by James Johns
To that end, Admiral Stark was of the opinion that if the Americans agreed they could not let Great Britain fall, full-scale escorting of Lend-Lease supply ships to Britain would have to be started, which sooner or later would get the United States involved in a shooting war. Every day America hesitated was a day lost. This gave clout to the argument of arming American merchantmen who were delivering Lend-Lease to Britain, although not officially admitted to, and to the final decision to escort these ships with the U.S. Navy. It was during this controversy, Communism versus Fascism, that FDR announced that he would send his advisor, Harry Hopkins, to Russia before confirming his tentative decision to support the Russians.
The German invasion of Russia hit Tokyo like a bombshell. Japan had just concluded in April a nonaggression pact with Moscow, and “The ink was scarcely dry on Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka’s neutrality treaty.”14 So Germany’s attack on Russia could totally reverse any hope of leaving the back door to the Asian continent unguarded. Matsuoka had not gone to Moscow to make a deal at Tokyo’s behest. He had done this on his own. Japan may suddenly be left with one of three options, of which there may not be time to deliberate, all a Catch-22.
Matsuoka’s term as foreign minister would be short-lived. In spite of the neutrality pact he had signed with Russia, he believed strongly that Japan should attack Siberia. At the same time, his hostility toward the United States grew, since he believed that the Americans were provoking Japan into war, a war that the Konoye cabinet wanted to avoid. Becoming unpopular with the military as well as with the cabinet, Konoye and his cabinet (including Matsuoka) resigned in July 1941, and when Konoye was promptly reinstated, he filled Yosuke Matsuoka’s foreign minister post with Admiral Teijiro Toyoda. Toyoda, too, wanted to avoid war with the United States, and shortly after his new appointment, he dispatched Ambassador Nomura to the United States to strengthen negotiations with the Americans.
Fumimaro Konoye was first appointed prime minister of Japan in June of 1937, just before the Marco Polo Bridge incident. Becoming disillusioned with the Chinese conflict, and tired of being manipulated by the military, he resigned in January 1939. However, it was the Japanese Army that called for his reappointment in July of 1940. The army had drafted a policy to continue its conquest of China and to move into Indochina, but the policy also called for a peace negotiation with Russia. Any additional moves would be determined on responses from the Americans and the British. Preferring peace with the United States rather than war, Konoye’s proposal included, among other things, the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China, and he strongly encouraged a meeting with President Roosevelt. Similar to Matsuoka’s fate, his views were unpopular with the emperor and the military, and in October 1941, he resigned for the second time. And the entire cabinet went with him.
Foreign Minister Toyoda’s fate, of course, would be sealed with the rest of Konoye’s cabinet. After the second cabinet resignation in October, Toyoda would accept a position with Japan Iron and Steel Works. Having studied steel production earlier in his career, he was able to improve industrial work methods and conditions in Japan’s efforts to meet her wartime needs.
With Hitler’s invasion of Russia in June, Berlin may suddenly advise Tokyo of its obligation to the Tripartite Pact and expect Japan to attack Russia from the east, forcing Russia to fight on two fronts. This could be the golden opportunity for Japan to complete the once-intended invasion north into Russian territory toward Vladivostok, with Siberian divisions headed west to meet the German threat. But none of this would be possible without first getting control of the British and Dutch colonies, assuring the supplies of oil, rubber, and tin, which would probably bring the United States into the war.
If Japan honored the Tripartite obligation, she would automatically break the nonaggression treaty with Russia, in which case, she would have to guard against a Russian advance against Japanese-occupied territory in China and Manchuria. Consequently, forces available for the conquest of the colonies would be reduced. And she would possibly be entering a two-front war herself. There had been no diplomatic exchange warning Tokyo of Berlin’s intentions, but now the diplomacy came, after the fact, but still months before Germany would be desperate for any outside help.
