by James Johns
Apparently, the recent depression had taken its toll on the health and education of the draftees. In 1941, many of them were rejected for military service due to bad teeth, bad eyes, and illiteracy. Many of them had to make a mark because they could not sign their own names. The balance of draftees consisted of those with children, those going out of their way to avoid service, and finally those who just couldn’t pass the physical. Because the army was the only service drafting, it had already set its standards lower than the others.
At the other end of the spectrum, many American flyers apparently felt quite differently about the war in Europe and Asia. From September 1940 through August 1941, over two hundred forty American pilots turned up in England to fill the ranks of over three flying squadrons. These men became known as the Royal Air Force Eagle Squadrons and carved for themselves a record against the Luftwaffe.
Likewise, a retired Army Air Corps captain by the name of Claire Chennault accepted an appointment by Chiang Kai-shek, a promotion to general, and was allowed to recruit among air corps, navy, and Marine flying units. Chennault eventually recruited ninety pilots and one hundred fifty ground personnel. By the fall of 1941, the recruits all casually arrived in Rangoon, Burma, to form the Flying Tigers.27 Their three squadrons would establish an unprecedented record by destroying three hundred enemy aircraft in the first seven months of the war. But due to their limited resources, the Flying Tigers would officially be disbanded by July 1942.28
Slowly, the scales were turning and various polls were indicating that the Americans should support Britain, almost to the point of going to war. While the isolationists were becoming more hardened, their membership numbers were falling.
On August 3, 1941, the president disappeared from Washington, where educated speculation was an overdue fishing trip. The unpublished destination was actually Placentia Bay, Newfoundland, where the president with his military staff secretary met with Winston Churchill and his military advisers. The meeting took place aboard the newest and fastest battleship in the British Navy, HMS Prince of Wales, which had carried Churchill across the North Atlantic to this meeting. Its purpose was to draft an outline of the common principles of the two countries in looking toward the future.
With the aid of Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles and British Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs Sir Alexander Cadogan, an eight-principle document was created. There were many issues involving the Axis to be resolved, but first there had to be a common ground from which to work. This portion became known as the Atlantic Charter. It contained eight principles that included commitments to the rights of peoples, no territorial interests, self-government, and cooperation among nations, among others.
When news of the conference was given to the press, the details released included the charter, as well as discussion of aid to Russia, which would involve some type of return commitment. Not given to the press were any details on how to deal with Japan in various likely scenarios. Churchill wanted a pledge from FDR as to U.S. intentions should the Japanese advance beyond a certain point or attack either Malaya or the East Indies. Would the president ask Congress for war, or at least for the authority to aid them? The president would not commit to either. Nor was there any discussion of organizing the various Pacific commands.
The Atlantic Conference conclusions included FDR’s reassurance to the American people that no commitments had been made that would draw the United States into war. During the 1945–46 congressional investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack, the only man who had sat in on the Roosevelt-Churchill conversations, Undersecretary Welles, was called to testify to report on what was actually discussed. Welles reported that it was Churchill who actually suggested a mutual-aid document to be signed by the United States, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and possibly Russia in the efforts to restrain Japan, and that in the absence of such a document, the Allies might fall one by one.
As America was the powerhouse of the Pacific, such sponsorship would fall on the president, who did nothing. In hindsight, as a result of Harry Hopkins’s return from Moscow and the decision to extend Lend-Lease to Russia, this could have been contingent on Stalin’s signature on such a document that would certainly have offered some fear of exposure of Russia’s eastern border to Japan. And it also would have recognized the far greater advantage of her only source of outside help. The extent of FDR’s plan simply warned that any action against Britain might draw the United States into the war.
Also on the agenda in Newfoundland was the occupation of the Azores. There was apprehension that Germany might invade both Spain and Portugal. This would naturally include the Azores, from which Germany would be in a position to hamper U.S. sea traffic and communications. FDR and Churchill both agreed on a thirty-day notice for its occupation. However, the reality of the situation recognized that Germany’s main attention was now on the eastern front.
