Generals of the Army

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by James H. Willbanks


  Before the Philippine campaign’s conclusion, the American forces in the Pacific were reorganized. Once again, there was no unity of command. MacArthur received command of all ground troops and Nimitz controlled all naval units in the Pacific. Each commander controlled the organic air elements of his services with the exception of the Twentieth Air Force; General Henry H. “Hap” Arnold retained control of this strategic air element. The three air forces operated under the direction of Kenney, Nimitz, and Arnold. Although MacArthur lost command of the Seventh Fleet, he gained control of the Tenth Army.85

  With the Philippine campaign concluded, his promise kept, and the reorganization of the Pacific forces under way, MacArthur looked to the invasion and defeat of Japan. Kyushu was the first objective. Although there were others involved in planning Japan’s final defeat, MacArthur recommended and the JCS approved his suggestion to conduct a “direct attack at Kyushu” to set the conditions for the invasion of Honshu. The target date for Operation Olympic was November 1, 1945.86

  MacArthur had primary responsibility for conduct of the entire operation. After Kyushu fell, Operation Coronet, the invasion of Honshu, would follow. The Sixth Army had primary responsibility for Olympic; the Eighth Army together with the First from Europe would lead the Coronet effort. The XXIV Corps would secure Korea “when opportunity permitted.”87 Contrary to U.S. and Allied policy regarding Soviet entry into the Pacific theater, MacArthur did not believe Russian intervention was necessary in 1945. He felt it would have been appropriate in 1941 under the strategic circumstances of the time, but not in 1945, when the United States and its Pacific Allies were on the cusp of victory.88 No one in Washington, MacArthur lamented, seemed to want his advice on the matter of Soviet intervention.

  Operation Olympic never occurred. The atomic bomb’s detonation over Hiroshima on August 6 and the subsequent atomic attack over Nagasaki on August 9, in conjunction with the Soviet entry into the war and potential civilian unrest, led to Japanese capitulation. On August 15 Emperor Hirohito announced Japan’s surrender. MacArthur became the supreme commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), and by late August he exercised his authority over a prostrate Japan. The official surrender ceremony occurred aboard the USS Missouri on September 2, 1945. MacArthur, with General Jonathan Wainwright and British General Arthur Percival to his rear, officiated. MacArthur spent the next six years rebuilding a decimated nation. Not only did he restore Japan’s economic and political infrastructure, he also led efforts to reconstitute Japanese society in accordance with Western models and values without eradicating the essence of Japanese culture. The Allies had disarmed Japan, but MacArthur insisted that the Japanese had to be spiritually demilitarized as well. Article 9 of the May 3, 1947, Japanese constitution was one manifestation of this spiritual demilitarization. The Japanese constitution outlawed belligerency as a means of state policy.89

  MacArthur, determined to mold Japan into a democratic society, had to implement significant and difficult changes in Japanese attitudes and traditions. His handling of the emperor was one challenge. MacArthur understood the cultural imperative to maintain the emperor, but he also had to reduce if not eliminate the emperor’s political influence and spiritual hold on the Japanese people. MacArthur exempted Hirohito and the imperial family from war crimes charges, and he saw no need for the emperor to abdicate, as some had suggested. His initial encounters with Hirohito went a long way in establishing MacArthur’s credentials as the ruler of Japan. They also reflected his magnanimity as the Gaijin Shogun (foreign military ruler) of Japan.90

  MacArthur was clearly in charge, but he was a benevolent yet firm ruler. He did not want to seek vengeance against the Japanese, but he insisted on harsh punishment for those military and civilian leaders associated with the rape of Nanking, the Bataan Death March, and the destruction of Manila. As SCAP, he confirmed and enforced the International Military Tribunal for the Far East judgments and sentences.91

  To transform Japan, MacArthur relied heavily on the new constitution as the primary instrument of change. As long as U.S. forces occupied Japan and the Japanese complied with MacArthur’s demands, the changes specified in the constitution altered Japanese society. Some of the more significant political and societal changes included the enfranchisement of women, the adoption of a parliamentary form of democratic government that limited the emperor’s role and enhanced the power of the Parliament and the Cabinet, and the decentralization and reduction of police and local government power.92

