by James Johns
For years, the United States Navy never admitted that they had broken Japan’s JN-25 code. OP-20-G, the navy’s intelligence and cryptanalysis group, had been reading it since at least October 1941. Perhaps the reason for their denial is the fact that the Japanese used this code to transmit the final instructions to the Kido Butai to attack Pearl Harbor. The navy wasn’t running the navy; the president was. This then raises many more interesting questions. Did Washington know even Japan’s last-minute orders? The code was never mentioned in any of the prior investigations. The first reference to it was during the congressional hearings, where it was quickly dropped.
Essentially, and to no surprise, the congressional hearings reversed the army and navy boards’ findings and absolved Washington, the president and his cabinet, of negligence relating to the Pearl Harbor attack. They concluded that the attack itself was unprovoked and that U.S. policy would not have justified it. In fact, the president and his cabinet had gone out of their way to avoid war. The disaster was the result of Hawaiian leadership. Washington’s warnings were not heeded, which was the result of errors of judgment—not dereliction of duty. However, they conceded that War Plans had failed to advise Short of his misinterpretation of the war warning of November 27. They further conceded that intelligence operations had failed to comprehend the significance of the bomb plot messages, and finally to properly monitor the Sunday, 12:00 (noon) warning to Pearl Harbor to ensure its timely arrival in Hawaii. All of these points were well clear of presidential responsibility.
Their conclusion that the president did nothing to invite war is not borne out by the American stranglehold on the Japanese economy, implementing trade embargos in conjunction with Great Britain and the Netherlands East Indies; nor is the conclusion borne out by the Ten Point Note of November 26 that demanded that Japan surrender China and get out of French Indochina. The committee’s conclusions had fulfilled its purpose 100 percent: the absolution of the president and his cabinet. The rallying cry, “Remember Pearl Harbor,” would for some take on a new meaning: deception, connivance, conspiracy, manipulation, cover-up, frame, and devise.
Even Justice Owen Roberts would admit in 1946 that he had not been provided all the information that Washington had had in their hands prior to the attack. Without correct evidence, he had been trying to build an incorrect image of actual events. He conceded that the request for him to preside over a committee convened, not to decide a case of law under the Constitution, but instead over a kangaroo court that involved no attorneys or due process, was a request he should have refused.
Washington’s admission of guilt over the mishandling of the bomb plot message, requesting the types of ships and their berthing locations in Pearl Harbor, leaves no room for surprise that Pearl Harbor was targeted. And all of Roosevelt’s cabinet members would acknowledge that the Ten Point Note, in lieu of a modus vivendi, was the trigger for attack. And finally, Lieutenant Schulz’s testimony alone refutes those who denied delivery of the thirteen-part message to FDR and his staff on Saturday night, removing any sound reasoning for not notifying Hawaii by Sunday morning, when they still had the chance. And yet, the majority of the joint congressional committee refused to assign any responsibility to the White House.
Admiral Harry Yarnell, who had commanded the Pearl Harbor naval base during the late 1930s, summed up the whole Pearl Harbor affair quite accurately:
The most disgraceful feature of the whole affair was the evident determination on the part of Washington to fasten the blame on the Hawaiian commanders. The incomplete and one-sided Roberts report, the circumstances of the retirements of Kimmel and Short, the attempts of the War and Navy Departments to deny access to the intercepted messages by the Naval Court of Inquiry and the Army Board of Investigation, the appointment of secret one-man boards to continue investigations, and finally, the inability of the Joint Congressional Committee to secure access to pertinent files, constitute a blot on our national history.44
To hold Admiral Kimmel and General Short completely accountable for the attack on Pearl Harbor belies the American justice system, not simply because of the evidence that has been uncovered since 1941, but also because of the biased manner in which the numerous investigations were conducted.
Withholding evidence and denying testimonies in today’s world would not be tolerated. The injustices that Kimmel and Short were served in most of the investigations, and a review of the facts today, clearly warrant the exonerations that so many Americans believed were due.
