Canaris

by Mueller, Michael;

  On 12 August Lahousen recorded in the Abteilung II diary: ‘In view of the overall political situation, the Amtsgruppenchef [Canaris] has ordered the Abwehr to yellow alert (Spannungsdienst).’57 Plans for the Dirschau and Jablunka Pass operations had been in hand since mid-June, together with a series of other sabotage missions for Abteilung II in Poland,58 and negotiations were proceeding with Ukrainian nationalists settled in Poland who were prepared to foment an uprising. Lahousen kept Canaris regularly informed of this.59 At some point, by mid-August at the latest, Canaris was drawn into the intrigues of Himmler and Heydrich providing the pretext for war.

  SS-Gruppenführer Heinz Jost, head of the SD foreign espionage service (originally Amt III Abwehr at SD, now Amt VI-SD-Ausland60), brought the Führer’s order that the Abwehr was to assist the Reichsführer-SS in an operation:61 150 Polish uniforms, weapons and soldiers’ paybooks were to be procured, and Himmler would provide the necessary personnel; two days later a list of 364 names had been made available for ‘most secret missions’.62 Jost was one of the oldest party members at SS-RSHA and a close friend of Werner Best, the two having met while in the Hesse police when Jost had been Best’s deputy, but nevertheless Canaris apparently did not discover the purpose to which the men and material were to be put.63 Lahousen and Oster suspected ‘something really evil’ behind it,64 Lahousen noting in the service diary on 17 August:

  To my question of why the request of General Manstein regarding deployment of three assault battalions with Polish uniforms was refused while in the same area an operation of SS-Reichsführer Himmler will be carried out, he replied that it was at the order of the Führer, who wishes under all circumstances to keep the Wehrmacht distant from all operations having a pronounced illegal character.65

  Heydrich’s plan was that, on the night before the German invasion, SD and Sipo troops disguised as Polish auxiliaries and soldiers would simulate raids on German installations and their occupants, put there by the SD. The radio station in German Gleiwitz would be occupied and anti-German propaganda broadcast. Other squads would raid the forestry house in Pitschen woods near the border (then Kreuzburg in Upper Silesia) and destroy the German customs post at Hochlinden (near Ratibos).66 The essential point of the plan – to prove Polish culpability for the attacks – was to have bodies lying around, these being previously murdered concentration camp inmates. Gestapo chief Müller labelled this plan ‘Operation Jam’,67 and these ‘Polish attacks’ would become immediate propaganda for the allegedly provoked German response, and provide the British and French Governments with a last opportunity to renounce their treaty pledges of support for Poland.68

  The plan was no great secret; on 17 August, Oberst Warlimont, head of Abteilung L at OKW, informed Lahousen of the request for Polish uniforms and equipment.69 The same day Halder made a reference to the affair in his diary70 and Canaris notified Keitel that SS-Brigadeführer Jost had ordered uniforms, weapons and paybooks for the ‘operation ordered by the Reichsführer-SS’. Canaris observed later in a note that has been preserved: ‘I reported to Keitel my discussion with Jost . . . he says that he does not think much of the operations but that there is no alternative if the Führer has ordered them. He was not able to ask the Führer how he thought these special operations should be carried out.’71 Keitel sheltered behind the Führer’s orders, as was his wont, even though Canaris tried to convince him that Italy would not enter the war on the side of the Reich; King Vittorio Emmanuel had declared a few days previously that he would not sign a mobilisation order from Mussolini under any circumstances.72 Keitel now thought it pretty certain that Britain and France would not intervene in support of Poland, for if a dictatorship such as Italy was not willing to participate, then how much ‘worse’ would it appear to the democracies? He rejected any attempt to have him represent other views to the Führer.73

