since the momentous year of 1903. Even before the
outbreak of the Great War it was possible for the care-
ful student to obtain a very clear idea of the issues
involved and of the ultimate aims pursued by Vienna,
Budapest and Belgrade, though it must be added that
European diplomacy as a whole as yet regarded them
in an all too superficial and conventional light. But
since the war the decision of the revolutionary govern-
ments of Austria and Germany to make public their
whole diplomatic dossier has provided us with over-
whelming evidence on all the major points at issue.
Indeed to-day the main difficulty which confronts us
is that of sifting out of the mass such details as are really
material, and what is most important of all, such as the
average reader may hope to assimilate without a sense
of being lost in an interminable labyrinth. In the
following pages it will be my endeavour to piece together
the salient facts in such a manner as to present a reasoned
sequence of events and policy. In every case the fullest
1
Herr Melden was for years leader-writer on the Fremdenblatt, the chief organ
of the Ballplatz, and his pamphlet reflected official views. In 1917 he published
AloisG, raf Aehrenthal, a semi-official
glorification of
Austrian foreign
policy
since 1908. cf. Kanner, Kaiserliche Katastrophenpolitik, p. 177.
161
possible references will be appended, and the reader will
thus be able, if he should so desire, to check point by
point both statements of fact and the conclusions drawn
from them.
Berchtold's Expose of Policy
A natural point of departure is provided by the long
exposé of Austro-Hungarian policy in the Balkans which
the Ballplatz had had in preparation since May 1914,
for the information of the German Government and
which, after revision by Count Berchtold himself, appears
to have reached its final form on 24 June, only four days
before
the
murder.1
It
is
instructive
to
note that
though the conflict with Serbia is of course recognised
as the ultimate rock of offence, the foremost subject of
discussion is the change in the attitude of Roumania
to the Triple Alliance since the Treaty of Bucarest in the
previous year. As is pointed out very clearly and
accurately, the two Balkan Wars had resulted in the
virtual elimination of Turkey from the Peninsula, the
defeat of Bulgaria by a coalition of her four Christian
neighbours, and the aggrandisement of Russophil Serbia,
and following upon this a marked deviation (bedeutsame
Schwenkung)
in
Roumanian
foreign
policy,
due
not
merely to the Balkan upheaval, but also to the increas-
ing resentment of public opinion at Magyar policy in
Transylvania.
The
Memorandum
complains
that
in
defiance of Roumania's commitments towards the Triple
Alliance, the Roumanian Foreign Minister has recently
laid public emphasis on " the principle of the free hand "
as the basis of Roumanian policy; while King Charles
— himself the originator of these very commitments —
had felt bound to warn Count Czernin1 that, though
1 The first draft was prepared in May by Baron Flotow, the second (which
incorporated a good deal of the first) by Baron Matscheko. For details see
Gooss, Das Wiener Kabinett, pp. 4-6, 13, 22-5.
2Then Austro-Hungarian Minister at Bucarest.
162
during his own lifetime he would do all in his power to
prevent a Roumanian Army from entering the field
against
Austria-Hungary,
he
could
not make
policy
alone against the public opinion of present-day Roumania,
and further, that if Russia should attack the Monarchy,
there could be no question of Roumanian support for
the latter, in spite of the existing secret alliance.1
A situation had thus grown up in which the political
advantages
formerly
accruing
from the
alliance
had
actually been reversed; for in the event of an Eastern
war it would now no longer be necessary for Russia to
send troops against Roumania, while Austria-Hungary
would no longer be quite sure of her Transylvanian frontier
which, owing to the alliance, had been left unfortified.
Assuming a frank discussion between Bucarest and Vienna
to be essential, the Memorandum proceeds to consider
the alternative methods of forcing Roumania to break
definitely with the Triple Alliance or to renounce before
the whole world the secrecy which had hitherto veiled
the agreement binding her to the central group of powers.
