The Cubs Way

by Tom Verducci

  In 2014 the Cubs were among the nine worst teams in baseball at turning batted balls into outs (68 percent, a rate known as defensive efficiency) and among the nine worst teams when it came to batting average on balls in play against their pitchers (excluding home runs and strikeouts, opposing batters hit .308). In 2015 they flipped the script. They were one of the nine best teams at defensive efficiency (69.5) and one of the nine best teams when it came to batting average on balls in play (.290). Oddly enough, the turnaround began with a hitting coach.

  In December 2014, Epstein hired John Mallee as one of the two Cubs hitting coaches. Mallee, who held a similar job with the Houston Astros, grew up in the south side Chicago neighborhood of Hegewisch. His dad was a Chicago police officer. During the interview process, Mallee mentioned to Epstein how in Houston he benefited from a dedicated support assistant, somebody who could coordinate all things hitting, including scouting reports and video. Epstein liked the idea. He quickly decided to dedicate two “coordinators,” one to oversee the offensive side of the game and one for the defensive side. He named video coordinator Nate Halm, then 29 and a former college catcher, to the position of coordinator, advance scouting. Unofficially, Halm became the “run-production coordinator.”

  As a second coordinator, advance scouting—unofficially, the “run-prevention coordinator”—Epstein hired Tommy Hottovy, then 33, a veteran of 10 minor league seasons who pitched in 17 major league games before he blew out his shoulder in Cubs spring training camp in 2014. While rehabbing his shoulder that summer, Hottovy, who majored in finance with a minor in economics at Wichita State, took a Sabermetrics 101 online course offered by Boston University.

  Backing up the coaches and coordinators were 11 back-office analytical wonks with no playing experience. Epstein may have broadened his scope of player acquisition and development over the years to emphasize character, but he did so as an adjunct, not a replacement, for quantitative analysis. If anything, the Cubs drilled even more deeply into analytics than the Red Sox had under Epstein.

  The 11-member analytics team included Jeremy Greenhouse, who was hired in January 2014, three years after graduating from Tufts University, where he served as president of the Baseball Analysis Club and the Table Tennis Club. The day before his graduation, Greenhouse, then an analyst for Bloomberg Sports, was a co-presenter at a conference at Harvard titled “Sabermetrics, Scouting and the Science of Baseball.” The talk focused on “how Win Probability Added divided by Leveraged Index is calculated, and why he thinks it is a superior stat to Linear Weights.”

  When Epstein hired Maddon, he designated Greenhouse as Maddon’s personal analytics assistant. If Maddon wondered about the optimum situations to bat the pitcher eighth in the lineup, for instance, he could call Greenhouse, who would crunch the numbers to give him an answer.

  Working with Greenhouse was Sean Ahmed, whose title was analyst, research and development. Ahmed earned a degree in economics from the University of Chicago in 2006. Greenhouse and Ahmed were just two of the hundreds of millenials with degrees from elite schools who instead of chasing high-paying jobs on Wall Street and Silicon Valley were entering Major League Baseball, no doubt inspired by people like Epstein. Baseball had come a long way since the mid-’90s, when Epstein occupied a desk with the San Diego Padres that sat between the analytics guy and the scouting guy who had such disregard for one another they didn’t talk to each other.

  What Epstein did in Chicago, starting in 2015, was to blend the two separate silos of information as never before. Ahmed, for instance, is the “defensive specialist” of the research and development department. His job is to crunch the data from advance scouts and game video to draw up models on where best to position the Chicago defenders for each hitter.

  Those models are passed to Hottovy, the bridge between the wonks and the on-field staff who speaks both of their languages. He synthesizes the data with his own observations—he is with the club both home and away and typically watches games in a seat high above the field.

  When it is time to formulate specific game plans for pitching and defense—really, it’s foolish to try to separate the two—Bosio, the pitching coach, is the point person. He oversees Hottovy and catching instructor Mike Borzello in coordinating the overall game plan of how to attack opposing hitters and where to best position the seven players behind the pitcher. Bullpen coach Lester Strode delivers it to the relievers. Third base coach Gary Jones serves as the infield instructor while first base coach Brandon Hyde and bench coach Dave Martinez make in-game positioning adjustments.

