by James Johns
Obviously is it the intention of the American Government to conspire with Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan’s efforts toward the establishment of peace through the creation of a New Order in East Asia, and especially to preserve Anglo-American rights and interests by keeping Japan and China at war. This intention has been revealed clearly during the course of the present negotiations. Thus, the earnest hope of the Japanese Government to adjust Japanese-American relations and to preserve and promote the peace of the Pacific through cooperation with the American Government has finally been lost.
The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American Government that in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations.7
Within two hours came two more supplements, the first of which designated the time that the ambassadors were to present Tokyo’s response to those in Washington: “Will the Ambassador please submit to the United States Government (if possible to the Secretary of State) our reply to the United States at 1:00 p.m. on the 7th, your time.”8 The second supplement issued final instructions to destroy any remaining intelligence: “After deciphering Part 14 of my #902, and also #907, #908, and #909, please destroy at once the remaining cipher machine and all machine codes. Dispose in like manner all secret documents.”9
There it was, the fourteenth part, Japan’s answer to the Americans’ Ten Point Note: a termination of negotiations. But most important was the supplement stating a specific time for presentation of the dispatch. Even to the most uninformed, it was obvious that something was going to happen somewhere at the stated time.
Ever since the November war warning, Admiral Kimmel had been concerned that he be totally prepared if war should start in the Pacific. He was busy assembling a checklist-type document that he titled Steps to Be Taken in Case of American-Japanese War Within 24 Hours. It covered notification to subordinate commands, air patrols, and other necessary personnel. He spent Saturday morning in briefing with his second in command, Admiral William Pye. Pye was one of those convinced that if war came, a strike would not be directed at the Americans but rather at the British or the Dutch.
Fort Shafter was the scene of the usual Saturday morning staff meeting. General Short’s G-2, Colonel Fielder, who worked closely with the Japanese-American community toward army recruitment, was not one to coordinate with his navy counterpart. But his assistant, Lieutenant Colonel George Bicknell, had friends not only in naval intelligence but also in the local FBI. Bicknell maintained the opposite view of Fielder’s, supporting the internment of Japanese-Americans in the event of war, and as such was keeping a closer eye on things. It was from the navy that he discovered that the local Japanese were burning documents and destroying codes, which he felt indicated that something was about to happen somewhere. Fielder was unimpressed.
That same afternoon, Bicknell received a call from his contact with the Honolulu office of the local FBI. He was asked to come over immediately. Upon arrival, Bicknell was handed a transcript of a monitored phone call from Honolulu to Tokyo. It was a very unusual conversation when one considers the cost of such a call in those days. The subjects ranged from flying weather to seamen roaming the streets, and ended with a discussion of the types of flowers in bloom. The call was just too suspicious, and the FBI was convinced that it should be passed on to the army. Bicknell was alarmed. He automatically called Fielder. He had something of dire importance for Fielder and Short. Again Fielder was not impressed, but in making their dinner engagement, both men read the transcript. The two decided that it was nothing to be alarmed over, and that ended it.
The aircraft on the army and naval installations were secured for the weekend. At many sites, gas tanks were emptied, guns were removed for cleaning, ammo was locked up, guard was doubled in accordance to Alert No. 1, and the weekend passes were issued.
At Hickam, there were approximately fifty-five bombers parked on the half-mile-long ramp, which included the B-18s, the B-17s, and the one B-24 intended for the reconnaissance mission to the Marshals. Bordering Hickam was Pearl Harbor, where sixty-five aircraft, mostly amphibians, were parked, with the PBYs all tethered next to Hangar Six at the south end of Ford Island. At the Kaneohe Naval Air Station on the northeast coast, thirty-seven aircraft, mostly PBYs, were parked on the ramp just out of the water. At Ewa Marine Corps Air Station, there were forty-seven aircraft, consisting of SBDs, F4Fs, and SB2Us. At Wheeler Field in the center of the island, across the road from Schofield Barracks, there was the baker’s mix of mostly P-26, P-36, and P-40 fighters, and a variety of single-engine aircraft, totaling about 145. And finally, at Bellows there were approximately twenty planes, which included observation aircraft and the P-40s being used for training.