Though many details of the Conference have never been released, there was a great deal of speculation. Some insist it was at Placentia Bay that FDR convinced Churchill that, in order to defend British interests in the Far East, Americans would have to reclaim some Lend-Lease. At the time, one out of every three B-17 Flying Fortress long-range bombers rolling off the assembly line at Seattle was going to Lend-Lease.29 The United States would reclaim one of three of the one of three and fly them to the Philippines, where American airpower would be introduced to the Far East, to deal with any Japanese aggressive moves. All through the Atlantic Conference, British officers were briefing their American counterparts. Present at the conference, of course, was Harry Hopkins, who, on his return from Moscow, sailed with Churchill to meet with Roosevelt.
Another interesting event that occurred in August of 1941 was the arrival of Dusko Popov. There would be a number of individual warnings provided Washington of the Japanese plans to attack Pearl Harbor that were not acted on for various reasons, mostly because of the mindset of lower officials who were only reacting to the mindset of those above them who, in turn, had no sense of urgency.
One such example of intelligence not acted on in Washington exemplified the frustration of the most dashing and flamboyant double agent operating in the United States. Dusko Popov, an aristocratic Yugoslavian, was educated in Germany, where he received a law degree, and then in short order was arrested by the Gestapo on suspicion of being a Communist sympathizer. Family connections arranged for his release, and after returning to German-occupied Yugoslavia, he was approached by the German Abwehr Dienst (counterintelligence) to become an agent and operate in Britain. His upper-class status and attraction to women and fast cars would make him an ideal, unsuspected hopeful. Being first a patriot with the full understanding that the best way to destroy something was to become part of it, he agreed. But it wasn’t long before he also offered his services to the British Security Service and soon was passing information to the Germans, all of which was orchestrated by the British intelligence organization, MI6.
After the successful British attack on the Italian fleet in November 1940, the Japanese became so dedicated to getting the minute details that it could mean only one thing: virtual duplication. But where could they get this information? Conferring with their Axis partner in Berlin, it was determined that what was needed was a top agent to go to Hawaii, a Caucasian who could move and mingle more easily than could an Asian. Popov was the man, now code-named Tricycle because of his preference to bed down with two women at the same time. He would be armed with Germany’s new technology of the microdot system, with which an entire page could be reduced to the size of a period.
Popov’s instructions from the German Abwehr Dienst were to provide as many details as possible about the military operations at Pearl Harbor. Their inquiry included details on not only airfields and ammunition dumps, but also on “pier installations, number of anchorages and depth of water.”30
En route to Hawaii, his first stop was in New York City, where he was to establish a new German spy ring. The FBI had whittled down the existi
ng one to the point where it was time to build one with new blood. As planned, he was met by an FBI agent. And after setting himself up with a penthouse, a new car, and his movie star contacts, he got down to the business of explaining his mission of the spy ring, the microdots being utilized, and his anticipated mission to Hawaii. Surprisingly, the FBI didn’t believe him. Everything was too detailed, too complete, and was thought to be an attempt to throw them off.
At a meeting with the FBI director, J. Edgar Hoover took an immediate dislike to Popov. His lifestyle of enjoying two women at once was particularly repulsive to Hoover’s homosexual tendencies; plus, Hoover had no stomach for double agents, and thus chose not to believe a word Popov said. Popov failed to impress on Hoover that the Japanese were going to attack Pearl Harbor before the end of the year and that he should be allowed to leave at once. All the director showed interest in was the microdot system, and Hoover postponed Popov’s permission to leave for Hawaii.
The British observed J. Edgar Hoover’s handling of Popov’s mission and intelligence with disbelief. Hoover, who was so used to closing down foreign intelligence rings, had the complete inability to establish one. And While the FBI did not take his information seriously, Popov enlisted the help of William Stephenson, British envoy to the United States, as well as Sir John Masterman, who recruited German agents to work for the Allies. They, too, were unsuccessful in getting the administration’s attention.