  The specifics of pitch calling and sequencing—what, where, and when to throw to individual hitters—is driven by Borzello, a former minor league catcher in the St. Louis Cardinals organization who played in just 42 games over four years with a .151 batting average before his release after the 1994 season. Borzello went home to California to take a job driving a delivery truck for his father, Matt, a childhood friend of Joe Torre in Brooklyn. When the Yankees hired Torre to manage in 1996, Torre invited Mike to try out during spring training for a spot on the Yankees’ support staff. Mike would have to pay his own way. Borzello earned a job as a batting practice pitcher and bullpen catcher. The Yankees players respected Borzello so much that when they won the World Series that year they voted him three-quarters of a World Series share, about $180,000—a generous amount for someone who was neither a player nor a full-time coach. Borzello won three more World Series championship rings in New York before joining Torre in Los Angeles in 2008.

  Borzello’s career reached a turning point in 2009, when veteran catcher Brad Ausmus joined the Dodgers at a time when video scouting information was becoming easily accessible by computer. Twenty of the 30 major league teams at the time, including the Dodgers, were using a video software system called B.A.T.S. from Sydex Sports. The scouting reports that used to take three days of acquiring and breaking down video could be done in 15 minutes. Teams were building “video rooms” around clubhouses to facilitate video study. Ausmus loved digging into the B.A.T.S. system for clues about how to break down opposing hitters.

  “I was lucky enough to sit down with him and learn this new age stuff, and it was enlightening and fun at the same time,” Borzello said. “Brad was all into it. He had a lot of time to study because Russell Martin was playing every day. So Brad was really the one who brought this to the table. I thought, This is really, really important and can change the game.

  “I feel like up until the last couple of years so many pitchers went out there and pitched blind. They just pitched off their strengths. This system points out the weakness of the hitters. Over time the system I used kept evolving—kind of like the Ausmus system on steroids. It’s become really, really, really in depth.”

  After the 2011 season, Dale Sveum, who had been a Red Sox coach in 2004–2005, called Borzello with a tentative job offer.

  “I think I’m going to get the Red Sox managerial job,” Sveum told Borzello. “Would you come with me?”

  “Yeah. Actually, I’m probably going to need a job,” said Borzello, as the Dodgers were in the midst of an ownership change.

  Two days later, Sveum called Borzello back.

  “Would you come if it’s the Cubs?”

  “Sure.”

  “It looks like the Red Sox are going back and forth. It looks like the Cubs are going to offer me the job and I’ll take it. I’d like you with me. I want you to help Bosio and put together an infrastructure of scouting reports like you did with the Dodgers.”

  Epstein and Hoyer did hire Sveum. They gave conditional approval to his hiring of Borzello, but first wanted to meet with Borzello for an interview.

  “I had done a little research going in,” Borzello said. “Dale had already told me they were pretty good guys. I made a couple of calls. I talked to Gary Tuck, who was one of their bullpen coaches in Boston. He told me, ‘You’ll love them.’ I thought, If Tuck loves them they must be great guys. He’s a tough nut to crack.

 
“First, I sat with Jed [Hoyer] for about an hour. It was almost like two fans talking about the team. He was really reflective about the Yankees–Red Sox rivalry in those years and wanted my perspective from the other side. It was a fun, easy conversation. He’s got a great personality anyway, but it was especially fun rehashing those wars we both went through.

  “Then, after we wrapped up, I went into Theo’s office. He was a little more direct, asking me about what I do and what I would bring to the table. And we talked a little more in technical terms about the catching position—essentially what I was being hired to do. It was very in-depth. He said he had heard a lot of good things about me, some things that weren’t as good, and he wanted to hear me out.

  “That was it. I flew out the next day. Randy Bush called me a couple of days later and offered me the job.”

  Officially, his title is catching coach, but not only does Borzello help with game-planning, he also works with the catchers in between innings on scouting reports and pitch selections. When the Cubs come off the field, the catcher will sit next to Borzello and they will review how to pitch at least the next three hitters due up for the opponent. When they are in the field, Borzello stands near the dugout rail to assist in the pitch calling. While he does not call pitches, Borzello is ready with a suggestion if the catcher looks over for help.