Within Pearl Harbor itself, the battleships and cruisers were moored to concrete quays at Ford Island in the center of the harbor. On the southeast side was Battleship Row with the California in the lead, followed by the oiler USS Neosho (AO-23). Then moored in pairs were the Oklahoma, the Maryland, the West Virginia, and the USS Tennessee (BB-43). The repair ship, USS Vestal (AR-4), and the USS Arizona (BB-39) were followed by the USS Nevada (BB-36). On the west side of the island were the seaplane tender, USS Tangier (AV-8), and two light cruisers, the USS Raleigh (CL-7) and USS Detroit (CL-8), along with the USS Utah (BB-31) moored between the Tangier and Raleigh. (The Utah had been converted from a battleship to a target ship.) With the exception of the USS Pennsylvania (BB-38) which was in dry dock, all ships were at Condition 3. This required that one-quarter of their antiaircraft batteries were to be manned and the balance ready for quick response, and all were pointed toward the harbor entrance for a fast exit that would eliminate any maneuvering time.
At Wheeler Field, the main fighter base, 90 percent of army personnel were available for duty, along with perhaps one hundred fighters that could have been brought into the fight with advance warning. Instead they sat parked, out of fuel and ammunition, which would require four hours to get them all airborne. And with the proper alert from Washington, the aircraft that would have warned them, the PBYs, would have been hundreds of miles at sea and not sitting on the ramps undergoing maintenance for wear and tear demands.
Honolulu itself was settling into its usual beautiful, peaceful Saturday night that only that city can offer. In the distance, the black hills met the dark blue sky with a sporadic light here and there in the hills. With the December moon reflecting off the water, one could see the silhouette of Diamond Head where it met the ocean. The streets faced either the mountains or the ocean with the street lights exposing the palm tree–lined boulevards, each view more exotic than the last. The Moana and Royal Hawaiian Hotels were the scenes of dinner parties with the cares of reality far removed. Admiral Kimmel, Admiral Pye, and a few friends attended a dinner party at the Halekulani Hotel, but by 9:30 p.m., Kimmel was on his way back to his quarters at Makalapa Heights at Pearl Harbor. Short and his G-2, Colonel Fielder, had gone to dinner at the Officers’ Club at Schofield Barracks, and like Kimmel, Short was back in his quarters on Palm Circle at Fort Shafter by 10:00 p.m.
Back in Washington, no one was in greater anticipation of the fourteenth part of Japan’s message than Commander Kramer, who was back in his office by 7:30 a.m. on Sunday. Most resident deliveries would not be necessary. He added the fourteenth part to the folders to be ready for distribution. Admiral Stark had already arrived and was handed his copy on Kramer’s way to the White House. From there, Kramer was off to the State Department to deliver to Secretary Knox. They met on the way in, and at that moment, Colonel Bratton arrived to deliver to Secretary Hull. Captain Beardall presented the president’s copy in his bedroom. FDR’s only comment was, “It looks as though the Japs are going to break off negotiations.”10 Upon Kramer’s return to the Navy Department, recipients were all present and hashing over the meaning of the message. Admiral Wilkinson suggested another warning to Admiral Hart in the Philippines. The
re was no response from Stark.
By 10:30 a.m. in Washington, the two supplements stating the delivery time were in Kramer’s hands. This was only one hour away from Nagumo’s takeoff time from the Kido Butai. Kramer then made a time check on the wall map to interpret the delivery time of 1:00 p.m. in Washington. He noted that it would correspond to 1:00 a.m. on the Kra Isthmus (Siam) and 3:00 a.m. in the Philippines. No major attack would begin in the dead of night, with most major targets blacked out and with landing forces fumbling around on unfamiliar terrain. This would also rule out Malaya and the Dutch colony. But 1:00 p.m. did equate to early morning on Oahu and to high noon at the Panama Canal, where a task force would have to sail through many hours of daylight in highly traveled commercial sea lanes, eliminating the element of surprise.
Colonel Bratton had reached General Miles and General Gerow and hurried them into their offices in the Munitions Building.
