,000 members of the Citizens National Army. Equipage and training were major concerns. Naval assets were available, but they were not under MacArthur’s control. The naval element contained a regiment of Marines, three cruisers, thirteen destroyers, eighteen submarines, and six PT boats. If MacArthur could somehow gain more time and strengthen his forces, he believed the Philippines represented the “single hope of effective resistance in Southeast Asia, and, given time and resources, the Philippine Defense Plan would accomplish its long range objective of making them too costly in men and dollars to attack.”55 The Japanese did not give MacArthur the time he desired; the Japanese timeline mandated a quick and decisive assault in December 1941.

  The total complement of Filipino defense forces was grossly insufficient. MacArthur’s command, however, did not simply wait for the Japanese attack. He was aware of the likelihood of a Japanese attack and took appropriate actions. MacArthur’s air chief, Major General Lewis Brereton, recommended moving the bomber force beyond Japanese bomber range, to Mindanao. In one of the war’s great mysteries, only about half were relocated. MacArthur later remarked, “I never learned why these orders were not promptly implemented.” Washington also forbade any offensive action against Japan. It was essential that Japan commit the first overt act of armed hostilities. A preemptive assault on Japanese forces was politically unacceptable. The Army commenced night air patrols on December 4, 1941. These initial sorties reported Japanese air activity twenty to fifty miles beyond Filipino air space. These were clear indicators of Japanese intentions. By December 7 MacArthur believed that “every disposition had been made, every man, gun, and plane was on the alert.”56

  It was not enough. At 0340 on December 8, 1941, MacArthur learned of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Ever the optimist, he hoped that the Japanese might have suffered a setback. He later learned of the Japanese success, but by then he was also under attack. At 1145, MacArthur received the first of many reports of Japanese bomber formations approaching the Philippines and Clark Field. The lack of resources and the failure to disperse their air assets led to heated debate among MacArthur’s staff regarding who was responsible. There was plenty of blame to go around, but most focused on Brereton’s actions or inactions. MacArthur defended Brereton to a certain degree. “The force was in the process of integration, radar defenses were not yet operative, and the personnel was raw and inexperienced. They were hopelessly outnumbered,” MacArthur stressed, “and never had a chance of winning.” MacArthur refused to accept responsibility, and he did not blame his chief of staff, Major General Richard K. Sutherland.57 Regardless of American shortfalls, one must give the Japanese their due. They identified and eliminated American and Filipino strongholds and set the stage for a successful Japanese occupation of the Philippines.

  War Plan Orange, the Rainbow Plan associated with Japan, detailed the general defense approach regarding a Japanese invasion. It called for the U.S. Navy to keep the Philippines’ supply lines open to sustain the forces until massive reinforcements arrived. The plan called for the ground forces to hold out for four to six months. After Pearl Harbor, this was impossible. In MacArthur’s words, “Our sky defense died with our battleships in the waves off of Ford Island. It cancelled Rainbow 5, and sealed our doom.” This was true, but MacArthur always believed that the Navy could have rescued his forces. MacArthur assumed that the “Navy deprecated its own strength and might have cut through to relieve our hard-pressed forces.”58 Regardless of the Navy’s capabilities and intent, time and space worked against MacArthur and those forces that remained.

  After the Japanese secured a beachhead at Lingayen on December 21, 1941, they marched toward Manila. The retreat to Bataan and Corregidor soon symbolized American pluck. MacArthur had no plans to surrender and instilled hope in his troops on the basis of Washington’s promises of aid and resupply that would never arrive. MacArthur, as he usually did, blamed Washington. “No one will ever know how much could have been done to aid the Philippines,” MacArthur reasoned, “if there had been a determined will-to-win.”59 Military necessity clouded MacArthur’s understanding of geopolitical realities.

  This was not the last time MacArthur questioned Washington’s political will, but without immediate reinforcements he knew he and his forces could not hold out indefinitely. He was prepared to die if necessary, but Roosevelt ordered him to Australia in February 1942. There he would lead the Allied effort to halt the Japanese advance and liberate occupied territories. Australia must hold. It was the last major land mass between India and the United States. Without its resources, ports, and manpower, Japan’s defeat might prove unattainable. In a Hollywood-esque escape from Corregidor, MacArthur departed with his family along with select members of his staff on PT-41. They made it to Mindanao and flew to Batchelor Field, forty miles south of Darwin, on St. Patrick’s Day. While there, MacArthur made one of his famous wartime statements: “The President of the United States ordered me to break through the Japanese lines and proceed from Corregidor to Australia for the purpose, as I understand it, of organizing the American offensive against Japan, a pri
mary objective of which is the relief of the Philippines. I came through and I shall return.” MacArthur later described the context and intent of his famous promise. “I spoke casually enough,” MacArthur remembered, “but the phrase ‘I shall return’ seemed a promise of magic to the Filipinos.”60

  From Batchelor Field MacArthur flew to Alice Springs. General Jonathan Wainwright assumed command of Corregidor. Bataan held until May 6, 1942. After its surrender, MacArthur agonized over the details of the subsequent Bataan Death March. He had directed the issuance of the story to the press, but Washington “forbade the release of any details of the prisoner-of-war atrocities.” Perhaps, MacArthur speculated, it was because of the Europe-first strategy. The American government did not want to arouse American public opinion to the point that it would demand more action in the Pacific at the expense of operations against Nazi Germany. Regardless of America’s grand strategy, MacArthur would always focus on his theater’s needs and requirements. He was also driven by his need to fulfill his promise to the Filipino people. The Philippines were and would always be his “obsession—and his redemption.”61

  MacArthur received the Medal of Honor for his actions. It was the first time in American history a father and son had received the award. Though medals and ribbons were important to MacArthur, he believed that they meant little in the absence of commensurate results. He knew the road back to Manila would be difficult, but he hoped it would be short. He was right on the first count but wrong on the second. Before he could liberate the Philippines, he had to defend Australia. MacArthur did not like the existing plan; it was too defensively oriented. He decided to abandon the plan and focus on the Owen Stanley Mountains in New Guinea. He believed the only way to save Australia was to go on the offensive.62 In his quest for operational maneuver, he faced the same obstacles all theater commanders encountered—too little time, limited resources, and vast spaces. To compensate, MacArthur needed airfields within range of New Guinea to supply and reinforce any offensive efforts there. He needed the cooperation of the indigenous peoples, and he had to overcome Japan’s command of the sea.