and this Francis Ferdinand was firmly resolved not to do,
until that constitution could be brought into line with
the requirements of the Monarchy as a whole. But even
he hesitated at the idea of open repudiation, and was glad
to find a pretext for delay in the undoubted fact that the
Austrian and Hungarian versions of the compromise of
1867 conflicted in certain important particulars which
must be cleared up before an oath could reasonably be
exacted. The most striking example of this related to
a Southern Slav problem, for in the one document
Dalmatia
is
assumed
to
belong
to
Austria
(which
was of course its actual de facto position), while in
the other it is implied to be an integral part of the
Triune Kingdom and therefore of the Crown of St.
Stephen. 1
Francis Ferdinand was not the man to shirk awkward
facts. He realised that his political aims could only be
attained through the overthrow of the Dual System, and
that this must involve him in conflict with the ruling
caste in Hungary. It was this which led him to seek
allies
among
the
non-Magyar
nationalities,
and
he
advocated
the
introduction
of
universal
suffrage
in
Hungary, not of course because he believed in democratic
principles, but simply because it was an instrument for
placing the Magyars in a minority and securing national
justice all round, and he calculated that the other races
would gladly purchase this by an endorsement of his
plans
for
constitutional
reform.
It
would
thus
be
possible to superimpose upon the existing Parliaments
of Vienna and Budapest a central parliament and execu-
tive for the whole Monarchy, perhaps simply by fusing
the Delegations and converting them from deliberative
to legislative bodies. The Archduke boldly reckoned
l See the Austrian Law of 21 December, 1867, §8, and the Hungarian Art. xxx,
01 1868 (compromise between Hungary and Croatia), which refers throughout
and .Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia " as one of the two contracting parties,
and in 65§. expressly insists upon " the reincorporation of Dalmatia."
86
with the impossibility of effecting such far-reaching re-
forms by normal means, and within the limit of six months
prescribed for the Coronation, and was therefore prepared
to announce his intentions by a manifesto on accession,
which would have been virtually equivalent to a coup
d'etat and have given rise to a constitutional crisis of
the first magnitude.1 It should be added that Colonel
Brosch had worked out to the smallest details a plan to
ensure order in all parts of the Monarchy in the critical
days following the public proclamation of his intentions.
He calculated, probably with reason, that if proper
precautions were taken, Hungary would remain helpless
and impassive, and this belief he based to a large extent
upon the precedent of March 1906, when non-Magyar
troops were massed round the Parliament buildings by
an unconstitutional government and a Colonel of Militia
read the decree of dissolution, without a single serious
act of resistance from the country at large.
In foreign policy the Archduke also held pronounced
views, and indeed his projects of internal reform were
very largely prompted by his desire to strengthen the
international status and prestige of the Monarchy. His
Este and Bourbon blood, combined with the ultramontane
views of himself and his wife and his detestation of
Freemasonry and Radicalism, rendered him suspicious
of Italy who, a sure instinct told him, would range her-
self against Austria-Hungary at the moment of supreme
crisis in Europe. These doubts lay at the root of his
interest in the Navy and the problem of Adriatic defence,
which again has its obvious connections with the Southern
Slav Question. It was inevitable that Germany should
bulk largest in his survey of Europe, but the idea of
Austria-Hungary's
dependence
upon
her
northern
ally
Was distasteful to him, alike from the political and the
1 A most valuable summary of the considerations which weighed with the
Archduke is contained in an essay of the late Professor Lammasch, in the Volu me
entitled Heinrich Lammasch, pp. 77-95 (Vienna, 1922).
87
dynastic
standpoint.