On July 1, the anticipated, dreaded announcement arrived in Tokyo in the form of a telegram from German Foreign Minister Joachim Von Ribbentrop. Although very unpopular among other Nazi party leaders, Von Ribbentrop was one of Hitler’s most avid “yes men” and had devoted his earlier efforts to getting Adolf Hitler appointed chancellor of Germany in 1933. Appointed ambassador to Great Britain in 1936, Ribbentrop was the leading influence behind the Anti-Comintern Pact of 1936, but then later, as Hitler’s Reich minister of foreign affairs, he also signed the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of 1939.
The wording of Von Ribbentrop’s message to the Japanese on July 1 wasn’t exactly what had been anticipated. Instead, it was an invitation to a “unique opportunity”15 that read:
It seems to me, therefore, the requirement of the hour that the Japanese Army should, as quickly as possible, get into possession of Vladivostok and push as far as possible toward the west. The aim of such an operation should be that, before the coming of cold weather, the Japanese Army advancing westward should be able to shake hands at the half-way mark with the German troops advancing towards the east … and that finally the whole Russian question should be solved by Germany and Japan in common in a way which would eliminate the Russian threat to Germany and Japan for all time.16
As tempting as it was, Japan’s petroleum supply had to be first priority. Foreign Minister Matsuoka, perhaps in an effort to save his reputation, had tried to convince the Japanese cabinet to scrap his own nonaggression pact in favor of entering the Russo-German conflict on the side of Germany. But he was alone. The Konoye cabinet was convinced that by removing themselves from Hitler, they might be able to secure oil concessions from the Dutch or Americans. In the July 1941 cabinet reorganization, however, when Matsuoka was replaced by Admiral Toyoda, Tokyo assured Berlin that Japan would remain faithful to the Tripartite Pact.
The risk for Japan just seemed too great to move militarily into Russia with her back to the precious oil resources behind her. The Konoye cabinet came to two decisions: self-sufficiency and a compromise with the army. In exchange for an army move into Russia, it would occupy all of French Indochina, which could serve as a bargaining chip in future negotiations in Washington.
Since 1939, the Dutch East Indies and Japan had maintained an informal trade agreement. However, in 1940, the German occupation of Holland and Japan’s membership in the Tripartite Pact had the potential of leaving Japan on the short end. The Dutch refused to be tied down with export quotas so they could remain flexible in a changing world situation. Since the East Indies were key to Japan’s requirements of petroleum, rubber, tin, and other raw materials, Tokyo had to protect her interests. To that end, many diplomatic missions were sent to Batavia to seek commitments in negotiations which ran from the end of 1940 through May of 1941. The Japanese had infiltrated most aspects of Dutch domestic affairs and business and had a labor force ready, all in the vain hope of control or disruption if and when necessary. Then there was the highly publicized Matzuoka trip to Berlin that only served to reinforce Dutch suspicions of how much export was actually going to Germany.
In the interest of a guaranteed flow of oil to Japan, Kenkichi Yoshizawa, hand-picked by Prime Minister Konoye, was dispatched to Batavia, Dutch East Indies. Yoshizawa, a career diplomat, had served as minister to China and ambassador to France, and was also Japan’s representative to the League of Nations. In his role as special envoy to the Netherlands East Indies, he faced a “no holds barred” confrontation. The Dutch negotiator was Dr. Herbertus Van Mook, more than ably qualified for his task. Van Mook, a Dutch administrator, had been born and raised on the island of Java and considered it home. With the Japanese, he would not back down. Japan’s demands were intentionally unacceptable, and inclu
ded, among many things, increased shipments of oil, tin, rubber, and foodstuffs such as coconut oil and sugar. With the Dutch government at home in exile, Van Mook couldn’t count on outside help, but he held his ground. The Japanese argument included the threat that to not give in to Japanese demands meant the Dutch would have to deal with the Germans, who were also eyeing the East Indies’ oil reserves. But again, Dr. Van Mook was concerned that exports from the Dutch to Japan were finding their way to Germany anyway.
After it was obvious that negotiations were going nowhere, Tokyo called Yoshizawa home in June. Van Mook well understood that this was only round one. Would round two be conducted at the bargaining table or with flying lead?