  “He is our secret weapon,” Epstein said. “And I mean that sincerely.”

  “Borzy is the best,” Maddon said. “He is the secret weapon. He doesn’t exist anywhere else. You have hitting coaches, assistants to the hitting coach, pitching coaches, assistants to the pitching coach, but nobody else has a Borzello.

  “His ability to break it down is different from anybody else. First of all, it’s the time he puts into it. Then it’s his ability to disseminate data and what he’s seeing and write it down in little boxes to pinpoint what to do and what not to do against certain guys—to the point of certainty. It’s not like he says, ‘Maybe.’ It’s, ‘Do this. Don’t do this.’ There are no maybes.

  “I’ll test him during games. I’ll say, ‘I like this here,’ and he’ll go, ‘Yes,’ or ‘Ahh, I’d rather this.’ He’s very certain. And that’s important. I don’t care if it doesn’t work. He’s very convicted, and I like that a lot.”

  The Cubs reached the 2015 All-Star break with a record of 47–40. But as their run-prevention infrastructure took root in the second half, they became one of the most efficient pitching and defensive teams in baseball. After the All-Star break, they ranked first in strikeouts (677), first in batting average allowed (.234), first in on-base percentage allowed (.291), and third in earned run average (3.42). Most important of all, they ranked first in wins (50, the most for the franchise after the All-Star break since 1945).

  From the whip-smart recent college grads in the back office, to Borzello’s insanely detailed game plans, to Bosio’s physical and mental preparation of his pitchers, to Hottovy’s synthesis of information, the Cubs in 2015 built the baseball equivalent of a Central Intelligence Agency for pitching and defense. Nobody personified the efficacy of this system better than Jake Arrieta. A pitcher once given up as a lost talent by the Baltimore Orioles, Arrieta flourished in the system in the second half of the season. In his 15 starts after the All-Star break Arrieta allowed only nine runs. His 0.75 ERA over 1071⁄3 innings set a record for the lowest second-half ERA since the All-Star Game began in 1933.

  Overall, Arrieta was 22–6 with a 1.77 ERA, the lowest ERA by a Cubs pitcher since Grover Cleveland Alexander in 1920. Only two other pitchers had won so many games with such a low ERA since the mound was lowered in 1969: Dwight Gooden in 1985 and Ron Guidry in 1978.

  The Cubs won 97 games, the third most wins in baseball. The only teams with more happened to play in their same division—St. Louis and Pittsburgh. That meant Chicago’s rewards for 97 victories would be the second wild card and an elimination game on the road—the National League wild card game at Pittsburgh. The good news for the Cubs is that they would put the ball in the hands of Arrieta.

  The routine for Arrieta to prepare for this start, like all of them, begins five hours before he actually takes the mound. It starts with a 40-minute stretching session, in which he pays particular attention to his hips, joints, IT bands, and glutes, and uses a lacrosse ball to roll out his back. Next, he moves to a stationary bike, where for 20 minutes he gets his heart rate up, increases blood flow, and lets “the fascia release.”

  Then it is time for a small plate of food: roasted Brussels sprouts, marinated chicken, and a quinoa chocolate chip cookie, washed down with a cup of carrot juice.

  Next, he finds a quiet place to sit in the players’ lounge, where he watches some video, listens to music, and then meditates.

  “I use that as my time to focus on breathing,” he said. “I feel like we don’t take enough time to put some thought into that. A lot of stress can be relieved by inhaling and exhaling. I’m focusing on one singular thought: How do I create a sense of calm? I want to feel calm and collected with a clarity of mind in what I am doing for the ultimate preparation for how I am about to perform.

  “I feel that meditation is so important for me because there are so many things going on outside of our arena—family, things in the community, health problems with friends or family—and it can be hard to put that aside and just completely focus on this. Sometimes that’s difficult for me, but more times than not I can completely separate the outside world from what I’m about to accomplish.”

