Generals of the Army
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40. In overall command Rundstedt neither commanded the panzer divisions assigned to western France and Belgium nor controlled either German sea or land assets assigned to defend the English Channel ports. Rundstedt only nominally controlled SS units, as their commanding officers could appeal directly to Reichsführer Heinrich Himmler if they did not approve of Rundstedt’s orders. See Veranov, Mammoth Book of the Third Reich at War, 492.
41. Ibid., 493–94.
42. Bradley, A General’s Life, 247.
43. Weigley, Eisenhower’s Lieutenants, 1:131.
44. Forrest Pogue, The Supreme Command, U.S. Army in World War II (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1954), 192.
45. Martin Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1961), 4.
46. John J. Sullivan, “The Botched Air Support of Operation Cobra,” Parameters 18 (March 1988): 98.
47. Ibid., 99.
48. Ibid., 100.
49. Bradley states in his autobiography that he had made it clear that nothing but a parallel approach was acceptable. See Bradley, A General’s Life, 276.
50. Sullivan, “The Botched Air Support of Operation Cobra,” 101.
51. Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, 236.
52. Bradley, A Soldier’s Story, 372.
53. Weigley, Eisenhower’s Lieutenants, 1:395.
54. There were other factors as well. First, too few ports supported the supply effort. German demolitions had significantly damaged nearly every port in Allied hands. Second, the Allies had planned to bypass Paris to avoid the additional demand the population of the city would place on supplies. Factors beyond the battlefield brought Paris under Allied control and along with it the supply drain logisticians feared. Third, not only were there too few truck companies, but there was also not an ideal mix of heavy and light trucks. There were too few of the former and too many of the latter. Ibid.
55. Eisenhower’s orders to Montgomery dated August 24, 1944, were clear: “Take Antwerp; advance eastward on the Ruhr.” See John A. Adams, The Battle for Western Europe, Fall 1944: An Operational Assessment (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010), 191; Weigley, Eisenhower’s Lieutenants, 2:91; and Pogue, The Supreme Command, 310.
56. Pogue, The Supreme Command, 301.
57. Bradley concedes that planners had failed to man the force adequately, particularly in the numbers of infantry available. Infantry divisions at full strength numbered roughly 14,000 soldiers, but only one soldier in seven actually served as infantry. See Bradley, A Soldier’s Story, 445, and Pogue, The Supreme Command, 305.
58. Bradley admits that part of the problem came from the supply crisis. As transportation was limited, he had elected to favor the movement of fuel and ammunition over that of winter clothing. Bradley, A Soldier’s Story, 445.
59. The 9th, 28th, 45th, 8th, and elements of the 1st Infantry divisions all took casualties in the Hürtgen Forest. The 28th alone suffered 6,184 casualties there. By contrast, 1st and 29th Infantry divisions suffered just over 4,000 casualties on Omaha Beach. See Adams, The Battle for Western Europe, 246.
60. U.S. Army doctrine as written in the 1940 edition of FM-100.5 advised that woods be bypassed if possible. Believing their flank threatened by the German divisions in the Hürtgen, Hodges and Collins elected to take the forest. Bradley agreed to the decision. Ibid., 191, and Weigley, Eisenhower’s Lieutenants, 2:633.
61. Bradley, A General’s Life, 343.
62. As early as the 1930s, Polish intelligence had been working to break the German ciphers used in military and diplomatic traffic. Much of their work found its way to Britain’s Government Code and Cipher School at Bletchley when German armies overran Poland in September 1939. The British eventually did succeed in deciphering much of the German code system used to deploy German ground and some naval forces. Code-named Ultra, this capacity frequently tipped Allied intelligence to German plans. At the time of the Ardennes offensive, German units assigned to the attack were placed on radio silence, which somewhat mitigated the usefulness of Ultra. See John Keegan, The Second World War (New York: Viking Press, 1989), 497.
