Return to Capitalism

by William Northwall

  This doesn’t mean that the Sunni Arab states, which are America’s traditional allies, like the Russians’ choice. But they understand it. What they don’t understand is the frightening strategy their longtime protector is pursuing. The result is that a traditional U.S. ally like Saudi Arabia had felt obliged to take risky actions in self-defense, such as executing a Shiite cleric last month, and intervening in Yemen’s civil war by backing the Sunni-led government against the Shiite Houthis favored by Tehran.

  Most Middle Easterners regard ISIS as abhorrent and want to see it obliterated. But ISIS is not the root problem. The real problem of the Middle East stems from the failure of the post-World War II Arab state system, which has produced state collapse, power vacuums and civil wars, such as those raging in Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Yemen.

  These wars have now spilled over on to their neighbors in massive refugee flows, terrorism, wide-spread radicalization, cross-border violence, economic dislocation and the specter of a region wide Sunni-Shiite conflict. This destabilizing spillover now threatens Europe’s and America’s national interests—and the main threat is the region’s civil wars.

  Such conflicts invariably spawn extremist groups like ISIS and al Qaeda. ISIS was born (initially as al Qaeda in Iraq) after civil war broke out in Iraq. The group was brought to the brink of extinction when the U.S. finally succeeded in ending the Iraqi civil war in 2007-10, only to escape and revive into civil war in 2011. ISIS and al Qaeda have since grown and spread across the region, but effectively only to states in civil war or on the brink—Syria, Yemen, Libya, Mali, Somalia, Egypt, and once again, Iraq.

  Even if the U.S. could “defeat” or “degrade” ISIS, as long as civil wars burn in the region, the conditions that led to its emergence would still exist, and new radical groups would simply emerge to replace it. End civil wars, and the terrorist groups will wither.

  Moreover, civil wars can be contagious. One of the best indicators that any country will experience a civil war is if it borders a country in a civil war already. The longer conflicts continue in Iraq, Syria, Yemen and Libya, the more likely they will destabilize their neighbors. Jordan, Lebanon, Tunisia, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait are already experiencing violent unrest, while nascent civil wars are catching fire in Turkey, Egypt and South Sudan.

  What should the U.S. do? The history of civil wars since 1945 provides clear lessons that current policy is ignoring.

  Contrary to common wisdom, it is possible for an external power to extinguish someone else’s civil war. Since 1945, over 20% of the approximately 150 civil wars have ended in negotiated settlements. That number increased to nearly 40% after 1991, as in the Balkans, Mozambique, Cambodia and El Salvador, in part because the international community learned how to facilitate such settlements.

  We now know that negotiating an early end to a civil war involves three things: (1) shifting the military dynamics to a situation where none of the warring factions believes it can win an outright victory and all believe they can safely lay down their arms; (2) forging a power-sharing arrangement among all of the rival groups that ensures an equitable distribution of political power and economic benefits, couple with guarantees against the oppression of minorities; and (3) putting in place institutions (external or internal) capable of ensuring that the first two conditions endure.

  This approach is what the U.S. achieved in Bosnia and (temporarily) in Iraq. But it will only work if it is properly resourced and deliberately pursued. External interventions that don’t employ this approach or don’t employ enough resources to make it plausible not only fail, but also tend to make the conflict (and its spillover) worse.

  The problem is that the Obama administration is not pursuing this settlement approach in either Iraq or Syria. The sketchy cease-fire in Syria announced late last week is unlikely to accomplish much other than let some warring factions catch their breath.

  In Syria, Secretary of State John Kerry’s diplomatic efforts might someday produce a workable power-sharing arrangement on the political side. But it will have no chance at success until there is a parallel military effort. Such a military effort need not be as expensive and painful as America’s recent experiences in the region, including Afghanistan or Iraq. It does need to create a robust opposition force able to halt all the radical factions and the Assad regime, so that it is clear to everyone that negotiation is the only way out. It would also need to provide real security, so that warring factions and their supporters believe they will not be slaughtered if they disarm.

  In Iraq, the opposite is true. The American-led military campaign against Islamic State might someday convince combatants that outright victory is impossible, but the U.S. has not shown the same vigor in pursuing a commensurate political process of national reconciliation that could produce a workable new power-sharing agreement.