Viewed
in
the
abstract,
what
would have pleased him most would have been a revival
of the League of the Three Emperors, as a guarantee of
conservative development in Central and Eastern Europe
and a bulwark against revolutionary ideas: and Count
Czernin has pointed out that the Balkan rivalry between
Vienna and St. Petersburg caused him genuine anxiety. 1
Hence it is probably a mistake to credit him with bellicose
tendencies, though undoubtedly there were times when
his overbearing and explosive nature led him to regard
war as probable. To Conrad he was generally ready
to listen, both because of his zeal and military efficiency
and because they found common ground in their distrust
of Italy; yet both Conrad himself and Auffenberg, who
stood in his favour till the winter of 1912, represent him
as hardly less reluctant to engage upon war than the
old Emperor himself, and Count Czernin maintains that
he was by no means as anti-Serb as he has been depicted.·
This is confirmed by Dr. Danev, to whom Francis
Ferdinand,
during
an
audience
granted
to
him
as
Bulgarian Premier at Budapest during the first Balkan
war, assumed the whole credit for averting Austria-
Hungary's intervention against Serbia.4
Of special interest is Conrad's testimony, fi On the
repeated opportunities I had of discussing with the Arch-
duke the need for decisive action against Serbia, I could
never be quite clear whether the Archduke in his inmost
heart had decided on warlike action. He dealt with
all matters bearing on it, discussed concrete prepara-
tions for war with an interest which suggested that he
1 Interesting confirmation of this is provided by a conversation with the
German Military Attaché in Vienna, Count Kageneck, in which the Archduke
summed up his political confession of faith in the phrase, " Alliance of the Three
Emperors, with adhesion of England where possible " (mit tunlichstem Anschluss
Englands).
This is
quoted
from
Kageneck's unpublished report, by
Montgelas,
Leitfaden zur Kriegsschuldfrage, p. 54.
2 In the World War, p. 51.
3 cf. Auffenberg, op. cit., p. 231; Conrad, op. cit., iii, pp. 353, 597.
4 Interview of Danev in Trgovinski Vjestnik, reproduced by Neues Wiener
Tagolatt of 9 July, 1914, See Friedjung, Zeitalter des Imperialismus, ii., p. 269.
88
had its execution in view, but yet seemed to me in his
heart to have no real liking for it." And here he adds
his impression that Francis Ferdinand was influenced
against war from the German side and especially from
the Emperor William.1 Again, Count Kageneck, the
German Military Attaché, in a report to Berlin, quotes
the Archduke as describing war with Russia as " posi-
tively a monstrosity " überhaupt ein Unding) and declar-
ing that he saw no reason for war with Serbia. * During
the same critical period a letter of the Archduke to his
brother-in-law,
Duke
Albrecht
of
Württemberg, was
communicated by the latter to Bethmann Hollweg early
in February and by him to Moltke; in it was a strong
expression of feeling against war with Serbia, since at
the
very
best
Austria-Hungary
would
only
acquire
untrustworthy subjects and " a heap of plum trees."
Moltke replied that this coincided with previous remarks
of the Archduke, and that the Chancellor's chief task
would be "to prevent Austrian follies so far as possible
— not a pleasant or an easy task! "'
Interesting confirmation of Francis Ferdinand's atti-
tude can be found in a conversation between Berchtold,
Czernin and Conrad on 10 October, 1913, recorded by
the latter in his memoirs.« On this occasion the military
Cato urged a policy of action against Serbia and re-
affirmed the view that he had preached for years, that
" the Southern Slav and Panserb Question " were
fundamental for the Monarchy. " But here in Austria,"
objected Czernin, " one must reckon with Emperor and
Heir Apparent. They are not for war, and least of all
the Heir Apparent; he holds stubbornly to peace."
1 Conrad, op. cit., ii., p. 413.
2 Kageneck's reports of 17 December, 1912, and 26 February, 1913, cit.,
Brandenberg, Von Bismarck zum Weltkriege, p. 372.
3 Quoted from imprinted documents in the German Foreign Office, by Count
Max Montgelas in his Leitfaden zur Kriegsschuld/rage, p. 52. Moltke's phrase
throws some light on his correspondence with Conrad in 1914, quoted supra, p. 52.
4 op cit., hi., pp. 463-4.
89
During the same winter Baron Szilassy, before proceed-
ing to his post at Athens, had an audience with Francis
Ferdinand and found him " every bit as pacific as his
Imperial uncle" and anxious for an understanding with
Russia. He blamed Tisza's nationalist policy for the
friction with Serbia and Roumania.x
Of
the
Archduke's
friendly
attitude
towards
the
Croats there can be no matter of doubt, and it would
seem probable that he looked upon them both as an asset
in the struggle against Hungary, and also among the
Jugoslavs as a counterweight to Belgrade. The fact
that the Croats were Catholics told much in their favour
with the Archduke and his clerical advisers, who saw in
them a weapon for the reconquest of the Balkans from
Orthodoxy. He rightly resented the short-sighted policy
which was steadily alienating Croat sentiment from the
Habsburgs, and on at least two occasions he made violent
protests to the Emperor against the Cuvaj régime, but
without any effect. His real aim was to bring about
Jugoslav unity under the Habsburg sceptre — an aim
which in certain circumstances might have placed Serbia
and even the Karagjorgjevic dynasty in the same relation
to Vienna as that of Bavaria and the Wittelsbach towards
Berlin. This project has come to be known as " Trialism,"
