come to terms with Russia. Aehrenthal's hand was
forced by Ferdinand of Bulgaria at the last moment, but
he, in his turn, dragged Germany in his train. William II
was furious with Austria-Hungary, spoke of the " in-
tolerable way " in which it had " duped " him, and
denounced " Aehrenthal's appalling stupidity " l· But
all this was carefully concealed from the outer world,
and Vienna had the full support of Berlin throughout
the crisis. Then, as on later occasions, one of Germany's
main motives was the fear of loosening her only sure
alliance, if she withheld her backing from an Austrian
quarrel, and of thus finding herself isolated, if a new
crisis should arise in Europe over a matter which was
of primary interest to herself, but only of secondary
interest to Austria-Hungary.
Aehrenthal had risked war, but, when his main object
was attained, he no longer advocated extreme measures,
and he, of course, had to reckon with the pacific (or,
above all, passive) attitude of Francis Joseph. On the
other hand, Baron Conrad von Hötzendorf, Chief of the
General Staff, holding that the Monarchy's future lay
in the Balkans, strongly urged that the right moment
had come for a reckoning with Serbia, and that war with
Italy might safely be risked, either as a preliminary or
as a corollary. But Aehrenthal radically disagreed, and
Francis Joseph would not hear of anything save a
defensive war with Italy; and it was, above all, con-
sideration for Italy that led Aehrenthal to evacuate the
^andjak, rather than give her any title to compensation
1 See Brandenburg, op. cit., pp. 274, 276.
36
in the Balkans under Clause VII of the Triple Alliance. »
Though the evacuation was sound from the tactical
standpoint, yet politically it was a blunder, as it made it
possible for Serbia and Montenegro to join frontiers
barely three years later in the war against Turkey.
Russia's surrender brought with it the humiliation of
Serbia, who had to accept the new situation in Bosnia
and declare publicly that it in no way affected her rights,
and that she would abandon all opposition and change
her policy towards Austria-Hungary. Needless to say,
Serbian public opinion bitterly resented this renunciation,
and henceforward took a keener interest than ever in
their kinsmen across the frontier, the internal situation
in Croatia and Bosnia providing a perpetual irritant.
One result was the foundation of the Narodna Odbrana
(Society of National Defence), of which it will be necessary
to speak in a later chapter.2
In a word, the Bosnian crisis converted the Southern
Slav Question and the relations between Austria-Hungary
and Serbia into an international problem of the first
rank, and this rank it was to retain through a whole
series of crises in 1912 and 1913, till it at last served as
the spark which lit the world war. It also greatly
accentuated the grouping of the Great Powers into two
hostile and fairly balanced camps. The personal rivalry
of Aehrenthal and Izvolsky gave added force to the com-
petition of Austria-Hungary and Russia in South-Eastern
Europe.
AehrenthaFs stiff and unconciliatory attitude was not
approved by the more enlightened Austrians, and in
November 1909 Dr. Baernreither — who was known to
enjoy the confidence of the Heir-Apparent, and who soon
afterwards played the part of mediator behind the scenes
of the Friedjung Trial — had a friendly meeting in Vienna
1 Fourth Agreement, 28 June, 1902, see Pribram, Geheimverträge Oesterreich·
Ungarns, p. 94.
2 See pp. 118 and 138.
37
with the Serbian Premier, DA. Milovanovic. The con-
ditions laid down by the latter for a real Austro-Serbian
entente were four: a new economic policy on the part of
the Monarchy; free transit through her territory for
Serbian armaments; the
introduction of
land reform
and a more Serbophil administration in Bosnia; and
consent to Serbia's territorial expansion in Macedonia.1
But Aehrenthal remained impervious to Baernreither's
arguments in favour of such a basis, and the whole matter
was dropped.
1 Dr. Baernreither in Deutsche Revue, January 1922, cit. Wendel, op. cit.,
p. 41-2.
CHAPTER II
THE BALKAN WARS
IN 1909 and 1910 there seemed to be a slight lull, but
the rival activities of Vienna and St. Petersburg were
illustrated by an attempt at Russo-Italian rapproche-
ment, by a secret Russo-Bulgarian Treaty in December
1909, and by Vienna's encouragement to Prince Nicholas
of
Montenegro
to
assume
the
Royal
title,
thereby
reaffirming
the
rivalry
of
the
two
remaining
Serb
dynasties of Karagjorgjevic and Petrovic. And all the
time the unrest produced by Young Turk Chauvinism
and misrule among the Christian subjects of the Porte,
and especially the troubles in Albania, made it clear that
an explosion might come at any moment and in almost
any
part
of
the
Peninsula.
