by James Johns
To illustrate the ambassadors’ innocence and sincerity in trying to turn things around, they continued: “We might suggest one thing for saving the situation. Although we have grave misgivings, we might propose, first, that President ROOSEVELT wire you that for the sake of posterity he hopes that Japan and the United States will cooperate for the maintenance of peace in the Pacific … and that you in return reply with a cordial message, thereby not only clearing the atmosphere, but also gaining a little time.”53 Understanding that the Americans and the British would protect the Dutch East Indies, they closed by saying, “We should propose the establishment of neutral nations, including French Indochina, Netherlands Indies and Thai[land, as Roosevelt had proposed the previous September].”54
It would be Hull’s decision, and in the early afternoon hours on November 26, he presented himself to the President Roosevelt for official approval of his recommendation, which read:
In view of the opposition of the Chinese Government and either the half-hearted support or the actual opposition of the British, the Netherlands, and the Australian Governments, and in view of the wide publicity of the opposition and of the additional opposition that will naturally follow through utter lack of an understanding of the vast importance and value otherwise of the modus vivendi, without in any way departing from my views … I desire very earnestly to recommend that at this time I call in the Japanese ambassadors and hand them a copy of the comprehensive basic proposal for a general peaceful settlement, and at the same time withhold the modus vivendi proposal.55
History does not indicate army or navy approval of this recommendation, considering the three months needed in the Philippines, but the president approved it, and Hull returned to his office.
It is interesting to note that while the modus vivendi would have given the temporary, three-month time advantage to the United States, each one of the objecting nations would expect the United States to save their situation in the event that they were attacked. They were only concerned with their particular interest, not considering that strengthening the Philippines could be the fundamental blueprint to save the entire theater.
Meanwhile, General Marshall departed Washington for a two-day trip to the Carolinas to observe army maneuvers.
It was also on November 26 that President Roosevelt ordered the Census Bureau to document, by state, all Japanese residing in the United States for future internment. And by December 3, they would complete the task, providing names of nearly one hundred twenty-seven thousand Japanese living in the United States.56 Concerning Hawaii alone, there were thirty-seven thousand five hundred foreign-born Japanese residing on the islands who were not American citizens,57 and who would dare to guess as to whom their allegiance would be?
After meeting with Roosevelt, Hull returned to his office and sent for the Japanese ambassadors who arrived about 5:00 p.m. By this time, Admiral Nagumo’s task force was one day at sea. Each ambassador was given the proposal of an agreement between the United States and Japan. They were dumbfounded. Was this the Americans’ answer to a modus vivendi? This was the Ten Point Note that was in reality an arrogant demand, as they saw it, to the settlement of unresolved issues. It included the following proposals:
Section 1.
Draft mutual declaration of policy.
The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan both being solicitous for the peace of the Pacific affirm that their national policies are directed toward lasting and extensive peace throughout the Pacific area, that they have no territorial designs in that area, that they have no intention of threatening other countries or of using military force aggressively against any neighboring nation, and that, accordingly, in their national policies they will actively support and give practical application to the following fundamental principles upon which their relations with each other and with all other governments are based:
1. The principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations.
2. The principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.
3. The principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity and treatment.
4. The principle of reliance upon international cooperation and conciliation for the prevention and pacific settlement of controversies and for improvement of international conditions by peaceful methods and processes.
The Government of Japan and the Government of the United States have agreed that toward eliminating chronic political instability, preventing recurrent economic collapse, and providing a basis for peace, they will actively support and practically apply the following principles in their economic relations with each other and with other nations and peoples:
1. The principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations.
2. The principle of internal economic cooperation and abolition of extreme nationalism as expressed in excessive trade restrictions.
3. The principle of non-discriminatory access by all nations to raw material supplies.
4. The principle of full protection of the interests of consuming countries and populations as regards the operation of international commodity agreements.
5. The principle of establishment of such institutions and arrangements of international finance as may lend aid to the essential enterprises and the continuous development of all countries and may permit payments through processes of trade consonant with the welfare of all countries.
Section 2.
Steps to be taken by the Government of the United States and by the Government of Japan:
The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan propose to take steps as follows:
1. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will endeavor to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact among the British Empire, China, Japan, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, Thailand and the United States.
