Sixth Century BCE to Seventeenth Century
Page 67
“speech” if a “theory of language” is to be attributed to Jiao Hong at all. On the
other hand, the word “doctrine,” though undoubtedly the closest En glish equiv-
alent for yan in the pres ent context, is nevertheless too confi ning to serve the
author’s dialogical purpose.
However, all the falsifi cations and manipulative translations done to the
note on “Zhuzi” discussed above are nothing compared to what I am going to
say below. The most shocking discovery I have made about this par tic u lar text
is that it is not Jiao Hong’s writing at all. With the exception of the two or three
introductory sentences, it turns out that this lengthy note was authored by Zhao
Zhenji
(Mengjing
, 1508–1576), and Jiao Hong also stated the fact in
no uncertain terms in his brief introduction. I have confi rmed Jiao Hong’s
statement in a Ming edition of Zhao Zhenji’s writings in the collection of the
Gest Oriental Library at Prince ton University. The entire note is practically a
verbatim quotation from Zhao Zhenji’s “Third Letter to Educational Intendant
Wang” in Zhao Wensu Gong wenji
, compiled by none other than
Li Zhi.59 We are almost sure that Jiao Hong must have copied Zhao’s letter from
this edition.
It is common knowledge that Jiao Hong’s Bicheng, like all the other biji
notebooks of its kind, consists mostly of quotations from works by earlier or
con temporary scholars. Methodologically, it is not permissible for an intellec-
tual historian to simply take these quotations as Jiao Hong’s own writings. The
author’s attitude toward his sources is so uncritical, however, that he feels no
need at all to distinguish Jiao Hong’s own texts from texts merely quoted by
him. On the contrary, he takes it for granted that a word quoted is also a word
owned by Jiao Hong. Thus, throughout this study, we fi nd that ideas of Yang
Jian
(1140–1226), Li Heng
(1100–1178), Su Shi, Geng Dingxiang, and
many others are often presented directly as Jiao Hong’s own.60 As a result, we
are unable to judge whether this book is a study of Jiao Hong’s thoughts, or of
ideas held by a variety of writers in diff er ent periods of Chinese intellectual his-
tory. The lengthy note on “Zhuzi” is also a case in point, but it is a case that
deserves special attention because several impor tant conclusions in this study
are built on the basis of this single note.
Allow me to give two more examples. First, an amusing one:
Jiao Hong said that he had very much wanted to write a book to exonerate
all the phi los o phers who had been attacked by Zhu Xi, and thereby to
340 t h e in t e l le c t ua l wor l d of j i ao hong r e v isi t ed
demonstrate that they “each had a purpose ( zong) in their learning.” After
some consideration, however, he gave up on the idea, knowing that such
a book “would involve a great deal” and that he “might not be able to get it
done soon.” Nevertheless, we may regard as a minor fulfi llment of this
wish the prefaces that he wrote to the “Phi los o phers” ( tzu
) section of
his Bibliographical Treatise, where he discussed the reasons for all the sev-
enteen schools of his classifi cation and may therefore be said to have
demonstrated that they “each had a purpose.” (69)
This account is amusing because its textual basis is again the note on “Zhuzi.”
Needless to say, it was Zhao Zhenji, not Jiao Hong, who had wanted to write
such a book.61 It is really amazing that in this case, Jiao Hong is made not only
to take possession of Zhao’s unwritten book but even to have fulfi lled a wish
that he had never had in the fi rst place.
However, a much more serious example concerns Jiao Hong and the origin
of the “evidential research.” The author writes:
Jiao Hong desired to thematize the intentionality of all the phi los o phers
attacked by Zhu Xi so that he could demonstrate that they “each had a
purpose in their learning.” This concern for textuality accounts for his
interest in philology and phonetics, which could help him overcome the
technical multiplicity of language and thereby restore and reapprehend a
text in its original materiality as a linguistic presence. (181)
I cannot pretend to understand all the foggy abstractions in this passage such
as “intentionality,” “textuality,” “materiality,” “linguistic presence,” etc., which
seem to be gaining currency in some circles of Chinese studies relating to phi-
losophy and intellectual history as if they were credentials of philosophical
competence and intellectual depth. If I may hazard a guess, however, I think
what the passage is saying is, in plain En glish, that Jiao Hong’s interest in “evi-
dential research” grew out of his philosophical stance as a pluralist and syncre-
tist who wanted to understand each and every text in terms of the language in
which it had been originally written. Whether this interpretation is valid or not
is a matter that I shall discuss at a later juncture. For the time being, let us just
accept it as it stands. Nevertheless, by now it must be clear to the reader that the
whole argument is once more based on Zhao Zhenji’s “Third Letter to Educa-
tional Intendant Wang.” Hence, if the author is right, then the intellectual his-
tory of Ming- Qing China must be thoroughly revised to reinstate Zhao Zhenji
as a true founder of the school of “evidential research,” for the kind of “concern
for textuality,” if indeed accountable for the rise of “evidential research” as the
author has emphatically and repeatedly insisted in this book, is clearly Zhao
Zhenji’s, not Jiao Hong’s.