What is equally questionable is the treatment afforded another military officer of similar rank, General Douglas MacArthur. Even with sufficient warning of enemy attack, his indecision and miscalculations in the Philippines would send tens of thousands of troops to Japanese POW camps or to their deaths, and nearly his entire air force would be destroyed. Yet it is MacArthur who went on to be awarded the Medal of Honor within a matter of months of his departure from the Philippines, and it is MacArthur who would go down in history as one of the greatest American military leaders. It would fall to the next president, Harry Truman, to finally end MacArthur’s military career. In April 1951, Truman fired MacArthur because of the manner in which he was handling the war in Korea.
What would also taint MacArthur’s reputation later on was the $500,000 he was paid by President Quezon of the Philippines, supposedly for MacArthur’s prewar efforts on Quezon’s behalf. President Roosevelt and Secretary Stimson were aware of the payment, but turned a blind eye to it.
General MacArthur died in 1964. And in the late 1970s, it was confirmed that the Chase National Bank of New York had accepted a payment of $500,000 in February of 1942, perhaps $5 million in today’s values, which was deposited into the personal account of General MacArthur by President Quezon. The administration in Washington wanted Quezon evacuated after their move to Corregidor, and MacArthur argued that it was too dangerous to try to get him out of the country. Had the payment offered by Quezon changed his mind?
Quezon and his family were evacuated by way of U.S. submarine on February 20, 1942, one day after Chase National Bank confirmed receipt of the funds by MacArthur. And this payment was made at a time when the Philippine economy was being bled for their war effort.
It was historian Carol Petillo, while working toward her doctoral degree in the late 1970s, who uncovered confirmation of the payment among General Richard Sutherland’s papers located in the National Archives. Among them was Quezon’s “Executive Order No. 1” directing total payments of $640,000 to MacArthur and his staff. In addition to MacArthur’s payment, Sutherland received $75,000, and two other payments of $45,000 and $20,000 went to Brigadier General Richard Marshall, Jr., MacArthur’s deputy chief of staff, and to Lieutenant Colonel Sidney Huff, MacArthur’s personal aide, respectively.45
Although the payoffs were against U.S. Army regulation, MacArthur had no reservations about taking the money while the islands were being overrun because of his continuous fumbles. In addition to the $500,000, MacArthur demanded $35,000 in personal expenses, dated December 28, 1941, during the final collapse of Manila.46 The Roosevelt administration was so desperate for heroes that when Chase notified the War Department in February 1942 of the payments, the response to Chase was to complete the transactions. And among all the medals and honors MacArthur boasted about throughout the rest of his life, he never discussed the Quezon reward.
There are some who believe that Mac was paid off not to respond to the initial Japanese attacks, hopefully to convince the Japanese that the Philippines preferred to remain neutral. It possibly explains his refusal to empty warehouses of food and supplies in Manila for transport to Bataan as required by WPO-3 until it was too late; or his refusal to fire upon Japanese-occupied towns because they might harm civilians; or his personal demand requiring his approval for all actions taken in the field by the lower commanders.
MacArthur’s credibility would be questioned by many. One example is provided in the diaries of General Brereton, which were published in
1946. Although Brereton is respectful toward MacArthur, he details the events prior to and during the Philippine attack that depict MacArthur’s passive leadership in a time of crisis. The day the book went on sale, MacArthur issued another of his now famous press releases stating that Brereton’s diary was all lies. He had never heard of Brereton asking permission to bomb Formosa, which would have failed with no fighter support. Yet on December 9, with half of his air force destroyed on the ground, he had told Washington that he was ordering just such a raid. It was quite apparent that MacArthur had prematurely embarrassed himself by condemning Brereton, who had refused to criticize MacArthur’s leadership.
Years later, General Eisenhower, who had been MacArthur’s aide for seven long years, and who had turned down money offered by President Quezon, commented that Mac was neither above nor below anything. Quezon had also offered Eisenhower a payment of $60,000, but Eisenhower had the foresight to understand the potential implications of a payoff.
