by James Johns
Almost a century ago the President of the United States addressed to the Emperor of Japan a message extending an offer of friendship…. That offer was accepted, and in the long period of unbroken peace and friendship which has followed, our respective nations, through the virtues of their peoples and the wisdom of their rulers, have prospered and have substantially helped humanity….
Developments are occurring in the Pacific area which threaten to deprive each of our nations and all humanity of the beneficial influence of the long peace between our two countries….
Both Japan and the United States should agree to eliminate any form of military threat….
During the past few weeks it has become clear to the world that Japanese military, naval and air forces have been sent to Southern Indo-China in such large numbers as to create a reasonable doubt on the part of other nations that this continuing concentration in Indochina is not defensive in its character….
I am sure that Your Majesty will understand that the fear of all these peoples [of the Southwest Pacific] is a legitimate fear…. I am sure that Your Majesty will understand why the people of the United States in such large numbers look askance at the establishment of … bases manned and equipped so greatly as to constitute armed forces capable of measures of offense.
It is clear that a continuance of such a situation is unthinkable. None of the peoples whom I have spoken of above can sit either indefinitely or permanently on a keg of dynamite.
There is absolutely no thought on the part of the United States of invading Indo-China if every Japanese soldier or sailor were to be withdrawn therefrom….
I address myself to Your Majesty at this moment in the fervent hope that Your Majesty may, as I am doing, give thought in this definite emergency to ways of dispelling the dark clouds. I am confident that both of us, for the sake of the peoples not only of our own great countries but for the sake of humanity in neighboring territories, have a sacred duty to restore traditional amity and prevent further death and destruction in the world.44
Because Grew had to go through the protocol of contacting the prime minister for his appointment with the emperor, this was Prime Minister Tojo’s perfect opportunity to drag things out. It would be important to make sure that the emperor did not see the president’s message until it was too late. And he did not.
Chapter 9
* * *
Air Raid Pearl Harbor, This Is No Drill
On Saturday night, Mrs. Roosevelt hosted a party at the White House. But by 9:00 p.m., the president had retired to his second-floor study, where he was conversing with Harry Hopkins, when one of the White House ushers entered, followed by a navy courier. The officer carried with him a locked briefcase, which he opened, and he handed the contents to the president. The dispatch consisted of a number of pages that had just come from Navy Decoding Headquarters down the street. After FDR had read them all, he handed them to Hopkins with the statement, “This means war.”1 After a ten-day wait, was this the answer to the November 26 Ten Point Note? After Hopkins completed his study of the papers, he handed them back to the courier, who relocked them in the pouch and left.
By procedure, on even days of the month, the Army Signal Intelligence Service translated intercepts and delivered them to Secretaries Hull and Stimson, General Marshall, and other authorized readers of Magic. The Navy Communications Intelligence Unit handled the same task on the odd days and delivered the messages to the president, Secretary Knox, CNO Stark, and their authorized officers. On Saturday, it was the army’s turn.
Earlier that day, around noon, Magic started to decode what was apparently going to be the answer to the Ten Point Note in a message from Foreign Minister Togo to Ambassador Nomura. In essence, negotiations would be broken off by Japan, but the ambassadors in Washington were to continue as if nothing had changed:
1. The Government has deliberated deeply on the American proposal of the 26th of November and as a result we have drawn up a memorandum for the United States contained in my separate message #902.
2. This separate message is a long one. I will send it in fourteen parts and I imagine you will receive it tomorrow. However, I am not sure. The situation is extremely delicate, and when you receive it I want you please keep it secret for the time being.