Although Tricycle was not permitted to go to Hawaii, he was allowed to make a trip to Rio de Janeiro several months later to receive particulars from the Abwehr Dienst on setting up a two-way radio in New York City that the FBI would control. It was on his return trip that he heard of the Pearl Harbor attack. Popov was personally elated that, thanks to information he had passed on to the FBI, the U.S. Navy had been waiting. Upon his arrival, he discovered that it was the other way around. But Popov had the satisfaction of knowing that J. Edgar Hoover had been warned, and thanks to Hoover’s ego, had failed to pass it on. In fact, Hoover had failed to share the microdot system with army and navy intelligence operations even though such sharing of information had been mutually agreed upon. (It was Tricycle and his lifestyle that would later be the inspiration for British author Ian Fleming to create James Bond in the image of Dusko Popov.)
At least two more, similar warnings would be presented later in October. Another glaring case in point was that of Kilsoo Haan, whose attempts to pass on Japanese intelligence proved futile. Since the Japanese occupation of Korea in 1910, there were a number of patriots and organizations dedicated to throwing off the bonds of oppression. One such organization was the Sino-Korean Peoples’ League, and one of their agents, Kilsoo Haan, while born in Korea, was raised in Honolulu, where he became active with the league. And in 1938, he moved to Washington, D.C.
Passed on to Haan was intelligence from their agents in Japan and Hawaii that Japan would attack Pearl Harbor in December. One had even seen detailed blueprints of the harbor laid out on a desk in the Japanese consulate. But Haan was frustrated by his inability to create any interest in officials at the State Department, all of whom promised to pass it on, and yet, no one ever got back to him. Finally, in October, he found someone who would listen, Senator Guy Gillette (D–IA). As one of the conservative Democrats, Gillette had opposed Roosevelt’s third and fourth terms, and it was his opposition to Lend-Lease that would cost him his own re-election in 1944. His attempts to pass on the Haan intelligence fell on deaf ears. In addition to Pearl Harbor, the Japanese would make coordinated attacks on the Pacific islands of Guam, Midway, Wake, and the Philippines. Gillette informed the State Department, as well as army and navy intelligence operations, and personally met with the president. The response from Roosevelt was, “Thank you, the matter will be looked into.”31
Now Haan’s updated information indicated that it would be the weekend of December 7, and he passed this on to Maxwell Hamilton, the State Department’s chief, Division of Far Eastern Affairs, and to Senator Gillette, who again passed it to the president. Through an aide, Roosevelt responded to Gillette that “the matter had been taken care of.”32 Gillette’s apprehension turned to a sigh of relief in that it had been officially acted on and passed to Pearl Harbor. The Haan dilemma ended the day after Pearl Harbor was attacked when he received a call from Hamilton at the State Department threatening him not to breathe a word of his warnings: “If you do, I can put you away.”33 Kilsoo Haan reluctantly agreed not to say a word until after the war.
But Senator Gillette’s story continues. The FBI and naval intelligence had been well aware of Japanese espionage activities in Honolulu. Just by renting a plane and flying as close as possible to military installations would reveal everything. The agencies could not stop photos from going to Japan, nor could they monitor the mail. So while espionage activity was being observed, nothing was being done. Diplomatic immunity was home free, and those observing the espionage were helpless. It was thought by some that the Japanese spy system in this country would put the Germans to shame.