In this connection it is very rightly argued that while
such an agreement could have but little value as a make-
weight against the Entente unless it was known to, and
accepted by, Roumanian public opinion, it was on the
other hand most improbable that either the King or
any possible Government which he might form could
win over the country to so decided a step. " Hence a
categorical ' aut-aut ' on the part of the Monarchy might
lead to an open breach." Moreover, it was doubtful
whether further concessions, such as a guarantee of
Roumania's new frontier towards Bulgaria, or even a
certain
Austro-Serbian
rapprochement,
would
really
restore the old cordiality between Bucarest and Vienna,
it
being
inferred
that
Hungary's
attitude
to
the
Roumanians of Transylvania was the real stumbling-
block. Elsewhere we learn that Count Berchtold had
1 See Memo, in D.D. (Die Deutschen Dokumente), ί.,Νο. 14, p. 26; D.A., i., No. 1.
163
urged Count Tisza to modify this attitude in view of
its influence upon foreign policy1 that it figured
prominently in the discussion between Francis Ferdinand
and William II at Konopistë, and that the latter was
fully alive to its bearings upon the Balkan prospects
of the Triple Alliance.2 The Memorandum, however,
unreservedly accepts the view that in any discussion
with Bucarest no reference to the internal affairs of the
Monarchy can be tolerated; in other words, it rules
out ab initio the very topic which kept Roumanian
opinion in a patriotic ferment, and was so largely respons-
ible for the growth of a Serbo-Roumanian rapprochement.
ITS REVISION AFTER THE MURDER
It is significant that in the first draft of the memoran-
dum the possibility of King Charles and his Government
mediating between Belgrade and Vienna was seriously
considered,3 but that Count Berchtold dismissed this
as impracticable and ordered its excision from the draft
prepared on 24 June. Serbia being regarded as irre-
concilable and Roumania being henceforth ruled out as a
reliable
pivot
for
Austria-Hungary's
Balkan
policy4
it obviously followed that " other dispositions " were
necessary in order to counter Russia's designs for a new
and aggressive Balkan League.
The only alternative apparent to Berchtold's mind was
an alliance with Bulgaria, which had for some time past
been " seeking " a backing (Anlehnung) 5 with the Triple
Alliance. If Bulgaria and Turkey could be brought
together and attached to the Central Powers, and if the
future alliance with Bulgaria can be framed on such lines
as not to injure Roumanian interests, then the tables
will be completely turned against Russia, Serbia will
1 Gooss, op. cit., p. 6.
2
cf. Tschirschky to Bethmann Hollweg. D.D. i., No. 4. (Marginal note of
William II).
3 Gooss, op. cit., p. 6.
4 ibid., p. 19.
5 D.D., i., p. 29.
164
change places with Bulgaria as the isolated state, and
all the other Balkan countries will be attracted into the
orbit of the Dual Monarchy, thus presenting a solid
phalanx against Russian ambition. In contrast to this
seductive picture of the future, the Memorandum dwelt
upon the strenuous efforts of Russia and France " to
break the military superiority of the two Empires by
means of auxiliary troops from the Balkans "; Russia
was depicted as irrevocably committed to aggressive
Panslav aims, and renewed stress was laid upon the
common
interests
of
Austria-Hungary
and
Germany.
In conclusion, Berlin was invited, not merely to express
its views on the policy thus outlined, but to co-operate
in such " timely and energetic " action as would forestall
Russia in her designs. The contents of this Memorandum
make it quite clear that in June 1914 Austria-Hungary
was on the point of resuming that diplomatic action
against Serbia which Italy's attitude in August 1913
and Serbia's surrender in the following winter had
compelled her to postpone.
In the form summarised above, the Memorandum
was actually ready for transmission to Berlin when the
tragedy
occurred.
That
event,
not
unnaturally,
only
served to confirm the Ballplatz in their outlook, and it
was decided to leave the document unaltered, save for a
brief postscript describing the murder as " indubitable
proof " that the conflict between the Monarchy and
Serbia was " unbridgeable/' and that despite an attitude
of " goodwill and conciliation/' Austria-Hungary must
reckon in future with Serbia's "obstinate, irreconcilable
and aggressive enmity."1 This was the view long held
by Count Berchtold, and in it he was still further fortified
by his permanent officials, notably Count Forgách and
Baron Macchio, and by his Chef de Cabinet, Count
Hoyos. As we have seen, there was little or no regret,
either in Court or in official circles, for the two victims;
1 O.A., i., p. 16; Gooss, op. cit., 24.
165
indeed it was felt that their removal solved many awk-
ward problems, and not least of all, provided a very
admirable pretext for drastic action. It is no longer
in dispute that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and of
War were from the very first virtually unanimous in
favour
of
an
immediate
attack
upon
Serbia.
