Boeing Versus Airbus

by John Newhouse

  AIRLINERS, like T-shirts, come in different sizes—small, medium, large, and extra-large. But they have more variety than T-shirts, because the suppliers build each of their products into families; in turn, the family members, the airplanes, vary somewhat in size, range, and other characteristics, the better to fill each of the airline market’s crevices.

  The low end of the market is covered by two single-aisle airplanes, Boeing’s 737 and Airbus’s A320. They are roughly the same size, seating up to 190 people. Both are exceptionally successful, having exceeded the most optimistic forecasts of their respective companies. The 737 is older and has been steadily improved over the years. But the A320, a newer, slightly larger, and more comfortable aircraft, is outselling the 737, not least in the low-cost market that Boeing had monopolized. In December 2004, the surge in orders for A320’s from low-cost carriers caused Boeing to shake up its sales force and replace its chief salesman, Toby Bright.

  The biggest revenue earners are airplanes with 200 to 300 seats. For many years, Boeing had this so-called middle market largely to itself with the 757, a long, single-aisle airplane, and the double-aisle 767. The narrower and less comfortable of the two, the 757, could seat up to 239 passengers, while the more popular 767 carries 218 to 304, depending on the version. The extended-range version of the family became the most profitable of all Boeing aircraft (a distinction widely but wrongly thought to belong to its 747 jumbo). This airplane’s other distinction lay in becoming the first long-range, transatlantic, twin-engine airliner. It was quietly followed by the Airbus A310, which was less popular.

  Then, in the mid-1990s, Airbus moved aggressively into this Boeing fiefdom with the A330-200, a new medium-size airplane that quickly became very popular with airlines as a vehicle for moving both people and cargo. The heavy demand for the A330-200 drove Boeing out of the middle market, the richest segment. In October 2003, it announced that too few orders for its single-aisle 757 had dictated a decision to end production of the aircraft by the end of that year; the news foreshadowed serious job cuts. As for the 767, its days, too, were clearly numbered.

  Between these middle-sized vehicles and the high-end jumbos lay a hole in the market for which Boeing and Airbus began competing vigorously in the 1990s. Boeing entered the fray with the 777, a high-quality and very popular airplane. The 777 in a standard configuration seats between 300 and 370 passengers. Its launch customer, United Airlines, began flying it in 1994. Airbus’s counterpart aircraft in this market, the A340, began life commercially a bit earlier, with Air France and Lufthansa, in March 1993.

  Predictably, these minijumbos—the 777 and the A340—became minifamilies of aircraft with varying ranges and other features. Each of the two product lines flourished for a time, until the 777 began to take control of the market. It is judged marginally more comfortable than the A340 (and most other aircraft, too) and is believed to have slightly lower operating costs. In most ways that matter, the 777 is much the better airplane.

  More important, the 777, in its early standard version, may have trailed the A340, but Boeing had thoughtfully begun to design and build an extended-range member of the minijumbo family before Airbus got going with a similarly long-range A340. This meant that the competitive edge in what became a highly profitable market for the longest-range versions of these big airplanes belongs to Boeing.

  The market’s extra-large segment—the high end—has belonged to Boeing since the late 1960s, when it built and began selling the 747, an airplane that was two and a half times larger than the 707, the next-biggest LCA. Thirty years later, Airbus, perhaps unwisely, chose to overtake and even oust Boeing from this market by building a new and even bigger airplane. This superjumbo, the A380, had been scheduled to begin its commercial life with Singapore Airlines (SIA), the launch customer, in the spring of 2006. But Airbus, aware that the airplane couldn’t meet performance guaranties, pushed the delivery date back to the fall of that year, and then was obliged to postpone it thanks to repeated and deeply injurious delays. The airplane’s prospects had become unclear.