  In neither Iraq nor Syria is the U.S. or its coalition partners building indigenous institutions or putting in place an external peacekeeping force that could convince the Iraqis and Syrians to trust that the changes would last. Until Washington is willing to take such steps and make ending the civil wars in Iraq and Syria its priority, nothing worthwhile is likely to be achieved.”

  It is notable that as reported in the Tampa Bay Times, 6-17-16, a memo signed by more than 50 State Department diplomats was been filed in the department’s dissent channel. The channel was set up during the Vietnam War as a way for employees who disagree with policies to register their protests with the secretary of state and other top officials. Use of this channel is not unusual, but the number, 51, is unprecedented. These mid-level career experts on Syria urged a tougher policy with the Assad government as a means of facilitating the arrival at a negotiated political deal to set up a new Syrian government. The war has now killed more than 400,000 people. Obama has shown little interest in shifting focus from his campaign against the Islamic State. These officials argued that military action against Assad would help the fight against the Islamic State because it would bolster moderate Sunnis, who are necessary allies against ISIS.

  Russian military entry into Syria: Despite the above policy to attempt ending Syria’s civil war, since that article was published the Syrian situation is now more complicated with direct entry of Russian into Syria. Syria did invite Russian help. This now greatly complicates efforts by the U.S. to seek a MiddleEast deal with the Russians. Syrian dictator Bashar Assad’s regime was being led by Iran, and Iran was losing in Syria. The Russian-Iranian embrace is very tight, as explained by Michael Ledeen in “To Break the Moscow-Tehran Alliance, Target Iran’s Regime”, The Wall Street Journal, 2-14-17. Mr. Ledeen co-authored with Michael Flynn, of Field and Flight, and a scholar at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies. Iran’s nuclear program, except what North Korea supplied, is all Russian, and Iran has committed to purchasing billions of dollars’ worth of weaponry from Russia. So, Russia probably has no interest in pulling out of helping Assad, which would then hurt Iran. What then should the U.S. do? Answer: American policy must rest on dismantling the Khamenei regime as peacefully as possible.

  “Anti-regime demonstrations erupt in Iran all the time, and most experts believe that the vast majority or Iranians detest Mr. Khamenei and his henchmen. With U.S. support, these millions of Iranians could topple the Islamic Republic and establish a secular government resembling those in the West.

  With the Islamic Republic gone, the Trump administration would be in a much stronger position to strike a deal with Mr. Putin. The road to Moscow runs through Iran.”

  We need to challenge Iran and Saudi Arabia: I think it’s human nature to think that others in distant lands are like us, but that thinking can be dangerous. From ‘Mirror Imaging’ and America’s Dangerous Middle East Illusions, Henry A. Crumpton (former CIA veteran in counter-terrorism) and Allison Melia (former CIA analyst and White House National Security Council), The Wall Street Journal, 5-4-16.

  “Americans tend to think other countries share values like we do; such as tolera
nce, equal opportunity, rule of law, freedom of speech and religion, and separation of church and state, but many countries do not share these values, and that includes Saudi Arabia and Iran. Their religion is their political ideology and a critical element of their foreign policy. The Saudi ruling “family depends upon support of the Wahhabi clergy, who represent an ultraconservative doctrine that is the cornerstone of the countries identity... Terrorist groups like al Qaeda and Islamic State frequently cite or distort repression of women, autocratic rule and violence against non-Muslims.” Our aversion to tackling religious matters has to be overcome when dealing with Riyadh to address the underlying ideology that inspires ISIS when we offer support in security matters.

  Iran’s politics are even more intertwined with religion. Iran engages directly in international terrorism. The U.S. likes to tip-toe around these issues, when in fact we have a lot of leverage with both countries due to the recent transformation of the oil markets, and softening of global demand and the shale oil boom, and now our reduced dependence on Saudi oil. Saudi security depends upon our advance weaponry, trainers and advisers. The U.S. should redouble its efforts to contain Iranian terrorism, with deadly force if necessary. Our inclination of religious tolerance should never skew our analysis of other country’s behavior.”

  Don’t forget the Taliban: We have such short memories. The Taliban took over Afghanistan, who then gave safe haven to Al-Qaeda, who then fomented 9/11. We ousted Taliban control of Afghanistan, but now the Taliban are a resurgent force in Afghanistan. Our policies more recently have been muddled.

  From David Petraeus and Michael O’Hanlon (Brookings Institute), The Wall Street Journal, 5-21-16, “Take the Gloves Off Against the Taliban”.

  “The U.S. has done a balancing act in both Afghanistan and Iraq in fighting, then weaning off local forces to carry on, as rapidly as possible. Then we’ve drawn down our forces; too early in Iraq, and now in danger of doing the same in Afghanistan. We have a lot of our and NATO airpower in the region, but current policy ‘generally allows them to strike targets on the ground only when hostile forces can be identified as al Qaeda or ISIS loyalists, when they pose an imminent threat to NATO personnel, or, reportedly, when strategic collapse is imminent. The rules of engagement mean that the indigenous Afghan and Pakistani Taliban generally get a pass.’ The Taliban are now gaining more territory, threatening the unity government, and though not invincible, we do have a real fight on our hands against them. Our current policy as shown by bombs dropped, 1,000 in Afghanistan in 2015 and 300 in the first 3 months of 2016. In Iraq and Syria, we dropped 6,000 in 2014, almost 30,000 in 2015, and almost 7,000 in the first 3 months of 2016. Why do we still need to be there; to keep Taliban, al Qaeda, and ISIS from finding a new safe haven there?”

  The Homeland: To the Homeland Security Administration; a suggestion. When hiring for TSA and other offices under your administration, hire returning war vets. They’ve met the enemy.

  Domestic Terrorism: We are in a war that we didn’t ask for, defending ourselves against a foreign enemy that has declared war against us, the modern world, and Western civilization. A national debate has been building upon how to confront the problem of domestic terrorism. One side sees this as a “gun” issue, and the other side is more concerned with how to confront extremist elements within the Muslim religion, with overtones on problems with immigration. Let’s leave guns and immigration for discussion elsewhere. I reproduce here an op-ed from The Wall Street Journal, 6-28-16, “ISIS and the Culture of Narcissism” by Robert Pape and Walker Gunning. Mr. Pape is a professor of political science at the U. of Chicago, and the founding director of the Chicago Project on Security and Terrorism, where Mr. Gunning is the executive director. This piece to me is the most succinct illuminating relevant opinion piece I’ve read of on the subject of domestic terrorism, and may give useful direction to our leaders as to how best confront this terrible state of affairs.

  “The transcript of Omar Mateen’s call to 911 during the Orlando nightclub shooting paints a picture of a man on an unshakable mission of terror in the name of Islamic State, or ISIS. While the call is a chilling reminder of Mateen’s horrible act, it is not the only window we have into the killer’s mind. Equally disconcerting are the selfies that have emerged showing Mateen in poses more common to a narcissistic teen than an ISIS operative.

  How do we process seeing the deadliest mass shooting in U.S. history preening in an NYPD T-shirt, or smiling up at the camera, shirtless? Which is the true image of Mateen, the image-obsessed gym rat or dead-eyed killer?

  The answer is both, and together they solve a puzzle that perplexes terror experts: Why is ISIS so successful at recruiting Westerners?

  The terror group has moved away from the old recruiting tactics of groups such as al Qaeda, which sought to connect with deeply observant Muslims. Instead, ISIS is looking for a new type of recruit, one who spends as much time in the multiplex as in the mosque.

  A recent study by one of the authors here, Robert Page, and Dana Rovang of the Chicago Project on Security and Terrorism (CPOST) shows that at the core of ISIS’s strategy is an appeal to the individual’s sense of self—not his duty to the community. ISIS tells its recruits that they will be recognized in ways they never were before. Their special talents will finally be noticed, and fighting and dying for ISIS will make them heroes. The approach lets angry men with over-sized egos identify with the group, and eventually use the tool kit of ISIS to carry out their own violent agendas.

  Mateen was a perfect fit. He was a man in his late 20’s with a connection to the Middle East but not necessarily Syria or Iraq where ISIS is strongest; a practicing Muslim, who was not always devout. These characteristics don’t make Mateen an outlier, they make him the norm.

  An examination by CPOST of Americans indicted for ISIS-related crimes from March 2014 to December 2015 reveals almost a quarter of those charged were recent converts to Islam. A further 23% did not identify as particularly religious, while at 70% had no personal association with Iraq or Syria.

  How are these recruits made to feel they belong with ISIS? The answer lies in the group’s complex and prolific video operation.

  While many ISIS videos don’t rise above simple battlefield films, the highest-end productions, made by the group’s Al-Hayat Media Center, are glossy, carefully scripted and designed to recruit Westerners. One of the most prominent videos— ‘Al-Ghuraba (The Stranger): The Chosen Few of Different Lands’—follow a popular 12-step screenwriting technique called the ‘Hero’s Journey,’ first formulated by a Disney executive and familiar to any ‘Star Wars’ fan. After the film’s protagonist, Andre Poulin, decides to give up an idyllic life in Canada to follow the call of adventure, the video tracks his journey as he arrives in Syria, takes the name of Abu Muslim, joins ISIS, and dies fighting for the group.

  The video ends with a softly focused shot of Poulin talking, as if from beyond the grave. He’s calm, confident and satisfied with his choice, urging others to heed the call.

  Propaganda like this is a far cry from the martyr videos produced by terrorist groups in the past. Al Qaeda’s videos, best known for featuring Osama bin Laden or Ayman al Zawahiri standing in front of a static backdrop and staring directly into the camera, used an explicitly Islamic framework to attract recruits.

  A massive gulf separates ISIS’s video recruitment efforts from this old style, but Western techniques for combating them have not caught up. In a highly-publicized campaign, the State Department produced a series of videos and social-media messages titled “Think Again Turn Away.” The campaign, which sought to paint ISIS as un-Islamic, was phenomenally unsuccessful. Widely derided for inadvertently giving ISIS a bigger platform, its reliance on al Qaeda’s logic of messaging was behind the times.

  To catch up, the U.S. and its allies must fight ISIS on its own terms. That means exposing ISIS fighters not as liberators but foreign occupiers and murderers. We need to hit ISIS where it truly hurts—its carefully curated iden
tity. To pierce that mystique, we should tell the back stories of its lauded foreign fighters. We should publicize, in English, French, Arabic and other languages, that ISIS’s Western ‘heroes’ were petty criminals in their home countries and went to Syria and Iraq as thrill seekers for their own benefit.

  Those like Omar Mateen, who kill innocents in their home country, should be portrayed as disturbed outsiders fueled by a twisted creed. Mateen’s posting selfies, or checking to see if his rampage was trending on Facebook, reveals the ISIS recruit’s ‘journey’ for what it was: a narcissistic, demented quest. If ISIS can convince recruits their deaths will lead to individual glory, others will follow the same path.”

  In response to the above op-ed, a follow-up letter from Sidney Weissman, M.D. of Northwest University, Chicago, The Wall Street Journal, 7-9-16, presents the following thoughts.

  “Robert Pape and Walker Gunning present Omar Mateen as the model ISIS recruit, an individual who suffers from pathological narcissism. Appealing to this narcissism is presented as the foundation of the ISIS recruitment strategy. But Mateen’s pathology stands out as addressing any number of other internal conflicts. There are many young men struggling to define themselves not suffering from pathological narcissism who at some time become interested in ISIS. ISIS offers an apparent means to salve their internal pain by identifying or becoming part of a group that presents an opportunity to create a new self by becoming a heroic Muslim warrior. Recruiters for every army know the psychological vulnerabilities of youth that may make their army attractive. In the U.S., this population partially consists of high-school dropouts or graduates who don’t have a clear trajectory or meaning in their life. The U.S. Army recruiting television slogans ‘Be All That You Can Be, Join the Army’ or ‘Join the Team That Makes a Difference’ are designed to respond to these psychological needs. The ISIS slogan ‘Brothers rise up! Claim your Victory! Let’s Go! Let’s Go for Jihad’ has served as a successful recruiting tool when presented through social media. It is eerily similar in message to the U.S. Army’s recruiting slogans. ISIS recruits primarily for three young adult groups in the West: young Muslims who perceive that they have limited opportunities; young Muslims from middle-class families who don’t perceive that a middle-class career gives life meaning, and a group that is initially non-Muslim. This third group attracts individuals who share the vulnerabilities of the first two groups who see conversion to Islam as a first step to self-healing and joining ISIS the second step. A common link to all three groups is the desire to participate in something greater than themselves—the creation of a non-Western-controlled Muslim state. Only when ISIS controls no territory and is thus not a state will we succeed in fully halting the recruitment of these young adults.”