2. Both Governments will endeavor to conclude among the American, British, Chinese, Japanese, the Netherland and Thai Governments an agreement whereunder each of the Governments would pledge itself to respect the territorial integrity of French Indo-China and, in the event that there should develop a threat to the territorial integrity of Indo-China, to enter into immediate consultation with a view to taking such measures as may be deemed necessary and advisable to meet the threat in question.
Such agreement would provide also that each of the Governments party to the agreement would not seek or accept preferential treatment in its trade or economic relations with Indo-China and would use its influence to obtain for each of the signatories equality of treatment in trade and commerce with French Indo-China.
3. The Government of Japan will withdraw all military, naval, air, and police forces from China and Indo-China.
4. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will not support—military, politically, economically—any Government or regime in China other than the national government of the republic of China with capital temporarily at Chungking.
5. Both Governments will give up all extraterritorial rights in China, including rights and interests in and with regard to international settlements and concessions, and rights under the Boxer Protocol of 1901.
Both Governments will endeavor to obtain the agreement of the British and other Governments to give up extraterritorial rights in China, including rights in international settlements and in concessions and under the Boxer Protocol of 1901.
6. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will enter into negotiations for the conclusion between the United States and Japan of a trade agreement, based upon reciprocal most-favored-nation treatment and reduction of trade barriers by both countries, including an undertaking by the United States to bind raw silk on the free list.
7. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will, respectively, remove the freezing restrictions on Japanese funds in the United States and on American fu
nds in Japan.
8. Both Governments will agree upon applying the stabilization of the dollar-yen rate, with the allocation of funds adequate for this purpose, half to be supplied by Japan and half by the United States.
9. Both Governments will agree that no agreement which either has concluded with any third powers shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area.
10. Both Governments will use their influence to cause other Governments to adhere to and to give practical application to the basic political and economic principles set forth in this agreement.58
Kurusu’s only response was “that when they reported our answer [in essence, Hull and FDR’s approval not to negotiate] to their Government it would be likely to throw up its hands.”59 All the ambassadors could do was to ask for an appointment the next day to report Tokyo’s response, which was granted. The ambassadors retired to their embassy to cable Tokyo. After summarizing, they added:
In view of our negotiations all along, we were both dumbfounded and said that we could not even cooperate to the extent of reporting this to Tokyo. We argued back furiously, but HULL remained solid as a rock. Why did the United States have to propose such hard terms as these? Well, England, the Netherlands and China doubtless put her up to it. Then, too, we have been urging them to quit helping CHIANG, and lately a number of important Japanese in speeches have been urging that we strike at England and the United States. Moreover, there have been rumors that we are demanding of Thai[land] that she give us complete control over her national defense. All this is reflected in these two hard proposals, or we think so.60
These Purple communications (Magic decryptions) to Tokyo definitely refute the claims of some historians that the ambassadors were trying to deceitfully promise things that were fantasy, and that they themselves were buying time to allow Nagumo’s task force to cross the Pacific. In actuality, they were stunned, with no comprehension that the negotiations were virtually meaningless.
Stimson’s diary records the question as to whether Secretary Hull had even presented the modus vivendi on Wednesday. Hull’s response to Stimson was that “he had broken the whole matter off,”61 and that “I have washed my hands of it and it is now in the hands of you and Knox—the Army and the Navy.”62 Did Hull have FDR’s permission to “wash his hands” of negotiations, or was he ordered to replace the modus vivendi with the harsh Ten Point Note?
Top priority consideration for FDR and the war council was that the modus vivendi termination was two full days prior to the Japanese deadline of November 29. Was this an invitation to war? With FDR’s isolationist opposition in Congress, could he be accused of maneuvering a war? On the other hand, if he reached an interim settlement with Tokyo, and then they attacked, Roosevelt could be compared to Britain’s Neville Chamberlain as an unsuccessful appeaser, which would make it impossible for him to get his congressional support for promises made to Britain. And finally, if he did nothing, he could be accused of dereliction of duty. All secret evidence that had been gathered from Magic about Japanese movements and the deadlines would have to be kept under a high state of security.
