in the hope of lulling both Serbia and Europe into a sense
of false security. The old Emperor had long detested
his nephew and remained quite unmoved by his removal.
Those nearest to him describe him as receiving the
first news quite calmly, as yet another of the many
tragic events in his family, and as not assuming any
grave
political
consequences.1
But
his
attitude
was
certainly one of extreme depression, and he informed
the German Ambassador that " he saw the future very
black." 2 Speaking further of the sudden death of the
1To this Baron Margutti bears convincing evidence (Vom Altem Kaiser, p.
395). quoting not only his own experience, but that of Count Paar, the Emperor's
Aide-de-camp, and Baron Bolfras, the chief of his military Chancellery.
2 Tschirschky to Bethmann Hollweg, 2 July, D.D., i., No. it, p. 16,
168
Italian Chief of Staff, General Pollio, he remarked,
" Everything is dying around me; it is too sad." In
passing, it may be noted that Pollio's death was a very
real blow to Austria-Hungary, owing to his personal
intimacy with Conrad and Moltke.1
In such a mood Berchtold and the soldiers calculated
very soundly that the surest way of overcoming their
sovereign's resistance would be to isolate him by winning
over the Hungarian Premier to their side. Tisza was
indeed a formidable opponent, full of resource and
argument, and as strong action was out of the question
without Hungary's consent, every effort was concen-
trated upon his conversion, Berchtold meanwhile drawing
a shroud of silence over his intentions and justifying
this to all enquirers by the need for awaiting a full
investigation at Sarajevo.
Count Tisza's Attitude
Alone of all the statesmen of the Monarchy, Count
Tisza showed statesmanship and foresight at this crisis,
and a legend has grown up which credits him with opposi-
tion to war, and at the same time seeks to exculpate
Hungary from all blame for the final catastrophe. It
is
therefore
extremely
important to
examine
Tisza's
attitude in detail, and to make quite clear his original
views and the manner in which the war party eventually
won his support, thereby securing the adhesion of the
Emperor also to their plans.
Tisza's original views upon the murder and the action
which the Dual Monarchy should adopt were committed
to paper by him, in a Memorandum to the Emperor-
King, dated 1 July.» In this he opened by a direct
challenge to Berchtold's project of a surprise attack on
Serbia, and he adduced various reasons for regarding
1 His successor, General Cadorna, was friendly to the Entente.
2 O.A., i., No. 2, pp. 16-18; Gooss, op, cit., pp. 60-64.
169
such a policy as " a fatal mistake " for which he could not
accept responsibility.
In the first place there were no adequate proofs of
Serbian complicity, and Austria-Hungary would there-
fore appear before the world as a disturber of the peace
and " would start a great war under the most unfavour-
able circumstances." Secondly, it was a bad moment
for warlike action, since Roumania was " as good as
lost " for the Central Powers, without any compensation;
while Bulgaria, the only Balkan State on whose support
they could reckon, was exhausted and isolated after the
two
Balkan
wars.
Tisza's
next
argument
makes
it
impossible for even the most wilful critic to credit him
with pacifist motives. " As things stand in the Balkans,
the last thing that would trouble me would be to find a
suitable casus belli. When once the moment for striking
has come, one can create (aufrollen) a case for war out
of various questions. But first of all a diplomatic
constellation must be created, such as shall make the
balance of power less unfavourable to us." What is so
interesting in this attitude is not its author's own entire
cynicism as the fact that knowing Francis Joseph as he
did, he should have thought it suited to his master's
mentality. The true policy, he goes on to argue, must
be to win Bulgaria definitely for the Triple Alliance, in
such a manner as would not offend Roumania and
might even leave the door open for an agreement with
Greece. If Germany cannot win back the Roumanians,
she must not object to Austria-Hungary securing the
Bulgarians. Besides, further delay might easily have
the effect of forcing Bulgaria into the arms of a new
Balkan League, which would pay for her support against
Austria-Hungary by territorial concessions in Macedonia;
while to secure Bulgaria would be " the sole possibility "
of winning back Roumania, who has always been afraid
of her southern neighbour. In conclusion, Count Tisza,
writing at a moment when the Emperor William was
170
still expected in Vienna for the Archduke's funeral,
urges the need for " combating his prejudice in favour
of Serbia by means of the recent horrible events." The
whole tenor of the document shows that Tisza is not
opposed to war on principle, but only to rash action
without the necessary diplomatic preparations.
