was now Inspector-General of the Army, and Conrad,
drew up a memorandum advocating the re-occupation
of the Sand jak and the expulsion of the Serbs from
Albania — which would of course have involved a cam-
paign for the conquest of Serbia itself. They were even
ready to risk Russian intervention. What seems to have
held back Berchtold and Francis Joseph from war was
the attitude of Germany and, to a lesser degree, of
Italy.
On
23
November,
Francis
Ferdinand
met
William II at Springe, and is alleged to have advocated
action against Serbia, but William insisted on the need
of peace with Russia: 1 and in renewing the Triple
Alliance on 5 December, Bethmann Hollweg, on the
Emperor's instructions, made it clear " that Germany
would only join in a conflict if her partner were the
victim of aggression."2 As Sazonov on his side declined
to back the Serbian claim to an Adriatic outlet and told
Hartwig flatly that Russia would not wage war for
Durazzo,4 there was still some room for moderate
counsels: and the joint pressure of Germany, Italy and
1 This is expressly admitted by Baron Szilassy, who was a high official in the
Ballplatz at that very time, but who was also an honest man who could not
approve the methods of his chief and colleagues. See his Der Untergang der
Donau-Monarchie, p. 230.
As early as 21 November the Neue Freie Presse printed a wire from Prochaska,
stating that he was well and unharmed. On 26 November the Consul Edl,
sent officially from Vienna for the purpose, was allowed to meet Prochaska
at Skoplje and convinced himself of the truth. Yet it was not till 17 December
(in other words till Vienna had definitely postponed the idea of war on Serbia
and therefore no longer needed this incident as a stimulus to public opinion)
that
the
Ballplatz
published
an
official
communiqué, to the effect that the
tory
of
Prochaska's
imprisonment
or
ill-treatment
was
"
entirely
without
oundation." Cf. Sosnosky, Die Balkanpolitik Oesterreich-Ungarns, ii., pp. 293-5,
354.
2 Pribram, Austrian Foreign Policy, p. 41; but see infra, pp. 53-4.
3 Gooch, Modern Europe, p. 507.
4 ibid,, p. 507.
44
Britain won Berchtold's reluctance consent1 to a Confer-
ence of Ambassadors in London for the settlement of
the Albanian and kindred disputes.
Yet, though the immediate danger of war had thus
been averted, the reappointment of Conrad as Chief of
Staff on 12 December showed that the war party was
still very strong in Vienna. If we may trust his own
account of his previous interview with Francis Ferdinand,*
the latter must have regarded war as still virtually
certain: and Conrad, knowing that Francis Joseph also
regarded the situation as "extremely dangerous for Austria-
Hungary,"8 returned to the charge on 30 December,
with a memorandum urging war. His view was that
this was inevitable sooner or later, and that every further
delay made the position worse for Austria-Hungary. He
recognised frankly that " the union of the Southern
Slavs is one of those nation-moving phenomena which
cannot be denied or artificially prevented," and that the
only question was whether that Union was to be achieved
inside the Monarchy at Serbia's expense, or under Serbia
at the Monarchy's expense.4 But while Conrad was
at least frank and downright in his ideas and intentions,
there was among leading statesmen a complete lack of
1 Pribram, op. cit., p. 42. 2 Conrad, Aus Meiner Dienstzeit, vol. ii., p. 378.
3 ibid., p. 389.
4 ibid., p. 380. This coincides almost exactly with the view which I myself
advocated to the best of my ability in a series of books and articles on the eve
of war. In The Southern Slav Question (1911 ), I wrote: "The movement in
favour of Croato-Serb unity has many obstacles to surmount. . . . But as
surely as Germany and Italy have won their liberty and unity, so surely will
it be won by the Croato-Serb race. The real problem is the manner of its achieve-
ment: and here we are at once faced by two alternatives. Unity can be obtained
either inside or outside the Habsburg Monarchy, either by the latter's aid and
under its auspices, or in defiance of its opposition. ..." (p. 336.) " Upon
Austria's choice of alternative depends the future of the Habsburg Monarchy."
(P· 344·)
Unfortunately though our diagnosis was the same, our remedies were radically
different. I still cherish the belief — it may be a mere illusion — that real states-
manship might have reconciled Austria and the Jugoslavs, and having in 1911
dedicated my book " to that Austrian statesman who shall possess the genius
and the courage necessary to solve the Southern Slav Question," I repeated
this dedication in the German edition (1913), adding the words " at the twelfth
hour."