There was still time that day, November 26, to get a message from Roosevelt off to the High Commissioner of the Philippines, Francis B. Sayre. As high commissioner of the Philippines, Sayre had little authority, serving mainly as the personal representative of the president of the United States. Roosevelt’s message to Sayre read, “Preparations are becoming apparent … for an early aggressive movement of some character although as yet there are no clear indications as to its strength or whether it will be directed against the Burma Road, Thailand, Malay Peninsula, Netherlands East Indies, or the Philippines. Advance against Thailand seems the most probable. I consider it possible that this next Japanese aggression might cause an outbreak of hostilities between the U.S. and Japan.”63
This warning leaves little doubt that Washington expected a hostile response from Japan. Yet the subsequent warnings to the field commanders would be watered down, leaving them with the assumption that they would be kept informed of any updates.
That night, the Washington newspapers made a brief press release from the State Department to the effect that the United States had deserted the modus vivendi and had presented so-called final terms to the Japanese. Although there were no details, Washington was awaiting for an official Japanese response. Washington would have to wait until Saturday evening, December 6. Diplomatically, the key had been to somehow buy three months’ time without showing any sign of weakness. But in the event of war, the president had insisted that the Japanese must strike the first blow directly at the United States.
Not knowing what the Japanese response or action would be to Hull’s surprising proposal, Americans had to be prepared for any and all eventualities. There were war warnings to be sent to overseas commands. The nation should be alerted, but not to a point of ringing the alarm.
General Hap Arnold was busy making final preparations to dispatch two of the army’s long-range B-24s requested by the navy for photo reconnaissance missions to the Marshall and Caroline Islands. Army Chief of War Plans General Gerow was meeting with Navy Secretary Knox and CNO Admiral Stark to compose a war warning for MacArthur that would require General Marshall’s signature as soon as he returned to Washington.
Hull called a news conference for selected correspondents in order to tell the nation as much as he dared, mainly of what the Japanese were doing. He passed on reports of the Japanese landing twenty thousand fresh troops in Saigon. There was a reported movement of ten thousand troops from the north to the south of Indochina.64 It appeared that the next logical move would be to the west to occupy Siam (Thailand). This would put them in an ideal position to launch an invasion of Burma. Indochina seemed to be the key to moving west or south toward Malaya or the Indies.
What Hull did not disclose to the correspondents was the justification to the American public of going to war if an attack was not directed at the United States. Although the Japanese ambassadors were granted their request to speak directly to the president, they had nothing new to report. FDR had already received a briefing from Stimson, Knox, Stark, and Gerow, stating, “If the current negotiations end without agreement … Japan may attack: the Burma Road; Thailand; Malaya; the Netherlands East Indies; the Philippines; the Russian Maritime Provinces.”65 There was no mention of the likelihood of a combined attack on several at once or of a strike from Japan thirty-five hundred miles east to Pearl Harbor, considered to be in the backwaters of the Pacific.
Between Stimson and Gerow, a war warning was drafted for General MacArthur and Admiral Hart (and sent to MacArthur), which read:
Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only barest possibilities that Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize the successful defense of the Philippines. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in revised Rainbow 5 which was delivered to you by General Brereton. Chief of Naval Operations concurs and request you to notify Hart.66
Hawaii also had to be alerted, but obviously the same warning would not apply. In addition, there were the concerns for sabotage and alarming the civil population. However, as much concern as there was for the sabotage issue, it could not overshadow the military threat. So, with the first three sentences the same as for the Philippines, the warning for Hawaii and Panama was issued. Message No. 472 read:
This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to
a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow 5 so far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of the highly secret information to minimum essential officers.67
In Washington, General Miles of G-2 didn’t think that the sabotage alert was strong enough and sent a follow-up message to General Short’s G-2, Lieutenant Colonel Kendall Fielder, emphasizing, “Hostilities may ensue. Subversive activities may be expected.”68
This message put on record at least two warnings from commanders concerning the threat or fear of sabotage on Oahu, including the G-2 himself, Miles. In response to the order to report to Washington as to what steps were being taken, Short responded the following day that he had initiated Alert No. 1, the alert against sabotage. In essence, this should have gotten Short off the hook because his response was on file for the next nine days with no negative reply from the War Department.
The wording of the war warning itself would account for Short’s actions. His orders were specifically not to alarm the civil population. How could he possibly activate Alert No. 3 and not alarm the populace or disclose intent? His orders included carrying out tasks assigned in Rainbow 5 only after hostilities commence. He was also under orders to limit dissemination of this information to a minimum of essential officers. How could he alert all commands to prepare for a major attack and limit this knowledge to only essential officers? A more likely answer would appear that the war warning was covering Washington’s knowledge of events rather than notifying Hawaii to prepare for war.