Canaris

by Mueller, Michael;

  81 Werth, Nicolas, ‘Ein Staat gegen sein Volk. Gewalt, Unterdrückung und Terror in der Sowjetunion’, in Courtois et al, Schwarzbuch, pp 51–295, here p 220.

  82 Lukes, Igor, ‘Stalin, Benesh und der Fall Tuchatschewski’, Viertelsjahrhefte für Zeitgeschichte 44, 1996, pp 527–47, here p 529f, with n 9.

  83 Werth, ‘Staat’, p 221.

  84 Schellenberg, Walter, Memoiren, London, 1956, p 48f.

  85 Abshagen, Canaris, p 167f.

  86 Hagen, Walter, DiegeheimeFront, Linz and Vienna, 1950, p 56f.

  87 It is equally impossible here to delve into all the ramifications involved in the passing of information on the part of the interested German side during these secret negotiations. For greater detail see Lukes, ‘Stalin’, including discussion on the research with opinion and sources.

  88 Ibid, p 541ff.

  89 Heinz, ‘Canaris’, p 40f.

  90 Letter, Patzig to Walter Baum, 10 November 1953, IfZ, ZS 540, folio 5. That it was not only Heydrich who was waiting for Canaris to throw in the towel is proved by a letter or file note – without an addressee it is uncertain which – of Gruppenleiter Rudolf Bamler, who with regard to Canaris’s workload and frequent absences abroad attempted quite openly to undermine his position. Bamler told Canaris frankly that he would not be able to run the Abwehr himself. Apparently the manoeuvring had no success. Letter signed by von Bamler, August 1937, BA-MA, RW 5/207, folios 65–9.

  14 Ousting the Generals

  1 For the Blomberg-Fritsch crisis see primarily Müller, Heer und Hitler, ch VI, pp 255–99; Janssen, Karl-Heinz and Tobias, Fritz, Der Sturz der Generale – Hitler und die Blomberg-Fritsch-Krise ìŷj8, Munich, 1994; Mühleisen, Horst, ‘Dokumentation: “Die Fritsch-Krise im Fmhjahr 1938. Neun Dokumente aus dem Nachlaß des Generalobersten”’, Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen 56, 1997, pp 471–508. Mühleisen is highly critical of Janssen and Tobias. The analysis of the Blomberg-Fritsch crisis here really follows Mühleisen and the documents edited by him in the Fritsch collection (BA-MA, N 33/19 and N 33/20) as well as Müller.

  2 From Colvin, Ian, Chief of Intelligence. Was Canaris, Hitler’s Spy Chief, a British Agent?, London, 1951, p 43.

  3 Mühleisen, ‘Fritsch-Krise’, pp 473 and 497, n 164.

  4 Kershaw, Hitler 1936–1945, p 93.

  5 Janssen and Tobias, Sturz, p 45f.

  6 Ibid, pp 27f and 51; Kershaw, Hitler 1936–1945, p 95.

  7 Goebbels’s Diaries, vol 3, p 1184, entry 27 January 1938.

  8 Hossbach, Zwischen Wehrmacht und Hitler, p 125.

  9 Ibid, p 126.

  10 Longhand draft by Fritsch. ‘Notiert von Februar bis September 1938, beendet am 27. September 1938’, in Mühleisen, ‘Fritsch-Krise’, document 7, p 493.

  11 Ibid, and p 494.

  12 Ibid, p 494.

  13 Letter from Fritsch addressed to commanding generals (but not sent), May 1938, in Mühleisen, ‘Fritsch-Krise’, document 6, p 492.

  14 Longhand draft, Fritsch, in Mühleisen, ‘Fritsch-Krise’, document 7, p 494.

  15 Ibid, p 495.

  16 Letter, Fritsch to Hitler, 26 Janaury 1938, in Mühleisen, ‘Fritsch-Krise’, document 1, Ρ 483.

  17 Longhand draft, Fritsch, in Mühleisen, ‘Fritsch-Krise’, document 7, pp 495 and 496.

  18 Ibid.

  19 Mühleisen, ‘Fritsch-Krise’, p 476 and document 6, p 492 with n 125 and 126. See also statement of Gisevius in IMG, vol XII, p 222. Contradicting this, see Janssen and Tobias, Sturz, pp 167–70 who strongly doubt that the Gestapo was handling the Fritsch investigation before the official start to the inquiry on 24 January 1938.