  Groscurth wrote in his diary on 24 August: ‘The basis for the war is to be provided by 150 concentration camp inmates, who will be dressed in Polish uniforms and sacrificed! This is Heydrich’s doing. WC [Canaris] has done everything he can to stop it, Army completely declines, etc.’74 Even the head of the Military Economics Office, General Georg Thomas, who prepared memoranda on the subject for Keitel, was waved away brusquely. The memoranda had been put together in collaboration with prominent members of the ‘civilian opposition’ such as minister Johannes Popitz, ambassador Ulrich von Hassell, Carl Goerdeler, Hjalmar Schacht, Hans Gisevius, Generaloberst Beck and Hans Oster, the intention being to show Keitel that ‘Hitler’s plans for conquest’ would lead to ‘World War’ and to a long struggle that Germany could not survive without powerful allies; a lost war would mean the disappearance of Germany.75 Keitel, General Thomas noted, had interrupted him during his discourse to tell him that ‘Hitler would never fight a World War. There was no danger, in Hitler’s opinion, since the French were a completely pacific people and the British far too decadent to offer Poland any useful help, and the United States would never again send a single man to Europe to pull British or even Polish chestnuts out of the fire.’76

  Everything during the August crisis revolved around the question of whether Britain and France would stand by their treaty obligations to Poland and force Germany into a war on two fronts. While the generals prepared plans for mobilisation and invasion, on 23 August they awaited the call from Ribbentrop, who had travelled to Moscow the previous day with about thirty assistants to conclude the long-prepared pact with the Kremlin.

  Towards one o’clock that afternoon Hitler received British ambassador Henderson bringing a letter from Prime Minister Chamberlain saying that war between Britain and Germany would be the worst catastrophe. As to the expected agreement between Berlin and the Kremlin, Chamberlain said that even a German–Soviet alliance would not change Britain’s obligation towards Poland, and he renewed his offer for talks if it would lead to the restoration of an atmosphere of trust and peace. He proposed direct talks between Germany and Poland over the treatment of minorities by both sides, the goal being a treaty guaranteed by the major powers.77 This was Hitler’s worst scenario – the resurrection of the Munich Agreement – and he responded by accusing Britain of having stimulated ‘the excesses against Volksdeutsche in Poland’. ‘We were under the impression’, his adjutant von Below wrote, ‘that on that day he was especially outraged by Britain.’78

  In his letter of reply to Chamberlain, Hitler’s purpose was to persuade London to abandon its treaty obligations to Poland.79 He would attack Poland if a single German there should be mistreated. Great Britain would then be responsible for the war, just as it was responsible for forcing him into his pact with the Soviets; Henderson assured Hitler ‘that a war was probably unavoidable if Hitler insisted on direct action against Poland’.80 The letter also contained a veiled threat of a general mobilisation if Britain and France mobilised. Once Henderson had left the room, Hitler slapped his leg and laughed: ‘Chamberlain will not survive this conversation, his Cabinet will fall this evening.’81 It did not, though, and the same day France reaffirmed its pledge to Poland, eclipsing one of the main aims of the forthcoming German–Soviet Pact; Poland was not isolated and the pact might not be enough to prevent Britain and France from entering the hostilities.82

  Shortly afterwards Ribbentrop reported from Moscow that the negotiations were very promising, but questions remained to be resolved regarding Soviet influence in Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia, and their claims to the seaports of Libau and Windau. Within thirty minutes they had conceded the point, after poring over a map,83 and Ribbentrop and Molotov signed the treaty after midnight; Ribbentrop telephoned Hitler the news within the hour. Hitler congratulated him: ‘That will come as a bombshell!’84

  In the ten-year Non-Aggression Pact, Berlin and Moscow had pledged themselves mutually not only to neutrality in the case of unprovoked attack on either, but even if either partner were involved in hostilities with a third party. A secret protocol set down the respective spheres of interest in Eastern Europe from Fin
land to Bessarabia. Poland was to be divided between them. With this ‘Aggression Pact’85 Stalin had given Hitler a free hand for his attack on Poland and Hitler had sealed a union with his worst ideological opponent – one of them ‘wanted war, and the other, wanting to do nothing to prevent it, united in negotiating a business of life and death’.86

  For many such as Canaris, who was still hoping to stop Hitler by means of a strong international alliance, the Hitler–Stalin Pact was a catastrophe: ‘The signing of the Moscow pact paralysed all those who just a year before had been ready to stop Hitler.’87 The last psychological barrier to Hitler’s leap into the abyss had been removed. Canaris and Beck were both of the opinion that Stalin had signed this pact with cold calculation; the Kremlin could now bide its time until Europe had bled to death, and their own hour struck.88