63. The German plan changed in the first days of the offensive. Sixth Army proved unequal to the task assigned and came to have its hands full holding the northern flank of the penetration. American resistance by the 2nd and 99th Infantry divisions on Elsenborn Ridge largely accounted for Sixth Army’s failure. Fifth Army became the main attack. Hitler called off Fifteenth Army’s supporting attack.
64. Known as Operation Liège-Aachen or the Small Solution, the plan called for a German drive from northern Luxembourg penetrating the Ardennes and then turning northward to link with a secondary attack originating near Aachen. Both Rundstedt and Model considered this option within their capability. Neither favored the larger concept Hitler demanded. See Charles V. P. von Luttichau, “The German Counteroffensive in the Ardennes,” in Command Decisions, ed. Kent Roberts Greenfield (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1987), 453.
65. Adams, The Battle for Western Europe, 273.
66. Charles B. MacDonald, A Time for Trumpets: The Untold Story of the Battle of the Bulge (New York: Morrow, 1984), 298.
67. Allied intelligence, Forrest Pogue argues, should have detected the Ardennes offensive well before it was launched. Although little in the way of Ultra traffic suggested an offensive, human intelligence, as well as aerial reconnaissance, had nonetheless largely located and identified most of the units in the panzer armies. See Pogue, The Supreme Command, 371.
68. Bradley, A General’s Life, 356.
69. MacDonald, A Time for Trumpets, 262.
70. The withdrawal of 7th Armored Division came by way of Montgomery, who had assumed command of both the U.S. First and Ninth armies by this time. Montgomery’s intention was to gather together a counterattack force. The problem was that First Army was not only extended but lacking a reserve. In part to create a reserve but also to save 7th Armored from being overwhelmed, he pulled the division out of St. Vith. To better allow for the creation of a reserve, he ordered Simpson to extend Ninth Army’s frontage to permit First Army to employ its VII Corps as a counterattack force. See Robin Neillands, Battle for the Rhine: The Battle of the Bulge and the Ardennes Campaign, 1944 (Woodstock, N.Y.: Overlook Press, 2007), 294–95.
71. Pogue, The Supreme Command, 359.
72. Eisenhower directed that Devers expand his Army group front to take over that of Third Army.
73. Eisenhower had asked Bradley and Patton how soon Third Army could ready a counteroffensive into the southern flank of the German penetration. Patton, who had seen the opportunity well before Ike’s request, had already directed his staff to prepare plans for just such a contingency. Patton’s response was three days with four divisions. In disbelief, Eisenhower responded, “Don’t be fatuous.” Patton attacked in three days as promised. Pogue, The Supreme Command, 359.
74. The Army’s official history lists German casualties as approximating 100,000. Neillands claims the numbers were closer to 81,000 and still other sources go as low as 67, 000. See Luttichau, “The German Counteroffensive in the Ardennes,” 458, and Neillands, Battle for the Rhine, 300.
75. Neillands, Battle for the Rhine, 299.
76. German reconnaissance elements from 2nd Panzer Division of Fifth Panzer Army fought their way to within four kilometers of the Meuse at Dinant but could go no farther. Opposition from the U.S. 2nd Armored Division as well as shortages of fuel and ammunition brought the drive to a halt. Furthermore, clearing skies had brought American airpower fully into play, and, as Manteuffel noted, “the activity of the enemy air force was decisive.” General der Panzertruppen Hasso von Manteuffel, “The Fifth Panzer Army during the Ardennes Offensive,” in Hitler’s Ardennes Offensive: The German View of the Battle of the Bulge, ed. Danny S. Parker (Mechanicsburg, Pa.: Stackpole Books, 1997), 115– 17, 144, and Neillands, Battle for the Rhine, 295.
77. Bradley, A General’s Story, 453.
&nbs
p; 78. Ibid., 451.
79. Ibid., 483.
80. Ibid., 482.
81. Ibid., 483.
82. Ibid., 485.
83. NSC-81 authorized MacArthur to go north of the 38th parallel as well as to effect the unification of all of Korea for free elections. As for the North Korean army, Bradley admits that it was the unanimous belief of the Joint Chiefs that it was destroyed. Ibid., 559–60.