  DURING THAT SMALL WINDOW in the mid-1980s when T. Wilson was disengaging from his company and Pierson was taking charge of his, Airbus swiped Boeing’s playbook. It set about building families of airplane types that would span the entire market and demonstrate a stronger commitment to staying even with technology creep. Boeing was still covering the low end of the market with the 737, a 1960s design, and the high end with the 747, a model of the same vintage. Most of Boeing’s production methods not only lagged behind those of Airbus but were traceable to the era of big World War II bombers.

  Starting in the 1980s, Boeing’s arrogance began to coexist with a concern that it was losing its edge, that it was no longer as good at making airplanes more productively than the competition. Its concern about itself deepened. It began to take the threat from Airbus more seriously, while still avoiding risks of the sort it had once taken and that had accounted for its success.

  Airbus had started to exude confidence. The talk from Airbus people was reminiscent of Boeing engineers’ and senior executives’ talk when there was no serious competitor. Airbus then became a metaphor for how Europe could compete against the best and most successful of American industries. And that alone is a big, possibly historic, reversal of attitude. Not long before, European suppliers had been known for making aircraft that were short both on market appeal and on reliable product support.

  Airbus wasn’t launched because some person, or persons, had an original and creative idea. Instead, its origins reflected the deep anxiety of Britain, France, and Germany, each of which wanted to preserve its aircraft industry. No one of these industries was any longer strong enough to compete with American companies, and the Europeans saw this multiparty approach—the still nascent European idea—as the only way.

  As for Airbus, until recently it was seen by its American counterparts as bearing the stigma of being French (it’s centered in Toulouse) and, worse, socialist—just another jobs program built upon government subsidies that made possible the development of all the new aircraft. Moreover, given Airbus’s apparent reliance on direct government support, American companies used to tell themselves that this oddly configured new player would be slow-moving and unable to match the standards of, say, Boeing. This line helped to breed complacency in Seattle. Boeing people didn’t look beyond, or contest, their own dogma. Even now, one can hear Airbus described dismissively by some current and former Boeing staff as “just socialism.”

  Describing Airbus as a jobs program is simplistic. Europe’s aerospace industry has traditionally performed that role while producing equipment ranging in quality from acceptable to high. But most labor forces there are protected by a munificent safety net, which, along with Europe’s most serious problem—the demography gap—bedevils governments.

  Airbus employees are critical of Boeing’s habit of laying off thousands of highly trained mechanics in slack periods and then rehiring those that haven’t slipped away to work for a competitor. Europeans profess to see this pattern as hard to understand.

  The challenge for Airbus in its early days was getting labor and manufacturing costs under control. The company succeeded in doing so, and starting in the early to mid-1990s, it was costing Airbus less to build airplanes than it was costing Boeing.

  Airbus began as a consortium of four European national aircraft corporations. France, Germany, Britain, and Spain were each represented. In the summer of 2000, three of the four partners became a unified commercial enterprise and part of the huge, publicly traded corporation called EADS, which is based in Paris. Today, 22.5 percent of EADS is owned by DaimlerChrysler. The French state and the Lagardère aircraft group, also French, divide another 30 percent share. Spain holds a 5.5 percent share, and the balance is traded on European stock exchanges. British Aerospace—later reinvented as BAE Systems—did not join EADS, but did retain its 20 percent share in Airbus.

  Airbus-EADS is a curious and badly flawed structure.
EADS owns most of Airbus, but its Airbus component amounts to most of EADS. The top jobs at EADS are held by two co-chairmen, one French, one German. Their operational supervision of Airbus is nominal, however, possibly because it accounts for roughly 65 percent of the Paris-based parent company’s turnover and 80 percent of its revenue. In short, Airbus has more or less run its own show, a freedom that probably contributed to its steep ascent.

  But Airbus staffers chafe at being, at least technically, an appendage of EADS. “Why do we need EADS?” they ask. “We are a stand-alone company. We supply half of all the corporation’s labor, seventy percent of its revenue, and most of the profits. So why not float shares in Airbus?” The tail, they think, wags the dog.