The
remedy
advocated
by
Field-Marshal
Conrad,
on
the
other
hand,
was not conciliation, but sheer force, and that was from the first foredoomed
to failure.
45
goodwill. Berchtold in particular was not merely less
sincere than Conrad, but more negative and far less
energetic.
His
own
peculiar
temperament,
the
old
Emperor's pacific and negative mood, and above all,
the fear that Germany might not support her ally in a
war of aggression, were the real deterrents; but the
Foreign
Minister
and
his
all-powerful
subordinates
Forgách, Macchio, Kanya, and others, remained steadily
hostile to Serbia, and only waited for a safer way of
taking the plunge which they too regarded as necessary.
One
indication
of
this
is
Berchtold's
contemptuous
rejection of the overtures made by the Serbian Premier,
Mr. Pasic, through the mediation of Professor Masaryk
in the winter of 1912. Pasic was willing to come to
Vienna and discuss a political and commercial agreement
which would facilitate Serbian exports to the Adriatic
and in return place the work of West Balkan recon-
struction and development in the hands of Austro-Hun-
garian firms. But Berchtold treated Masaryk with lordly
contempt, and actually left the overture unanswered.1
In the first half of 1913 the Conference of Ambassadors
in London exercised a restraining influence upon Austria-
Hungary and preserved pe
ace. By ordering an inter-
national naval blockade of the Montenegrin coast, in order
to enforce trie demand for a Serbo-Montenegrin evacua-
tion of Skutari, the Powers robbed Austria-Hungary
for the moment of an excuse for military action; and
the mission of Prince Gottfried Hohenlohe to the Tsar
on the express initiative of Francis Joseph, helped to
produce a slight detente. According to Szilassy2 the
l This again is confirmed by Szilassy, Untergang der Donau-Monarchie, p. 231.
Herr
Kanner
{Kaiserliche
Katastrophenpolitik,
p.
112),
tells
us
that
Masaryk
informed him of these facts at the time and that he made enquiries through a
friend
of
Berchtold,
Count
Arthur
Bylandt.
When
asked,
Berchtold
told
the
latter that " he had enquired about Masaryk and learnt that he was a poor
devil, who probably wanted to ' make a commission,' " and " we are not there
to help people to commissions." This anecdote tells us more of Berchtold's
Mentality and political capacity than many volumes. And this was the man
whose hands foreign policy rested.
2 p. cit., p. 236.
46
Tsar said to Hohenlohe, " If you really want war, you'll
get it. But then both your Emperor and I will stagger
on our thrones."1
That Berlin also saw the dangers of the Balkan
situation and, as in 1909, resented its ally's policy,-is
shown very clearly in the correspondence of Kiderlen-
Wächter, who in September, 1912, wrote to the Chan-
cellor: " What I stress most, is that we should not
merely learn afterwards what Vienna is planning, but
beforehand. Otherwise Vienna will involve us over-
night in a Balkan adventure."1
Demobilisation was secured, but the war-mongers set
themselves to attain their aims against Serbia by the
more indirect method of encouraging the dissensions
inside the Balkan League and in particular setting Serbia
and Bulgaria by the ears. Serbia's double aim in the
war had been the liberation of her kinsmen under Turkish
rule, and her own economic emancipation by means of
free access to the sea; and the second half of this pro-
gramme was now destroyed by the veto of Austria-
Hungary. It should be unnecessary to add that Serbia
had no right whatever to Skutari or any of the Albanian
coast, but that as her natural outlets through Bosnia
and Dalmatia were in Austria's hands, she was tempted
to cast covetous eyes upon what lay farther to the South.
This veto left the Vardar valley as Serbia's only possible
alternative outlet, and a claim to the Vardar brought
her automatically into conflict with Bulgarian national
aspirations in Macedonia. Thus it is not too much to
say
that
Austria-Hungary's
Balkan
policy
made
the
second Balkan war inevitable; and indeed this was one,
though not the only, motive of her support to Albania.
1 Bogicevic (Kriegsursachen, Appendix X) prints the text of Francis Joseph's
letter to Nicholas II (February 1913). In it he expresses " great sorrow " that
Austria-Hungary's
Balkan
policy
should
be
"
regarded
ironically
in
Russia,"
and insists " that it would be a sin against our sacred mission," not to realise
the " grave dangers of disagreement between our Empires."
2 Kiderlen-Wächter, Nachlass, ii., p. 187.
47
Russia, who under the secret Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty
of Alliance had been appointed arbiter in cases of dispute,
strained every nerve to effect a peaceful compromise
between the two Balkan allies, but national Chauvinism
was already running very high on both sides, and here
again
Austria-Hungary,
through
her
able
and
active
Minister in Sofia, Count Tarnowski, did all she could to
render
Russian
efforts
ineffective.
