Complete Works of Xenophon (Illustrated) (Delphi Ancient Classics)

by Xenophon

  They then set forth; but the Athenian horsemen, setting out from Eleusis, had taken dinner at the Isthmus and, after having passed through Cleonae also, chanced to be approaching Mantinea or to be already quartered within the wall in the houses. And when the enemy were seen riding toward the city, the Mantineans begged the Athenian horsemen to help them, if in any way they could; for outside the wall were all their cattle and the labourers, and likewise many children and older men of the free citizens. When the Athenians heard this they sallied forth to the rescue, although they were still without breakfast, they and their horses as well. [16] Here, again, who would not admire the valour of these men also? For although they saw that the enemy were far more numerous, and although a misfortune had befallen the horsemen at Corinth, they took no account of this, nor of the fact that they were about to fight with the Thebans and the Thessalians, who were thought to be the best of horsemen, but rather, being ashamed to be at hand and yet render no service to their allies, just as soon as they saw the enemy they crashed upon them, eagerly desiring to win back their ancestral repute. [17] And by engaging in the battle they did indeed prove the means of saving for the Mantineans everything that was outside the wall, but there fell brave men among them; and those also whom they slew were manifestly of a like sort; for neither side had any weapon so short that they did not reach one another therewith. And the Athenians did not abandon their own dead, and they gave back some of the enemy’s under a truce. [18]

  As for Epaminondas, on the other hand, when he considered that within a few days it would be necessary for him to depart, because the time fixed for the campaign had expired, and that if he should leave behind him unprotected the people to whom he had come as an ally, they would be besieged by their adversaries, while he himself would have completely tarnished his own reputation, — for with a large force of hoplites he had been defeated at Lacedaemon by a few, and defeated likewise in a cavalry battle at Mantinea, and through his expedition to Peloponnesus had made himself the cause of the union of the Lacedaemonians, the Arcadians, the Achaeans, the Eleans, and the Athenians, — he thought for these reasons that it was not possible for him to pass by the enemy without a battle, since he reasoned that if he were victorious, he would make up for all these things, while if he were slain, he deemed that such an end would be honourable for one who was striving to leave to his fatherland dominion over Peloponnesus. [19] Now the fact that Epaminondas himself entertained such thoughts, seems to me to be in no wise remarkable, — for such thoughts are natural to ambitious men; but that he had brought his army to such a point that the troops flinched from no toil, whether by night or by day, and shrank from no peril, and although the provisions they had were scanty, were nevertheless willing to be obedient, this seems to me to be more remarkable. [20] For at the time when he gave them the last order to make ready, saying that there would be a battle, the horsemen eagerly whitened their helmets at his command, the hoplites of the Arcadians painted clubs upon their shields, as though they were Thebans, and all alike sharpened their spears and daggers and burnished their shields. [21] But when he had led them forth, thus made ready, it is worth while again to note what he did. In the first place, as was natural, he formed them in line of battle. And by doing this he seemed to make it clear that he was preparing for an engagement; but when his army had been drawn up as he wished it to be, he did not advance by the shortest route towards the enemy, but led the way towards the mountains which lie to the westward and over against Tegea, so that he gave the enemy the impression that he would not join battle on that day. [22] For as soon as he had arrived at the mountain, and when his battle line had been extended to its full length, he grounded arms at the foot of the heights, so that he seemed like one who was encamping. And by so doing he caused among most of the enemy a relaxation of their mental readiness for fighting, and likewise a relaxation of their readiness as regards their array for battle. It was not until he had moved along successive companius to the wing where he was stationed, and had wheeled them into line thus strengthening the mass formation of this wing, that he gave the order to take up arms and led the advance; and his troops followed. Now as soon as the enemy saw them unexpectedly approaching, no one among them was able to keep quiet, but some began running to their posts, others forming into line, others bridling horses, and others putting on breast-plates, while all were like men who were about to suffer, rather txan to inflict, harm. [23] Meanwhile Epaminondas led forward his army prow on, like a trireme, believing that if he could strike and cut through anywhere, he would destroy the entire army of his adversaries. For he was preparing to make the contest with the strongest part of his force, and the weakest part he had stationed far back, knowing that if defeated it would cause discouragement to the troops who were with him and give courage to the enemy. Again, while the enemy had formed their horsemen like a phalanx of hoplites, — six deep and without intermingled foot soldiers, — [24] Epaminondas on the other hand hqd made a strong column of his cavalry, also, and had mingled foot soldiers among them, believing that when he cut through the enemy’s cavalry, he would have defeated the entire opposing army; for it is very hard to find men who will stand firm when they see any of their own side in flight. And in order to prevent the Athenians on the left wing from coming to the aid of those who were posted next to them, he stqtioned both horsemen and hoplites upon some hills over against them, desiring to create in them the fear that if they proceeded to give aid, these troops would fall upon them from behind.