  Economic reforms reinforced MacArthur’s political changes. MacArthur demanded changes in land ownership and distribution. Between 1947 and 1949 the Japanese government purchased approximately 38 percent of Japan’s limited and valuable agricultural lands and resold them to independent farmers. Under this program Japan’s farmland was redistributed from wealthy property owners to independent farmers. By 1950 almost 90 percent of Japan’s farmers owned their own land, which broke the former practice of land tenancy. In addition to land restructuring, MacArthur also insisted on labor reform. His initial efforts saw an amazing rise in trade union membership. The greatest effect on Japan’s economic structure was MacArthur’s disruption of the infamous Zaibatsu. This tight-knit financial coalition consisting of prominent Japanese families had virtually monopolized Japan’s economy before the war. These changes met resistance, but MacArthur’s power was virtually absolute. Until the Japanese assumed full sovereignty in 1952, the Japanese business elite could do little to resist or alter MacArthur’s economic policies. In sum, MacArthur’s actions as SCAP reflected what the historian Samuel Eliot Morison considered to be the general’s “greatest claims to fame.” Ambassador William J. Sebald reinforced Morison’s assertion by stating that “MacArthur became not only the symbol of the Occupation; to the Japanese people he was the Occupation.”93

  Success in occupied Japan, however, would not equate to triumph in MacArthur’s next challenge—Korea. Before President Harry S. Truman fired MacArthur in April 1951, the general achieved one of the most spectacular military victories in history. The Allied powers had divided the peninsula at the 38th parallel in 1945 as a temporary measure before Korea’s eventual unification. Soviet forces occupied the northern section and the Americans controlled the south. As the Cold War intensified, the two Koreas became separate states. The Republic of Korea (ROK) had formed in 1948 and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) in 1949. Both North and South Korea sought unification, but on June 25, 1950, the North opted for a military solution and launched an invasion of South Korea.

  The United Nations established the United Nations Command (UNC) to restore peace and order to Korea. The U.S. JCS unanimously recommended MacArthur as the new UNC commander. While serving as UNC commander, MacArthur retained his positions as SCAP and as commander of the United States Army Forces in the Far East. President Syngman Rhee placed his South Korean troops under MacArthur. Reluctant to leave Tokyo, MacArthur commanded all three elements from his headquarters there. The North Korean advance stalled around Pusan. The rapid deployment of the U.S. Eighth Army, combined with U.S. air and sea dominance, prevented a North Korean victory, but the crisis was not over. MacArthur devised a plan to defeat the North Koreans and restore South Korea’s sovereignty. Operation Chromite was a risky, audacious amphibious assault designed to envelop the beleaguered and logistically constrained North Korean forces south of Seoul with a landing at Inchon.94 The JCS originally opposed the plan, but MacArthur persisted. The astounding success of the operation exceeded almost everyone’s expectations.

  With the landing’s success, U.S. forces quickly recaptured Seoul, linked with the Eighth Army, and forced the North Koreans to retreat in disorder. South Korea’s liberation having been achieved and UN forces proximate to the 38th parallel, the UNC had accomplished its mission. MacArthur now faced a critical decision—should UN forces halt at the 38th parallel or continue into North Korea? With Washington’s and the UN’s written approval, MacArthur pushed northward. He sent the E
ighth Army up the western coast and deployed the X Corps to Wonsan and up the east coast.95 Pending any unforeseen occurrence, the two forces would eliminate any North Korean resistance and reunify the entire peninsula. All went according to plan until the Communist Chinese intervened in late November 1950.

  MacArthur (far right) at the front lines above Suwon, Korea, accompanied by other senior officers. (Library of Congress)

  Despite indications of Chinese intervention, little had been done to prepare for a possible Communist offensive against UN forces in North Korea. MacArthur had met President Truman at Wake Island in October. Truman was concerned about possible Chinese intervention in the war. MacArthur assured the president that, despite significant indications to the contrary, the Chinese were not a threat and American troops would begin withdrawing by Christmas.96 MacArthur was wrong. The Chinese intervention changed the calculus of the war and forced a massive U.S.–UN retreat. Inchon may have been his greatest military accomplishment, but the humiliating withdrawal from North Korea tarnished MacArthur’s image. MacArthur did not give up, but he now faced an entirely different kind of war, and he seemed unsure of what to do next.