but in the Archduke's eyes it was only part of a wider
whole. For, as Czernin assures us, he also entertained
the possibility of ceding Transylvania to Roumania, but
then admitting united Roumania as a vassal state within
the bounds of the Monarchy. This idea was actually
discussed between Czernin and Nicholas Filipescu, the
Conservative patriot statesman, who — perhaps all too
logically — regarded it as the sole alternative to an
ultimate life and death conflict between Roumania and
Austria-Hungary.2 Once more, it is obvious that neither
idea could have been realised until the obstinate Resistance
1 Der Untergang der Donau-Monarchie, p. 259.
2 In the World War, p. 80: Conrad, op. cit., iii., p. 783.'
90
of Hungary had been overcome: for the effect would
inevitably have been to diminish the relative importance
of the Magyars in the aggrandised Habsburg state.
A further very vital factor in the Archduke's character
was the growth of the sinister disease which was sapping
his strength and which found vent in occasional fits of
ungovernable rage, bordering for the time being upon
insanity. The symptoms were most marked at shooting
parties, when the Archduke fired at everything within
range, and was an object of general terror. On one
occasion, brilliant marksman though he was, he shot a
beater;
and
the
Austrian
aristocracy
were
already
beginning to be chary of their invitations to him.1
According to a story repeated to Professor "Masaryk by
members of his party in the neighbourhood of Konopistë,
the Archduke's lawyer, when summoned on some legal
business, was shown into a large unfurnished room, and
found him sitting on the floor and playing with his
children. " The Archduke motioned to him to sit like-
wise on the floor, and on seeing him hesitate, flew into
a violent passion, abused him roundly and drove him
from the castle."» Another story which reached me
from the same source came from the Czech railway
officials who had charge of the Imperial train. The
Archduke had visited the German Emperor in Potsdam
and some incident must have occurred to arouse his
displeasure: for after the train had started southwards,
he drew his sword and in his fury hacked at the upholstery
of his compartment.
It is not quite certain whether the Archduke realised
the full gravity of his symptoms, but he undoubtedly
felt his health to be deteriorating, and burned with
impatience and anger as he saw his uncle ageing in
1 During his visit to England in 1913 his reckless shooting and the frantic
manner in which he
abused his loaders made a strong impression upon a member
of the British Royal family and led him to inquire (in complete ignorance of the
facts) whether there was not a strain of madness in the Archduke.
2 H. W. Steed, Through Thirty Years, i., p. 367.
91
impotent negation, and the short time probably available
for himself slipping away from him, while such vast and
vital tasks were still untouched. It is certain that the
Duchess knew the full truth: not long before the end
she had discussed settlements with the family lawyer
and had told an intimate friend that her husband might
be seized with madness or paralysis at almost any time.
Though the secret was jealously guarded, some of these
facts could not fail to become known. They amply
explain the nervousness of the Imperial family, who knew
that another bronchial attack might at any time prove
fatal to the old Emperor,1 and saw the prospect of the
throne being occupied, at a period of latent European
crisis, by a man of autocratic leanings, committed to a
vast programme of political adventure, yet liable at any
moment to lose all balance and control, and influenced
by an ambitious wife who might in the interests of her
children persuade him to change the succession and throw
" Habsburg House Law " to the winds. Disturbing
possibilities were presented by the fact that the law of
succession differed in Hungary and Austria, that the
Magyar nationalists had an obvious motive for widening
the gulf, and that no legal or constitutional means existed
for
preventing
the
Archduke's
succession,
whatever
might be the state of his health.2
Though the full facts remained a jealously-guarded
secret, the precarious state of the Archduke's health, his
conflict of opinion with the Emperor and his intention
of introducing drastic changes on succeeding to the throne,
gradually became known to wide circles, and took shape
in rumours of the most contradictory kind. Thus, though
unable to influence the political development, the figure
1
Even in the winter of 1910 Dr. Neusser had assured Colonel Brosch, the
Archduke's confidant, that the Emperor could only live one or at most two
years longer, and that his physical condition was one of " from to-day till to-
orrow." See Heinrich Lammasch, p. 81.
2
His granduncle Ferdinand I had reigned from 1835 to 1848, though notoriously
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