Meanwhile, the navy was having their meeting. One of those meeting with Stark was Commander McCollum, who headed up Far East Section of the Office of Naval Intelligence. Born and raised in Japan, McCollum was considered an expert on the Japanese, and in his capacity, he was the communications routing officer responsible for providing Roosevelt with Japanese intercepts. McCollum would later become known as the author of the McCollum Memo, which many believe influenced Roosevelt’s actions to provoke Japan into war.
The McCollum Memo, which was drafted in October 1940, included eight points, all of which Roosevelt would follow through with by the time Pearl Harbor was attacked. The points specified that the Americans should gain access to British bases in the Pacific, continue aid to the Chinese, deploy ships and submarines to Asian ports, increase U.S. naval strength at Pearl Harbor, instruct the Dutch not to negotiate with the Japanese, and finally, apply trade embargoes on the Japanese. Summarizing these points, McCollum stated, “If by these means Japan could be led to commit an overt act of war, so much the better. At all events we must be fully prepared to accept the threat of war.”11 There is no proof that Roosevelt actually saw this memo, but McCollum did pass it to then Captains Walter Anderson and Dudley Knox, both of whom were close to Roosevelt.
At the gathering in Stark’s office, Commander McCollum reiterated that the situation was elementary in that the deadline would be timed to an attack, with the only question being where. Wilkinson suggested that perhaps a call to Kimmel was in order. Stark excused them with the statement that he should call the president first. Kimmel was never called, and for that matter, neither was the president. Stark would later testify that the president’s personal line was busy. The disaster at Pearl Harbor was the result of a busy signal. An unofficial statement from a member of the White House staff had the president at his desk working on his stamp collection with the phone off the hook. What would the president’s reaction have been at the request for a call to Admiral Kimmel?
Back in the Munitions Building, Miles was in a huddle with Gerow and Bratton. The more conversation they had, the more convinced they were that a new warning including the deadline should be sent to the Hawaiian commanders at once. But General Marshall should concur, and he was nowhere to be found.
The occurrences of Saturday night and Sunday morning can be described with many interpretations. Although the Roberts Commission was designed to not implicate anyone in Washington, the Army and Navy Boards of 1944 would search for the truth. Were the changes in testimony truly the result of lapses of memory? Or were some covering themselves from potential future liability in connection with their participation in the Saturday and Sunday events? Their military careers could hang in the balance. Even Kramer and Bratton would have to change their testimonies to fit that of their superiors, which made them appear incompetent. The disappearance of the key military leaders, and the orders not to disturb them in the most critical hour in American history, leaves little doubt that unusual orders had been issued. The following could illustrate what appears to be the dragging of feet in the final hours to allow the attack on Pearl Harbor to happen.
Just before 9:00 a.m. on Sunday in Washington, Colonel Bratton phoned Marshall at his home at Fort Myer and was told by his orderly that the general was on his usual Sunday morning horseback ride. In so many words, Bratton told the orderly that it was imperative that he track down Marshall at once and get him to a phone. He was instructed to get help if necessary. The call was not returned until 10:25 a.m. With phone security and time in mind, Bratton told Marshall that he was on his way and would be at Fort Myer in twenty minutes with new Magic. Marshall said no, he was on his way to the War Department. Later, he would not even recall talking to Bratton.