t h e in t e l le c t ua l wor l d of j i ao hong r e v isi t ed 341
“ R A G E O F C O H E R E N C E ”
Throughout this study, Jiao Hong has been presented as a late Ming Neo-
Confucian syncretist who was able, supposedly, “to integrate and hold in bal-
ance the divergent systems of Buddhism, Daoism, and Confucianism from
which his own philosophy evolved as a synthesis” (46). The concept “synthesis”
indeed holds the key to the author’s interpretation of Jiao Hong. All of Jiao
Hong’s ideas and works, though apparently unrelated to or inconsistent with
one another, are interpreted as systematic and consistent at a deeper structural
level by reference to the alleged “synthesis.” Jiao Hong’s use of Buddhist and Dao-
ist ideas, for example, is thus said to be “governed by a systematicity which co-
heres with the discursive regularity of his thought as a holistically monistic for-
mation” (242). Even Jiao Hong’s “evidential research” is also seen as an outgrowth
of his philosophical “synthesis.” True, sometimes an intellectual historian can
be very enlightening when he is able to penetrate beyond surface inconsisten-
cies to hidden connections, structural or other wise. However, when he allows
this “rage of coherence” to run wild in a state of methodological anarchy, he is
surely heading for disaster, with the result that historical reconstruction be-
comes indistinguishable from fabrication.62
As the author repeatedly assures us, Jiao Hong’s “synthesis was not indis-
criminate jumping” (181, 189). If so, Jiao Hong could not possibly have developed
a philosophical synthesis without being aware of it himself. We must therefore
fi rst determine what his attitude toward “synthesis” was. According to the au-
thor: “In his tombstone inscription for Guan [Zhidao
, 1536–1608], Jiao
Hong characterized Guan in terms that could well have applied to himself. He
said that Guan ‘attempted to encompass The Three Teachings and fuse the Nine
Schools of thought in order to formulate a doctrine of his own’ ” (38–39). Here
the author is actually following a suggestion originally made by Rong Zhaozu,
though he does not acknowledge it.63 To characterize Jiao Hong in this way is
quite wide of the mark, however. It is directly contradicted by Jiao Hong’s self-
portrait sketched specifi cally as a contrast to Guan Zhidao. In his letter to Guan,
Jiao Hong said: “What you have wanted to accomplish is a grand synthesis of
Confucianism and Chan Buddhism that is broadly inclusive. On my part, how-
ever, I am rather troubled by the fact that I have not been thoroughly enlight-
ened about Mind and Nature. What I am after is very limited in scope. The dif-
ference between the two of us is one of quantity.” 64 This self- analy sis practically
leaves no room for any suggestion that Jiao Hong was interested in “synthesis,”
despite his great diversity of intellectual pursuits and enormous erudition.
What he said in the rest of the letter is no less in ter est ing. He emphasized
that what he really needed was some simple but true faith to help him overcome
the ever- intensifying dread as death was drawing near. He asked if Guan could
342 t h e in t e l le c t ua l wor l d of j i ao hong r e v isi t ed
enlighten him on this matter in the simplest terms. What is particularly note-
worthy is the following confessional sentence in the letter: “I now deeply regret
that throughout my life, I have played games with empty ideas and doctrines.”
This letter explains a great deal about why at a deep emotional level, Jiao Hong
was always committed to Buddhism. As he said elsewhere, what initially aroused
a person’s interest in Buddhism must always be the fear of death, which can
be transcended only after he has acquired Buddha’s wisdom. The fear of death,
he further remarked, is actually the gateway to the Dao. To deny that one is
concerned about death at all, as some Confucians have done, is simply self-
deception.65 We may therefore assume that it was his search for some simple,
true faith to cope with deep personal concerns about life and death that drew
Jiao Hong ever increasingly into Buddhism. As he explic itly stated, “The princi-
ple of Nature and Destiny” is more fully elucidated in Buddhism than in either
Confucianism or Daoism.66
His brief encounter with Luo Rufang in Nanjing, prob ably in 1586, also con-
fi rms his mentality as revealed in the above- quoted letter to Guan Zhidao. After
listening to Luo Rufang’s lectures on the Confucian ethical teaching delivered
at his residence, Jiao Hong expressed a mild disappointment, and asked Luo
why he withheld the highest truth in Buddhist and Confucian teachings from
his audience. By this, Jiao Hong referred specifi cally to the Buddhist doctrine
concerning “Seeing Nature and Becoming Buddha” with which, we are now told,
he was then deeply concerned.67 Later, after Luo Rufang returned home, he wrote
a letter to Jiao Hong in which he made the telling point that the realization of ren,
or “humanity,” consists in caring for the suff ering of other people, not suiting
one’s personal spiritual needs.68 Clearly, the letter was intended as a subtle criti-
cism of Jiao Hong’s preoccupation with personal concerns in his pursuit of the
Dao. Thus, we see that Jiao Hong was indeed revealing his innermost thoughts
to Guan Zhidao when he said that he was, ultimately, seeking to know the truth
about Mind and Nature as a simple faith to live by. “Synthesis” does not seem to
have been his name of the game.
