by James Johns
Meanwhile, with the removal of Kimmel, Short, and Martin on December 16, Admiral Pye, Kimmel’s second in command, took temporary command of the Pacific Fleet the following day until its permanent commander, Admiral Chester Nimitz, arrived. Kimmel had been assured that he’d get another command. In his December 29 letter to Kimmel, Admiral Stark wrote, “Don’t worry about our finding duty for you. I value your services as much as I ever did and more and I say this straight from the heart as well as the head.”20 But the handwriting was on the wall, and Kimmel would be forced into retirement within a month. And along with Short, the two became scapegoats for Washington’s failures.
As suspected, Admiral Pye, as temporary commander, was not going to stick his neck out in an attempted reinforcement of Wake Island, which, if it failed, would put him in the same predicament as Kimmel. Reinforcements were to be supplied Wake Island by means of Task Force 11 under the command of Rear Admiral Frank Fletcher. At the center of Fletcher’s task force was the Saratoga, which had been ordered from San Diego the day Pearl Harbor was attacked. Sailing on December 8, and loaded with Grumman fighters, Douglas dive bombers, Douglas torpedo bombers, and Brewster Buffalo fighters, the Saratoga reached Pearl Harbor on December 15. After refueling, it headed for Wake Island on December 16.
Admiral Pye, who was more of an administrative admiral, had served on the staff of the Atlantic Fleet’s commander in chief during most of World War I and had never seen any combat action. Because the wheels had already been put in motion to reinforce Wake Island, Pye had no choice but to go along with the plan. But he had his own plan, which was more conservative. In what would become the most hotly debated issue in the defense of Wake Island, Admiral Pye ordered Admiral Fletcher’s relief force to refuel at sea when it did not need refueling.
It delayed the help that the island desperately needed in its dying throes. On December 23, the day of Wake Island’s surrender to the Japanese, it was still being argued to continue an attack that had already been canceled. Even the seaplane tender Tangier, a Pearl Harbor survivor, would attempt an unescorted sortie to Wake to try to rescue survivors, but this effort, too, was canceled. Just before the island formally surrendered, Pye timed his recall of the task force back to Pearl Harbor. If Kimmel had been allowed to retain his command, for even just another ten days, Wake would have been the Americans’ first victory in the Pacific, later claimed at the Battle of Midway.
Over a year and a half had passed since the Roberts Commission published their conclusions and Kimmel was more determined than ever to clear himself. Toward the end of 1943, he enlisted the services of a retired navy captain, Robert Lavender. Being a patent attorney, Lavender advised Kimmel that he was not qualified to adequately represent him, but he would assist if he could. And instead, he referred Kimmel to a Boston attorney, Charles Rugg, who had served as assistant attorney general during the early 1930s in the Hoover administration. Around the same time, late 1943, Navy Secretary Frank Knox had given Kimmel the approval to review the navy’s records relevant to Pearl Harbor.
Unbeknownst to Kimmel, Captain Safford, who was still with OP-20-G in December 1941, was also doing his homework. Thinking that Kimmel and Short would, at some point, be court-martialed, and thinking he might be called as a witness, he started reviewing the Magic decryption files to refresh his memory. Reviewing the Roberts Commission report as well, he realized what little intelligence had actually been sent to the Pearl Harbor commanders prior to the attack. Understanding now that Kimmel and Short had been scapegoated, he, too, became more determined than ever to set the record straight.
With Knox’s authorization, Robert Lavender, who was assisting Rugg, took on the task of going through the navy records. Although Safford had prompted him on what to look for, Lavender was astounded at the “stack of papers two and a half feet high of intercepted messages.”21 Pulling over forty messages he thought relevant to Kimmel’s defense, he said he had become “nauseated when I realized what the information in my hands would have meant to Kimmel and the men of the Fleet who died.”22 Lavender shared the information later on with Edward Hanify, another attorney assigned to Kimmel’s defense team. Hanify described his disgust, wondering “why the highest leaders of the government of the United States reading the most secret designs of their potential enemy would keep this material from trusting and loyal commanders at the distant, lonely, and inadequately protected bastions of defense with the lives of my fellow citizens in the armed forces at risk.”23
By February of 1944, the demands of the war were still all-consuming. In the effort to head off any statute of limitations involving court-martials, and to avoid any loss of evidence, Admiral Thomas Hart, former Asiatic Fleet commander now retired, was called by Secretary Knox to gather information to keep the Pearl Harbor issue open until the army and navy could conduct their own inquiries. Hart and his command had experienced the shock waves of Pearl Harbor, and he would make no conclusions or recommendations. As most of Kimmel and Short’s immediate staff and subordinate personnel were sent overseas immediately after the attack, where they would not be available for comment or testimony, it would be important to have such a record if need be. It was during the Hart Investigation of 1944 that Admiral Turner, in his testimony, would defend the inactions of Washington, stating that it was the policy of the chief of naval operations “not to nag on matters of that sort,”24 justifying the few messages sent to Hawaii concerning the Japanese communications.