  20 Mühleisen, ‘Fritsch-Krise’, p 474. Janssen and Tobias, Sturz, pp 86ff and 276, n 15, agree that in the wake of the Blomberg affair, Hitler recalled the Fritsch affair in 1936 and feared a supplementary scandal. Therefore he had ordered the file reconstructed. The authors rely on the statements of General Hermann Foertsch in 1952. Kershaw, Hitler 1936–1945, p 96f, follows this version. Müller, Heer und Hitler, p 256, contends that Goering linked the Blomberg and Fritsch cases together and laid the Fritsch papers before Hitler. See also Krausnick, ‘Vorgeschichte’, p 286, with n 177.

  21 Thun-Hohenstein, Remedio Galeazzo Graf von, Der Verschwörer – General Oster und die Militäropposition; mit einer Einleitung von Golo Mann, Berlin, 1982, p 44f; for Oster see also Graml, Hermann, ‘Der Fall Oster’, Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 14, 1966, pp 26–39; for Nebe see Rathert, Ronald, Verbrechen und Verschwörung: Arthur Nebe. Der Kripochefdes Dritten Reiches, Münster, Hamburg and London, 2001; Gisevius, Hans Bernd, Wo ist Nebe? Erinnerungen an Hitlers Reichskriminaldirektor, Zürich, 1966; on the relationship between Gisevius and Nebe, see Jacobsen, Hans-Adolf (ed), Opposition gegen Hitler und der Staatsstreich vom 20. Juli 1944 – Geheime Dokumente aus dem ehemaligen Reichssicherheitshauptamt, 2 vols, Stuttgart, 1989, vol 1, p 245.

  22 Gisevius, Hans Bernd, Bis zum bitteren Ende, Vol 1, Vom Reichstagsbrand zur Fritsch-Krise, Zürich, 1946, p 40of.

  23 Jodl diaries, 28 January 1938, in IMG, vol XXVIII, p 359.

  24 Gisevius, Bis zum betteren Ende, vol 1, p 404.

  25 Jacobsen, Opposition, p 430, SD report, 2 October 1944.

  26 Hoffmann, Peter, Widerstand, Staatsstreich, Attentat. Der Kampf der Opposition gegen Hitler, Munich, 1985, p 66f; Müller, Heer und Hitler, p 276f; Fest, Joachim, Staatsstreich. Der lange Weg zum 20. Juli, Berlin, 1994, p 65.

  27 Höhne, Canaris, p 254, from a communication from Halder to the MGFA.

  28 Draft notes, Christine v. Dohnanyi, IfZ, ZS 603, folio 4.

  29 On Dohnanyi, see principally Smid, Marikje, Hans von Dohnanyi – Christine Bonhoeffer: Eine Ehe im Widerstand gegen Hitler, Gütersloh, 2002, p 185ff.

  30 Quoted from Janssen and Tobias, Sturz, p 120.

  31 Ibid, p 121. Janssen and Tobias put forward the argument that Gmtner helped Hitler out of his quandary by anticipating the verdict and thus accelerating Fritsch’s downfall. Kershaw, Hitler ìў¡6-ìў45, p 99, considers that the opinion inverted all standard rules ofjustice.

  32 Smid, Dohnanyi – Bonhoeffer, p 186.

  33 Draft, Christine v. Dohnanyi, IfZ, ZS 603, folio 4.

  34 Bosch, Hermann, Heeresrichter Dr. Karl Sack im Widerstand, Munich, 1967, p 51; Deutsch, Harold C, Das Komplott oder die Entmachtung der Generale. Blomberg- und Fritsch-Krise, Hitlers Weg zum Krieg, Eichstätt, 1974, p 253.

  35 Krausnick, ‘Vorgeschichte’, p 308; Müller, Heer und Hitler, p 284f; Hoffmann, Widerstand, p 65.

  36 Thun-Hohenstein, Verschwörer, p 67.

  37 Müller, Heer und Hitler, p 278; Hoffmann, Widerstand, p 65; Gisevius, Bis zum betteren Ende, vol 1, p 4o8ff.

  38 Müller, Heer und Hitler, p 282.

  39 Hoffmann, Widerstand, p 68; Müller, Heer und Hitler, p 283; Fest, Staatsstreich, p 65.

  40 Quoted from Kershaw, Hitler 1936–194$, p 103.

  41 Ibid, p 101.

  42 Keitel’s instruction of 7 February 1938, reproduced in Müller, Heer und Hitler, document 35, p 641. For the divergent plans of the Army and Navy Commands to the Wehrmacht leadership in the spring of 1938 see DHffer, Jost, ‘Uberlegungen von Kriegsmarine und Heer zur Wehrmachtspitzengliederung und zur Führung der Wehrmacht im Kriege im Februar-Marz 1938’, Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen 9, 197Ĩ, pp І45–7Ī.