Representative Martin Dies (D–TX), head of the Special Committee to Investigate Un-American Activities from 1938 to 1944, had been encouraged by Roosevelt to confine the committee’s investigations to Nazis and Fascists, but Dies expanded his efforts to include any subversive activities, right-wing and left-wing, inside and outside the government. Now he found an even greater threat, the Japanese. He found a staunch ally in Senator Guy Gillette, and between them they planned to hold hearings in the fall of 1941 to make America aware of the Japanese threat. Witnesses had even been subpoenaed to testify as to the magnitude of the threat. But in early October, the whole investigation ground to a halt when the State Department advised against its continuance as it might offend the Japanese during the negotiations between Hull, Nomura, and Kurusu. FDR’s sensitivity to Tokyo’s concerns brought the last word on the subject. Both Dies and Gillette were later convinced that had they been permitted to continue their investigation, the flow of intelligence to Tokyo would have stopped. And it would have been unlikely that Admiral Nagumo would have chanced the Pearl Harbor attack with only old information on the ship locations. Later, Democratic majorities in both Houses would absolve the president of anything that could have been construed as aggressive or warmongering.
And yet another warning that went unheeded was from perhaps the most brilliant Russian agent in all of World War II, Richard Sorge. Educated in Germany, he was operating out of the German Embassy in Tokyo, from where he was forwarding to Moscow intelligence weeded from both Berlin and Tokyo. Sorge is credited as being the one who warned Joseph Stalin weeks in advance of Germany’s June invasion, which provided ample time to reposition Siberian divisions to the west. And it was Sorge who advised Stalin that Japan had no plans for an attack on Russia, thereby freeing up those divisions guarding Russia’s eastern frontiers for the German front. But Sorge did not have the confidence of Stalin, who either did not believe or perhaps did not trust him, with the result that nothing was done in either case.
In October 1941, Sorge was arrested by the Japanese Secret Police, and before his execution in 1944, he made a lengthy confession containing the sum of his activities as an espionage agent. Included in his disclosure was the fact that Japan was going to attack Pearl Harbor in sixty days. Russia, by then a recipient of American Lend-Lease, would have been very anxious to forward such information to Washington to get the United States into the war to take the pressure off Russia’s western front. This would have passed through diplomatic channels; however, again there is no such record in the Capitol.
That Moscow knew in advance of the Japanese plan to attack Hawaii was authenticated in files discovered by U.S. Army intelligence in postwar occupied Japan. But the Washington copy is somewhat abbreviated in that there is no reference to an attack at Pearl Harbor in sixty days. Had someone done some editing, and if so, who had ordered it? (After Richard Sorge’s arrest, there was an opportunity to exchange him for an agent held in Russia. Stalin refu
sed.)
Even Major Warren Clear, who during 1941 worked for army intelligence operations in the Far East, was ignored. He had tried to warn Washington that Japanese intentions in the Pacific included attacks on Guam and Hawaii, but like all the others, he got no response. He would later write that Washington had “solid evidence, prior to P.H. that Japan would take the whole chain of islands, including attacks on Guam and Hawaii.”34 Similar to Ralph Briggs, Major Clear would be another individual who would not be asked to testify before the joint congressional committee convened in 1945–46.
Meanwhile, the embargo imposed on Japan in July had hit every level of Japanese commerce. This could not continue. It was time to reopen dialogue with the Americans. But concessions would be demanded. To what could, or would, the Japanese concede? In Washington, Ambassador Nomura was expecting instructions. Japan was not about to bend, based on economic pressure, but on what could they bend? The message to Nomura read in part, “With this instrument we hope to resume the Japanese–U.S. negotiations which were suspended because of the delay of the delivery of our revised proposals of July 14 and because of our occupation of French Indo-China which took place in the meantime.”35
Ideally, a settlement should be reached before Japan would have to tighten the belt to the strangling notch. In desperation, the Japanese military finally conceded to Prince Konoye not to venture south of Indochina, with Indochina itself to be evacuated after settlement of the China issue.
In exchange, the United States would have to resume normal trade and aid to Japan, and at the same time, convince China to accept Japanese terms and undertake suspension of U.S. measures in the southwest Pacific. And finally, the United States would offer a priority status for Japan in Indochina, even after the removal of their troops, based on settlement of the China issue. Armed with this proposal, Ambassador Nomura was at the State Department the next day, August 6. The secretary of state read the document, listened, and concluded that Japan obviously wanted everything in exchange for giving nothing. Two days of discussion made crystal clear both positions.