It need cause no surprise that the pressure for a
Bulgarian alliance should come mainly from Budapest,
for it was Magyar policy towards the Roumanians of
Transylvania, as expounded especially by Count Tisza,
that was mainly responsible for the reorientation of
Roumania in a Serbophil and Russophil sense, which the
Ballplatz viewed with such growing concern. We have
already
seen
that
Magyar-Roumanian
relations
had
figured prominently
in the discussions at
Konopistë
on 12 June between William II and Francis Ferdinand,
both of whom agreed1 in condemning Tisza's intransige-
ance. William's marginalia on a despatch of Tschirschky
shows that he both realised and resented the possible"
effects of Tisza's " internal policy upon the foreign
policy of the Triple Alliance."2
COUNT BERCHTOLD AND BERLIN
It was from the first clear to Berchtold and those
who shared his views that Tisza's weighty objections
to a war policy could only really be overcome if the
Ballplatz could obtain assurances of unreserved support
from Berlin. In this lay the key to the whole situation,
for had Berlin's attitude been lukewarm or discouraging,
more peaceful counsels would necessarily have prevailed.
Berchtold, then, set himself to ascertain that attitude
by direct inquiry, the more so as Tschirschky, in his
firs
t conversation with Berchtold after the murder had,
according to his own account,» " used every occasion for
1 According to information supplied by Berchtold to Tschirschky. (See the
latter's despatch of 17 June to Bethmann Hollweg. D.D., i., No. 4, p. 6.)
2 Ubid., p. 6.
3 D.D., i., No. 8, p. 11.
171
warning, calmly but very emphatically and seriously,
against over-hasty action," and had added a reminder
that Austria-Hungary was bound to consider the position
of her Allies and of Europe generally, as well as the
probable attitude of Italy and Roumania in a fresh
Balkan crisis. But this moderate language, when re-
ported to Berlin, drew down upon the Ambassador the
indignation of the Emperor William,1 and a consequent
" reproof " from the Wilhelmstrasse for such " luke-
warm " advice.' This appears to have had a magic
effect upon Tschirschky, for already on 2 July we find
him assuring Berchtold that in his own view " only
energetic action " would be of any use, and that Germany
would always give her backing to Austria-Hungary in
Balkan questions.»
To this Berchtold significantly replied that despite
Berlin's frequent assurances to that effect, he had not
always found its support " in practice/' and consequently
did not know how far he could count upon it now —
doubtless a reference to Germany's attitude towards the
Balkan
coalition
against
Bulgaria
a
year
earlier.
Tschirschky did not challenge this, but again, speaking
entirely for himself, ascribed the German attitude to a
feeling that in Vienna " there was much talk of ideas,
but never a clear-cut plan of action," such as Berlin
regarded as an essential condition of its support. Even
now, he added, to make war on Serbia without first
1 ibid., " Who authorised him to this? That is very stupid! No business
of his but solely Austria's affair what she thinks of doing in the matter. After-
wards, if things go wrong, it will be said that Germany did not want to! Tschir-
schky will kindly stop such nonsense! There must be a settling up (aufgeräumt)
with the Serbs and that soon too! "
2 Despatch of Szögyény to Berchtold (8 July, No. 243), quoted by Gooss
(op. cit., p. 40) but not included in O.A., i., which is really less complete than D.D.
This fact doubtless explains why Professor Fay, in his " Origins of the War "
(American Historical Review, July 1920, p. 632, note 55), says that no such
reprimand appears in any of the documents. As Gooss put together the Austrian
post-war Red Book, there is no reason to doubt the authenticity of the document
quoted by him elsewhere, though it would be interesting to learn his motive
for omission. It can hardly have been consideration for Berlin's feelings, in
view of many other documents included.