  43 Abshagen, Canaris, p 70.

  44 Letter by Fritsch addressed, but not sent, to the commanding generals, May 1938, in Mühleisen, ‘Fritsch-Krise’, document 6, p 492.

  45 Statement dictated by Fritsch, 23 February 1938, in Mühleisen, ‘Fritsch-Krise’, document 3, p 487.

  46 Fritsch’s closing address to the Reich War Court, 17 March 1938, in Mühleisen, ‘Fritsch-Krise’, document 4, p 488.

  47 Jodl diaries, 10 February 1938, in IMG, vol XXVIII, p 367.

  48 Longhand draft, Fritsch, in Mühleisen, ‘Fritsch-Krise’, document 7, p 499.

  49 Statement by Gisevius, in IMG, vol XII, p 222.

  50 Janssen and Tobias, Stur
z, p 164f.

  51 Müller, Heer und Hitler, p 279.

  52 ‘Niederschrift eines Vortrags des Chefs der Amtsgruppe Ausland/Abwehr, Konteradmiral Canaris, anläßlich einer Ic-Besprechung im OKW am 3. Marz 1938’, printed in Müller, Heer und Hitler, document 36, pp 641–5.

  53 Ibid, p 642.

  54 Ibid, p 643.

  55 Ibid, p 644.

  56 Quoted from Höhne, Canaris, p 260.

  57 ‘Niederschrift eines Vortrags des Chefs der Amtsgruppe Ausland/Abwehr, Konteradmiral Canaris, anläßlich einer Ic-Besprechung im OKW am 3. Marz 1938’, p 645.

  58 What transpired in the remaining days before the trial began is also disputed. Ex-Adjutant Hossbach and OKW legal expert Heinrich Rosenberger were concerned for the safety of Rittmeister Frisch and had asked Canaris to ask Gürtner to ensure his safety; Gürtner refused, saying that it was up to the Wehrmacht to do so. Canaris and Rosenberger then attempted unsuccessfully to convince Keitel to protect Frisch (Janssen and Tobias, Sturz, p 171f). Another version states that Canaris did not take the fears seriously, and Frisch was then arrested by the Gestapo. Canaris had photographed the Gestapo papers, as a life policy for Frisch. Höhne, Canaris, p 267). Janssen and Tobias refer to the statement of Kriminaldirektor Erich Sander, in which Frisch was never arrested (Janssen and Tobias, Sturz, p 172). No less controversial is the alleged additional interrogation of Generaloberst Fritsch on 20 February by the Gestapo at a Wannsee villa. This neutral venue had been chosen at Keitel’s suggestion because Canaris, Goltz and Oster feared for Fritsch’s life (Höhne, Canaris, p 265). Janssen and Tobias doubt such an interrogation took place, since neither Goltz nor Fritsch mentioned it in their memoirs (Janssen and Tobias, Sturtz, p 163). This is supported by Fritsch’s longhand draft in Mühleisen, ‘Fritsch-Krise’, document 7, p 501, with n 179. Here Fritsch wrote that he was interrogated by the Gestapo twice (27 and 28 January) and by the Reich War Court once (23 February).

  59 Mühleisen, ‘Fritsch-Krise’, p 475 and document 6, pp 491–3.

  60 Longhand draft, Fritsch, in Mühleisen, ‘Fritsch-Krise’, document 7, p 500.

  61 Longhand draft, Fritsch, 18 January 1939, in Mühleisen, ‘Fritsch-Krise’, document 8, p 506.

  62 Blackmailer Schmidt, sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment in 1936, was transferred to Sachsenhausen concentration camp in November 1939 and hanged there on Himmler’s order on 30 October 1942. See letter from Himmler to Goering, 29 July 1942 in Müller, Heer undHitler, document 32, p 637, with appendix at p 638. Goering noted in the margin of the letter: ‘He should have been shot long ago.’

