by James Johns
Virtually overnight, Japan had removed all of the obstacles that could prevent her conquest of the western Pacific. Rarely has history witnessed such devastating success over such a large geographic area in such a short amount of time: the American battleships at Pearl Harbor, the U.S. offensive air power in the Philippines, and the British sea power in Malaya. The Japanese success, however, would prove to be her downfall in the strategic decision to expand on her lightning achievements. Japan attempted to broaden the Japanese Empire to include Midway, the Aleutians, India, and Australia as buffers for her dominion, but her enemies would not allow the conquest to continue, and the tides of the Pacific war would start to turn.
On December 8, 1941, FDR asked Congress for a declaration of war on Japan only. Unbelievably, Hitler postponed declaring war on the United States until December 11 because he wanted it to coincide with a speech he was going to deliver to the Reichstag, where he would hurl accusations and insults at FDR personally, blaming him for virtually everything that had taken place so far in the war. Hitler declared that Roosevelt, backed by the millionaires and the Jews, was a man of no conscience. He told members of the Reichstag that the Japanese had been trying to negotiate with this man for years and had finally given up.
Following Hitler’s notification of war with the United States, Congress responded with a declaration of war with Germany on December 12, 1941.
In the not-too-distant future, the Battle of Midway would be a disaster difficult for the Japanese to comprehend. Within just six months of the Pearl Harbor attack, four of the six Japanese carriers employed in the attack, the Akagi, the Kaga, the Soryu, and the Hiryu, would go to the bottom of the ocean during their attack on Midway. Along with those pilots lost, many more would be lost in the defense of the Solomons. And with little or no reserves, this meant the end of Japanese sea power. The military manpower that remained lacked the needed combat skills, and they would become easy pickings for American air and sea power.
Through correspondence with Japanese veterans, the author learned that by the 1980s, of the 765 Japanese airmen in the sky over Oahu, only eighteen were still alive. By comparison, of the sixty-one American airmen to get airborne over Oahu that Sunday morning, forty were still alive.
There is no doubt that December 7, 1941, provided for Americans the incentive to produce planes, ships, tanks, and guns on a scale unimaginable just two years before. Pearl Harbor had galvanized the will and determination of the nation to ensure American victory under the slogan, “Remember Pearl Harbor.”
Kimmel and Short, however, would be left with the image of failure in their Hawaiian commands. General Short would pass away in 1949 and Admiral Kimmel in 1968, while both were still carrying the burden of Pearl Harbor on their shoulders.
Chapter 10
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Aftermath and Investigations
Within forty-eight hours of the attack on Pearl Harbor, Navy Secretary Frank Knox suggested to the president that Knox himself should go to Hawaii to see for himself what had happened and to determine who was responsible for the unpreparedness of the Hawaiian forces. Now that the country was officially at war, the administration hoped to head off any congressional investigation that could be embarrassing. By December 10, he was on his way, accompanied by his aide and two staff members. When their PB2Y Coronado departed North Island, San Diego, it was loaded down with medical supplies for Hawaii.
While they were en route, Guam had also fallen to the Japanese, and Kimmel was convinced that Wake Island would be next unless he could get his planned relief expedition launched immediately. With a distance of two thousand miles, there was no time to lose.
Upon landing in Kaneohe Bay, Knox was taken by all of the devastation. Kimmel assured Knox that it wouldn’t have happened if he had had any warning and that presently, there was still danger of another attack. Knox retorted, “Did you get Saturday night the dispatch the navy department sent out?”1 Kimmel responded that he had received nothing since the November 27 alert. Knox replied, “Well, we sent you one.”2 The same question was asked individually to Kimmel’s staff members, all of whom knew only of the Marshall warning on Sunday afternoon that had arrived too late. Knox had apparently assumed that the president’s statement, “This means war,” would have been followed with a war warning, an assumption he made after attending the war council meeting late Saturday night on December 6.
In just thirty-two hours that included meetings with General Short and the Hawaiian territorial governor, Joseph Poindexter, Knox felt that he had gathered enough to report back to the president. (It was Governor Poindexter who, after the attack on Pearl Harbor, declared martial law, allowing the U.S. military to take over.) While in Hawaii, Knox had approved Kimmel’s Wake Island operation and understood that a premature removal of Kimmel would sacrifice the mission. The first Japanese attack on Wake, just hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor, had failed, and they were reorganizing for the main thrust. Japan would now have to mount a much larger force to be able to finish the job. On a daily basis, Americans read of the island’s heroic resistance. This would certainly vindicate Kimmel’s plan to strengthen the island. No other commander could launch an expedition in time. Saving Wake Island could also save Kimmel’s prestige and inspire a reputation as an aggressive commander.
