being made without previously hearing our view." He
was also informed that William II regarded BerchtokTs
attitude on Monastir as " a grave blunder."1
There is no difficulty in discovering the underlying
motives. William II was anxious to help his brother-
in-law,
King
Constantine,
and
thus
extend
German
prestige in Greece. He was genuinely concerned at the
loosening of Roumanian relations to the Triple Alliance
and opposed to anything which might force her into the
arms of the Entente: and here his friendship for King
Charles and the Hohenzollern dynasty played its part.
On the other hand he both disliked and distrusted King
Ferdinand of Bulgaria — feelings shared even more
vehemently by the Archduke Francis Ferdinand. 2 Lastly
William II was by no means anti-Serb until the murder
of his friend produced a violent outburst of feeling.
1 The two telegrams were published by Count Montgelas in the Deutsche
Allgemeine Zeitung on 7 March. 1920, and are quoted in his book Leitfaden zur
Krieggsschuldfrage, pp. 61-3.
2 He had actually refused to cross the Channel in the same ship when they
attended King Edward's funeral in 1910.
50
Tisza's memorandum to Francis Joseph after the murder 1
stresses the need for overcoming the prejudices of
William II in favour of Serbia; and it is not sufficiently
well known that Germany had a very active and Serbophil
Consul-General in Belgrade, and was during the eighteen
months previous to the Great War busily extending her
markets in Serbia at the expense of Austro-Hungarian
merchants, whose prospects were injured by the political
friction between Vienna and Belgrade. William II in
particular more than once made it clear to Vienna that
he could not understand its persistent refusal to allow
the Serbs a harbour on the Adriatic.
Austria-Hungary did not at once desist from her design,
and as late as 9 August8 — the day before the Treaty
of Bucarest was signed — notified Berlin and Rome of
her intention of attacking Serbia, arguing that such
action could be defined as defensive. But San Giuliano
and Giolitti, in conjunction with Germany, took the
line that the casus foederis of the Triple Alliance would
not apply, and made it clear to Vienna that they would
not give their backing. Finding herself thus in complete
isolation, Austria-Hungary had no alternative save to
draw back and leave the Bucarest settlement untouched.
What finally turned the scale in favour of peace was the
awful scandal of Colonel Redl, the Austrian Staff officer
who was now discovered to have been the spy of Russia
for the last fourteen years, yet was allowed to commit
suicide and carry half his secrets to the grave. This
incident seems to have had an overwhelming effect upon
Francis Joseph, whose intellectual powers, never very
high, were now noticeably failing. It also not unnaturally
filled Francis Ferdinand with fury, and rendered him
1 Diplomatische Aktenstücke, (henceforth referred to as D.A.) i., No. 2.
2 See Giolitti's speech on 5 December, 1914, in the Italian Parliament (Collected
Diplomatic Documents, p. 401). Montgelas {op. cit., p. 64) argues that Giolitti is
mistaken in the month, and that this really took place in July. Giolitti in his
Memoirs, however, adheres to the date of August.
51
distrustful of the General Staff and its chief, and caused
corresponding uncertainty and discouragement in all the
higher ranks of the Army.1
The Emperor William's bestowal of a Field-Marshal's
baton on King Constantine and his public telegram of
cordial good wishes to King Charles on the signature of
peace, gave such offence at Vienna that Francis Ferdinand
and the Austro-Hungarian military delegates abandoned
their visit to the German manoeuvres in August. This
did not affect the personal relations of Conrad with
Moltke, who assured his colleague that though "as so
often, diplomacy has thrown a stone across the path of
the soldiers," he himself adhered to terms of closest
alliance. But though the Archduke was induced to
attend the Leipzig celebrations in the following month,
it is not too much to speak of a temporary coolness
between Vienna and Berlin, which it required a special
effort during the winter to remove,2 and which is still
reflected
in
Berchtold's
distrustful
attitude
towards
Germany at the time of the tragedy of Sarajevo.3
The Treaty of Bucarest seemed for the moment to have
stabilised the situation and averted war; but there was
the
gravest
uncertainty
throughout
Europe,
and
in
Austria-Hungary that summer there seemed to be a smell
of the charnel-house in the air.4
In
the
winter
of
1913-14
Austria-Hungary
again
twice tried to pick quarrels with Serbia, first in regard
to the Albanian frontier, where the Serbs were in the
wrong, but where the ultimatum was made as unpalatable
as possible to them, and second in regard to the shares
held by Austro-Hungarian subjects in the Orient Railway.
1· Auffenberg, Aus Oesterretchs Höhe und Niedergang, p. 241.