3. Concerning the time for presenting this memorandum to the United States, I will wire you in a separate message. However, I want you in the meantime to put it in nicely drafted form and make every preparation to present it to the Americans just as soon as you receive instructions.2
The receipt of the fourteen-part message is considered proof by many that Washington allowed Pearl Harbor to happen. The pilot message itself alerted that a message was coming that was considered so secret that its contents were to remain confidential until the time for presentation. Extra diligence had to be taken to make sure that it was decoded and ready for delivery at a time to be announced in a separate message, and the time for presentation would be critical to the entire effort. It is known that this pilot message, while only raising eyebrows, was in the hands of the State Department by 3:00 p.m. on the afternoon of December 6, and it warned all authorized readers that something big was coming. The navy translators had replaced the army at 1:00 p.m. and were about to close down at 4:30 p.m. for the weekend when Part 8 appeared, signaling that all parts were not necessarily in a sequential order. Everyone stayed on.
Sometime after dinner, thirteen parts were in their possession, translated and about ready for distribution. The late-afternoon workload had been such that, upon request, the army personnel had returned to duty. As there was still no sign of the fourteenth part, Lieutenant Commander Alvin Kramer, the senior officer on duty, decided that there was no reason to hold back the existing parts while waiting for the last one, and shortly after 8:30 p.m., as per custom, he was on the phone calling the authorized recipients that highly classified intelligence was on its way. Of the utmost curiosity was the fact that the message had been sent in English. Unknown to its initial readers, this was done so as to avoid any delays or errors and would eliminate the possibility of Nomura’s diminishing or mellowing its meaning. In brief, the thirteen parts consisted of the following points.
Part 1 referred to the fact that Japan’s policy had been continuously aimed at stabilization and peace in East Asia, and that China had failed to appreciate Japan’s true desire for peace, forcing Japan to join with Germany and Italy to prevent any extension of warlike disturbances.
Part 2 referred to the United States and Great Britain as having resisted all of Japan’s efforts in its relationship with France for the joint defense of French Indochina, as having coerced the Netherlands East Indies to join with them to strain economic relations with Japan, and as placing a stranglehold on Japan, thereby endangering the Empire of Japan’s existence.
Part 3 raised the issue that in August, Prime Minister Konoye had proposed a meeting with the president, but the Americans had insisted that an agreement should be met before the meeting, putting the cart before the horse, and as such, the United States displayed no interest in negotiations nor in conciliation.
Part 4 reiterated that the Japanese on November 20 had submitted a proposal to arrive at a solution in the Far East, suggesting restoration of commercial relations, restoring trade with the Netherlands East Indies, and dispatching no troops to any region (except in French Indochina) in all of the South Pacific or Southeast Asia. (Japan had promised to remove troops from Indochina in exchange for the United States’ help to resolve China.)
Part 5 indicated that the United States made known its intention to continue support for Chiang Kai-shek, and finally, on November 26, had introduced ten harsh demands on Japan, stating that the time was not ripe for peace between Japan and the United States.
Part 6 stated that Japan wanted to include China in trade and even volunteered to remove troops from South Indochina as a signal to that end, but was rebuffed by the United States.
Part 7 asserted that the Unit
ed States had refused to bend one inch in any discussions, and that world peace was based only on principles favorable to the United States.
Part 8 stated that while the United States discouraged Japan’s obligation to the Tripartite Pact, they thought nothing of supporting Great Britain, China, Russia, the Netherlands, and Thailand against the Tripartite nations.
Part 9 stated that while the United States was attempting to secure peace in the Pacific, they continued “in aiding Great Britain and may be preparing to attack, in the name of self-defense, Germany and Italy, two Powers that are striving to establish a new order in Europe.”3
Part 10 indicated that where the United States objected to settling international issues militarily, they had no objection to such settlements by economic pressure. “The Japanese Government cannot tolerate the perpetuation of such a situation since it directly runs counter to Japan’s fundamental policy to enable all nations to enjoy each its proper place in the world.”4
Part 11 stated that the six nations of Japan, United States, Great Britain, the Netherlands, China, and Thailand should restore trade relations, and at the same time recognize the agreement that Japan currently maintained with France concerning French Indochina.