With the German invasion of Russia, Japan now became convinced that Batavia would reduce trade with Japan in favor of Russia, since they were fighting Germany. Japanese diplomatic efforts to convince the Dutch that in spite of the Tripartite Pact they would remain neutral, had little effect. Because of Japanese espionage activity, the Dutch on July 29, 1941, prohibited the use of the Japanese language in the Dutch East Indies. The Dutch considered the Japanese invasion of southern French Indochina a threat to their security and placed an embargo on all shipments to Japan. The result was a seesawing of asset- and goods-freezing. After President Roosevelt and Great Britain froze trade with Japan on July 26, Batavia immediately sided with the Allies and warned Japan that continued aggression would result in a military alliance with the United States and Britain.
The Japanese occupation of southern French Indochina was ostensibly a move to place them in a better position to strike at Singapore and the Dutch East Indies. But in Washington, Ambassador Nomura was reminded that this occupation could hardly be justified for Japan’s defense. For food, raw materials, and economic security, the Dutch, British, and American harbors would open if Japan would only follow a peaceful policy in the Far East.
Kichisaburo Nomura had achieved the rank of full admiral before retiring from the Japanese Imperial Navy in 1937. Earlier in his career, he had also served as naval attaché to Austria, Germany, and the United States, diplomatic roles that would later qualify him for his 1939 appointment to foreign minister of Japan. Then in November 1940, Nomura was appointed ambassador to the United States, and throughout his negotiations with Secretary of State Cordell Hull, he made numerous pleas for concessions to his own government that were ignored.
It was also in July of 1941 that FDR sent Harry Hopkins, who was now in charge of the entire Lend-Lease program, to London again and then on to Russia to meet with Stalin. “Of course,”17 the president said, Americans would give their support to the Russians. He did. They received $1 billion worth.18 Much of FDR’s later belief in Stalin was the result of what some thought was the spell Stalin had on Hopkins.
There was no one more loyal to Franklin Roosevelt than Harry Hopkins, who would become FDR’s closest advisor throughout most of the war. During World War I, Hopkins had been rejected by the draft due to poor eyesight, and with his experience in social and public-health roles prior to the war, he served as a director for American Red Cross. Hopkins continued his health-project work after the war, and by 1924, he became the executive director of the New York Tuberculosis Association, building on his reputation by significantly growing that organization.
While Roosevelt was governor of New York in 1931, Hopkins had been appointed executive director of the Temporary Emergency Relief Administration (TERA) by its president, Jesse Straus. Roosevelt was so impressed with Hopkins’s efficient management practices that in 1932, he appointed Hopkins president of TERA.
After Roosevelt was elected to his first presidential term, he brought Hopkins to Washington to supervise the Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA), the Civil Works Administration (CWA), and the Works Progress Administration (WPA), all programs sponsored by FDR’s New Deal. By 1938, Roosevelt would appoint Hopkins secretary of commerce, but due to his fragile health, he would step down from the role in 1940.
There were those in Congress who opposed Roosevelt’s appointment of Hopkins to head up Lend-Lease, and one in particular was Senator Taft. One of Roosevelt’s harshest critics in the Senate, condemning the New Deal as socialism, and staunchly defending isolationism, he made his concerns about Harry Hopkins perfectly clear: “Harry Hopkins’ administration of the W.P.A. could hardly be called a success except perhaps from a political viewpoint, and the same is true of his efforts as Secretary of Commerce. I say that any administration which takes away the administration of the seven-billion-dollar lend-lease program from Knudsen and gives it to Harry Hopkins brands itself as completely incompetent and inefficient.”19
But it was Hopkins’s meeting with Stalin in July of 1941 that was the deciding factor in extending Lend-Lease to Russia, and eventually, Hopkins would become the primary negotiator with the Russians. With all the different hats he was wearing, many believed he held more power and influence than all of the State Department put together. Some referred to him as Roosevelt’s “alter ego,” while others referred to him as “deputy president.”