  Thus, then, he made his attack, and he was not disappointed of his hope; for by gaining the mastery at the point where he struck, he caused the entire army of his adversaries to flee. [25] When, however, he had himself fallen, those who were left proved unable to take full advantage thereafter even of the victory; but although the opposing phalanx had fled before them, their hoplites did not kill a single man or advance beyond the spot where the collision had taken place; and although the cavalry also had fled before them, their cavalry in like manner did not pursue and kill either horsemen or hoplites, but slipped back timorously, like beaten men, through the lines of the flying enemy. Furthermore, while the intermingled footmen and the peltasts, who had shared in the victory of the cavalry, did make their way like victors to the region of the enemy’s left wing, most of them were there slain by the Athenians. [26]

  When these things had taken place, the opposite of what all men believed would happen was brought to pass. For since well-nigh all the people of Greece had come together and formed themselves in opposing lines, there was no one who did not suppose that if a battle were fought, those who proved victorious would be the rulers and those who were defeated would be their subjects; but the deity so ordered it that both parties set up a trophy as though victorious and neither tried to hinder those who set them up, that both gave back the dead under a truce as though victorious, and both received back their dead under a truce as though defeated, and that while each party claimed to be victorious, [27] neither was found to be any better off, as regards either additional territory, or city, or sway, than before the battle took place; but there was even more confusion and disorder in Greece after the battle than before.

  Thus far be it written by me; the events after these will perhaps be the concern of another.

  AGESILAUS

  Translated by E. C. Marchant

  This minor work summarises the life of the Spartan King Agesilaus II, whom Xenophon greatly revered, considering him as an unsurpassed example of the civil and military virtues. Agesilaus ruled from approximately 400 BC to 360 BC, during most of which time he was, in Plutarch’s words, “as good as thought commander and king of all Greece,” and was for the whole of it greatly identified with his country’s deeds and fortunes. Small in stature and lame from birth, Agesilaus became ruler somewhat unexpectedly in his mid-forties. His early reign saw successful military incursions into various states in what is now Turkey, although several diplomatic decisions resulted in Sparta becoming increasingly isolated p
rior to his death at the age of 84 in Cyrenaica. In Xenophon’s work, the king’s life is narrated in chronological order, portraying Agesilaus as one of the first examples of biographical writings. Certain passages from the work are borrowed from the Hellenica, with only minor changes to the text.

  A statue of King Leonidas, who flourished as a Spartan King prior to Agesilaus

  AGESILAUS

  1. I know how difficult it is to write an appreciation of Agesilaus that shall be worthy of his virtue and glory. Nevertheless the attempt must be made. For it would not be seemly that so good a man, just because of his perfection, should receive no tributes of praise, however inadequate. [2]