  18

  The Madness Unfolds

  According to plan, OKH removed from Berlin to a new headquarters at Zossen, south of the capital, and on 24 August 1939 Major Groscurth, who had headed Abteilung II before Lahousen, returned to Berlin to take charge of the Abwehr liaison group at OKH, from October renamed ‘Abteilung zbV’ of the Army General Staff. This made Groscurth the most important liaison officer between Canaris and OKH.1 He reported to Canaris and the chief of Abteilung IV at Army General Staff (Ober-QM IV), and General Major von Tippelskirch, to whom Foreign Armies East and Foreign Armies West, responsible for situation reports on enemy dispositions at Army General Staff reported directly to Groscurth.2

  The Army’s secret field police (GFP) was under Abwehr control. Its primary function was anti-sabotage and to prevent disaffection amongst the troops, under the new leader Wilhem Krichbaum, who came from the Gestapo, where he had been frontier inspector southeast at Dresden.3 He was a close friend of Heydrich, who had inveigled him into the new position,4 and as a former member of the Hesse-Thuringia Freikorps, Brigade Ehrhardt and Org-C, he was an old street-fighter.5 On his first day in Berlin, Groscurth noticed the tension existing between the Abwehr, the General Staff and the GFP. He noted in his diary: ‘What a day! . . . [Tippelskirch] opportunist, aiming high. Enemy of the Admiral [Canaris]. Combining with my group impossible. Krichbaum told me at once he was an Oberst! Will have difficult times!’ After Canaris had apprised him of recent developments, Groscurth concluded his diary entry: ‘God grant me soon a fast, graceful end! And to everybody close to me!’6

  Those in the know were now convinced that Hitler would strike. At the ‘Kolonne’, the daily morning situation conference of Abwehr chiefs in Canaris’s office, mobilisation was discussed, with Lahousen noting: ‘Italy: unknown. No visible signs of mobilising, mood in France and Italy not very enthusiastic.’7 An increased watch was ordered on the Ukraine nationalists in Germany to prevent the leaders going abroad to stir up unrest against the Warsaw and Moscow Governments.8 That kind of disturbance was no longer opportune.

  When Groscurth expressed concern about the GFP, fearing interventions from convinced Nazis like Krichbaum, Canaris reassured him that he would act against the GFP if they would not follow orders. Canaris was more preoccupied with his commando units to operate behind enemy lines; some of them were already in position on the border awaiting the signal to move.

  On 24 August 1939 the attack order was issued by Hitler at 1502hrs.9 During the afternoon movement orders were distributed to the various troop commanders, telephone connections between Berlin, Paris and London were disconnected and accredited military attachés in Berlin were forbidden to leave the capital without the permission of the War Ministry. The airspace over Berlin was closed to civilian aircraft, and all airports were ordered to shut down next day.10 At 16o5hrs Abwehr headquarters was notified of the orders. Groscurth noted: ‘Finally, after an hour and a half delay, the order to march for 0430hrs. First X-Day. A relief!’11 For the Abwehr this was the signal for the K-and S-Organisations to move: Leutnant Herzner would lead the attack on the Jablunka Pass railway tunnels at the scheduled time,12 and the attack to avert the destruction of the Dirschau bridges would coincide with the crossing of the Polish frontier.13 Other Abwehr units, such as that formed for Operation Hornisse, in which so-called ‘Corridor people’ would arrive in Dirschau from areas of southwest Poland to sow confusion, were brought to a state of readiness14 as were Heydrich’s agents provocateurs.

  The postponement of the attack order came about for the following reasons. The previous day in a letter to Mussolini, Hitler had insisted on his keeping to the terms of the pact, and was now awaiting the response. At 1400 hrs the British ambassador had called again at the Reich Chancellery; if he received a free hand to resolve the German–Polish problem, Hitler told Henderson, then he would be ready to come to an understanding with Britain that ‘would not only guarantee for the German part the existence of the British Empire under all circumstances, but also, should it become necessary, provide the British Empire with German help irrespective of where such help was required.’15 Henderson had scarcely closed the door behind him when Hitler issued his orders, not wishing to tarry longer for Mussolini’s response. There now came two setbacks: Foreign Minister Ribbentrop brought Hitler news that Britain had finally signed the agreed military alliance with Poland, and a little later the French ambassador, Robert Coulondre, gave Hitler his word of honour as an officer that France would stand at Poland’s side and fight.16 The Italian ambassador Attolico then came with Mussolini’s answer: ‘It is for me one of the most painful moments of my life to have to inform you that Italy is not ready for war.’17 The fuel and raw material stocks of his army and air force would last barely three weeks of war, and only the navy was ready; the Duce asked the Führer for understanding for his situation. Interpreter Schmidt observed that Hitler, with an icy demeanour, dismissed the ambassador; the treaty ally had been believed secure, but now was not. Keitel was told to call the Army commander-in-chief,18 and Brauchitsch confirmed that there was still time to stop the attack going ahead – to gain time to win ‘the political game’ – and towards 1945hrs that evening Halder received the order to abort the invasion.19