  63 Quoted from longhand draft, Fritsch, in Mühleisen, ‘Fritsch-Krise’, document 7, p 501, n 196.

  64 Anonymous opinion on the case of Generaloberst Freiherrn von Fritsch, reproduced in Müller, Heer und Hitler, document 34, pp 639–40. For the collaboration of Canaris and Hossbach, see Hossbach, Zwischen Wehrmacht und Hitler, p 129. For the origins of the Canaris-Hossbach relationship see Müller, Heer und Hitler, p 280. The Gestapo and SD were convinced after 20 July 1944 that Oster and Dohnanyi were the authors of a document entitled ‘Die Wehrmacht als Machtfaktor im innerpolitischen Kräftespiel’ (The Wehrmacht as a Power Factor in the Internal Political Power Game), appendix to KaltenBrünner’s letter to Bormann, 15 December 1944, in Jacobsen, Opposition, p 529. Janssen and Tobias consider their involvement probable and also attribute to Gisevius a hand as author or contributor, which is not to be inferred from his memoirs (Janssen and Tobias, Sturz, p 190f; Gisevius, Bis zum Bitteren Ende, vol i, p 413. In my opinion too much weight is attached to this part. Also ibid, p 437ff.)

  65 ‘Stellungnahme zum Fall des Generaloberst Freiherrn von Fritsch’, p 640.

  15 A Double Game

  1 Kershaw, Hitler 1936–1945, p 115.

  2 Schmidt, Außenpolitik, p 249; see also Papen, Wahrheit, pp 456 and 460ff.

  3 Kershaw, Hitler 1936–1945, p 116; Schmidt, Außenpolitik, p 250.

  4 Record of conference of 12 February 1938, in ADAP, series D, vol i, no 294, pp 421–4; Kershaw, Hitler 1936–1945, p 116; Schmidt, Außenpolitik, p 251.

  5 Statement Keitel, IMG, vol X, p 568.

  6 Jodl diaries, 13 February 1938, IMG, vol XXVIII, p 367; also IMG, vol II, p 449 and Statement, Keitel, IMG, vol X, p 568.

  7 Höhne, Canaris, p 263.

  8 Jodl diaries, 14 February 1938, IMG, vol XXVIII, p 367.

  9 Nuremberg document 1775-PS, IMG, vol II, p 450.

  10 Statement, Keitel, IMG, vol X, p 568 and vol XI, p 28.

  11 Jodl diaries, 4 March 1938, IMG, vol XXVIII, p 369.

  12 Schmidt, Außenpolitik, p 251; Kershaw, Hitler 1936–1945, p 118f.

  13 Ibid, p 120.

  14 Schmidt, Außenpolitik, p 252f.

  15 Kershaw, Hitler 1936–1945, p 121.

  16 Jodl diaries, 4 March 1938, IMG, vol XXVIII, p 371.

  17 Statement, Keitel, IMG, vol X, p 566; Kershaw, Hitler 1936–1945, p 122.

  18 Müller, Heer und Hitler, p 236.

  19 Statement, Manstein, IMG, vol XX, p 566.

  20 Leverkuehn, Der geheime Nachrichtendienst, p 69.

  21 Kershaw, Hitler 1936–1945, p 125.

  22 Information from Stefanie Lahousen to the author, 3 January 2006; Glaubauf and Lahousen, Lahousen, p 26f; another version with slight differences appears in Brissaud, Canaris, p 154. Brissaud, who gives no sources and relies mainly on personal conversations with former Abwehr colleagues, must be treated with caution, but what he says does not contradict Pruck’s recollection that Canaris spent the night of 13 March in his office. It is very possible that he flew back on the 12th to observe the foreign policy situation (Höhne, Canaris, p 270). Responsibility for the security measures attending Hitler’s entry into Vienna on 14 March was handed to Schellenberg, who flew to V ienna on the night of13 March (Schellenberg, Memoiren, p 53).

  23 Höhne, Canaris, p 270.

  24 Foreign Ministry note, 13 March 1938, in ADAP, series D, vol i, no 372, p 482.

  25 British ambassador Henderson to Generalfeldmarschall Goering, 13 March 1938, in ADAP, series D, vol i, no 376, p 484.

  26 Chargé d’affaires in Rome to Foreign Ministry, 13 March 1938, in ADAP, series D, vol i, no 373, p 482.

  27 Kershaw, Hitler 1936–1945, p 130.

  28 Herbert, Best, p 234.

  29 Statement, Lahousen, IMG, vol 2, p 491. According to Stefanie Lahousen, the main purpose of Marogna-Redwitz’s suggestion that Canaris should take Lahousen with him to Berlin was to rid himself of an unsettled colleague in Vienna by elegantly ‘pushing him upstairs’.

  30 See Groscurth, Helmuth, Tagebüchereines Abwehroffiziers 1938–1940, edited by Helmut Krausnick and Harold C Deutsch, Stuttgart, 1970, here Introduction, pp 15–95; referred to hereafter as Krausnick, Deutsch and Kotze, Einführung, also ‘Groscurth diaries’.