It would take an act of Congress to ensure that the scapegoating of Kimmel and Short was not buried. While Roosevelt supporters opposed any additional investigations during wartime, let alone during the upcoming election, there were sufficient Republicans and anti–New Deal Democrats to pass a joint resolution which led to the organization of the Army Pearl Harbor Board and the Navy Court of Inquiry.
The Army Pearl Harbor Board convened from July through mid–October of 1944 with the only limitation of this investigation being that the board was “not authorized to criticize Mr. Roosevelt.”25 The purpose of this board was to determine if the army shared any responsibility for the disaster at Pearl Harbor. There were three general officers on the board, of which Lieutenant General George Grunert was the president. Grunert had previously commanded the Philippine Department, and was currently serving as deputy chief of staff of the Army Service Forces. He had served a long and distinguished career and knew the Far East. Also on the board were Major General Henry Russell and Major General Walter Frank. Russell held a law degree and had been in the army since 1916, when he enlisted in the National Guard. Frank had previously served as an air commander at Headquarters Hawaiian Department at Fort Shafter from 1938 to 1940.
The findings of this board shifted part of the responsibility of the Pearl Harbor attack to Washington, lifting some of the blame from General Short, concluding:
The Chief of Staff of the Army, General George C. Marshall, failed in his relations with the Hawaiian Department in the following particulars:
A. To keep the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department fully advised of the growing tenseness of the Japanese situation which indicated an increasing necessity for better preparation for war, of which information he had an abundance and Short had little.
B. To send additional instructions to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department on November 28, 1941, when evidently he failed to realize the import of General Short’s reply of November 27th, which indicated clearly that General Short had misunderstood and misconstrued the message of November 27 (472) and had not adequately alerted his command for war.
C. To get General Short on the evening of December 6th and the early morning of December 7th, the critical information indicating an almost immediate break with Japan, though there was ample time to have accomplished this.
D. To investigate and determine the state of readiness of the Hawaiian Command between November 27 and December 7, 1941, despite the impending threat of war.26
But Marshall would not stand alone
, and the board would also find:
The record shows that from informers and other sources the War Department had complete and detailed information of Japanese intentions. Information of the evident Japanese intention to go to war in the very near future was well known to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Chief of Naval Operations. It was not a question of fact; it was only a question of time. The next few days would see the end of peace and the beginning of war.
If it be assumed that for any reason the information could not have been given to the Hawaiian Department, then it was the responsibility of the War Department to give orders to Short what to do, and to tell him to go on an all-out alert instead of a sabotage alert.
As elsewhere related in detail, when vital information of December 6th reached G-2 of the War Department, not later than nine o’clock the evening of December 6, it was placed in the locked pouch and delivered to the Secretary of the General Staff, Colonel Bedell Smith, now Lt. General Smith, with a warning from Colonel Bratton, Chief of the Far Eastern Section of G-2, that it contained a vitally important message. In fact, the message implied war and soon. Whatever was the reason of Colonel Bedell Smith for not conveying the message to General Marshall on the night of December 6th it was an unfortunate one. And further, with the top War Department officials fully aware of the critical nature of the situation, standing operating procedure should have required the delivery of this vital information to General Marshall at once. He, himself was responsible for the organization and operation of his own immediate office.
This information could have been sent to Short on the afternoon (Honolulu Time) of December 6. Additionally, this same information was given to General Gerow’s Executive, Colonel Gailey, of the War Plans Division, and there’s no evidence of action taken by that Division.
The responsibility of the War Department is clearly defined and plain. Action by it would have been sufficient further to have alerted the Hawaiian Department. It was in possession of the information which was the last clear chance to use the means available to meet an attack. It had the background of the full development of the Japanese preparation for war and its probable date.
Again, the equally important and vital information of December 7th, the day of the attack, was in the possession of the War Department at 0900 on the morning of December 7. Under the circumstances where information has a vital bearing upon actions to be taken by field commanders, and this information cannot be disclosed by the War Department to its field commanders, it is incumbent upon the War Department then to assume the responsibility for specific directions to the theater commanders. This is an exception to the admirable policy of the War Department of decentralized and complete responsibility upon the competent field commanders.
Short got neither form of assistance from the War Department. The disaster of Pearl Harbor would have been eliminated to the extent that its defenses were available on December 7 if alerted in time. The difference between alerting these defenses in time by a directive from the War Department based upon this information and the failure to alert them is a difference for which the War Department is responsible….
The War Department had the information. All they had to do was either to give it to Short or give him directions based upon it.27
The board did find that Short had failed to place his command on a higher state of alert; to implement the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan; to stay informed to the extent of the navy’s long-range reconnaissance; and finally, to replace inefficient staff officers.
General Short had held a high reputation in the army, and many colleagues felt that his failure to appreciate the situation was, in itself, the obvious proof that he did not have sufficient information.
Although the board was under orders not to directly criticize the president, such findings of his General Staff and the War Department itself would automatically include him. After all, he had continuously been advised of Japanese actions and intentions and had been briefed on all intelligence being sent to Hawaii.