Everywhere
lawlessness
and megalomania joined hands: such a situation was a
logical outcome of that political and social disintegration
which had now reached its final stage in what was left
of Turkey's European provinces, and which in its earlier
stages had been mainly responsible for the unsatisfactory
development of Serbia and the Southern Slavs.
In 1910, it should be added, Austria-Hungary did
take one real step towards conciliation, by establishing
a Diet in Bosnia, but the device adopted of placing the
three religions in distinct water-tight compartments for
election purposes, aroused m
uch antagonism, while the
c
reation of yet another artificial Diet merely underlined
still further the divided stat e of the Jugoslavs. Mean-
while Austria-Hungary's alienation of Serbia on the one
side and the policy of Turkification favoured by the new
regime in Constantinople
on the other, naturally
39
strengthened the tendencies
in
favour of a Balkan
League, and Italy's adventure in Tripoli in 1911 only
served to hasten the pace.
In Vienna, Conrad as Chief of Staff urged war upon
Italy while she was at a disadvantage, setting before
himself the domination of Serbia and the Balkans as
his ultimate goal. But though Francis Ferdinand shared
his suspicions of Italy and gave eager support to his
plans of
military reorganisation, Franc
is Joseph and
Aehrenthal would hear nothing of such a " highway-
man policy " and insisted upon peace. Conrad was
therefore dismissed in 1911, to the indignation of Francis
Ferdinand, who treated it as a personal affront.1 In
February 1912 Aehrenthal died and was succeeded by
Count Berchtold, a man whose mediocre intelligence
was aggravated by indolence and aristocratic prejudice,
and whose anti-Slav outlook made him more than ever
dependent upon Berlin, though by no means free from
suspicions of his ally.
It was a moment of very great activity in the Balkans.
The original idea of a Balkan League including a Turkey
amenable
to
Russian
influence,
proved
unrealisable,
and in its place there took shape a League of the four
Christian
states
directed
against
Turkey.
While
the
Greco-Bulgarian agreement was due to the initiative
of Mr. Venizelos and probably owed its attainment to
Mr.
Bourchier,
the
Serbo-Bulgarian
agreement
was
leached very largely under the influence of Russia, and
especially its Minister in Belgrade, Mr. Hartwig. It is
important to note that Serbia made a condition of her
adhesion the promise of Bulgarian military support on
her Northern frontier in the event of Austria-Hungary's
intervention — obviously in the calculation that then
Russia would also become involved and make Serbian
resistance possible. It is more than dqubtful whether
Bui garia intended to carry out this pledge, and it has
1 Margutti, Vom Alten Kaiser, p. 392.
40
even been alleged that King Ferdinand betrayed it to
Vienna. In any case it reflects the profound distrust
and hostility which had grown up between Belgrade and
Vienna in recent years.
The Balkan League came not a moment too soon,
for in the summer of 1912 real anarchy spread through
Albania and Macedonia, the rival komitadji bands and
the agents of the Committee of Union and Progress were
more active than ever, and when Berchtold put forward
a tentative scheme of Turkish reform and opened discus-
sions with the other Powers, the four Christian states,
who had suffered from a series of nominal paper reforms
for two generations past, decided to precipitate events
and declared war upon Turkey early in October. That
the Powers, having failed to stop them, adopted a passive
attitude during the early stages of the war, was due to
the almost universal assumption in official and especially
in military circles, that the Turks would be victorious,
and that the refractory Balkan States would soon be
only too glad to accept a settlement dictated from the
outside.
But the
unexpected
happened.
The
Balkan
Allies
gained rapid and overwhelming successes, and by the
end of November, Turkish rule in Europe was limited
to the Tchataldja and Gallipoli lines and to the three
fortresses of Adrianople, Janina and Skutari. The Serbs
in particular had not only avenged Kosovo and five
centuries of thraldom by their victory at Kumanovo,
but had linked up with Montenegro and reached the
Adriatic at Medua and Durazzo. The Ballplatz, to its
anger and concern, saw the situation suddenly trans-
formed to its disadvantage, both without and within —
without, by the downfall of Turkey, the shifting of the
balance of power in the Peninsula, the recovery of self-
confidence by Serbia; within, owing to the decisive
repercussion of these events among the Jugoslavs of the
Monarchy.