Even
the
Tsar's
appeal to the Slav feelings of the Kings of Bulgaria and
Serbia fell upon deaf ears, and the joint démarche of the
Powers at Sofia and Belgrade in favour of demobilisa-
tion was also disregarded. Nothing did so much to
stiffen the Bulgarian attitude as the speech delivered
by the Hungarian Premier, Count Stephen Tisza, on
19 June, emphasising the right of the Balkan States
to settle differences in their own way — even by war —
and stating that Austria-Hungary could not allow any
other Power to acquire special prerogatives
in the
Peninsula — in other words an open rebuff to Russia
and
an
encouragement
of
Bulgaria
to
adventurous
courses.
Tarnowski's
influence
with
King
Ferdinand
completely triumphed over that of his Russian colleague.
Some
indication
of
Vienna's
intentions
during
this
critical week may be gathered from a conversation
with Berchtold which Conrad records in his Memoirs1
(21 June). In reply to the Chief of Staff's enquiry, the
Foreign Minister declares quite explicitly that Austria-
Hungary will make war on Serbia if Bulgaria is beaten
by the latter (in other words, in a war which Vienna
and Sofia were jointly plotting). It is true that when
Conrad asks whether they will remain in Serbia, Berch-
told at once becomes vague, stating that Francis Joseph
evades an answer to the question, while Francis Ferdinand
wont hear of annexation (in other words, it had been
der discussion).
The result was the famous Bulgarian night attack
1 Conrad, Aus Meiner Dienstzeit, iii., p. 353.
48
upon the Serbs and Greeks on 29 June, 1913, which
inaugurated the second Balkan War. But once more
Austria-Hungary had gravely miscalculated; the Serbs
and Greeks were not caught napping, and much more
than held their own, while Roumania, who had given
Sofia a fair warning of her probable attitude, joined the
Allies and invaded Bulgaria from the north. If the v/ar
brought disaster upon Bulgaria, it was also very serious
for Austria-Hungary, for Serbia had not merely increased
her military laurels and prestige, doubled her territory
and established direct contact with Montenegro, but
had won to her side Roumania — till then linked wit
h
the Dual Monarchy by a secret alliance and military
convention and regarded as a safe adjunct to the Triple
Alliance; while the Jugoslavs of the Monarchy, still
suffering from the dictatorship in Croatia and parallel
repression in Bosnia and Dalmatia, now openly began
to look upon Serbia as their future Piedmont.
Berchtold again drew near to the war party, and
already, on 3 July — when the official Press of Vienna
was still acclaiming imaginary Bulgár victories — inti-
mated to his allies in Berlin and Rome that Austria-
Hungary could not tolerate further aggrandisement of
Serbia, " since this would not only mean a considerable
moral and material support of a traditionally hostile
neighbour, but also would result in a noticeable increase
of the Panserb idea and propaganda."1 Against this
view the Italian Foreign Minister, San Giuliano, strongly
protested, on the ground that there was no real danger
to
Austria-Hungary.
Half-jestingly
he
said
to
the
Ambassador Mérey, " We'll hold you back by the tails
of your coat if necessary."2
1 Pribram, Geheimverträge Oesterreich-Ungarns, pp. 301-2.
2 According to Bogice vie {Kriegsursachen, p. 76), San Giuliano used the phrase
" pericoiosissima avventura."
1 In the attitude of the Italian Government on this occasion may be found
the key to Berchtold's treatment of Italy during the critical weeks of July 1914.
See infra, pp. 234, 236, 241.
49
Still more decisive was the attitude of Germany, which
in the summer of 1913 was quite definitely opposed to
war. Berchtold, on 3 July, tried to convince Tschirschky
that
Austria-Hungary
would
be
forced
to
intervene
against Serbia in the event of a Bulgarian defeat, and
that she could under no circumstances allow Monastir
to remain in Serbian hands. He tried to justify this
attitude by depicting the dangers inherent in the Southern
Slav Question if Serbia should become a Balkan Pied-
mont, he hinted that even Trieste would be threatened,
and
he
begged
Germany
to
realise
the
dilemma
(Zwangslage) in which Austria-Hungary found herself.
But Berlin's reply to Tschirschky minimised " the danger
of a Great Serbia "and ordered him "to calm down Vienna,
hold it back from hasty action and ensure our being kept
regularly informed as to its intentions, and no decisions
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