3 Tagesbericht of Berchtold, 3 July (U.A., i., No. 3, pp. 10 -20 ).
172
making sure of Roumania and Italy, seemed to him a
" very questionable affair." In his audience with Francis
Joseph,
however,
Tschirschky
emphasised
Germany's
solidarity with her ally " as soon as it is a question of
defending one of her life interests," and added that " it
is for Austria to decide when and where such -an interest
lies."1
Prince Lichnowsky, in his evidence before the Reich-
stag Committee in 1919, confirms the view that this
change in Tschirschky's attitude " must have resulted
from instructions higher up." » He further described
Tschirschky, whom he had known for years, as a " con-
scientious " and " even rather pedantic " type of official,
" who would certainly never have adopted a truculent
attitude of his own initiative or have placed himself out
of agreement with superior authority."*
Tschirschky's
progressively
bellicose
attitude
is
illustrated from a Ballplatz report of 4 July, which quotes
very strong expressions on his part to an unnamed official
personage, " obviously with the intention that they
should be repeated in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs."2
His
assertions
that
Austria-Hungary
would
have
Germany's backing against Serbia " through thick and
thin," and that the sooner she took action the better,
were duly sent up for the consumption of Francis Joseph
and Tisza. On the same day, however, Count Szögyény
reports from Berlin a conversation with the Foreign
Under-Secretary,
Herr
von
Zimmermann,
who
urged
" great caution " and the avoidance of " humiliating
demands " to Serbia.·
Such conversations were hardly calculated to dispel
the doubt in Berchtold's mind, and he cannot be blamed
1 Tschirschky to Bethmann Hollweg, D.D., i., No. n.
2 Official German Documents (Carnegie Endowment), vol. i., p. 34.
3 It should, however, be pointed out that Lichnowsky, in his famous Memoran-
dum (Meine Londoner Mission) states that " in the spring of 1914 one of my
secretaries, returning from Vienna, where he had been on leave, told me that
Herr von Tschirschky had assured him that war was imminent."
4 Gooss, op. cit., p. 40, note.
5 D.A.e i., No. 5.
173
for deciding upon direct enquiry at the fountain-head.
In consequence of wild reports from consular agents in
Sarajevo and Semlin, to the effect that a whole bevy of
fresh assassins were being sent to Vienna — reports which
Berchtold of course took care to repeat to Tschirschky
as trustworthy1 — William II was induced by his
Chancellor to renounce his attendance at the Archduke's
funeral.2 It was therefore natural that Francis Joseph,
having lost the opportunity of a personal discussion,
should, while acknowledging his ally's condolence, express
at the same time his own views upon the general situation.
The Emperor's autograph letter3 was entrusted to Count
Alexander
Hoyos,
Berchtold's
Chef
de
Cabinet
and
confidant, who reached Berlin with it on 4 July. Its
main tendency was to represent the murder as a direct
result of Panslav agitation and of a well organised plot
whose threads reached to Belgrade. For even if Serbian
complicity could not be established, Belgrade's policy of
national unity "furthers such crimes." 'ihe danger of
the situation was increased by Roumania's estrangement,
even " so old a friend " as King Lharles, whose " loyalty
and good intentions " he found it hard to doubt, being
no longer reliable, and having twice in recent months
warned Vienna that
in
view of Roumania
n public
opinion he could no longer fulfil his treaty engagements
in the event of a general war. Ihe policy advocated
by Francis Joseph in face of such a situation was the
formation of a new Balkan League under the patronage
of the Ί riple Alliance, and of course as a direct counter
to a similar design on the part of Russia. Stated more
fully, it must be the aim of Austria-Hungary to isolate
and weaken Serbia, to win over and strengthen Bulgaria,
to detach Roumania from Serbia and reconcile her with
Bulgaria, and if possible to help Greece back to good
relations with Bulgaria and Turkey by an exchange of
1 D.A., i., No. 3.
2 D.D., i., Nos. 6a and 6b.
3 D.-A., i., No. i; D.D., i., No. 13.
174
territory. Such a League, he argued in conclusion,
would ensure peace to the Balkans, but " will only be
possible if Serbia, which at present forms the pivot of
Panslav policy, is eliminated as a political factor in the
Balkans.1
It was of the first importance that this document, and
the accompanying Memorandum of policy which we have
summarised above, should be placed in the Emperor
William's hands before he left for his Norwegian cruise
on 6 July; and the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in
Berlin, Count Szögyény-Maroch, was urgently instructed
not only to make sure of this but also to communicate
them to the Chancellor in time for him to have a proper
discussion with the Emperor before leaving.* On 6 July,
then, Szögyény fulfilled his commission at a private
luncheon with the Emperor, and the German and Austrian
diplomatic documents provide a sufficient record of what
passed.
The essential fact to remember about the Hoyos
Mission is that it is quite meaningless, unless its aim was
1
In the original draft this phrase ran as follows:
" But this will only be
pos sible if Serbia, which at present is the pivot of
Panslav policy, ceases to be
counted as a political factor in the Balkans. You, too, after the recent fearful
events in Bosnia, will be convinced that there can no longer be any thought o
f
reconciling the conflict which separates us from Serbia, and that the peace policy
of all European Monarchs will be threatened as long as this centre (Herd) of
criminal
agitation
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