84. Ibid., 577.
85. Ed Cray, General of the Army George C. Marshall: Soldier and Statesman (New York: W. W. Norton, 1990), 707.
86. Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean War (New York: Da Capo Press, 1967), 145–47.
87. The idea of employing the bomb did not in fairness begin with MacArthur. Navy Secretary Francis P. Matthews proposed its use on August 25, 1950, at a commemoration for the Boston Navy Yard. His suggestion was that the United States employ it as part of a preemptive strike against the Soviet Union. When Truman heard of the speech, he all but relieved Matthews of his job. The following month Major General Orville A. Anderson, commandant of the Air War College, found himself suspended from his duties when he elected to offer a course on preemptive war as part of the school’s curriculum. While making public statements denying that the United States intended to employ the bomb, Truman directed the Atomic Energy Commission and the JCS to examine the feasibility of increasing U.S. nuclear capabilities. The earliest discussions were of a more limited tactical use of atomic weapons. The problem was how to employ them so that the target was appropriate to the weapon and limited to North Korean forces and supporting infrastructure. See Stanley Weintraub, MacArthur’s War: Korea and the Undoing of an American Hero (New York: Free Press, 2000), 253–58.
References
Adams, John A. The Battle for Western Europe, Fall 1944: An Operational Assessment. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010.
Blumenson, Martin. Breakout and Pursuit, Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1961.
Bradley, Omar N. A General’s Life: An Autobiography. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983.
———. A Soldier’s Story. New York: Henry Holt, 1951.
DeFelice, Jim. Omar Bradley: General at War. Washington, D.C.: Regnery, 2011.
Garland, Albert N., and Howard McGaw Smyth. Sicily and the Surrender of Italy. U.S. Army in World War II. Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 2002.
Harrison, Gordon A. Cross-Channel Attack. U.S. Army in World War II: The European Theater of Operations. Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 2007.
Luttichau, Charles V. P. von. “The German Counteroffensive in the Ardennes.” In Command Decisions. Edited by Kent Roberts Greenfield. Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1987.
MacDonald, Charles B. A Time for Trumpets: The Untold Story of the Battle of the Bulge. New York: Morrow, 1984.
Neillands, Robin. Battle for the Rhine: The Battle of the Bulge and the Ardennes Campaign, 1944. Woodstock, N.Y.: Overlook Press, 2007.
Perret, Geoffrey. There’s a War to Be Won: The United States Army in World War II. New York: Random House, 1991.
Pogue, Forrest. The Supreme Command. U.S. Army in World War II. Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1954.
Sullivan, John J. “The Botched Air Support of Operation Cobra.” Parameters 18 (March 1988): 97–110.
Veranov, Michael, ed. The Mammoth Book of the Third Reich at War. London: Constable and Robinson, 1997.
Weigley, Russell. Eisenhower’s Lieutenants: The Campaigns of France and Germany, 1944–1945. 2 vols. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981.
Afterword
Ethan S. Rafuse
In the seventy years since World War II, Fort Leavenworth has remained the crossroads for the officer corps of the United States Army, the place where field-grade officers receive an educational experience designed to prepare them for the rest of their careers. The challenges that the United States has faced during that period have been formidable. Though no officer has been appointed to five-star rank since Omar Bradley’s promotion in 1950, the list of accomplished officers who have passed through the course at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) and the contributions of graduates of that institution to the Army and American national security is an impressive one.
For more than four decades the Cold War divided the world, and the officers educated at the CGSC played critical roles in the efforts of the U.S. military to contribute to the cause of containing and ultimately defeating Communism. It was Matthew Ridgway, a 1935 CGSC graduate, whose skilled and determined leadership helped turn the tide of battle in Korea after the entry of massive numbers of Chinese troops sparked fears of the total defeat of United Nations forces. Ridgway’s determined leadership of the Army in the years after Korea, supported by such officers as James Gavin (a 1942 graduate of CGSC) and Maxwell Taylor (a 1935 graduate), proved to be a key factor in sustaining the Army and its ability to continue playing a significant role in the defense of the free world from Communist aggression.