In his report to the president, Knox was of the opinion that any blame for the success of the attack had to be shared equally between Kimmel and Short. The bulk of the blame, however, laid in the denial of U.S. Magic intelligence, as well as the lack of patrol aircraft and antiaircraft guns. He acknowledged that there had been “a lack of a state of readiness against such an air attack”3 but also that neither of the Hawaiian commanders “had been privy to the Magic intercepts.”4 In his conclusion, Knox stated that “several factors were beyond the responsibility of the two commanders: Japanese fifth columnists and inadequate fighter planes and anti-aircraft guns.”5 This meant that Washington had failed. Knox realized that Kimmel would have to be relieved because his name was now associated with the disaster, but not before the Wake Island operation. Knox also recommended the creation of an official board of inquiry to investigate the attack. Next, he proposed realignment within the navy, creating the position of commander in chief of the U.S. Fleet, to be filled by Admiral King, currently the Atlantic Fleet commander, thus reducing the authority of Admiral Stark’s role as chief of naval operations.
President Roosevelt, on December 16, made the arguable decision to replace Kimmel, Short, and General Frederick Martin, effective immediately, rather than allowing them to continue with their wartime leadership roles while they were the subjects of an investigation. Was Roosevelt assuming guilt before the facts were even in?
At a press conference convened to answer America’s demand to know what had happened at Pearl Harbor, Knox assured the American people, “In the Navy’s greatest hour of peril, the officers and men of the fleet exhibited magnificent courage and resourcefulness.”6 Then came the blow that “the services were not on the alert against surprise attack.”7 He continued that the president was going to commence a complete investigation, and that no action would be taken against the Hawaiian commanders until “the facts and recommendations made by this investigating board,”8 meaning the Roberts Commission, were in. Didn’t the fact that the commanders were immediately relieved of their duties automatically imply their guilt to the American people?
The president’s choice would be the investigative board consisting of two army officers and two navy officers, presided over by Justice Owen Roberts, an associate justice of the Supreme Court. How could a justice of the Supreme Court preside over a kangaroo court that would predetermine guilt before the investigation had even opened?
Justice Owen Roberts had established his reputation during the 1920s when he was appointed by the U.S. Attorney General’s office to investigate the bribery that had taken place during the Teapot Dome Scandal. President Herbert Hoover was so impressed with his work that he later appointed R
oberts to the Supreme Court in 1930. Although Roberts was the only Republican serving on the court during World War II, he believed in broader government powers, and as an interventionist, he became one of Roosevelt’s strongest supporters in the aid to Britain and U.S. involvement in the war. As journalist and political commentator John Flynn would write in 1945, even though Justice Roberts was a Republican, Roosevelt’s appointment of Roberts to head the investigation “was a master stroke. What the public overlooked was that Roberts had been one of the most clamorous among those screaming for an open declaration of war.”9 And because of this, Flynn said that Roberts could be counted on not to “cast any stain upon it in its infancy.”10
The four members of the commission constituted a stacked deck: Major General Frank McCoy, a trusted aide of General Marshall; Brigadier General Joseph McNarney of the Army Air Corps, ambitious and desperate for promotion, who was also recommended by Marshall; Admiral William Standley, a former chief of naval operations; and Rear Admiral Joseph Reeves, who had left retirement to preside over the navy’s involvement with Lend-Lease. With the exception of Standley, the others all owed favors to the administration.
Sitting on the sidelines with the rest of America was former President Hoover, who had been a good friend of General McCoy’s. When McCoy was appointed to the Roberts Commission, Hoover dropped him a note to congratulate him. And at the same time, he asked McCoy if the State Department had adequately warned the Hawaiian commanders of the potential repercussions of the Hull Note. Hoover added, “Now the only reason why I write this is the feeling that some Admiral or some General in the Pacific may be made a goat for action or lack of action higher up, and thus a great injustice done.”11
The provost marshal of the Roberts Commission, a Marine colonel, had little legal experience, and the court recorder had no experience of any sort. Secretaries Knox and Stimson held an initial meeting with the members of the Roberts Commission to predetermine their mission and to set the guidelines for the investigation. Specifically, no fault could be found with Washington. As Roberts would later testify during the joint congressional investigation of 1945–46, his role was not to question the president or his cabinet members, but to limit the investigation to the army and navy only.
The investigation convened before all members of the commission were even present. Admiral Standley had been delayed en route to Washington, and interviewing had commenced in his absence even before determining the guidelines. Three days were devoted to interviews in Washington, which were meaningless as no guilt was to be cast on those at the Capitol.
The commission then moved to Hawaii, where they installed themselves at the Royal Hawaiian Hotel. Anyone was invited to testify. The atmosphere was anything but that of a legal environment. Principles of justice were totally disregarded, and unbelievably, Admiral Kimmel and General Short were denied the benefit of counsel. Nor were they allowed to hear the testimony of other witnesses. They not only could not cross-examine any witnesses, but they had absolutely no idea of what the evidence was.
Rear Admiral Theobald was permitted to assist because Kimmel was not allowed counsel. He would later write that not only were the defendants unable to defend themselves, the hired recorder staff was so inept that when Kimmel’s testimony was shown to him for verification, it was full of errors, and in some cases, passages were unintelligible. Kimmel’s documentation was not identified, and significant sections of his testimony had even been omitted. Questions and their respective answers made absolutely no sense. How could a commission with these standards be placed in a position with the authority to judge?