Part 12 indicated that the United States only recognized the Chungking government without taking the Nanking government into consideration, which demonstrated a lack of willingness to negotiate, and demonstrated clearly the intention of the United States government to obstruct the restoration of normal relations between Japan and China, which would, in turn, restore peace to East Asia.
Part 13 reiterated that Japan had been interested in negotiations all along but the United States’ proposal of November 26 indicated that the Americans were neither interested in negotiations nor in the stabilization of the yen to the dollar, in that “the proposal in question ignores Japan’s sacrifices in the four years of the China Affair, menaces the Empire’s existence itself and disparages its honour and prestige. Therefore, viewed in its entirety, the Japanese Government regrets that it cannot accept the proposal as a basis of negotiation.”5
There it was. While some authorized to read Magic would claim that it was work for diplomats, parts 2, 9, 10, and 13 were threats indicating military action and were certainly not diplomatic in tone. What could the fourteenth part add that hadn’t already been said?
Starting with Commander Kramer’s Saturday night deliveries of the thirteen parts, history will record an almost unlimited variety of scenarios, all designed to cover or protect each member of the authorized readers of Magic from any degree of liability in connection with Pearl Harbor. The whereabouts of each officer was key to viewing and acting on the Japanese response to the Americans’ November 26 Ten Point Note.
Kramer first called those on the navy list to advise that he would be delivering top secret intelligence for their viewing. He then requested his wife to act as chauffeur. The president was first on the list, but Roosevelt’s naval aide, Captain John Beardall, had a dinner engagement at the home of Director of Naval Intelligence Admiral Wilkinson. So Lieutenant Lester Schulz, the temporary communications watch officer reporting to Captain Beardall, was briefed to be on the alert to receive a message for immediate delivery to the president. When Schulz delivered the message to Roosevelt, he heard him respond, “This means war.” And yet, what Roosevelt had just read failed to inspire any attempt to contact his top military commanders.
Second on Kramer’s list was Navy Secretary Frank Knox. Upon reading the complete dispatch, Knox picked up the phone and arranged a meeting with Hull and Stimson for 10:00 a.m. Sunday, and he ordered Kramer to appear with any updates. While he was phoning those on the list, the call to Admiral Stark revealed that he was at the National Theater attending a performance of The Student Prince. There was no attempt to contact him at the theater in the interest of not raising undue public alarm. However, Captain Harold Krick, Stark’s flag secretary, would later indicate that upon returning home, Admiral Stark called the president and learned of the message. Another failed call was to War Plans Director Admiral Turner who, later it was revealed, was out walking his dogs.
Next on the list was Admiral Wilkinson. In addition to Captain Beardall, Kramer also found General Miles at Wilkinson’s party. According to Kramer, all three read the contents of the pouch, to which there was no conformity of response. Lieutenant Commander Arthur McCollum, an assistant intelligence chief, was in his office Saturday afternoon and was sure Wilkinson, Stark, and Turner had seen it then. Wilkinson would testify at the Hewitt Inquiry in June 1945 that he had seen it, but to the congressional investigation of 1945–46, he reversed his claim and testified that he had not. When Kramer had delivered the message to Wilkinson’s party, the general consensus from those in attendance was to wait for the fourteenth part to come in. Wilkinson then told Kramer to go home and to make the balance of the deliveries Sunday morning.
Kramer recalled that after reading the message, General Miles apparently made no effort to call General Marshall or Secretary Hull. A call to the White House by Beardall to make sure that the president had seen it further reduced the urgency of the situation. Kramer returned his documents to the Navy Department on Saturday night and went home.
Colonel Rufus Bratton, Kramer’s equivalent delivering for the army, phoned his recipients, informed them of the pilot message, and advised that he would make deliveries as the parts came in. All knew that it would be the answer to the Ten Point Note. He made the delivery to Hull, but as a result of the phone call to Miles, Bratton was ordered to make the balance of the deliveries on Sunday morning. While some would later charge that he failed to deliver, he would not have had the authority to withhold vital security information strictly on his own volition. What looks suspicious from the very top is the fact that not one of the four officers authorized to alert overseas commands—Stark, Turner, Marshall, and Gerow—saw the fourteen parts until Sunday morning. What kind of odds would Las Vegas make of that?