And where the Roberts Commission did not have access to Magic in its deliberations, the Army Board did. By the end of their investigation, this board interviewed 151 witnesses in Washington, Hawaii, and San Francisco.28
The Navy Court of Inquiry also convened from July until October 1944 and consisted of three retired admirals: Admirals Orin Murfin, Edward Kalbfus, and Adolphus Andrews. The court’s president, Murfin, had commanded the Asiatic Fleet, Fourteenth Naval District, and the Pearl Harbor Naval Yard. Kalbus’s commands had mostly been at sea, but he presently presided over the Naval War College. Andrews’s commands had been at sea and at Pearl Harbor.
Kimmel’s intelligence officer, then Captain Edwin Layton, would later detail how the navy inquiry completely exonerated Admiral Kimmel. The Navy Court of Inquiry determined that Kimmel and Short had adequately consulted with one another, and that each of them was “informed of the measures being undertaken by the other in defense of the Base to a degree sufficient for all useful purposes.”29 Layton emphasized, “Kimmel’s plan of defense was held to be ‘sound’ but it depended on ‘advance knowledge that an attack was to be expected.’”30 And considering the limited amount of intelligence Kimmel had at hand, as well as the few planes he had available, he did conduct the long-distance reconnaissance that fit within these limitations.
It was during the Navy Court of Inquiry that Admiral Turner also admitted that he thought the Japanese attack was a very strong likelihood and that he was fully aware that Kimmel did not have an adequate number of planes to perform the necessary long-distance reconnaissance. When asked if he had discussed these concerns with the chief of naval operations, he sidestepped the question, but admitted that more planes could have lessened the losses.
Now the Navy Court of Inquiry criticized Admiral Stark. He was admonished for sending a war warning that, without additional information, did not even closely resemble the full picture that Washington had of the situation. It was Stark who had “failed to display the sound judgment expected of him in that he did not transmit to Admiral Kimmel … important information which he had regarding the Japanese situation.”31 He was also reprimanded for failing to pass on to Hawaii information that was given him, particularly that which he had on the morning of December 7. The board further concluded that in no way could the attack have been prevented, nor could the timing have been predicted, and as a result, no further actions against other naval officers would be considered.
Certainly the secretaries of both services as well as the chiefs themselves were not elated with the army and navy boards’ findings, as the blame for Pearl Harbor had just shifted from Hawaii to Washington. In essence, the inquiry had established two categories for their findings, classifying any material dealing with Magic or general intelligence, and that of non-classified information that could be released to the public.
Admiral Kimmel’s attorney, Charles Rugg, immediately wrote to Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal, who had been appointed after the death of Frank Knox in May of 1944:
I request immediate release of findings of Navy Court of Inquiry as to innocence or guilt of Admiral Kimmel. For nearly three years he has borne public blame for Pearl Harbor disaster. He has requested and been denied court martial. His treatment has been un–American. In your letter to Admiral Murfin released to press on October 20 you intimate that facts, now three years old, found by Naval Court may be withheld as “secret” or “top secret” on ground disclosure would interfere with the war effort. Certainly release of findings of court as to Kimmel’s innocence or guilt cannot affect war. Past injustices cannot now be remedied. Simple justice and common decency require immediate public announcement of courts finding as to Kimmel’s innocence or guilt.32
While Forrestal agreed with Rugg, it was now the chief of naval operations, Admiral King, who had replaced Admiral Stark in March 1942, who interceded. (Admiral Stark had been transferred in April to Br
itain, where he became commander of the U.S. naval forces of the European theater of operations.) Admiral King demanded that all of the findings be considered classified, presumably on the basis that Magic secrecy must be preserved. And he personally questioned the findings of the inquiry, even though he later admitted that he hadn’t read them. This would eliminate any possibility that the public would ever see the findings of the inquiry, not only to preserve the secret of Pearl Harbor, but to also avoid any discredit to the administration just prior to the November 1944 election.
Although the army and navy boards had completed their investigations by the fourth week of October, it was not until November 6 that Navy Secretary Forrestal and War Secretary Stimson got together to discuss what would be released to the press. While Stimson would endorse the Army Board’s findings, Forrestal would waver concerning the Navy Court’s findings. Roosevelt’s response to the Army Board’s finding was, “This is wicked,”33 adding that any steps possible had to be taken to keep the conclusions out of the papers. It would not be until the end of November that Stimson and Forrestal agreed to a watered-down release, approved by Roosevelt, and the findings were finally published on December 1, 1944.
The delays in publishing the reports served Roosevelt’s political agenda well, as such a revelation of the board’s conclusions would have almost certainly removed him from office. The American public would not know when they went to the polls on November 7 that “the Army Pearl Harbor Board and the Navy Inquiry had just placed the burden of blame for Pearl Harbor, not on Kimmel and Short, but on Washington.”34 And there had been more intrigue in the weeks leading up to the election.