At 11:25 a.m., Marshall arrived at his office and methodically started to study the fourteen parts as the clock ticked down. A twenty-minute trip for Bratton was a one-hour trip the other way. And this was on a Sunday morning, years before the thought of traffic jams. It had been a full twenty-three hours since the pilot message announcing the fourteen parts had been received. Miles and Bratton made attempts to brush ahead to the fourteenth part, but Marshall would not be swayed. By 11:30 a.m., they were joined by Gerow, and between the four of them, it became quite apparent that something was about to happen at an American installation in the Pacific in an hour and a half. A call by Marshall to Stark to energize interest in a new warning to Pacific commanders with the time deadline failed. They had already been sent sufficient warning. Marshall started writing out a warning in longhand for MacArthur and Short. The phone rang. It was Stark, who had reconsidered and wanted Marshall’s warning passed on to Hart and Kimmel. Marshall wrote: “Japanese are presenting at 1 p.m. eastern standard time today what amounts to an ultimatum [and] also they are under orders to destroy their code machine immediately. Just what significance the hour set may have we do not know but be on the alert accordingly. Inform Naval authorities of this communication. Marshall.”12
The message was completed and ready for delivery at 11:58 a.m. Marshall then sent Colonel Bratton to the Army Signal Center to forward the message to Hawaii. Upon his return, Marshall inquired how long it would take to deliver. Bratton returned to the center for the answer, which was “about thirty to forty minutes.”13 Marshall had no choice but to be satisfied with that. But this did not include the required time to encipher for delivery and decipher for receiving the message. Whoever took the message would have understood at a glance that time was of the essence. That person appears to have been Colonel Edward French, commanding the Army Signal Center, who learned that heavy static was blackening out the army circuit to Hawaii. So he took it upon himself to send the message in the clear by Western Union to Seattle and then via RCA Commercial Radiogram to Honolulu, where it arrived at 7:33 a.m. Hawaiian time, just twenty-two minutes before the attack.
But because it was not marked “urgent” or “priority,” it sat in the out basket in Honolulu and Short never saw it until 2 p.m. Sunday, and Kimmel two hours after that. Had Marshall been aware of this, he may well have elected to call Short on the scrambler phone, which he feared could compromise Magic. Considering the urgency of the situation, it was a total breakdown in communications, one that would later support Roosevelt’s claim of a surprise attack.
Outside the entrance of Pearl Harbor, the Ward, a World War I four-stacker destroyer, was cruising on patrol, guarding the harbor entrance under the command of its newly appointed skipper, Lieutenant William Outerbridge. This was Outerbridge’s first patrol with the Ward. The responsibility for guarding what was known as the prohibited area, the two square miles covering the harbor’s entrance, was divided with three other old veterans, the USS Chew (DD-106), the USS Schley (DD-103), and the USS Allen (DD-66). And each ship patrolled from Saturday to Saturday.
Their mission was to identify all ships entering this area, which required a monotonous routine of sailing back and forth. Although U.S. submarines entered and left the harbor, they were always surfaced and escorted by a destroyer. But any unidentified vessels entering the area were to be sunk. I
t was now a standing order from Kimmel that any unidentified sub operating in the prohibited area would be attacked because such a presence could signal the approach of an enemy fleet. This, of course, was contrary to FDR’s order that Japan must fire the first shot.
With the approach of such an enemy fleet, Kimmel would promptly dispatch his forces to meet the enemy. But with what? His two carrier task forces were gone and his third carrier was in San Diego.
At 3:42 a.m. in Hawaii and after 9:00 a.m. in Washington, things were starting to stir in the Navy Department, and Colonel Bratton was trying to locate General Marshall. At Pearl Harbor, the minesweeper USS Condor (AMC-14) signaled the Ward that it had identified the periscope of a submerged submarine fifty yards off its bow, headed for the entrance of the harbor. The periscope was leaving its telltale feather of white water, revealing its direction. The Ward immediately went to general quarters, signaling the crew to prepare for battle. The object disappeared and no sound contact was made. At about 5:00 a.m., the submarine net gate at the entrance to Pearl Harbor opened to allow the Condor to enter. Following some distance behind was the Antares, a stores cargo ship returning from Canton Island. As the Ward observed the passage of the Antares, both its helmsman and officer of the deck identified the conning tower of a submarine attempting to follow the Antares into the harbor. Lieutenant Outerbridge was recalled to the bridge. The crew was still keyed up from the first sighting.
At 6:40, the ship went back to general quarters, and at 6:45, at a distance of one hundred yards, the No. 1 gun fired America’s first shot of World War II. It missed. The No. 3 gun, another four-inch rifle, fired the second round that hit dead-on, and the sub disappeared. The sub’s two-man crew would be the first official casualties in America’s new war. In addition, a PBY that had observed it all dropped depth charges, along with the Ward. The Ward immediately sent a message to the Fourteenth Naval District: “We have attacked, fired upon, and dropped depth charges upon sub operating in defensive area.”14