Almost unbelievably, on the most important day of their lives, neither Marshall nor Stark could later recall where they were or what they were doing. Marshall was later reminded by his wife that he was at home because she was recovering from broken ribs. But according to Kimmel’s intelligence officer, Captain Layton, Marshall left his office early on Saturday with specific instructions to Colonel Bratton that he did not want to be disturbed, while he was highly aware of the explosive situation in the Pacific, and that he was retiring to his quarters at Fort Myer. That night, however, he attended a reunion of World War I veterans in downtown D.C. It was just too suspicious that everyone of importance should not be disturbed.
In that connection, it is equally unbelievable that the intelligence chiefs of both services, Turner and Gerow, would pass instructions not to deliver until Sunday top-secret intelligence to those authorized to warn overseas commands. They knew that these officers had not seen it. Had they themselves been under specific orders, or were they simply following the do-not-disturb order?
To build up aircraft requirements in the Philippines, Washington had authorized sixteen B-17s to be transferred there in November 1941.6 The Thirty-Eighth Reconnaissance Squadron from Albuquerque, New Mexico, led by Major Truman Landon, would supply eight aircraft, and the Eighty-Eighth Reconnaissance Squadron from Fort Douglas, Utah, led by Captain Richard Carmichael, would supply the other eight. Landon’s B-17s would be piloted by Captain Raymond Swenson, and First Lieutenants Karl Barthelmess, Bruce Allen, Earl Cooper, Harold Hastings, Robert Richards, and Boris Zubko. And those piloting Carmichael’s B-17s would be First Lieutenants Harold Chaffin, Richard Ezzard, Frank Potter, Robert Thacker, Frank Bostrom, Harry Brandon, and David Rawls.
Unidentified crewmen inspect a B-17C: Note the straight vertical fin.
A Boeing B-17E with an enlarged vertical fin that, from a distance, sometimes led to the plane’s being mistaken for a Japanese aircraft.
General Marshall was concerned over the modification delays on installing the lo
ng-range tanks and sent General Hap Arnold to Hamilton Field in San Francisco to impress the necessity for speed. Where the greatest distance would be the first leg of the trip to Hawaii, the most dangerous would be from Hawaii on to the Philippines. At Hickam Field, the cosmoline would be removed from the guns and the guns would be armed, and the five-man crews would be increased to ten. Seeing them off, General Arnold warned them not to fly too close together because if the United States found itself at war before they reached the Philippines, they may be attacked.
On Saturday, December 6, at 9:30 p.m. PST, the B-17s took off on their twenty-four-hundred-mile flight to Hawaii. On departure from Hamilton, two of the Thirty-Eighth’s aircraft, piloted by Hastings and Zubko, experienced engine problems and did not depart. One of the Eighty-Eighth’s aircraft, piloted by Potter, experienced the same and aborted takeoff. And another Eighty-Eighth aircraft, piloted by Ezzard, developed problems in the air and returned to the field, leaving four B-17Cs and eight B-17Es to fly into history.
For the planes’ flight across the Pacific, the navy had positioned ships for the B-17s to home in on, and again, KGMB was delivering Hawaiian music as an additional means of navigation. At 0745, Captain Carmichael of the Eighty-Eighth had attempted to contact Hickam Tower, but because of the distance, the transmission was garbled.
At about 5:00 a.m. on Sunday, the graveyard shift at the Navy Department in Washington started to receive what appeared to be the beginning of the fourteenth part from the Magic machine. It had been a full twelve hours since the first thirteen parts were received, and its delay was at once obvious. Part 14 read: