Canaris

by Mueller, Michael;

  The police ‘chief ideologist’ was SD lawyer Werner Best. From late summer 1934 he had been employed in the Secret Prussian State Police and was also organisational head of the Party SD and SD Senior Section leader South and South West. On 1 January 1935 in Berlin he took over Hauptabteilung I (Law, Personnel, Administration) of the Gestapo bureaux (Gestapa). Head of Gestapa and Hauptabteilung II (Political Police) was Reinhard Heydrich. The initially insignificant Hauptabteilung III (Police Abwehr) was run by SD official Günther Patschowsky. Himmler presided over it all as inspector of Gestapo. Although, as Prussian minister-president, Goering was technically Himmler’s superior, Goering had relinquished practically all authority to Himmler. Best, as Heydrich’s deputy, was the third most important man in the Gestapo and held a key position ‘as organiser, head of personnel, arbiter and Gestapo ideologist’.9

  Hitler’s edict for the ‘Combination of all police under the Reichsführer-SS’ in October 1935, and the appointment of Himmler as ‘Reichsführer-SS and the head of the German Police’ in June 1936 led inevitably to demarcation and difficulties between the political police and the military Abwehr, especially since the political police also had an Abwehr division whose main concern was internal dissent.10

  The rivalry between Hauptabteilung III (Police Abwehr) under Patschowsky, and Patzig (Military Abwehr) resulted in Patzig’s departure and the appointment of Canaris.11 The first conference between the Gestapa and Military Abwehr was held at the Reichswehr Ministry on 17 January 1935. Canaris and General Staff Officer Rudolf Bamler, an NSDAP member in charge of Abwehrgruppe III (Counter-Espionage), represented Abwehr; Heydrich, Best and Patschowsky represented the Gestapa; and Jost the SD.

  By a Reich Government decision of 17 October 1933, ‘the Reichswehrminister will take all measures necessary for the protection of national security and military-political interests in Abwehr and propaganda. He will draw up the guidelines by which the Reich jurisdictions and provincial authorities concerned will be bound’,12 and at the January 1935 conference, Canaris and Heydrich signed an agreement defining the respective Gestapa and Abwehr spheres of competence. The ‘Duties of the Wehrmacht’ were:

  1. Military espionage and counter-espionage.

  2. Intelligence operations within the Reichswehr and its wholly owned enterprises.

  3. Supervision and imposition of all anti-espionage regulations.

  4. Control and vetting of all new officers admitted to the Wehrmacht.

  5. Administration and directives in all cases affecting internal defence.

  All Gestapo and SD officers . . . including frontier police posts are duty bound to the closest cooperation with the competent Abwehr offices.

  The Gestapo was responsible for all ‘Duties of the political police, the only competent bureau for the executive, resistance to all enemies of the State, and the duties of frontier police and the frontier intelligence service, the antiespionage police and Abwehr Intelligence Service within the Reich borders’. The competence of the SD, as well as internal political duties, consisted of ‘cooperation with intelligence work’. Canaris for the Abwehr and Heydrich for Gestapo and SD were to hold the sole monopoly for all future intelligence activities: ‘Other non-official intelligence services will not be recognised and will be suppressed by all available means.’13

  Canaris had secured for the Abwehr undisputed sole jurisdiction for military intelligence and had imposed on all others the obligation to cooperate. The phrase ‘responsible for resistance to all enemies of the State’ could be interpreted very generously by the Gestapo, however.

  Canaris and Heydrich met frequently thereafter; the 17 January conference was probably their first meeting for eleven years.14 By coincidence they lived in the same south Berlin street – Canaris’s family with two small daughters at Doellestrasse 48, the Heydrichs at No. 34,15 and the personal relationship between Canaris and Heydrich was ‘utterly correct, outwardly almost friendly’.16 But within the regime they were rivals, different in character, but both adept in conspiracy and falsehood, and thus below the apparent friendship there lurked suspicion. SS lawyer Walter Huppenkothen recalled Heydrich’s description of Canaris as ‘the old fox one must be careful of’. Later, Huppenkothen, who read Canaris’s diaries in 1944, stated that after his first official meeting with Heydrich, Canaris had emphasised that ‘it would probably be hardly possible to work together with Heydrich because he is a brutal fanatic’.17 Heydrich made the effort to keep the agreement and warned his subordinate officers to heed the wording strictly and cooperate with the Abwehr, and sacked his own Abwehr chief, Patschowsky, so as not to prejudice the accord.