On Thursday, July 24, Ambassador Nomura was called to the White House, where, in the presence of the Assistant Secretary of State Dean Acheson and Admiral Stark, the president tried to convince Nomura of the error of Japanese policy. He pointed out that it was difficult to convince American citizens that they should continue exporting gasoline to Japan to supply their aggression while American public supply was being reduced. FDR bluntly stated that for the last two years, the only reason that he had continued to allow the export of oil to Japan was that had the supplies stopped, the Japanese would have had an excuse to forcefully take the East Indies. The British would have come to the aid of the East Indies, and of course, the Americans were now aiding the British. A war in the Pacific would result. U.S. policy was the maintenance of peace, but Japan’s move into Indochina “created a serious problem for the United States.”20 Nomura stated that he personally objected to the move, but he was caught embarrassingly in the middle. His hands were tied.
The president took one last shot. If Nomura could convince Tokyo to reverse the advance into Indochina, pull out altogether, and return it to Vichy control, he would try, from China, Britain, and the Netherlands Indies, to recognize Indochina as neutral, and this would open up her raw materials and food products to Japan. Although Nomura would pass it on, both knew that nothing would come of it. That same day, the Vichy government officially welcomed the “protection” of Japan.
On July 25, General Marshall and Admiral Stark issued a joint message to the Hawaiian commanders, informing them that the final embargo order was about to be issued: “Chief of Naval Operations and Army Chief of Staff do not anticipate immediate hostile reaction by the Japanese through the use of military means, but you are furnished this information in order that you may take appropriate precautionary measures against any possible eventualities.”21
And on July 26, the White House issued an executive order to freeze all Japanese assets in the United States, requiring the U.S. government to assume control of all Japanese import and export activities. All U.S. ports would be closed to Japanese vessels, including the Panama Canal, which was closed at the time for technical reasons. By the weekend, Britain, its dominions, and the Dutch East Indies had virtually duplicated the White House order.
For Japan, the freezing of all assets and the suspension of all trade was almost a death blow. This act alone ended 75 percent of foreign trade and cut off 90 percent of her oil supply.22 Prime Minister Konoye’s bargaining chip had worked in reverse. Japan’s economy was suddenly dead in the water. Oil alone was a necessity for survival. All previous temporary sanctions were child’s play by comparison. The freeze had accomplished exactly what FDR had expected. There were now only two alternatives: to fight, or to lose face by submitting to the Allied strategy. On July 28, Japan responded by freezing American, British, and Dutch assets.
Members of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff were not among FDR’s retaliatio
n enthusiasts. They had recommended against the embargo with the conclusion that it would only force Japan into war. Their estimate of the situation gave Japan eighteen months of oil under war conditions.23 How long could they or would they wait to build a reserve? In addition, the Panama Canal was now closed to Japan. The likely scenario that Japan might soon act in her oil interest meant that the time had come to better organize U.S. defenses in the Pacific.
Meanwhile, Marshall was concerned that the first draftees, enlisted under the Selective Service Act of 1940, would be completing their one-year obligations, making them due for discharge starting in October. The original act applied to all males from ages twenty-one to thirty-five to serve a minimum of twelve months.24 He had spent the month of July trying to convince Congress of the necessity to revise or mainly extend the law. Now, since the embargo, at a time when the United States needed a larger army, it wasn’t there. Compulsory military service had always been unpopular with the politicians, especially at re-election time, but the Democratic minorities had to support the president. In the House, the vote to extend service by eighteen months passed by one vote, provided by Majority Leader McCormack. In the Senate, the vote was 45 to 30, but the age was reduced from thirty-five to twenty-seven.25 Starting at age twenty-eight, draftees would be separated from service. The draft would now be for two and a half years, and to counter the draft extension, the isolationists across the nation created the Ohio Movement. It had nothing to do with the state of Ohio, but was an acrostic for the slogan, “Over the hill in October,” and was intended to encourage desertion on the one-year anniversary date of the Selective Service Act.26 With the attack on Pearl Harbor in December, this became a nonissue.