American history has proven over and over again that politics and truth do not go hand in hand. And in the case of Pearl Harbor, it is a disgrace that two dedicated military officers who were only trying to serve their country paid the price with the loss of their reputations and utter humiliation. Considering all the evidence that has come to light over the last seventy years, there was far more going on behind the scenes that Kimmel and Short simply had no control over. Providing Hawaii with the needed aircraft for both defense and reconnaissance, and providing the commanders with the Magic decrypts that would have enabled them to prepare for the impending attack, could have changed the outcome considerably. But those decisions were all being made in Washington, and more specifically, by the administration.
A 1990s meeting of the Minnesota Pearl Harbor survivors. The author is at far left.
Many Americans hold that Franklin Delano Roosevelt was the greatest president of the twentieth century. For some, it may be difficult to consider that he intentionally provoked the Japanese to attack Pearl Harbor. Historian Robert Stinnett points out that the entire presidency of Franklin Roosevelt should not be judged solely on the disaster at Pearl Harbor. One could agree with that assessment had Roosevelt’s decisions been honest mistakes or simply poor judgment. But to understand that his decisions were based clearly on his deception at the risk of so many lives, as well as the reputations of others, casts a pall over his presidency and leadership abilities that, hopefully, history will not forget.
Information uncovered since 1941 points to a truth that was not provided the American people or Congress at the time of the attack, that a much greater plan had been laid down long before December 7, 1941. And after the attack, those in Washington simply needed to distance themselves from the actual events as they occurred. Isn’t it time now for Americans to put the responsibility for the attack on Pearl Harbor where it belongs?
Chapter Notes
Introduction
1. Robert B. Stinnett, Day of Deceit (New York: Free Press, 2000), 219.
2. John Toland, Infamy: Pearl Harbor and Its Aftermath (New York: A Berkley Book, 1983), 133.
Chapter 1
1. Terence McComas, Pearl Harbor: Fact and Reference Book, Everything to Know About December 7, 1941 (Honolulu: Mutual Publishing, 1991), 52–53.
2. Carl Smith, Pearl Harbor (Oxford: Osprey, 2001), 90.
3. Ibid., 91.
4. McComas, Pearl Harbor: Fact and Reference Book, 122.
5. Smith, Pearl Harbor, 54.
6. Deborah Bachrach, Pearl Harbor: Great Mysteries, Opposing Viewpoints (San Diego: Greenhaven Press, 1989), 10.
7. Edwin T. Layton, And I Was There: Pearl Harbor and Midway—Breaking the Secrets (New York: William Morrow, 1985), 300.
8. McComas, Pearl Harbor: Fact and Reference Book, 121.
9. Robert A. Theobald, The Final Secret of Pearl Harbor (New York: Devin-Adair, 1954), 8.
10. Lynne Olson, Those Angry Days: Roosevelt, Lindbergh, and America’s Fight Over World War II (New York: Random House, 2013), 425.
11. Roberts Commission, Attack Upon Pearl Harbor By Japanese Armed Forces: Report of the Commission Appointed by the President of the United States to Investigate and Report the Facts Relating to the Attack Made by Japanese Armed Forces Upon Pearl Harbor in the Territory of Hawaii on December 7, 1941 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government, 1942), 1.
12. Ibid., 1.
13. Ibid., 2.
14. Ibid., 2.
15. Ibid., 12.
16. Ibid., 14.
17. Ibid., 14.
18. Ibid., 21.
19. Ibid., 21.
20. Kemp Tolley, Cruise of the Lanikai: Incitement to War (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1973), 273.
Chapter 2
1. John W. Vandercook, “America’s Gibraltar of the Pacific,” Liberty Magazine, December 27, 1941, para. 7.
2. Ibid., para. 21.
3. Ibid., para. 21.
4. Ibid., para. 23.
5. Ibid., para. 25.
6. Thomas Parrish, ed., The Simon & Schuster Encyclopedia of World War II (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1978), 491.
