Sixth Century BCE to Seventeenth Century
Page 32
For the person who knows the meaning of the rites must roam beyond
the realm so as to keep order in the mundane sphere, must cling to the
mother in order to preserve the son, must acknowledge his feelings and
straightaway act accordingly. Should he display anxiety about his reputa-
tion or be restricted by the formalities, then his fi lial piety will not be
sincere and his compassion will not be genuine. Father and son, elder
brother and younger (as formalized relationships, make one) hold feel-
ings that lead to mutual deceptions. How can that be the larger meaning
of the rites?86
Here Guo Xiang charged that the Confucian ritual system of his time was de-
void of meaning because it could no longer freely express the true feelings of
man. Quite to the contrary, it had been formalized to the point of sheer artifi ci-
ality.87 Guo Xiang’s interpretation of “rituals” and “feelings” as antithetical to
each other proves beyond dispute that in the early fourth century, the Neo-
Daoists were still grappling with the prob lem of freedom of the individual in
the face of a strong and deep- rooted Confucian ritual order.
The Neo- Daoist revolt against the ritual order was more radical, widespread,
and profound than its attack on the po liti cal order. The reason for this is not
diffi
cult to see. The confl ict between feelings and rituals arose, after all, from
the everyday experiences of the spiritually liberated individual who was caught
between the growing need to express freely and openly his personal feelings
on the one hand and the inadequacy of the existing ritualistic forms on the
other. Naturally, the Neo- Daoist individualist would not hesitate to do away
with “rituals” whenever and wherever they proved to be in the way of free emo-
tional expression. Thus, when someone chided Ruan Ji for having violated ritu-
als by saying good- bye to his sister- in- law, he replied: “ Were the rites estab-
lished for people like me?” 88 In response to a criticism of his excessive grief
indi v idua l is m a nd t h e ne o - daois t m ov e m e n t 155
over the loss of a son, Wang Rong said: “a sage forgets his feelings; the lowest
beings aren’t even capable of having feelings. But the place where feelings are
most concentrated is precisely among people like ourselves.” 89 Needless to say,
for individualists like Ruan Ji and Wang Rong, it was far more meaningful to
be true to one’s au then tic self than to conform to a ste reo typed social norm. It
was precisely this search for inner authenticity that turned individualists of the
period away from Confucian ritualism.
An inside view that links the rise of Neo- Daoism to the self- discovery and
self- awareness of the individual has been provided by Xi Kang. In a debate on
the nature of Confucian learning, he explained why the Six Classics were unac-
ceptable to him:
The emphasis of the Six Classics is placed mainly on repression whereas
human nature experiences joy in the following of desires. Repression
goes against a man’s inclinations; he attains to naturalness by following
his desires. Therefore it follows that attainment of naturalness does not
come from the repressive Six Classics, and preservation of man’s nature
does not need a base in rituals and laws which run counter to feelings.90
Thus, in the fi nal analy sis, it was Xi Kang’s profound resentment of ritualistic
repression that led him to reject Confucianism. In a letter to a friend, he fur-
ther explained how he was drawn to the Daoist view:
Further, I was long left to my own devices, and my disposition became
arrogant and careless, my bluntness diametrically opposed to etiquette;
laziness and rudeness reinforcing each other. . . . Besides, my taste for
in de pen dence was aggravated by my reading of Zhuangzi and Laozi; as a
result, my desire for fame and success grew daily weaker, and my commit-
ment to freedom increasingly fi rmer.91
Here, we are told, it was love of in de pen dence and freedom that pushed him to
Daoism. These two self- revelatory accounts are complementary, and together
they reveal most vividly the inner dimensions of the rise of the Neo- Daoist
movement.
In view of the evidence we have examined thus far, the transition from Confu-
cian classical scholarship to Neo- Daoist metaphysics may be more intelligently
interpreted as what Michel Foucault calls a “rupture” in Chinese consciousness.
It was clearly the case that neo- Daoist metaphysics was not established in the
places formerly occupied by Confucian classical scholarship, but in an area
where the latter simply did not exist.92 Han Confucianism was ultimately con-
cerned with the collective life in an imperial order, and Wei- Jin Neo- Daoism
with the prob lem of freedom of the individual. The transition from one to the
other was by no means a smooth one. Viewed from this perspective, it may
156 indi v idua l is m a nd t h e ne o - daois t m ov e m e n t
justifi ably be contended that the central historical signifi cance of the develop-
ment of Pure Conversation lies in the emergence of a totally new mode of
discourse—an individualistic mode of discourse that superseded the old, col-
lectivistic one of the Han Period.