  Best took over as commissar of the Police Abwehr. Until the end of 1939 he was the ‘civilian counterpart to Canaris’18 and one of his most important conversation partners outside the Abwehr. There were times when they met daily to exchange political and organisational views; they took morning horseback rides in the Grunewald and Canaris became the most frequent visitor to the Best household.19 Best wrote that, ‘In serious matters’, he had ‘rarely known a negotiator who was more open-handed in his dealings and kept his promises more honourably than Canaris; in service he was completely the correct officer whose word was his bond. Moreover I got to know and value him as an utterly honourable, well-intentioned and morally sensitive character.’20 Best was more critical of the relationship between Canaris and Heydrich; the latter, who had been discharged from the Navy in 1931 as being ‘unworthy to be an officer’, apparently held a grudge against the Navy henceforth.21 During their service travels together Canaris and Heydrich would reassure each other of their fullest possible mutual agreement and honest collaboration.22

  The Reichswehr leaders were engaged with the question of rearmament; for political and diplomatic reasons the subject had been kept on hold in recent months to avoid prejudice to the forthcoming plebiscite to return the Saar to the Reich. The previous November the Geneva Rearmament Conference had been adjourned because Germany wanted the result of the plebiscite before considering any further international armaments treaties. On 13 January 1935 the Saar electorate voted overwhelmingly for reunification into the Reich and the Reichswehr leaders determined to capitalise on this as a reason for rearmament.23 On 6 March General Ludwig Beck, head of the Army Office, set out ‘the least demands for an armaments treaty’ in a memorandum:24 the peacetime Army of 300,000 men in twenty-one divisions of December 1933 had now risen to twenty-three and would be sixty-three by the outbreak of war. He also wanted the return of the demilitarised zones either side of the Rhine, the lifting of the ban on mobilisation exercises and the recognition of Germany’s right to determine for itself the size of the Reichswehr and questions of organisation, conscription, length of service and armaments. In the previous year, foreign powers had ‘rearmed to the greatest degree’ and thereby created a completely new situation for Germany.25 The potential threat came from ‘France, Czechoslovakia, Belgium and Poland’ (despite the Non-Aggression Pact signed with Poland the previous year). The neutrality of the other nations bordering Germany could probably be accepted, while the immediate danger from less amicably inclined powers of Europe – Russia, Italy and Britain – was less likely and therefore could be left out of the considerations.26 The goal of German rearmament was ‘to secure our living space’. That the act of unilateral German rearmament might itself represent a danger to security was not considered.27 Beck explained to Army Commander-in-Chief Fritsch in a letter a few days later that the twenty-three divisions were an interim solution for three or four years only, by which time the strength of the peacetime Army would have grown to thirty-six divisions. Blomberg and Fritsch both saw the foreign policy dangers of rearming too quickly,28 but the Reich policymakers were adamant, with regard to foreign policy, that a conscripted Army was to be the rule by the summer of 1935.

  Hitler himself determined the tempo. On 7 March the British Foreign Minister Sir John Simon and the Lord Privy Seal Anthony Eden had been expected to visit Berlin but Hitler
, irritated at the British Government’s statement that it was increasing military spending, cancelled the meeting.29 On 10 March Goering announced the abrogation of the Versailles Treaty by Germany and the existence of the Luftwaffe. France and Belgium had meanwhile renewed their mutual military agreement and five days after Goering’s announcement France extended the period of military conscription.