  Fortunately for MacArthur and the UN, the new Eighth Army commander, Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway, proved remarkably adept at reorganizing and motivating his troops. “Under Ridgway’s ubiquitous battlefield leadership the Eighth Army stiffened, recaptured Seoul, and slowly pushed the enemy northward toward the thirty-eighth parallel,” the historian Russell Weigley observed, “while MacArthur’s excessive pessimism on the heels of his earlier excess of optimism set events in motion toward his recall from command.”97 MacArthur could not isolate the North Koreans the way he had the Japanese in New Guinea or in the Philippines. MacArthur believed that if the United States would have bombed or blockaded China, or used the atomic bomb, perhaps the war could have been won. None of MacArthur’s options was viable, given the limited nature of the Korean War.

  Truman refused to extend the war to China. The Soviet Union was the main threat to U.S. national security, and increased use of resources for a wider war in Asia did not support America’s national security interests. As General Omar Bradley, chairman of the JCS, remarked, a war with China would be “the wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy.” MacArthur’s famous response exemplified the general’s concept of warfare— “There is no substitute for victory.”98 The Korean War was not World War II. The nature of warfare had not changed, but atomic weapons and a severely altered strategic environment had limited its character. Absolute victory could lead to absolute destruction. Truman grasped this concept; MacArthur did not.

  The final event that led to MacArthur’s relief was his letter to Representative Joseph Martin, the Republican leader in the House of Representatives. Martin read MacArthur’s criticism of Truman’s policies on the House floor on April 5, 1951. Truman and the JCS had had enough. Truman’s order to relieve MacArthur went out on April 10 with Bradley’s signature.99 The long and distinguished military career of one of the nation’s best soldiers had come to a sudden and inglorious end. General Ridgway replaced MacArthur, and the war dragged on for two more years until the belligerents signed an armistice in July 1953.

  MacArthur and his family returned to the United States to parades and adulation from a grateful American public. He made his last official appearance before Congress, during which he gave his famous farewell address. His conclusion best summarizes his life and his career:

  I am closing my 52 years of military service. When I joined the Army, even before the turn of the century, it was the fulfillment of all of my boyish hopes and dreams. The world has turned over many times since I took the oath on the Plain at West Point, and the hopes and dreams have long since vanished, but I still remember the refrain of one of the most popular barrack ballads of that day which proclaimed most proudly that—“Old soldiers never die; they just fade away.”

  And like the old soldier of that ballad, I now close my military career and just fade away—an old soldier who tried to do his duty as God gave him the light to see that duty.

  Good-by.100

  Some thought MacArthur might run for president in 1952. He had considered the White House during World War II, but he never made a commitment to seek the presidency while on active duty. He hinted that he might respond to a call from the Republican Party, but that was about as far as his political aspirations went until 1952. He did not run, and his former aide Dwight D. Eisenhower received the nomination. MacArthur consulted with President Eisenhower only once during the latter’s tenure in office. Meanwhile, he and his wife, Jean, lived at the famous Waldorf-Astoria Hotel. He accepted a position as chairman of the board of Remington Rand Corporation. The MacArthurs lived comfortably in New York, and the celebrated hotel proudly hosted the general’s birthday party every January.101 Poor health began to restrict the general’s activities in the early 1960s. He saw Eisenhower at the White House in 1961, visited the Philippines once more, and wrote his memoirs before he died on April 5, 1964. Before he passed away, West Point honored MacArthur with the Sylvanus Thayer Award for outstanding service to the country.102 Going back to where he began his illustrious military career and to where he had served as superintendent, MacArthur regaled the cadet corps with one last memorable speech in which he stressed the motto “Duty, Honor, Country,” for which he will always be remembered.