41
For by an irony of fate the Serbian victories came at
a moment when the quarrel between Hungary and
Croatia had culminated in the suspension of the ancient
Croatian Constitution by arbitrary decree from Budapest,
the appointment of a Dictator in Zagreb, and a thoroughly
oppressive
regime.
The
contrast
was
altogether
too
crude. The whole Southern Slav provinces of Austria-
fíungary were swept off their feet with enthusiasm for
the Balkan allies, there were demonstrations in every
town, the collections for the Balkan Red Cross reached
astonishing figures for so poor a country, many of the
young men succeeded in evading the frontier guards
and volunteering for the Serbian army. " In the Balkan
sun," said a leading Croat clerical on a public platform,
" we see the dawn of our day "; while a Catholic Bishop,
on the news of Kumanovo, recited the Nunc Dimittis.
On the other hand, even before the great events of the
Balkan War, the Hungarian flag had been burnt in
more than one town of Dalmatia, Croatia and Bosnia as
a protest against the Cuvaj dictatorship; the boys of
the gymnasia went out on political strike, and acts of
political terrorism became a new feature of the movement.
The opening of the Bosnian Diet in 1910 had already
been marred by an attempt on the life of the Governor,
General Varesanin, by a Serb student who then at once
shot himself. The story of the General's contemptuous
spurning of the corpse with his foot, as Zerajic still lay
where he fell upon the bridge of Sarajevo, spread on all
sides and appears to have done more than anything else
to breed successors to Zerajic among the youth of
Bosnia. It may have been entirely untrue, but it was
universally believed. And now in June 1912, came a
determined attempt on Cuvaj's life, the murderer killing
the Croatian Secretary for Education and a policeman
before he was captured. Then in November a third
student
fired
ineffectively
on
Cuvaj's
windows
and
committed suicide.
42
This state of tension among the Jugoslavs of the
Monarchy was intensified tenfold by the action of the
Ballplatz. After a short period of hesitation and com-
plete latitude to the population, it ordered restrictive
measures in the South, the leading municipalities of
Dalmatia were dissolved, there were frequent confisca-
tions of the Press, police espionage was extended still
farther, and above all, Austria-Hungary mobilised and
concentrated troops in Bosnia and Dalmatia. Typical
of this whole outlook was the notorious Prochaska
affair.
Prochaska
was
Austro-Hungarian
Consul
in
Prizren, and having been specially active against the
Serbs, found himself isolated from his own Government
when they
occupied the town early in November. For
many days afterwards the Press of Vienna and Budapest
rang with sensational stories as to the brutal ill-treat-
ment meted out to Prochaska by Serbian officers; and
as the Press campaign was encouraged by the Press
Bureau and the Ministry of War, most people in Vienna,
from the throne to the fiacre-driver and the concierge
believed the story of his castration, and were roused to
fierce
indignation
against
the
barbarous
Serbs.1
In
point of fact, this story was a deliberate invention.
When the crisis was over, Prochaska assured his friends
that nothing whatever had happened to him, but that
he had had instructions to " make an incident." More-
over, the Ballplatz deliberately allowed the campaign
to continue long after it knew the story of ill-treatment
1 Miss Durham, as part of her violent campaign of defamation of everything
Serb (" Serbian vermin " was her elegant phrase during an address at which I
was present last December), has fastened especially upon the Prochaska affair,
and I am therefore reluctantly forced to refer to repulsive details. She was in
Montenegro at the time of the incident, and claims that certain Serbian officers,
recently arrived from Prizren, boasted openly to her of having subjected him
to very disgusting indignities. While they thereby proved themselves to be a
disgrace to their uniform, it is no less certain that they were deliberately ' ' pulling
the leg " of Miss Durham. For there was not a word of truth in their story.
Shortly before the war the late Count Francis Lützow (the historian) repeated
to
me,
the
confidential
account
which
Prochaska
himself
had
given
to
a
mutual friend in the Consular service, and the gist of it is my statement in
the text.
43
to be utterly false.1 The reason for this was that the
irresolute Berchtold had very nearly come down on the
side of war, and wanted an excuse for picking a quarrel.
The war party was exceedingly strong. The War
Minister, Auffenberg, and the ex-Chief of Staff, Conrad
had very nearly won the ear of Francis Ferdinand, who
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