  The following day Hitler told his Wehrmacht adjutant Hossbach that he had decided to introduce conscription and draft a legal framework for the Army.30 When asked for his opinion on how large he thought the new Army should be, Hossbach gave a figure of 400,000, which Hitler accepted immediately. At Hossbach’s urging, Hitler informed Blomberg and Fritsch, who both told him that his decision was irresponsible at the present time, although the Foreign Ministry did not oppose him,31 and by the Cabinet meeting next day Blomberg and Fritsch were also in favour, Blomberg praising the Führer and swearing ‘unbreakable loyalty’.32

  On 16 March, when foreign diplomats were notified of the framework, their reactions were varied; only the United Kingdom made an official protest, and even this was accompanied by an enquiry as to whether Hitler was still interested in meeting Simon and Eden. After Hitler informed the German public, the newspapers printed special editions claiming that ‘the shame of defeat’ had been expunged and Germany’s military reputation restored, giving rise to cheering crowds assembling before the Reich Chancellery.33 On 25 March, when the talks with the two British politicians were held in Berlin, the British showed their willingness to meet Hitler halfway, even if this impinged on their solidarity with France; the international front against Germany began to crumble and this was the point where ‘the policy of appeasement’ began.34

  At an international conference on 11 April 1935 at Stresa on Lake Maggiore, Britain, France and Italy confirmed the 1925 Locarno Treaty guaranteeing the frontiers of western Germany and the independence of Austria. Before the conference, Canaris wrote to Abwehrstellen that it was ‘especially important to establish what, if any, military preparations were in hand in neighbouring states’. In the run-up to the conference, they should get their informers’ reports in early and keep enough people ready for timely deployment. ‘Times of foreign policy tension are a trial for the intelligence service, its organs and utility. I expect all Abwehr members to use their talents to the full for the good of the Fatherland.’35

  Canaris himself visited the Hungarian intelligence service in Budapest with which Germany had been cooperating for fourteen years. The political mood ‘was enthusiastic, and they admire our advances in military-political questions and rearmament’ but doubted that ‘we would fight together in a future war’.36 As regards the international situation in Europe, ‘Hungary cannot be expected to make a clear decision for or against Germany. Such a small country, surrounded by dangerous enemies, must pursue caution. If their statesmen can work out something with Italy is uncertain but possible.’

  The search for allies was difficult in view of the various international constellations, and Canaris realised the need for great circumspection when approaching the intelligence communities of potential allies. Budapest had admitted to exchanging information with Rome, and Canaris began his quest by seeing Colonel Mario Roatta, head of Italian military intelligence.37

  During his travels to inspect Abwehrstellen inside the Reich to determine the state of the organisation and its efficiency, Canaris saw that the apparatus was poorly equipped and that the network of agents at home and abroad needed to be made more comprehensive;38 he was especially interested in Gruppe III (Counter-Espionage).The reintroduction of general conscription was bound to result in increased foreign espionage against the Wehrmacht and German industry, particularly in the field of armaments. Canaris needed the Gruppe III network ‘at all levels of society’ and ‘on the broadest basis’,39 but did not want to use Gestapo people.40 He and Bamler recommended that people with access to secret information should be subjected to closer controls – briefcases searched on leaving work, socialising reduced to a minimum ‘since it can lead to treasonous acts’,41 private telephone lines tapped. Thus the Abwehr began a process of constant expansion. Best wrote: ‘By the way he built up the apparatus, Canaris proved that – contrary to legend – he was just a typical German officer who organised everything along military lines. The Abwehr became a gigantic State apparatus that employed more clerks than agents.’42 Best’s colleague Karl Schäfer thought that the Abwehr ‘swelled up overnight’,43 and Heydrich expanded the SD proportionately, which Best considered must lead eventually to jurisdiction disputes with the Abwehr, but in comparison with the Gestapo (in 1934 600 officials plus 2,000 in Prussian State Police offices44) the SD was small, having only 201 members that year and 269 in 1936, few of them salaried. The tally of informers was probably no more than a thousand in 1935.45

  There was an Abwehrstelle for each of fifteen Wehrkreise by mid-1937 plus non-territorial sub-stations in the frontier regions, each staffed by two to four officers. By the end of 1937 the Abwehr employed 327 officers, officials and clerks in Berlin, and 629 elsewhere. Counter-espionage head Bamler urged more non-Reich sub-stations as ‘very urgent’46 and Canaris created Sub-Gruppe IIIF under Richard Protze with the purpose of infiltrating opposing intelligence services, identifying their agents and disseminating false information.47 Abwehrstellen outside a Wehrkreis had to recruit agents from within the nearest Wehrkreis unless authorised otherwise by Abwehr headquarters. The ‘ Hauskapelle’ (house orchestra) system was set up for this purpose: each house was headed by a leader, often a retired police official, with a senior agent (Kapellmeister) and three to six agents. They had always to be near a telephone, be permanently mobile and available for ‘special assignments’ such as shadowing suspected persons, establishing identities and hunting down suitable future agents. Hotel porters, receptionists and auditors were often agents of the Hauskapelle, and their main task was to be aware of guests who might be potential recruits.48