After the Vietnam War, in which the high command of the U.S. Army was dominated by William Westmoreland, a former CGSC instructor, and Creighton Abrams, a graduate, CGSC was at the heart of the effort to revitalize the Army and prepare it for the future. As chief of staff of the Army, it was Abrams (CGSC Class of 1949) who in the early 1970s began driving what would be a successful, generation-long process of reforming the Army and provided the vision that would guide it to fruition. Playing critical roles in carrying Abrams’s vision forward were officers such as William DePuy (a 1946 CGSC graduate), who as the first commander of Training and Doctrine Command initiated an intense debate over doctrine, out of which would come the development of what became known as AirLand Battle doctrine. To support the development of doctrine and ensure the officer corps possessed the intellectual and leadership skills necessary to execute it successfully, the staff college underwent its own period of reform.
Under the direction of CGSC graduates and leaders like Donn Starry, William Richardson, Dave Palmer, Frederick Franks, Robert Arter, and Carl Vuono, the curriculum and methods of instruction at CGSC underwent a profound transformation during the 1980s. The School for Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) was created in 1983, giving officers an opportunity to continue their studies after completing the one-year Command and General Staff Officers Course (CGSOC); SAMS was headed by one of the officers who had developed AirLand Battle. At both SAMS and CGSOC the study of military history became an especially important component of the instructional program because of its unmatched value in fostering the critical and creative thinking skills the CGSC experience is designed to develop in field-grade officers. It was this foundation that provided much of the intellectual firepower that made possible the stunning battlefield victory in the Gulf War, in which several CGSC graduates—including Colin Powell, H. Norman Schwarzkopf, and Barry McCaffrey—participated prominently.
When the Soviet Union collapsed and the Cold War came to an end, the U.S. military entered an era in which the challenges to American national security became more complex. The clarity that the Cold War had provided to American strategy was replaced by ambiguity in terms of the threat Army leaders were to prepare for, while public expectations for a “peace dividend” led to limits on the resources with which the Army would have to operate. The Army and the junior officers who went on to wear five stars in World War II had encountered a similar situation in the aftermath of the Great War. In the 1920s and 1930s, when funding for the military was limited and popular enthusiasm for the nation’s participation in another great land war was low, they were nonetheless able to prepare successfully for the challenge of a global conflict of unprecedented scale. That has been no less true in recent times. CGSC has continued to play an important role in the development of the Army’s most senior leaders. Most former Army chiefs of staff, as well as the current one, General Ray Odierno, and most of the Army generals who have served as chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, including the current chairman, General M
artin Dempsey, have also been molded by the Leavenworth experience. It is also true for those officers who have guided the Army in the recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan from the most senior levels, like General David Petraeus, down to the battalion level.
Indeed, in 2006 General Petraeus commented:
For 125 years, Fort Leavenworth has been the crossroads for the officer corps of the United States Army. It is at the Command and General Staff College that field grade officers receive an educational experience that prepares them for the rest of their careers of service to the Army and the nation…. The College has superbly prepared thousands of officers for duty as field grade commanders and staff officers, as well as advanced the professional development of officers from the Army’s sister services and nations throughout the world. It has also played a central role in shaping the doctrines and procedures the Army employs to defend the nation. Today we are seeing CGSC go above and beyond its motto, Ad bellum pace parati—“In peace, prepare for war”—in line with a recognition that … it is not just during the relative calm of peace that intellectual preparation for war should take place.1
To prepare for war in time of peace is one of the greatest challenges that a military organization must confront. Since 1881 the schools of Leavenworth have accepted that mission on behalf of the United States Army. The graduates of those schools guided the Army and the nation through the tumultuous twentieth century and stand ready to face the twenty-first. The five-star generals of Leavenworth stand in the front rank of the legion of officers who have passed through this post and gone on to serve their nation in conflicts great and small around the globe.