The
Chief of the General Staff, Baron Conrad, was particularly
urgent in advising war, arguing as he had more than once
argued during the Archduke's lifetime, that each succes-
sive " lost opportunity " of settling accounts with Serbia
— in 1909, in 1912 and in 1913 — had placed the Monarchy
in a less favourable position, and that to draw back
yet again might have fatal results for its prestige and
safety. In a report drawn up at Count Berchtold's
request on 2 July,1 Conrad argued that action had been
rendered still more urgent by Roumanian estrangement
and its effect upon the general military situation. In
his post-war Memoirs he tells us that he accepted the
murder as "a declaration of war by Serbia," which
" could only be answered by war."* At the Archduke's
funeral he discussed the situation with General Auffen-
berg, treating war as certain and reckoning with Russian
intervention as a risk to be run.3 Most of the military
chiefs shared Conrad's views, and it was probably due
to this pressure that Potiorek, so far from being removed
from Bosnia, was retained in full favour and eventually
given high command in the first campaign against
Serbia.
COUNT TISZA'S MEMORANDUM TO FRANCIS JOSEPH
If any further proof were needed that Berchtold and
the War party " intended to make the outrage in Sarajevo
the occasion for a reckoning with Serbia," it may be
gathered from the Memorandum addressed by Count
1 Gooss, op. cit., p. 25.
2 Aus Metner Dienstzeit, iv., p. 18.
3 Auffenberg, Aus Oesterreichs Höhe und Niedergang, p. 262. In recording
the conversation Auffenberg says that his own chief preoccupation was the state
of the artillery.
166
Tisza to Francis Joseph on 1 July,1 and quoting Berch-
told in this sense. This Tisza condemned as " a fatal
mistake." It is, moreover, clear that Berchtold's orig-
inal aim was "a surprise attack upon Serbia without
previous
diplomatic
action."*
Tisza
insisted
on
the
need for " gentlemanlike " behaviour, but Berchtold on
the contrary contended that this was " hardly fitting
[schwerlich angebracht] when such important interests of
state were at stake, and especially towards such a neigh-
bour as Serbia"» — a phrase which throws a flood of
light upon the mentality of the Ballplatz. The impulsive
comment of William II — " towards murderers, after
what has happened! Idiocy!" — is a perfectly natural
and legitimate attitude for anyone who accepted Serbia's
guilt; but Berchtold is not merely applying the all too
widespread axiom that good faith need not be kept with
savages — and we know that he refused to the Serbs the
title of " a civilised nation " — but is proclaiming the
Machiavellian right to reject all scruples wherever great
d
iplomatic issues are concerned. It is a common trick of
journalists to employ the word " Balkan " when
describing devious methods of diplomacy; but it would
seem that the palm should be awarded to the school
of Aehrenthal and Berchtold.
OBSTACLES
TO
WARLIKE
ACTION
The main explanation of Austria-Hungary's long delay
in taking action against Serbia is to be found in the
opposition which Berchtold encountered in high quarters.
He himself was bent upon war at all costs, and in this
view he was supported by all the military chiefs and by
the Austrian Premier, Count Stürgkh, whose narrow
bureaucratic mind, tinged by clerical influence, was
already strongly prejudiced against Serbia, and who
may have welcomed external complications as a means
1 D.A., i., No. 2, p. 16.
2 D.A., i., No. 8, p. 27.
2 Berchtold repeated this to Tschirschky on 10 July, and complained of Tisza's
obstruction. See D.D., i., No. 29, p. 50.
167
of
escaping
from
the
constitutional
deadlock
which
his feeble Government had produced in Austria, and to
a lesser degree by the Joint Finance Minister, Ritter von
Bilinski, who, owing to the special responsibility of his
own Ministry for the tragedy of Sarajevo, was in a worse
strategic position for resistance to plans which he was
far too sober and acute to regard with anything save
misgiving. But two factors of the very first importance
were averse to war, and these were no other than the
Emperor himself and the Hungarian Premier, Count
Stephen Tisza. Francis Joseph was undoubtedly pacific
by nature, and a close inside knowledge of the European
situation reinforced a natural reluctance to end his reign
in war and possible revolution, and a caution engendered
by repeated failure in every military undertaking which
he had sanctioned. But old age, if it urged him to
caution, had also dulled his feelings, and, above all,
lessened his powers of resistance. The proclamation
which he addressed to the peoples of the Monarchy after
the murder reveals his own moderating influence in the
passage which declines to identify the Serbian race
or its official representatives with a small group of
assassins; though it is of course true that his advisers
accepted such phrases, not so much from conviction as
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