  In 1936 Himmler had set up two police central headquarters: Hauptamt Ordnungspolizei (general uniformed police) under Kurt Daluege, and Hauptamt Sicherheitspolizei (SS security police) under Heydrich; the SS now controlled the entire German police corps.49 Best wrote: ‘After the SD began its amateurish foreign work, it often rubbed up against the military Abwehr, particularly counter-espionage, while exploring for intelligence services.’ When Canaris protested at this ‘infringement’, Heydrich disputed the right of the Abwehr to handle foreign political intelligence, for which he claimed the monopoly. His actual aim was to take over counter-espionage and usurp the Abwehr completely.50

  Canaris refused to close down the Hauskapellen, but agreed to discuss counter-espionage. On 19 October 1936 Best stated: ‘Active espionage was exclusively the preserve of the military. Agreement was also reached about counter-espionage, where the Gestapo remained subordinate.’51 On 21 December, Best and Canaris signed the ‘Principles for Cooperation Between the Gestapo and the Wehrmacht Abwehr Office’, which became known as ‘The Ten Commandments’.52

  Gerhard Heinkel criticised his chief Canaris for always being prepared to go too far in search of a compromise, although later he corrected his opinion about the ‘Ten Commandments’,53 while Best’s colleague Schäfer saw it as ‘a severe setback for the police . . . the Police Abwehr is practically under the control of the military Abwehr. In a conflict of jurisdiction between a State police office and an Abwehr office, the State police office could not call on Gestapa support.’54

  It was an Abwehr victory. Best had not wanted to sour the close relationship with Canaris and the Wehrmacht High Command(OKW). ‘The position of the Wehrmacht within the National Socialist regime was so strong and autonomous at the time that for the Sipo to be recognised as an equal negotiating partner was a success even if here it had to take a back seat.’55 Best reported:

  Canaris met my trust with trust. He allowed me an extensive look inside his organisation and its work. He invited me to meetings, introduced me to heads
of Abwehrstellen, all of which I visited eventually. I did the same within the framework of the Police Abwehr: I invited Canaris and his section leaders to my meetings and ensured a friendly relationship56

  Best brought together Heydrich and Canaris horse-riding at the Berlin Zoo so that service matters could be discussed in a relaxed atmosphere,57 but the truce could not last for ever.

  13

  Between Führer, Duce and Caudillo

  Canaris and his Meldedienst (secret reports service) had their first major foreign policy test in the spring of 1936. On 7 March Hitler broadcast to the nation from the Berlin Kroll Opera House before the Reichstag deputies. He drew attention to the French-Russian mutual assistance treaty that had rendered the Locarno Treaty meaningless: ‘Germany therefore sees herself no longer bound by this defunct pact . . . by the primitive right of a people to secure its frontiers and defend itself, the German Government as from today has restored the full and unconditional sovereignty of the Reich in the demilitarised zone of the Rhineland.’1

  The deputies sprang to their feet, shouts of ‘Heil’ rang through the hall. The American journalist William Shirer wrote: ‘Their hands are extended in the slavish salute, their faces etched with hysteria, their mouths wide open and shouting, their eyes, burning with fanaticism, staring towards the new god, the Messiah. The Messiah plays his role superbly.’2 At about the same time, German troops, accompanied by two planeloads of selected journalists, reached the Hohenzollern Bridge in Cologne to be received with great emotion, women throwing flowers, priests blessing them. After three years, Hitler declared, the struggle for German equality and rights could now be considered won.

  Hitler’s abrogation of the treaties of Locarno and Versailles was the most serious provocation yet for the Western democracies. It made no difference to his wide-ranging proposals ‘to secure peace in Europe’ – including Germany’s readmission to the League of Nations – because he knew that they were unacceptable,3 but whether the West would merely look on while this revolution in the European foreign policy and treaty situation proceeded was less certain.4