weaK-nnnded, epileptic and unfit for the throne.
92
of the Archduke loomed very large in the life of the state
and gave an added tinge of uncertainty to a situation
almost equally unstable at home and abroad.
The Treaty of Bucarest (ίο August, 1913) seemed for
the moment to have stabilised the new Balkan situation
and averted the danger of a general conflict. But, as
we have seen, it was only rendered possible by serious
disagreements
inside the Triple
Alliance. A passing
coolness between Vienna and Berlin was the result, but
the vital necessity for seeing eye to eye was obvious to
both parties as each fresh incident occurred to show how
easily
a
conflagration
might
be
produced.
Vienna's
aggressive attitude towards Belgrade in the matter of
Albania, the acute friction between Russia and Germany
caused by the Liman von Sanders Mission, the announce-
ment of a Serbo-Greek alliance, the visits of the Serbian
Crown Prince to St. Petersburg and of the Tsar to Rou-
mania, the Serbo-Montenegrin negotiations, the dispute
between Greece and Turkey — each of these caused
nervousness
in
many quarters. It was
thus
natural
enough that those at the head of affairs in Germany and
Austria-Hungary should wish to meet and discuss future
policy in a world whose balance had undoubtedly been
upset by the Balkan Wars. Accordingly we find visits
of William II to Francis Joseph in Vienna and to Francis
Ferdinand at his Adriatic castle of Miramar in March,
and again to the Archduke's Bohemian home in June.
It is generally admitted that on each occasion Balkan
questions figured largely in the discussion, and that the
main preoccupation of Francis Joseph and his advisers
was not so much Serbia as Roumania. On 23, March,
1914, there were conversations between William^-Francis
Joseph and Berchtold, and from the report of the German
Ambassador, Herr von Tschirschky, to Berlin — based
on what the Emperor William told him the same day1 —
1 This report was published in Deutsche Politik of 11 June, 1920, and is reprinted
in an appendix of Montgelas, Leitfaden zur Kriegsschuldfrage, p. 189.
93
we learn that the two latter expressed great alarm about
Roumania, treating her as " already virtually lost for
the
Triple
Alliance."
William
was
more
optimistic,
argued that Roumania was bound to side with the Central
Powers " against the supremacy of Slav Russia/' and
that Berlin was now to be regarded as the link between
Bucarest and Vienna. Russian armaments he refused
to regard as a warlike menace, and explained them on the
one hand by French insistence and on the other by the
highly interesting theory that Russia was better informed
. than either Vienna or Berlin about the sad state of Turkey
and so felt bound to be prepared for the worst. A little
later William talked with Count Tisza, who impressed
him greatly as a man " of firm will and clear ideas."
They too began by a discussion of the Roumanian ques-
tion, the Emperor showing his joy at Tisza's negotiations
with the Roumanian leaders in Transylvania and assuring
him that on this Bucarest, did not ask for " action on a
grand scale, but merely concessions on minor points."
Tisza on his side spoke of the union of Serbia and Monte-
negro as the most important Balkan event, and assuming
it
to
be
unavoidable,
argued
that
Austria-Hungary's
main interest was to keep Serbia away from the Adriatic
and
hence
that
the
union
might
be
tolerated
in
return for the cession of the Montenegrin coast to
Albania.
At Miramar a few days later William repeated the gist
of
these
conversations
to
Francis
Ferdinand,
who
emphasised the need for attaching both Roumania and
Greece, and if possible Turkey also, to the Triple Alliance. »
The Archduke criticised very strongly Berchtold's attitude
to Bucarest, who could still be reconciled if only Vienna
treated it with " frank loyalty," and above all, if proper
treatment
were
meted
out
to
the
Roumanians
of
Hungary.2 William's appeal to the Archduke to trust
1 See report of Herr von Treutler (Minister attached to the Emperor) to Berlin,
published by Montgelas, ibid., p. 191.
2 This coincides exactly with the view put forward by the Austro-Hungarian
94
Tisza led to a frank discussion of the internal politics of
the Monarchy, and when William insisted on the need
for a " Germanic orientation " and for " washing the
heads of the Czechs," Francis Ferdinand concurred. The
Slavs, he remarked, were getting " too aggressive and
impertinent."