2 Brandenburg, Von Bismarck zum Weltkriege, p. 386.
3 It is even possible that the unofficial visit of Francis Ferdinand and his wife
England in November 1913 was stimulated by this passing friction.
4
This drastic but extremely apposite phrase was coined by Mr. Steed, then
on the point of leaving Vienna after eleven eventful years as correspondent of
The Times.
52
There can be no doubt that Conrad Was more convinced
than ever of the necessity for war, and that Berchtold
was already converted to his view and merely looking in
his indolent way for a safe pretext. This is made clear'
from Conrad's voluminous Memoirs which, like a gold-
mine,
contain
occasional
priceless
fragments
of
ore
scattered through the dull mass. Conrad, it should be
added, was perfectly logical from the very first. In
1906, on appointment as Chief of Staff, he argued that
the Monarchy's future lay in the Balkans; that this
involved the seizure of Serbia and Montenegro, to prevent
their exercising attraction on the other Southern Slavs;
that a preliminary step towards this was the defeat of
Italy, then still a relatively weak military power; and
that Russian intervention was not as yet to be feared.1
Serbia offered the very economic advantages which a
country like Austria-Hungary r
equired, and its annexa-
tion was positively a condition of life or death for Austria-
Hungary.2
Two
favourable
opportunities
had
already
been wasted, Russian intervention could no longer be
ruled out, there was a real danger of losing Roumania,
Serbia though exhausted was far stronger than before,
and the internal situation of the Monarchy was in-
creasingly unstable.
In February 1914, then, Conrad wrote to his German
colleague, General Moltke, expressing his belief in an
imminent catastrophe, insisting that France and Russia
were not yet ready, and exclaiming, " Why are we wait-
ing? "3 On May 12 he met Moltke at Karlsbad and
ended by securing the latter's admission that " any
postponement (jedes Zuwarten) means a diminution of
our chances."4 On 16 March again, he discussed with
the German Ambassador Tschirschky the Russian danger
and the advisability of a preventive war, but met with
the answer that both Francis Ferdinand and William II
1 Conrad, Aus Meiner Dienstzeit, iii., ρ. 755.
2 ibid., iii., p. 406.
3 ibid., iii., pp. 601, 605. " Warum warten Wir? "
4 ibid., iii., p. 670.
53
would oppose it and would only consent to war if placed
before a fait accompli:l and in June Conrad records his
impression
that
both
German
and
Austro-Hungarian
policy was " lacking in clear will or firm directive,"
though it was full of forebodings of approaching danger.
To Berchtold a few days earlier he had argued that the
balance of forces would alter more and more to Austria-
Hungary's disadvantage the
longer the decision was
postponed. 2
After the tragedy of Sarajevo he summed up his view
of the prospects as follows: in 1909 it would have been
a game with open cards, in 1913 it would still have been
a game with chances, in 1914 it had become a game of
va banque, * though in his view there was no alternative.4
In this connection it is interesting to note that in 1913
Conrad sent one of his officers to discuss the situation
with Mr. Steed. When the latter expressed grave doubts
as to the wisdom of a policy of armed aggression against
Serbia, he was told that Conrad regarded this as quite
inevitable, and that at the worst Austria-Hungary would
perish gloriously (glorreich untergehen).
It should be added that in the autumn of 1913 Conrad
twice talked with William II, and seems to have at least
partially infected him with his ideas. On 8 September
William asked him why it had not come to war in 1909:
" I did not hold back your soldiers: I declared that
Germany
would
stand
entirely
on
your
side."
But
Conrad quite accurately assigned the blame to the London
Conference of Ambassadors, which
had exercised a
restraining influence.' On 18 October, at the Leipzig
1 ibid., iii., p. 597.
2 12 March, ibid., iii., p. 616.
2 ibid., iv., p. 72.
3 ibid., iv., p. 18. An instructive comment upon Conrad's policy will be
found in the valuable memoirs of the German General
von Cramon, Unser
Oesterreichisch-ungarische Bundesgenosse im Weltkriege, p. 52. Conrad's various
Memoranda, he writes, reveal him "a s a mixture between a German-Austrian
Liberal of the 'seventies and a Federalist of the colour of Francis Ferdinand,
put in any case as the most determined enemy of the Dualist form of the state,
in which he saw the greatest danger to the Monarchy."
4 ibid., III. p. 43.
54
Centenary celebrations, William went 'further, declaring
Serbia's measure to be full, and approving energetic
action. " 111 go with you," he told Conrad. " The other
Powers are not ready and will do nothing against us.