  The main conspirators – Oster, Gisevius, Reichsminister Schacht and General Thomas – planned to use the short period between the issue of the order and the invasion for a last attempt to unseat Hitler. Pressure was to be brought to bear on Halder and Brauchitsch to arrest him on the grounds that a declaration of war without the assent of the Reich Cabinet was unconstitutional. Should they refuse, the conspirators would then threaten to reveal their secret contacts to the Gestapo.20

  When General Thomas arrived at Abwehr headquarters, Oster told him that the attack had been postponed; Oster was now not thinking of a coup d’etat – a supreme warlord forced to rescind such an order was finished: ‘The Führer had brought it to a head.’21 For Gisevius, this was the abiding memory of that unforgettable 25 August: ‘. . . how Oster, this man who since 1933 had fought the Gestapo thugs, this officer who had committed himself uncompromisingly and with great resolution to a coup, was now thinking, under the fresh expectation of Hitler’s fall from power, no longer on this side, but already on the far side of the goal.’22

  Canaris had also allowed himself to be ensnared by this deceptive hope. When Gisevius arrived at OKW next morning, Canaris beamed: ‘What do you say now? He will never recover from this setback. Peace has been preserved for twenty years.’23 But Gisevius, ‘made to look a fool by circumstances’,24 was not convinced and warned: ‘Only if we strike at him! Otherwise Himmler and Ribbentrop will use their influence and we will have the same situation within a week.’25 If he actually said this, then Gisevius was a prophet, yet even if ‘the idea of the avoided war was illusory and Gisevius was absolutely right’,26 nobody listened to him that day. His Resistance colleagues believed that a coup had become superfluous. Even Canaris was unwilling to undertake anything – Hitler had been eliminated. Erich Kordt recalled later these fateful hours and the attitude of the admiral: ‘Not only Oster and the younger opponents to the regime but even a man like Wilhelm C
anaris, who deliberated so cautiously, believed that Hitler had dug his own grave. A horse that refuses a fence for the second time will not jump!’27

  In the euphoria of their collective delusion, the conspirators let the last opportunity to avert war elude them. ‘Their incomprehension of political realities was breathtaking,’ wrote Ian Kershaw in his biography of Hitler.28

  That evening, unexpected complications arose for the Abwehr as the result of the recall order. When instructions were transmitted to Abwehrstellen at Königsberg, Breslau and Vienna to halt the K-and S-Organisations’ operations in Poland, Hauptmann Ernst zu Eickern of Abwehrstelle VIII Breslau reported that he could not guarantee to stop it.29 The twenty-four commandos under Leutnant Herzner had already set out, could not be contacted by radio and had crossed the Polish border at oo3ohrs;30 later, Eickern reported hearing heavy machine-gun fire from the Jablunka Pass area.31 Not until 0830hrs on the morning of 26 August was contact established with Herzner,32 and three hours later the signals office at Striegau morsed Abwehrstelle Breslau that Herzner was still in Poland and had two men wounded.33 Herzner and his men had succeeded in occupying Mosty Railway Station and defusing the explosive charges in the Pass tunnels;34 around midday the squad reached the safety of Slovakia under police fire.35 The incident – as others on the German–Polish border that night – was explained away through diplomacy.

  As head of Abwehr-Abteilung II, Lahousen was blamed, with the Foreign Ministry asserting that he had endangered ‘the Führer’s peace policy’. Canaris and Keitel were incensed that Herzner’s commando had not been equipped with radio. Lahousen made a sober entry in the service diary on 26 August that the mobilisation was proceeding since the resumed negotiations could collapse again.36 Unlike Canaris and Oster he anticipated that only a brief respite had been obtained.