During this same period Count Czernin, at the Bucarest
Legation, was sending periodical warnings to Vienna as
to the danger of losing Roumania altogether. Careful
investigations had led him to regard opinion both among
the general public and in the army as increasingly hostile
to Austria-Hungary,1 and a détente between the two
countries did not strike him as possible unless a Magyar-
Roumanian agreement could be reached in Hungary, and
unless in foreign policy some satisfaction could be found
for Bulgarian claims. This again was only possible at
Serbia's expense — in other words, through war. But
war, he reminded Berchtold, need not necessarily involve
the annexation of Serbia by the Monarchy, with the
unwelcome accompaniment of augmenting still further
its Slav population. An alternative would be to " reduce
Serbia to a minimum " by assigning portions of her
territory to Bulgaria, Greece and Albania.» Resorting
to the stump orator's argument of " don't put him under
the pump," Czernin at once disclaimed any idea of war
upon Serbia " to-day or to-morrow," but merely affirmed
Austria-Hungary's intention of hampering Serbia's diges-
tion of her new Macedonian territories, where she might
be kept busy for years to come.
Military Attaché in Bucharest, Colonel Hranilovic, who went so far as to maintain
that the Roumanian Government " made a condition of future friendship " the
solution of the Roumanian Question in Transylvania. See e.g his report to
Conrad (29 June, 1914)» quoted in the latter's Aus Meiner Dienstzeit, iii., p. 553
.
1 His two reports of 11 March and 2 April, 1914, are reproduced in full by
Conrad, Aus Meiner Dienstzeit, iii., pp. 781-9 (appendix x.), and 663-8.
2 This suggestion of Czernin may have been the germ of Berchtold's proposal
at the Crown Council of 19 July, 1914; see infra, p. 200.
95
But Czernin's report naturally concentrates its atten-
tion upon Roumania and upon the anxious and increas-
ingly equivocal position of King Charles. As he points
out, no one in Roumania, save the King himself, the
Premier, Mr. Ion Bratianu, and the Conservative leader,
Mr.
Maiorescu,
had
any
knowledge
of
the
secret
treaty that had so long attached the country to the
Triple Alliance, and more than one Roumanian Minister
abroad imagined himself to be free to work for closer
relations with the Entente. The King was no longer
"
unconditional
master
in
his
own
country,"
and
felt " that an open confession of Austrophil policy "
might involve him in serious conflict with Roumanian
sentiment.
Some weeks later Czernin dealt with the problem in
further detail, and challenged the view put forward by
Berchtold, as a result of his meeting with the German
Emperor, that the mediation of Berlin in Bucarest
would suffice to restore the old relations between Austria-
Hungary and Roumania. He then went on to warn
Berchtold against the double blunder of ignoring the
growing strength of public opinion in Roumania and of
assuming that the King was still the only decisive factor
in foreign policy. In the previous December, King
Charles had himself told Czernin that " as things stood
at the moment, Roumania in a war could not go with
the Monarchy."1 Save for a tiny Austrophil clique at
Court, Czernin added, all those in authority were already
reckoning upon an Austro-Russian war, and calculated
on waiting until " with a million soldiers they could
deal the death-blow to the defeated side and so secure
either Transylvania or Bessarabia for themselves."1 He
was able to reinforce his argument by a reference to two
recent incidents — the failure of Tisza's negotiations with
the Transylvanians, which stimulated afresh the feeling
against the Monarchy in Bucarest, and the bomb
1 Conrad, op. cit., iii., p. 634.
2 ibid, p. 635.
96
outrage of Debreczen,1 which was an ominous sign that
terrorism was spreading from the Jugoslavs to the
Roumanians.
These various reports make it clear that both Vienna
and Berlin were extremely anxious at the gradual evolu-
tion of Roumanian policy in a sense inimical to the Triple
Alliance; that while William II reckoned on his personal
influence with Charles of Hohenzollern to redress the
balance, his allies fully realised his optimism to be mis-
placed; that the project of making public the terms of
the secret alliance would only have led to its prompt
repudiation by the country and thus fatally compromised
the King; and that if Roumanian military aid could not
be relied upon in a war with Russia, the whole strategic
plans of the Central Powers would require modification,
and the problem of Transylvania's unfortified frontier
would become acute. In his annual report for 1913
Conrad treated Roumania as virtually lost, and assumed
that the next crisis would be evoked by the desire of
Serbia and Roumania to unite with their co-nationals in
the
Dual
Monarchy.2
Tisza,
for
his
part,
in
a
memorandum addressed to Francis Joseph on 15 March,
1914,8 was equally emphatic as to the Roumanian
danger and the urgent need for a clear understanding with
Germany
on
Balkan
problems.