In a few days you must be in Belgrade. I was always
for peace, but that has its limits. I have read and know
much about war and know what it means, but at last
there comes a situation in which a Great Power can't
look on any longer, but must draw the sword."1
That Conrad's misgivings were abundantly shared ·
by the supreme authorities of the Dual Monarchy is
shown by the Memorandum on foreign policy which was
being prepared in the spring of 1914 at the Ballplatz for
the purpose of winning Germany to an actively anti-Serb
policy and the attachment of Bulgaria to the Triple
Alliance. * In its earliest draft it does take into con-
sideration the possibility of coming to terms with Serbia —
mainly, it is true, because of the reaction of the Serbian
question upon Roumania, which is in 1914 the main
preoccupation
of
both
German
and
Austro-Hungarian
policy. But Berchtold eliminates this and revises the
draft in accordance with the assumption that Serbia
cannot be reconciled.
This is fully in keeping with Berchtold's attitude in
the autumn of 1913. Conrad, in his third volume,
prints in full the minutes of a meeting of the Joint Council
of Ministers held on 3 October, 1913:3 and from them
we learn that on the very day before Mr. Pasic had made
renewed overtures to Austria-Hungary, expressing the
desire for friendly relations "for decades to come."4
1 ibid., iii, p. 470. 2 See infra., p. 161. 3 Conrad, op. cit., iii., p. 729.
4
Mr. Bogicevié, then Serbian Charge d'Affaires at Berlin, claims (Kriegsur-
sachen, p. 69) to have learned direct both írom Pasic and from Jagow that during
the
peace
negotiations
at
Bucarest
in
August
1913,
King
Charles
and
Mr.
Maiorescu more than once urged Serbia to improve her relations with Austria-
Hungary. Evidently Pasic
took this advice to
heart. If the same
writer is
to be trusted, this overture of Pasic to Vienna is not unconnected with the
warning addressed in the same August by Jagow to the Serbs as to Austria -
Hungary's intended military action (ibid., p. 73.)
55
How
little
response
there
was
to
Pasic's
advance
is shown by the remarks of the Austrian Premier, Count
Stürgkh, who declared: "A reckoning with Serbia and
her humiliation is a condition of the Monarchy's exist-
ence. If this can't happen to-day, it must in any case
be thoroughly prepared."1 In his audience with Francis
Joseph on 2 October, Conrad talks of the impending
visit of Pasic to Vienna, and even he,
after years of
" Delenda Carthago," allows himself to entertain the
possibility of " binding agreements with Serbia."2
But Pasic was a second time rebuffed and never came
to Vienna. This incident deserves to be specially stressed,
for it is the final justification for Serbia falling more and
more under Russian influence. This lay in the nature
of things. On the one hand stood Austria-Hungary
consolidating her hold upon Bosnia, keenly resenting
Serbian protests, enforcing Serbia's public humiliation
before Europe, employing
forgery and
espionage to
discredit the Jugoslav movement and repressing Croatian
liberties at home, and again, blocking Serbia's economic
outlet, mobilising against her at the height of her struggle
with Turkey and encouraging discord between her and
her allies. On the other hand stood Russia, where
public opinion sympathised hardly less intensely with
the Balkan Slavs and their war of liberation, than it had
a generation earlier in the Eastern crisis of 1876 — with
the result that the Tsar was chosen as arbiter and his
Government strained every effort to secure a peaceful
solution of the dispute between the allies, and when those
efforts failed, served as the sole effective deterrent to
forcible intervention on the part of Austria-Hungary.
It was thus hardly surprising that the Pasic Government
should have been Russophil and eager to show its grati-
tude towards its saviour.
Yet though Russia actively sympathised with Serbia,
and though to prevent Serbia's overthrow had become
1 Conrad, op. cit., iii., p. 731.
2 ibid., iii., p. 456.
56
an obvious matter of Russian prestige· — recognised as
such by every Chancellory in Europe as part of the
unhappy pre-war situation — Russia had none the less
made quite clear to Serbia her desire to avoid a Great
War; though of course there were Russians in high
places, and notably Mr. Izvolsky, the Ambassador in
Paris, who regarded it as sooner or later inevitable, and
therefore not unnaturally desired that it should take
place at the most favourable moment for Russia.
Mr. Bogicevic,1 who was Serbian Charge d'Affaires
in Berlin shortly before the war, quotes Mr. Pasic as
remarking to his Greek colleague, Mr. Politis, at the con-
clusion of the Peace Conference in Bucarest (10 August,
1913): " The first round is won; now we must prepare
the second against
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