As we all know, Jiao Hong’s philosophical views are expressed, generally,
in a highly fragmented form consisting mostly of isolated remarks on a wide
range of specifi c quotations. To give them clear individual formulations is al-
ready diffi
cult, to determine their originality often unwarranted, and to see all
of them as integral parts of a “synthesis” defi nitely absurd. However, the au-
thor’s claim concerning Jiao Hong’s “synthesis” throughout this study is too
strong to be passed over wholly unnoticed. Since it is practically impossible to
argue with the author point by point, I shall select a few typical examples from
chapter 5, “A Synthetic Neo- Confucianism as Restructured Neo- Confucianism,”
to illustrate some of the diffi
culties involved in the author’s pre sen ta tion of Jiao
Hong’s ideas as a “synthesis.” In all of these cases, I have carefully checked the
author’s reconstructions against the original sources.
t h e in t e l le c t ua l wor l d of j i ao hong r e v isi t ed 343
According to the author, Jiao Hong equated the concept of “impartiality”
( gong
) with “humanity” ( ren
), which he then variously defi ned as: (a)
“awareness” or “enlightenment” ( jue
), (b) as “penetrating the beginning
and end,” (c) as “the mind of humane man . . . in being able to self- establish and
self- penetrate,” and (d) as “generation and regeneration” (207). However, it turns
out that Jiao Hong neither equated “impartiality” with “humanity” nor defi ned
“humanity” in terms of “awareness” or “enlightenment.” In the case of (a), it was
a questioner who asked Jiao Hong whether he would agree with defi ning
“humanity” as “impartiality” or “awareness” as proposed by Song Neo- Confucians.
In his reply, Jiao Hong rather dismissed them as “useless conjectures.” 69 As for
(c) and (d), “self- establish and self- penetrate” is a quote from the Analects (6.30),
and “generation and regeneration” is a quote from a passage of Luo Rufang. In
a word, this reconstruction not only distorts Jiao Hong’s text but is actually
based on a few terms taken out of context from disparate sources without either
logical or historical connections between them. This fi ts admirably well with
what the author calls “indiscriminate lumping.”
In the section “Learning and the Sage,” we are told that:
(a) Jiao Hong considered “learning” as “easy” and “diffi
cult” at the same
time (p. 231, nn. 253–255). The original text talks about the Dao, however, not
“learning” itself. What it says is that to learn the Dao is diffi
cult, whereas ob-
taining the Dao is easy.70
(b) The author attributes to Jiao Hong the view that gradual cultivation requires
constant “eff ort” ( gongfu
), which is to be maintained in the midst of daily ac-
tivity and not to be neglected, even “in moments of haste” or “in seasons of dan-
ger” (
p. 319, n. 257). Again, the topic in the original discussion is not “cultivation”
but “humanity.” Moreover, Jiao Hong emphatically pointed out that “humanity” is
inherent in human nature and therefore must not be mistaken as something ac-
quired through “eff ort” ( gongfu) . The passage says nothing about “learning,”
and the idea that cultivation requires constant “eff ort” is nowhere to be found.71
(c) Jiao Hong is said to have considered “self- confi dence” ( zixin
) as nec-
essary for a person to recover his “lost” mind (p. 231, n. 258). The text is Jiao
Hong’s comment on two passages in the “Zhongyong” (Doctrine of the Mean;
chapters 11 and 12) concerning a person’s inborn ability to understand and prac-
tice the virtue of the mean. Jiao’s comment only says that this ability may be
“lost” unless one has “self- confi dence.” There is defi nitely no “lost” mind to be
recovered.72
(d) To underscore the importance of the idea of self- confi dence to Jiao Hong’s
conception of “learning,” the author cites two more texts to support his argu-
ment (p. 231, n. 259, and p. 232, nn. 260, 261). Unfortunately, neither text has
anything to do with “self- confi dence” ( zixin). Instead, they discuss the Confu-
cian concept of xin in the sense of “having faith” or “believing” in “humanity”
( ren) or the Dao.73
344 t h e in t e l le c t ua l wor l d of j i ao hong r e v isi t ed
In all of the above four cases, distortions may well have resulted from the
author’s misunderstanding of his texts at the linguistic level.
There is one more in ter est ing case to be added. The author quotes Jiao
Hong’s reply to a student’s question saying, “caution, care, dread and fear are
manifestations of the vitality of Nature and Destiny” (p. 240, n. 320). Since the
original text only says, “caution, care, dread and fear are Nature and Destiny,” I
was very puzzled by the phrase “manifestations of vitality.” A further check re-
vealed that it is a translation of the last three characters— sheng yue ran
—
at the end of the paragraph. They are not part of Jiao Hong’s reply but constitute
another in de pen dent sentence meaning something like “comprehension sud-
denly dawned on the student.”74 The author obviously mistakes “student” ( sheng