R E C O N C I L I AT I O N B E T W E E N D A O I S T
I N D I V I D U A L I S M A N D C O N F U C I A N R I T U A L I S M
So as not to overstate the case of Wei- Jin individualism, we must, in conclud-
ing, say something about the ritualistic side of the coin. Throughout the period
under consideration, Confucian ritualism with its marked emphasis on moral
order and conformity never ceased to be a social and intellectual force with
vigor and vitality. Side by side with the new individualistic type of familial rela-
tionships described above there also existed a sharply contrasting type of family
order. The case of He Zeng
(199–278) may be proff ered as an illustrative
example. His was prob ably a family life of the most ritualistic kind. He was not
only a well- known fi lial son of the day but also maintained a highly formalized
relationship with his wife throughout his life. In his old age, we are told, he saw
his wife only two or three times a year; each time, he was formally dressed and
treated her in strict accordance with the Confucian etiquette between host and
guest.93 He was clearly following a ritualistic tradition of the Han Period that
managed the private house hold in the manner of the “government offi
ce.”94
Little won der that he found Ruan Ji’s transgression of mourning rites abso-
lutely intolerable and proposed to have him banished “beyond the sea.”95
It is in ter est ing to note that there are also indications of a strug gle between
Confucian ritualism and Neo- Daoist naturalism as two competing ways of life.
The following story will help to illuminate this contest:
Wang Rong and He Qiao
(d. 292) experienced the loss of a parent
at the same time, and both were praised for their fi lial devotion. Wang,
reduced to a skeleton, kept to his bed; while He, wailing and weeping,
performed all the rites. Emperor
Wu
(r. 265–290) remarked to Liu
Yi
, “Have you ever observed Wang Rong and He Qiao? I hear that
He’s grief and suff ering go beyond what is required by propriety, and it
makes me worry about him.”
Liu Yi replied: “He Qiao, even though performing all the rites, has suf-
fered no loss in his spirit or health. Wang Rong, even though not per-
forming the rites, is nonetheless so emaciated with grief that his bones
stand out. Your servant is of the opinion that He Qiao’s is the fi lial devo-
tion of life, while Wang Rong’s is the fi lial devotion of death. Your Majesty
should not worry about Qiao, but rather about Rong.”96
indi v idua l is m a nd t h e ne o - daois t m ov e m e n t 157
In the fi nal analy sis, the strug gle is clearly reducible to a contest between “ritu-
als” ( li ) and “feelings” ( qing ) . The story is unmistakably pro- Daoist in tone,
however. The judgment that Wang Rong surpassed He Qiao in fi lial devotion
suggests that Neo- Daoist naturalism could beat Confucian ritualism on the lat-
ter’s own ground. On the other hand, the story also reveals that at the end of the
Western Jin, Confucian ritualism, though crippled by a social and spiritual cri-
sis that had lasted for a century, was still very much alive.
The controversy over “feelings” and “rituals” was carried to the south by
Western Jin émigrés during the early de cades of the fourth century. It took at
least another century to bring the debate to a conclusion. The end of the contro-
versy was not as vis i ble and colorful as the beginning had been, but from the
historical point of view, it was as impor tant.
By the middle of the fourth century, Neo- Daoist naturalism and Confucian
ritualism began to show signs of reconciliation. We fi nd, for example, that the
idea of “rituals” was no longer being treated with contempt and resentment by
the elite. On the contrary, they came to the realization that interpersonal feel-
ings cannot be meaningfully and fully expressed without a sensitive ritual
system in the fi rst place. Thus, speaking of both the ruler– subject and father– son
relationships, Yuan Hong (328–376) could now say that their handling required
the presence of both “feelings” and “rituals” at the same time.97 How is such a
drastic change in attitude to be accounted for? To answer this question, atten-
tion must be drawn to a quiet but enduring movement in ritual reforms trace-
able to as early as the middle of the third century. It is particularly signifi cant
that the emphasis of the reform movement was focused quite specifi cally on
the mourning rites, the very battleground on which, as we have seen, wars had
been fought between Confucian ritualists and Neo- Daoist naturalists. The move-
ment was by no means a Confucian mono poly. As a matter of fact, Neo- Daoist
participants were just as active in it. Especially with the founding of the refugee
regime in the south, the study of the mourning rites gained an unpre ce dented
popularity. Leading specialists in the fi eld included not only Confucianists and
Neo- Daoists but Buddhists as well.
Ritual studies during the period are too complicated to be discussed here.
For our purposes, however, it will suffi
ce to note that the spirit of the reform
movement consisted in the particularization of the rites with a view to satisfy-
ing, as much as pos si ble, the individuated feelings of the members of each
mourning community.98 In this way, the reformists claimed that they had com-
pletely renovated the ritual system, thereby making it, once again, an eff ective
vehicle for the free expression of personal feelings. Thus, we see that along
with the self- discovery and self- awareness of the individual, there was also a
genuine search for ritualization throughout the Wei- Jin Period. Ironically
enough, even Pure Conversation, the very symbol of Wei- Jin individualism, be-
came highly ritualized in the course of its development. To qualify as a Pure
158 indi v idua l is m a nd t h e ne o - daois t m ov e m e n t
Conversationalist, for instance, one had to be trained in the art of speech, in-
cluding voice and logic,99 to know how to gesticulate the fl y whisk properly,100 to
be well versed in the three metaphysical works (the Classic of Changes, the
Laozi, and the Zhuangzi), and, above all, to belong to the elite circle.101 Wang
Sengqian’s
(426–485) letter to his son contains the following in ter est ing
admonition:
You have read only about fi ve feet each of the scrolls of the Laozi and the
Classic of Changes. You have neither known what Wang Bi and He Yan
had to say, nor the diff erences between the commentaries of Ma (Rong)
and Zheng (Xuan), nor (Wang Bi’s Laozi) zhi ( - lüe) and ( Zhouyi) li ( - lüe) .