"
The
conquest
of
Transylvania," he wrote, " always remains the greatest
bait," hence the essential point in a " politique de
longue main " was to win over Bulgaria to the Triple
Alliance
by
a promise of
future compensations
in
Macedonia.
It
should
then
be
possible
to
detach
Roumania and Greece from Serbia and reconcile them
1 The Magyar Government had in 1912 erected an artificial Magyar Uniate
Bishopric at Hajdúdorog, for the deliberate purpose of Magyarising the Rou-
manian Uniates. In March 1914 the Vicar-General of the new diocese was killed
by an infernal machine sent by post, and several of his priests were seriously
wounded.
2 ibid, iii., p. 761.
3 The text is published by Bishop Fraknói in his Die ungarische Regierung und
die Entstehung des Weltkrieges, and also by Professor S. B. Fay in Papers of Count
Tisza (American Historical Review for January 1924).
97
with Bulgaria. There must be no rash action, but also
no " passive expectation," for there was no time to be
lost if Bulgaria in her isolation was to be saved from throw-
ing herself into the arms of Russia. " Austria-Hungary's
task/' he adds, " is difficult in itself: of success there
can be no question, unless we have the full assurance
that we are understood, appreciated and supported by
Germany."
It was while such grave questions of foreign policy
were under consideration that William II paid a fresh
visit to Francis Ferdinand at Konopistë (12-14 June).1
Once more the discussions centred round the Roumanian
problem, though they opened on the existing friction
between Greece and Turkey. Both Emperor and Arch-
duke agreed that the settlement of Bucarest must be
upheld, and that King Charles should be sounded as to
future policy. The conversation then turned to home
politics, and Francis Ferdinand, " speaking still more
bluntly and with exceedingly drastic expressions of his
dislike," declared that Hungary was being maintained in
quite mediaeval conditions by a tiny oligarchy, and that
every Magyar was working against Austria and the
Monarchy as a whole. When William began to praise
Tisza, the Archduke retorted that he was really dictator
in Hungary and would like to be the same in Vienna,
that he was working for a separate Hungarian Army,
and that if foreign policy went wrong a large measure
of blame attached to Tisza for his ill-treatment of the
Roumanians of Hungary. He followed up this out-
burst
by
making
the
Emperor
promise
instruct
Tschirschky to urge upon Tisza, whenever they met, the
need for concessions to the Roumanians.
This is all that has transpired about the Konopistë
1 See report of Herr von Treutler to Berlin, 14 June, 1914, published in Deutsche
Politik of 14 May, 1920, and reprinted in Montgelas, op. cit., pp. 191-4· It
recounts two conversations, at the first of which Treutler was present, while
the second is based on what William II repeated to him the following day. Hence,
interesting as it is, it may be presumed not to be complete.
98
conversations, but early in 1916 Mr. Steed gave publicity1
to a highly sensational story purporting to reveal the
innermost secret of the meeting. His anonymous in-
formant asserted that William II then laid before his
host a grandiose scheme for transforming the map of
Europe. By it a new Kingdom of Poland, stretching
from the Baltic to the Black Sea, would become the
heritage of Francis Ferdinand's eldest son, while his
second son would become King of Bohemia, Hungary,
Croatia and Serbia, leaving German Austria, with an
Adriatic outlet at Trieste, to enter the German Empire,
under the Archduke Charles as King. The three groups
would be linked together by a customs union and military
conventions, and would control the Balkans and the
Middle East. In short, we are asked to believe that
Francis Ferdinand, in return for the promise of " vaster
realms elsewhere, acquiesced in the practical absorption
of the hereditary Habsburg provinces into the German
Empire." Such an idea conflicts with all that is known
of the Archduke's character — his intense belief in Habs-
burg greatness, his jealousy of undue dependence upon
Germany. Still more does it conflict with the solemn
oath of renunciation which he had sworn at his marriage
and which his strict religious views made him regard as
absolutely irrevocable. Moreover these feelings, which
were well known to all his intimates, were reinforced
by a genuine affection for his nephew the young Arch-
duke Charles, whose rights he was determined to respect.
In a word, the story only becomes credible on the assump-
tion that illness had deprived Francis Ferdinand of all
balance and that William was aware of the fact. But
in that case William's sanity might also be doubted,
since such a project obviously could not be carried out
1'"The Pact of Konopisht " {Nineteenth Century, 1916). At the time no
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