  31 From Abshagen, Canaris, p 182. [Translator’s note: an Ostmärker was an Austrian Nazi in favour of Austria becoming a German province.]

  32 Letter, Lahousen to Otto Benninghoff, 23 October 1954, IfZ, ZS 658, folio 12.

  33 ‘Die nationalpolitische Stellung des Offiziers in der Deutschen Wehrmacht’, Address by Vizeadmiral Canaris, OKW, 22 April in Vienna, IfZ, FD 47.There is no indication of where this conference was held or to whom the speech was made, and after the war Lahousen could not help with this information (see letter to Otto Benninghoff, IfZ, ZS 658, folio 12). Details here from Höhne, Canaris, p 275. Stefanie Lahousen remains of the opinion that this was mere ‘window dressing’ by Canaris and in no way reflected his real attitude.

  34 Address, Canaris, IfZ, FD 47.

  35 Ibid, p 2.

  36 Ibid, p 5.

  37 ‘Merkblatt über Spionage, Spionageabwehr und Landesverrat’, with annotation by Rudolf Bamler, BA-MA, RW 5/196 b, folios 22–6.

  38 Personal service record, Hans Oster, original at BA-MA, copy at IfZ, folio 87, Thun-Hohenstein, Verschwörer, p 33.

  39 Ibid, p 34.

  40 Ibid, p 4of.

  41 Ibid
, pp 42 and 277, n 53.

  42 Personal service record, Oster, IfZ, folio 87.

  43 Thun-Hohenstein, Verschwörer, p 51f.

  44 Ibid, p 120.

  45 Meinl, Nationalsozialisten, p 44.

  46 Ibid, p 244k For more on Heinz see: Meinl, Susanne and Krüger, Dieter, ‘Der politische Weg des Friedrich Wilhelm Heinz. Vom FreikorpsKämpfer zum Leiter des Nachrichtendienstes im Bundeskanzleramt’, Vierteljahrshefte far Zeitgeschichte 42, 1994, pp 39–69.

  47 Letter signed by Canaris, i May 1937, regarding the restructure of IIIc on 22 April 1937, BA-MA, RW 5/196a, folio 34.

  48 Ibid, p 255f.

  49 Affidavit, Lahousen, Seefeld, 27 January 1948, IfZ, ZS 658, folios 50–4.

  50 Glaubauf and Lahousen, Lahousen, p 28; Thun-Hohenstein, Verschwörer, pp 120 and 284, n 7. According to this account, Lahousen told Achim Oster after the war how his father had received him and how this welcome had very much surprised him.

  51 From Meinl, Nationalsozialisten, p 253.

  52 Meyer, Winifried, Unternehmen Sieben – Eine Rettungsakton für vom Holocaust Bedrohte aus dem Amt Ausland/Abwehr im Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, Frankfurt am Main, 1993, p 112f; Meinl, Nationalsozialisten, p 253.

  53 Ibid, p 252.

  54 Opinion of General (retd) Erwin Lahousen, 28 August 1952, IfZ, ZS 658, folio 6.

  55 Höhne, Heinz, ‘Canaris und die Abwehr zwischen Anpassung und Opposition’, in Schmädecke, Jürgen, and Steinbach, Peter (eds), Der Widerstand gegen den Nationalsozialismus. Die deutsche Gesellschaft und der Widerstand gegen Hitler, Munich, Ĭ:985, p 407.

  56 Letter, Canaris to OKM, OKH and OKL, 31 March 1938, BA-MA, RW 5/v. 197, folio 24.

  57 Meinl, Nationalsozialisten, p 272.

  58 Ibid p 273.

  59 Ibid, p 272.

  60 Höhne, Canaris, p 275f.

  61 Report, Vizeadmiral a.D. Leopold Bürkner, 22 August 1960, ‘Die “Abteilung späterAmtsgruppe Ausland” im “Amt Ausland/Abwehr” des Oberkommandos der ehemaligen deutschen Wehrmacht’, BA-MA, RW 5/278, folios 1–9, here folio 4.

  16 Between Obedience and Conscience

  1 Schmidt, Außenpolitik, p 261.

  2 Ibid; see also Röhr, Werner, ‘Das Sudetendeutsche Freikorps -Diversionsinstrument der Hitler-Regierung bei der Zerschlagung derTschechoslowakei’, Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen 52, 1993, p 36; Smelser, Ronald M, Das Sudetenproblem unddas Dritte Reich 1933–1938, Munich and Vienna, 1980, p 193ff; Kershaw, Hitler 1936–1945, p 148.