  Now concerning his high birth what greater and nobler could be said than this, that even to-day the line of his descent from Heracles is traced through the roll of his ancestors, and those no simple citizens, but kings and sons of kings? [3] Nor are they open to the reproach that though they were kings, they ruled over a petty state. On the contrary, as their family is honoured above all in their fatherland, so is their state glorious above all in Greece; thus they are not first in the second rank, but leaders in a community of leaders. [4] On one account his fatherland and his family are worthy to be praised together, for never at any time has the state been moved by jealousy of their pre-eminence to attempt the overthrow of their government, and never at any time have the kings striven to obtain greater powers than were conferred on them originally at their succession to the throne. For this reason, while no other government — democracy, oligachy, despotism or kingdom — can can lay claim to an unbroken existence, this kingdom alone stands fast continually. [5]

  However, there are not wanting signs that even before his reign began Agesilaus was deemed worthy to be king. For on the death of King Agis there was a struggle for the throne between Leotychidas, as the son of Agis, and Agesilaus, as the son of Archidamus. The state decided in favour of Agesilaus, judging him to be the more eligible in point of birth and character alike. Surely to have been pronounced worthy of the highest privilege by the best men in the mightiest state is proof sufficient of his virtue, at least before he began to reign. [6]

  I will now give an account of the achievements of his reign, for I believe that his deeds will throw the clearest light on his qualities.

  Now Agesilaus was still a young man when he gained the throne. He had been but a short time in power when the news leaked out that the king of the Persians was assembling a great navy and army for an attack on the Greeks. [7] While the Lacedaemonians and their allies were considering the matter, Agesilaus declared, that if they would give him thirty Spartans, two thousand newly enrolled citizens, and a contingent of six thousand allies, he would cross to Asia and try to effect a peace, or, in case the barbarian wanted to fight, would keep him so busy that he would have no time for an attack on the Greeks. [8] His eagerness to pay back the Persian in his own coin for the former invasion of Greece, his determination to wage an offensive rather than a defensive war, and his wish to make the enemy pay for it rather than the Greeks, were enough to arouse an immediate and widespread enthusiasm for his project. But what appealed most to the imagination was the idea of entering on a struggle not to save Greece, but to subdue Asia. [9]

  And what of his strategy after he had received the army and had sailed out? A simple narrative of his actions will assuredly convey the clearest impression of it. [10] This, then, was his first act in Asia. Tissaphernes had sworn the following oath to Agesilaus: “If you will arrange an armistice to last until the return of the messengers whom I will send to the King, I will do my utmost to obtain independence for the Greek cities in Asia”; and Agesilaus on his part had sworn to observe the armistice honestly, allowing three months for the transaction. What followed? [11] Tissaphernes forthwith broke his oath, and instead of arranging a peace, applied to the King for a large army in addition to that which he had before. As for Agesilaus, though well aware of this, he none the less continued to keep the armistice. [12] I think, therefore, that here we have his first noble achievement. By showing up Tissaphernes as a perjurer, he made him distrusted everywhere; and, contrariwise, by proving himself to be a man of his word and true to his agreements, he encouraged all, Greeks and barbarians alike, to enter into an agreement with him whenever he wished it. [13]

  The arrival of the new army emboldened Tissaphernes to send an ultimatum to Agesilaus, threatening was unless he withdrew from Asia; and the allies and the Lacedaemonians present made no concealment of their chagrin, believing that the strength of Agesilaus was weaker than the Persian king’s armament. But Agesilaus with a beaming face bade the envoys of Tissaphernes inform their master that he was profoundly grateful to him for his perjury, by which he had gained the hostility of the gods for himself and had made them allies of the Greeks. [14] Without a moment’s delay he gave the word to his troops to pack up in preparation for a campaign, and warned the cities that lay on the lines of march to Caria to have their markets ready stocked. He advised by letter the Greeks of Ionia, the Aeolid and the Hellespont, to send their contingents for the campaign to his headquarters at Ephesus. [15]

  Now Tissaphernes reflected that Agesilaus was without cavalry, while Caria was a difficult country for mounted men, and he thought that Agesilaus was wroth with him on account of his deceit. Concluding, therefore, that his estate in Caria was the real object of the coming attack, he sent the whole of his infantry across to that district and took his cavalry round into the plain of the Maeander, confident that he could ride down the Greeks before they reached the country where cavalry could not operate. [16] But instead of marching on Caria, Agesilaus forthwith turned round and made for Phrygia. Picking up the various forces that met him on the route, he proceeded to reduce the cities and captured a vast quantity of booty by sudden attacks. [17]