  General of the Army Douglas MacArthur received a state funeral by the direction of President Lyndon Johnson. MacArthur lay in state at the Seventh Regiment Armory and then at the nation’s Capitol. On April 11 MacArthur traveled to his final resting place in the city of his beloved mother’s birth—Norfolk, Virginia.103

  Nearly fifty years have passed since MacArthur’s death. Historians and military professionals still debate his actions, his decisions, and his legacy. Whether one hates him or loves him, compares him to Julius Caesar or castigates him as the most arrogant, vainglorious general in history, MacArthur was an exceptional leader and a consummate strategist. Several military institutions honor MacArthur’s legacy through established and highly coveted leadership awards. The U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and the Canadian Royal Military College both recognize distinguished officers for exceptional leadership and scholarship through a MacArthur Award.104 Though not as elaborate or extensive as Eisenhower’s presidential library or the George Marshall Institute, the MacArthur Memorial in Norfolk stands as a testament to the general’s vast and significant contributions to American society and to military history. The United States, Japan, the Philippines, and the world are the better for his accomplishments in war and in peace. He may not have been the most humble of military leaders, but he is among the most successful. All vanity and hubris aside, Douglas MacArthur deserves his place in the pantheon of great military leaders, and this book is a fitting tribute to the legacy of one of the nation’s greatest military leaders and strategists.

  Notes

  1. Quotations in William Manchester, American Caesar: Douglas MacArthur, 1880–1964 (New York: Dell, 1978), 18.

  2. Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences: Douglas MacArthur, General of the Army (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), 4–5.

  3. MacArthur, Reminiscences, 6–10; Manchester, American Caesar, 26–30; and Geoffrey Perret, Old Soldiers Never Die: The Life of Douglas MacArthur (New York: Random House, 1996), 6–9.

  4. MacArthur, Reminiscences, 11–14; D. Clayton James, The Years of MacArthur, 3 vols. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1970–85), 1:23; and Perret, Old Soldiers Never Die, 15.

  5. MacArthur, Reminiscences, 14–15, and Perret, Old Soldiers Never Die, 16.

  6. MacArthur, Reminiscences, 16, and James, Years of MacArthur, 1:56.

  7. James, Years of MacArthur, 1:59–60; Manchester, American Caesar, 57–58; and MacArthur, Reminiscences, 17.

  8. Manchester, American Caesar, 61; MacArthur, Reminiscences, 18; and James, Years of MacArthur, 1:62–66.

  9. MacArthur, Remi
niscences, 25, and Manchester, American Caesar, 67.

  10. Manchester, American Caesar, 68–69; James, Years of MacArthur, 1:79; and MacArthur, Reminiscences, 27.

  11. MacArthur, Reminiscences, 25–26, and James, Years of MacArthur, 1:69–71.

  12. MacArthur, Reminiscences, 27–28, and Manchester, American Caesar, 72–73.

  13. James, Years of MacArthur, 1:87–89.

  14. MacArthur, Reminiscences, 30–32; Manchester, American Caesar, 78–80; and James, Years of MacArthur, 1:90–94.

  15. MacArthur, Reminiscences, 32–33, and James, Years of MacArthur, 1:95–97.

  16. Manchester, American Caesar, 82.

  17. MacArthur, Reminiscences, 30–32; Douglas MacArthur, “Military Demolition,” http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/download/lectures/MacArthur.pdf (accessed February 12, 2012), and “Annual Report of Commandant, the Army Service Schools, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, School Year Ending August 31, 1909,” Army Service Schools Press, http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/download/reports/rep1909.pdf (accessed February 12, 2012), 23–24, 61–62.

  18. MacArthur, Reminiscences, 34; Manchester, American Caesar, 83; and James, Years of MacArthur, 1:105–9.

  19. Manchester, American Caesar, 84.

  20. Ibid., 53.

  21. Ibid., 88, and Richard B. Frank, MacArthur (New York: Palgrave, 2007), 6. For more on MacArthur’s Mexico experience, see James, Years of MacArthur, 1:115–27.

  22. MacArthur, Reminiscences, 44–45.

  23. Manchester, American Caesar, 91, and MacArthur, Reminiscences, 46–48.

 

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