  AIRBUS IS A CURIOUS ANIMAL—an unlisted company that once a year holds a meeting in New York City with financial analysts called the Airbus Wall Street Forum. The question arises: Why is a company that is not listed, but part of one that is listed, going directly to people who rate listed companies? Why shouldn’t Airbus become a listed company? Listed or unlisted, the point about Airbus is that a group of diverse Europeans managed to get out of one another’s way and, despite the company’s curious structure, were able to make major success of it.

  It is still a new company, having just begun life as an integrated corporate entity in 2000. There remain few traces of the rough-and-tumble style that divided Airbus when it was a consortium of four companies with very different business cultures and different approaches to building airplanes, which in turn reflected different levels of experience with the process.

  Pierson, unlike T. Wilson, wasn’t betting the company on a new airplane, but he and his colleagues had to reconcile France’s first priority, market share, with Germany’s overriding concern, the bottom line. And there was Britain’s congenital ambivalence regarding European projects, driven in this case by a concern that taking part in Airbus might harm British interests in the United States. Also, Wilson was running a company that possessed the strongest commercial franchise the industry had seen. He was the undisputed boss, surrounded by like-minded colleagues with whom communication could be held to a few words.

  In those early days, Airbus was a loosely strung sales-and-marketing organization without much in the way of a product line to do something with. The member companies could lobby the Airbus case for building an airplane with the Commission of the European Union, but were forbidden by these firms from lobbying their governments. The industrial assets of the companies were not pooled, and none of them knew anything about the financial details of its partners’ Airbus-related operations.

  If Airbus had a founding father it was Roger Beteille, a brilliant French engineer and the first director. Beteille had a flair for making things happen and a shrewd business sense. When he began maneuvering the fortunes of Airbus in 1967, with just a secretary to help, this gifted, multirole figure probably didn’t presume to think that he was seeding another version of Boeing or Douglas. But he did believe strongly in what he was doing and in what the various European aircraft companies could bring to a contest with their more successful and robust American counterparts.

  Beteille understood that the airlines needed competition among suppliers of LCA. By early 1980s, he could see that Lockheed was finished as a supplier and that McDonnell Douglas was making the wrong moves. Now, of course, the airlines have only Airbus and Boeing to play off and beat down on price. Although the carriers would much rather have three or four suppliers, having two is far better than being at the mercy of one.

  Airbus is a large and impressively modern assemblage of facilities located in Blagnac, a suburb of Toulouse. Until a combination of bad decisions and managerial strife within EADS took its toll, the company exuded a strong sense of being comfortable with itself. Since the 1980s, Airbus has done many things right, whereas in this same period Boeing got a great many of them wrong.

  Airbus did things that saved money and appealed to airlines. For example, it standardized the cockpits in its family of airplanes, a feature called “commonalty” that airlines especially like, yet one that Boeing was reluctant to emulate, mainly because of the costs involved, but will adopt with its new midsize airplane, the 787.

  Creating families of aircraft types that prospered in the marketplace has enabled Airbus to reduce labor costs. The more airplanes a supplier builds, especially those with similar features, the more rapidly its labor force descends the learning curve. Since workers learn as they work, both costs and mistakes decline with numbers of units produced. Boeing was a beneficiary of this first principle when it was building bombers in World War II and later when it created a first-generation family of jet airliners.

  Although Boeing remained a well-organized and reasonably well disciplined company into the 1990s, it had grown more hierarchical and less flexible. A similar judgment of the Boeing company can still be heard from its airline customers, engine makers, other big suppliers of airplane parts, and a great many of its own people. Boeing, they say, is more bureaucracy-laden than other companies—according to some former Defense Department officials who now observe Boeing from the private sector, even more so than the Pentagon.

  These are major flaws in a trade that draws heavily on instinct and seat-of-the-pants decisions. The arrogance remains, and, until recently, so did the tendency to take the customer for granted. Boeing’s critics, in-house as well as external, complain about a heavy presence of inexperienced business-school types and too little listening to the airline market.