  Two hours before game time, Arrieta will start to warm up his body. First he spends 20 minutes on a Pilates reformer, running through a progression of movements designed to “lengthen my obliques, my lats, fire up the shoulders a little bit, get some fast-twitch muscles going, stress every area of the body before moving onto competition.

  “I think preparing the body is very important, not just to perform but to prevent injuries. I think a lot of injuries could be prevented by having a better routine leading into competition.”

  After the work on the reformer, he does some work with stretch bands in the weight room. Then it’s time to put on his uniform. He puts headphones on and listens to mellow electronic music. As a young pitcher, he used to listen to heavy metal to get “pumped up” for a start. Now he has learned that it is more beneficial to “lower the heart rate and calm the mind and the body. When I get out there, I know the energy is going to be there. So I try to conserve as much energy as I can leading into the performance, so when I really need it I can have it out there.”

  After 30 minutes or so, he makes the long, slow walk to the outfield and the bullpen to begin his on-field routine. He will look around the ballpark, taking two or three minutes to simply absorb the atmosphere, and visualize being in the middle of it all on the mound. There is a 2-minute warm-up before he begins to throw. He runs a couple of quick sprints, does a couple of yoga poses, and does a few push-ups.

  Then he takes off his jacket, takes a sip of water, and begins to play catch, starting with throws of about 40 feet, stretching it to as far as 250 feet and bringing it back to 120 feet and then 90 feet. For the last five or six 90-foot throws, he takes a little crow hop and airs out fastballs, curveballs, and changeups.

  Then he is ready to step on the bullpen mound. He always starts out of the stretch position—the abbreviated delivery pitchers use with runners on base—rather than with the full windup, as most pitchers prefer. Arrieta believes in the same philosophy as Hall of Fame pitcher Greg Maddux: the most important pitches a pitcher will have to make will be made out of the stretch. So why not place a premium on practicing out of the stretch?

  His throwing always begins with arm-side four-seam fastballs—four or five of those pitches that Bosio emphasized to help turn around his career. Then he moves to glove-side fastballs. He repeats the sequence with two-seam fastballs.

  “I like to keep as little movement as possible until I get the timing and rhythm down,” he said.

  Next: changeups bounced on
the middle of the plate.

  “I prefer to bounce it on the plate,” he said, “because I know in the game things are going to be going fast, my adrenaline is going to be enhanced a little bit, so I want to put the emphasis on being down.”

  Next: a few slider/cutters, to both sides of the plate.

  Then: a few curveballs, because “once I’m really loose that’s when I’ll really put some spin on it.” Like the changeups, he will try to bounce them on the plate.

  Last: fastballs, first a few elevated, because coming off the curveball, “that’s the combination I like to use quite a bit. Whether I use it in a game or not is one thing, but to me hitters have a very difficult time differentiating when you can throw that high fastball off the same plane as your curveball.” The last two fastballs are thrown right down the middle. He typically throws between 25 and 30 pitches in the bullpen.

  “Then,” he said, “it’s game time. It doesn’t matter who is in the box. I’ve gotten to the point where I respect the competition greatly but at the same time I’ll do whatever I can to beat them.”

  When he climbs the mound and the ball is in his hand, his deep-set eyes and the pitch-black veil of his beard create a slate of emotion that is so blank it borders on disturbing. His gaze and his intentions are as fixed as dried concrete.

  Ask him what he loves most about pitching and he will answer, “Being in control. It’s the only sport where you’re on defense and you have the ball in your hand. That means a lot. Nothing happens until we make it happen. We control the pace of the game. We dictate everything, not only to the other team, to the hitter, but to the crowd and to our guys. I have the ability to set the tone for my fielders, the guys around me.

  “If I have the ability to get three quick outs and get them in the dugout, we have a great shot at getting runs on the board. It’s a big responsibility, but it’s something I really cherish and enjoy.”

  Arrieta completely controlled the Pirates in the 2015 wild card game. He threw the only shutout in postseason history with no walks and as many as 11 strikeouts. It was the pinnacle of one of the great pitching runs of all time. Late in that game, however, Arrieta felt a slight sense of fatigue washing over him.