Kimmel and Theobald spent two days trying to restore some degree of accuracy to Kimmel’s testimony, and when they were finished, they submitted it to the recorder, who advised them that no changes would be authorized. Attempts to explain that these were not changes, but corrections to clarify the record, a record that was inaccurate and incomprehensible, fell on deaf ears. They now submitted the corrections to Admiral Standley, who told them, again, that no changes could be made. But Standley relented to the point of allowing notations of the errors to be placed in an appendix. It was stressed to no avail that it would be far more difficult for a reader to reconstruct Kimmel’s testimony if he had to continually refer to an appendix, but there would be no reconsideration.
Standley insisted that nothing could be done, as Justice Roberts would not alter his decision. Admiral Theobald reiterated that all Kimmel was looking for was that he be treated in the same manner as he would be in a military court. What was the purpose of the commission if its four members couldn’t overrule the chairman’s decision? It was clear that Justice Roberts was calling all the shots. Admiral Standley’s answer to Theobald’s concerns was surprisingly blunt: “Admiral Kimmel and you are under no illusions about what is going to happen to him as a result of this investigation, are you?”12 Theobald acquiesced that the verdict was in before the jury had even deliberated.
When Admiral Kimmel and General Short were charged with failing to consult with one another on the November 27 war warning and for not changing the existing plans to meet the impending attack, Theobald stressed that these charges were unfounded because they did not specifically indicate what the “orders, warnings [and] plans”13 were. As Kimmel would later explain:
The conflicting and confusing orders sent to General Short and to me is best illustrated by the indictments in the findings of the Commission which states that General Short and I did not consult as to the meaning of the warning messages received. Aside from the fact that we did confer both before and after the receipt of the message, it is a strange doctrine that would require the admiral commanding the Pacific Fleet to consult with the commanding general at Hawaii to determine the meaning of a message from the Chief of Naval Operations and equally ridiculous to require the commanding general at Hawaii to consult with the commander of the Pacific Fleet to determine the meaning of a message sent to him by the Army Chief of Staff. Yet this was the principle indictment used by the Roberts Commission in their attempt to fasten the blame for the Pearl Harbor disaster upon General Short and me. The mere statement that such a consultation was necessary to determine the meaning of an order is an indictment of the agency which originated it.14
In addition, Kimmel could not understand how, in Justice Roberts’s opinion, Magic intercepts were incidental to the investigation. Justice Roberts would later tell the congressional committee of 1945–46 that had such intercepts been presented, he probably would not have read them. How could a thorough investigation of the attack or an accurate allocation of responsibility be made without an understanding of the Magic intercepts, and equally important, of their distribution prior to the event?
When a copy of a particular Pacific Fleet confidential letter was mentioned for reference, not one man on the five-man commission could find it. When Kimmel ordered an additional five copies for the members, the flag secretary informed him that this would make a total of seventeen copies that he had made, an example of the board’s lack of attention to detail. Yet at the same time, while Kimmel and Short were only required to answer questions but not allowed to cross-examine witnesses, they were being assured that they themselves were not on trial, but only serving as witnesses.
At the same time, the commission found no fault in how the secretaries of state and war and the senior military leadership in Washington had fulfilled their duties with respect to Pearl Harbor. Had Washington been included in the one-sided investigation, how could General Marshall and Admiral Stark have avoided charges of denying intelligence to Hawaii and not ordering the activation of the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, unless they themselves were under orders from their commander in chief, the president?
The interviews and testimony moved from the Royal Hawaiian Hotel to Fort Shafter and eventually back to Washington, where one by one, the brass testified that Hawaii had received as much intelligence as Washington had had prior to the attack, attempting to reduce their involvement and
to magnify Hawaii’s errors.
Although the existence of Magic was known to the Roberts Commission, it was totally left out of its report to the president. By the end of January, Justice Roberts had completed the investigation and submitted his report to the president who, upon study, was convinced that there was no evidence of responsibility by the army or navy that could cast a shadow on members of his administration.
The commission’s attempts to persuade Americans that only Kimmel and Short were responsible did not fly with everyone, namely the press. After the conclusions of the Roberts Commission were published, several newspapers protested that further investigation was required. The Washington Times-Herald demanded that Congress “fix due guilt for negligence where it belongs”15; the New York Times wrote that the Roberts Report “seemed too sweeping in exculpating their superiors in Washington from blame and in too easily finding that each of these ‘fulfilled his obligations’”16; and the New York Tribune alleged, “The want of foresight at Pearl Harbor was paralleled higher up.”17 As Admiral Standley, who had served on the Roberts Commission, would later point out, the report did contain true statements, “but the many sins of omission in the picture were omitted from our findings because the President in his executive order setting up the Commission had specifically limited its jurisdiction.”18
It is also interesting to note that during the joint congressional investigation of 1945–46, Justice Owen Roberts had been asked why the printed version of the Roberts Report had amounted to only 1,862 pages when the original, oral version had totaled 1,887 pages.19 He could not justify the discrepancy. Had the American public actually gotten all the facts?