7. Richard Connaughton, MacArthur and Defeat in the Philippines (New York: Overlook Press, 2001), 39.
8. Ibid., 44.
9. Ibid., 73.
10. Louis Morton, The Fall of the Philippines (United States Army in World War II, The War in the Pacific) (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1985), 37.
11. Duane Schultz, Hero of Bataan: The Story of General Jonathan M. Wainwright (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1981), 48.
12. William Bartsch, December 8, 1941: MacArthur’s Pearl Harbor (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2003), 38.
13. Morton, The Fall of the Philippines, 46.
14. Walter D. Edmonds, They Fought with What They Had: The Story of the Army Air Force in the Southwest Pacific, 1941–1942 (Washington, D.C.: Zenger, 1982), 25.
15. Bartsch, December 8, 1941, 59–60.
16. Walter Millis, This Is Pearl! The United States and Japan—1941 (New York: William Morrow, 1947), 32.
17. Ibid., 32.
18. Brian Cull, Buffaloes Over Singapore: RAF, RAAF, RNZAF and Dutch Brewster Fighters in Action Over Malaya and the East Indies 1941–42 (London: Grub Street, 2003), 40.
19. James Leasor, Singapore: The Battle That Changed the World (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1968), 122.
20. W.D. Puleston, The Armed Forces of the Pacific (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1941), 129.
21. Ibid., 129–130.
22. McComas, Pearl Harbor: Fact and Reference Book, 21.
23. Layton, And I Was There, 224.
24. Ibid., 224.
Chapter 3
1. Charles A. Beard, President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War 1941: A Study in Appearances and Realities (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1948), 178.
2. Parrish, ed., The Simon and Schuster Encyclopedia of World War II, 598.
3. U.S. Department of State, Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 1931–1941 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1943), para. 5.
4. Samuel Eliot Morison, The Rising Sun in the Pacific, 1931–April 1942: History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, vol. 3 (Edison, NJ: Castle Books, 2001), 63.
5. Barbara W. Tuchman, Stilwell and the American Experience in China 1911–45 (New York: Macmillan, 1970), 235.
6. Iris Chang, The Rape of Nanking: The Forgotten Holocaust of World War II (New York: BasicBooks, 1997), 148.
7. Conrad Black, Franklin Delano Roosevelt: Champion of Freedom (New York: PublicAffairs, 2003), 428.
8. Frank Knox, Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy for the Fiscal Year 1941 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1941), iii.
9. Ibid., 5.
10. Department of the Army, American Military History 1607–1958 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1959), 373.
11. Millis, This Is Pearl!, 103.
12. Leonard Mosely, Marshall: Hero
for Our Times (New York: Hearst Books, 1982), 148.
13. Millis, This Is Pearl!, 103.
14. Parrish, ed., The Simon and Schuster Encyclopedia of World War II, 560.
15. Jim Dan Hill, The Minute Man in Peace and War: A History of the National Guard (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole, 1964), 373.
16. Millis, This Is Pearl!, 104.
17. Black, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, 281.
18. Department of the Army, American Military History 1607–1958, 369.
19. Olson, Those Angry Days, 227.
20. Robert H. Jackson, Opinion on Exchange of Over-Age Destroyers for Naval and Air Bases (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Attorney General, 1940), para. 19.
21. Ibid., para. 11.
22. Layton, And I Was There, 87.
Chapter 4
1. Stinnett, Day of Deceit, 34.
2. Ibid., 35.
3. Ibid., 34.
4. Ibid., 36.
5. Ibid., 85.
6. Toland, Infamy, 8.
7. Millis, This Is Pearl!, 62.
8. Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, Congress of the United States, Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1946), 983.
9. Ibid., 988.
10. Smith, Pearl Harbor, 53, 60.
11. Millis, This Is Pearl!, 63.