  This achievement also was thought to be a proof of sound generalship, that when war was declared and cozening in consequence became righteous and fair dealing, he showed Tissaphernes to be a child at deception. It was thought, too, that he made shrewd use of this occasion to enrich his friends. [18] For the accumulation of plunder was so great that things were selling for next to nothing. So he gave his friends the word to buy, saying that he was shortly going down to the coast with his army. The auctioneers were ordered to have a schedule made of the prices obtained and to give delivery of the goods. Thus without capital outlay, and without any loss to the treasury, all his friends made a prodigious amount of money. [19] Further, whenever deserters offered to give information where plunder might be taken, they naturally went to the king. In such a case he took care that the capture should be effected by his friends, so that they might at one and the same time make money and add to their laurels. The immediate result was that he had many ardent suitors for his friendship. [20]

  Recognizing that a country plundered and depopulated could not long support an army, whereas an inhabited and cultivated land would yield inexhaustible supplies, he took pains not only to crush his enemies by force, but also to win them over by gentleness. [21] He would often warn his men not to punish their prisoners as criminals, but to guard them as human beings; and often when shifting camp, if he noticed little children, the property of merchants, left behind — many merchants offered children for sale because they thought they would not be able to carry and feed them — he looked after them too, and had them conveyed to some place of refuge. [22] Again, he arranged that prisoners of war who were too old to accompany the army were to be looked after, that they might not fall a prey to dogs or wolves. It thus came about that he won the goodwill not only of those who heard of these facts, but even of the prisoners themselves. In his settlement with the cities that he won over, he invariably excused them from all servile duties and required only such obedience as freemen owe to their rules; and by his clemency he made himself master of fortresses impregnable to assault. [23]

  However, since a campaign in the plains was impossible even in Phrygia, owing to Pharnabazus’ cavalry, he decided that h
e must raise a mounted force, if he was to avoid continually running away from the enemy. He therefore enrolled the wealthiest men in all the cities thereabouts as breeders of horses, and issued a proclamation that [24] anyone who supplied a horse and arms and an efficient man should be exempt from personal service. In this way he brought it about that every one of them carried out these requirements with the zeal of a man in quest of someone to die in his stead. He also specified cities that were to furnish contingents of cavalry, feeling sure that from the horsebreeding cities riders proud of their horsemanship would be forthcoming. This again was considered an admirable stroke on his part, that no sooner had he raised his cavalry than it became a powerful body ready for action. [25]

  At the first sign of spring he collected the whole of his forces at Ephesus. With a view to their training he offered prizes for the cavalry squadron that rode best, and for the company of heavy infantry that reached the highest level of physical fitness. He also offered prizes to the targeteers and the archers who showed the greatest efficiency in their particular duties. Thereupon one might see every gymnasium crowded with the men exercising, the racecourse thronged with cavalrymen riding, and the javelin-men and archers shooting at the mark. [26] Indeed he made the whole city in which he was quartered a sight to see. For the market was full of arms and horses of all sorts on sale, and the coppersmiths, carpenters, workers in iron, cobblers, and painters were all busy making weapons of war, so that you might have thought that the city was really a war factory. [27] And an inspiring sight it would have been to watch Agesilaus and all his soldiers behind him returning garlanded from the gymnasium and dedicating their garlands to Artemis. For where men reverence the gods, train themselves in warfare and practise obedience, there you surely find high hopes abounding. [28] Moreover, believing that contempt for the enemy would kindle the fighting spirit, he gave instructions to his heralds that the barbarians captured in the raids should be exposed for sale naked. So when his soldiers saw them white because they never stripped, and fat and lazy through constant riding in carriages, they believed that the war would be exactly like fighting with women.