And yet you have already picked up the fl y whisk and styled yourself a
Conversationalist. Nothing is more dangerous than this. Suppose Prefect
Yuan (Can,
420–477) asks you to talk about the Classic of Changes,
Palace Secretary Xie (Zhuang,
421–466) challenges you to a discus-
sion on the Zhuangzi, or Mr. Zhang (Xu,
433?–490?) questions you
about the Laozi, can you answer by admitting that you have not read
them? Pure Conversation is like the game of archery: the player must
always be aware of the marks already hit by others. A player who knows
nothing about them simply loses the game.102
This is a most vivid account of the basic intellectual qualifi cations of a Pure
Conversationalist. Clearly, by the middle of the fi fth century, Pure Conversa-
tion had developed a ritual framework of its own. It fi ts remarkably well with
Foucault’s description of the socie ties of discourse “whose function is to pre-
serve discourse by producing it in a restricted group.”103 Thus, with the teach-
ing of names fi rmly established on the basis of naturalness, and “rituals” on
that of “feelings,” as it were, a balance between order and individuality was
restored at long last.
not e s
1.
See Lu Xun
, “Wenhua pianzhi lun”
, in Lu Xun quanji
, 20
vols. (Beijing: Renmin wenxue, 1973), 1:45–46.
2.
Bohu tongde lun, SBCK chu, 7.58; Fung Yu- lan, A History of Chinese Philosophy, trans.
Derk Bodde, 2 vols. (Prince ton: Prince ton University Press, 1953), 2:44.
3. Yü
Ying-
shih
, Lishi yu sixiang
(Taipei: Lianjing, 1976), 39–41.
4.
HHS, 12 vols. (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1959), 5.1554; T’ung- tsu Ch’ü, Law and Society in Tra-
ditional China (Paris: Mouton, 1961), 279.
5.
HHS, 10.2775.
6.
Ruan Ji ji
(Shanghai: Guji, 1978), 66. For En glish translation, see Kung- chuan
Hsiao, A History of Chinese Po liti cal Thought, trans. Frederick W. Mote, 2 vols. (Prince ton:
indi v idua l is m a nd t h e ne o - daois t m ov e m e n t 159
Prince ton University Press, 1979), 1:622–623, and Donald Holzman, Poetry and Politics:
The Lif
e and Works of Juan Chi, a.d. 210– 263 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 195–196.
7. For more details, see Yü Ying- shih, “Mingjiao weiji yu Wei- Jin shifeng di zhuanbian”
, originally published in Shihuo
9, nos. 7–8 (November
1979): 2–4; now collected in Zhongguo zhishi jieceng shilun
(Taipei:
Lianjing, 1980), 333–337.
8. BPZ, 4 vols., WYWK, 4:773–774; En glish translation in Wolfgang Bauer, China and the
Search for Happiness, trans. Michael Shaw (New York: Seabury Press, 1976), 138–139.
9. Yang Bojun
, Liezi jishi
(Shanghai: Longmen, 1958), 102; A. C. Graham,
trans., The Book of Lieh Tzu (London: John Murray, 1960), 102. As Graham rightly
points out in his introduction, the consensus among scholars in China is that the Lieh
Tzu is a product of the third century c.e. Most of these scholarly opinions are now
con ve niently collected in Yang Bojun’s Liezi jishi, 185–245.
10.
Wang Wengong wenji
, 2 vols. (Shanghai: Renmin, 1974), 2:439. See Chen
Yinke
, Tao Yuanming zhi sixiang yu qingtan zhi guanxi
(Chengdu: Harvard- Yenching Institute, 1945), 52–53.
11. See passages quoted in Yü Ying- shih, “Mingjiao weiji,” 336 and n6.
12. For a general study of Wei- Jin anarchism, see Tan Jiajian
, “Lüe lun Wei- Jin shiqi
di wujunlun sichao”
, Zhongguo zhexue
2 (March
1980): 120–136.
13. Fuzi
(Writings of Fu Xuan
), quoted in SGZ, punctuated edition, 5 vols. (Bei-
jing: Zhonghua, 1959), 2:213; ZZTJ, 20 vols. (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1956), 5:2018–2019.
14.
Colin Morris, The Discovery of the Individual, 1050– 1200 (London: S.P.C.K. [for the
Church History Society], 1972), 160.
15. Weishu
, quoted in SGZ, 1:260.
16.
HHS, 8.2278.
17. Jinshu
, 10 vols. (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1974), 5.1360.
18.
BPZ, 3:509.
19. Richard B. Mather, trans., Shih- shuo hsin- yü: A New Account of Tales of the World (Min-
neapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1976), 485.
20. SGZ, 3:647. See Mori Mikisaburō
, “Gi- Shin jidai ni okeru ningen no hak-
ken”
, Tôyô bunka no mondai
1 (June 1949):
146–147.
21.