  Some of the harshest comment was heard from people serving in companies that have worked most closely with Boeing. General Electric Aircraft Engines is an example. Boeing has in recent years aligned, or tried to align, its corporate culture with GE’s; indeed, Airbus people feel that GE has at times shown a strong pro-Boeing bias in negotiations involving the engine and airframe companies. Still, GE people describe Boeing as indifferent to costs (indeed, extravagant), mired in layers of bureaucracy, and insensitive to customers’ needs. Many, if not most, of those customers are also GE customers.

  An incident that caused special pain to various GE people involved a Chinese-American executive, Li Hsi, who had handled the company’s engine sales in Taiwan and then became regional general manager in China. Li was highly regarded by his company. His view of the Boeing people whom he saw working on aircraft sales, some of which involved both companies, was that they lacked a feel for dealing with Chinese customers. Li’s informal suggestions for changes in Boeing’s modus operandi were passed to Boeing as well as to his own company, and they were entirely well intentioned and constructive, according to GE people.

  However, senior Boeing executives reacted by accusing Li of being pro-Airbus and asking that he be removed. His company obliged Boeing, and transferred Li to Cincinnati and a job that had little appeal for him. The incident angered several GE people at various levels. “He was very unhappy,” one of them said. “Boeing pressure caused GE to make a stupid decision. Li had been trying to help Boeing.”2

  During the 1990s, Airbus came to resemble the Boeing of old: predatory and conveying a relentless energy and commitment to the hunt for buyers of its wares. Airbus people appeared to be more comfortable with their company than is the case with Boeing staff that one encounters. And there are fewer of them. A part of Jean Pierson’s legacy was a much leaner bureaucracy, leaner than at other aerospace companies.

  In recent years, the adversary companies acquired different body language. The Airbus style was forward leaning. Boeing’s became wary and defensive, the arrogance a little less transparent. The people in Toulouse were looser and more discursive, less likely to adopt the glossy-brochure approach to describing an aircraft that one might encounter in Seattle. Boeing executives are far more scripted, and some of them, like many political types, respond to questions that have not been asked.

  The companies blow the same amount of smoke at visitors—a lot. Each tends to maximize the prospects for its product line and to plant or reinforce do
ubts about the other side’s. Each puts down the other’s strategic approach to the market. Each expresses wonder, or puzzlement, about why the other is basing its plans on this or that.

  But Airbus, because it was playing catch-up over the years—climbing a steep hill—learned to be more or less honest, at least with itself. Also, with four national players taking part, the process of building consensus on issues was often difficult, but exacting, and probably generated a number of good decisions. Meanwhile, Boeing was trying to assign blame for things going wrong. It would blame not itself but external forces, starting with weak, unreliable airlines, and also emphasize the subsidies that European governments were giving Airbus.

  There was something to that, but less than Boeing claimed. Luck plays a major part in this exigent business, as it does in so many endeavors. Airbus had the great good fortune to be well run at a time when Boeing was undergoing a stretch of serious mismanagement.

  “Provincial” is among the terms widely used to describe Boeing, and for a company that sells 70 percent of its aircraft overseas, it is a reproach. Some Boeing watchers have recommended that each of its executives be required to live abroad for a period of no less than six months. But Boeing has always been an unworldly company, even in the days when its chief competitors were Lockheed and Douglas. In any case, whether provincial or worldly, Boeing’s marketing and sales staffs are seen as less accomplished than Airbus’s, its cadre of talented executives smaller.

  As for the design and composition of airplanes, Boeing and Airbus have similar pools of accomplished—indeed, brilliant—aerodynamicists. And each company is carpeted with executives who began life as engineers. Otherwise their corporate cultures are dissimilar. Boeing’s management is layered, awkward, and in some sectors abnormally quarrelsome.