by Count Hoyos." — ibid., p. 27.
187
even if it should end with a striking humiliation of Serbia,
would be worthless, and hence that such far-reaching demands
must be put to Serbia as would create a prospect of rejection
(die eine Ablehnung voraussehen Hessen), so as to prepare
the way for a radical solution by military intervention."
Tisza, as a concession, consented that the conditions
should be " very severe," but " not such as to reveal
Austria-Hungary's intention of making them
inaccept-
able," since in that case there would be no legal basis
for a declaration of war. When the discussion was
resumed
in
the
afternoon
various
military
problems
were raised, and " the relation of forces (Kraftverhältnisse)
and the probable course of a European war " were
debated
at
some
length.1
In
conclusion,
Berchtold
pointed out that " though there was still a divergence "
between the views of Tisza and of all the others, yet
they were nearer than before, and that Tisza's proposals
" would in all probability " lead to that " warlike reckon-
ing with Serbia " which they regarded as necessary.2
It is quite clear that this Council was the decisive
moment, so far as Austria-Hungary is concerned, and
that the subsequent delay in acting was solely due to the
need for completing Tisza's still very partial conversion.
WThen once a surprise attack had been abandoned at
Tisza's instance, there was, of course, a further motive
for delay in the need for collecting incriminating material
at Sarajevo; but in Berchtold's case this was a purely
tactical motive, intended to keep Europe quiet, and,
in point of fact, as we shall see, the negative result of
the
enquiry
would
have
seriously
embarrassed
any
Minister less bent upon war than Berchtold.
On the day before the Council, Count Tisza had issued
an inspired statement in the Budapesti Hírlap to the
effect that there was no ground for fearing war, that no
concrete proofs of Serbia's guilt had as yet been found,
and that therefore the result of investigations into the
1 ibid., p. 36,
2 ibid., p. 38.
188
crime must be awaited. On the day following the
Council he answered interpellations in the Hungarian
Parliament with unusual reserve, protesting against the
assumption that the situation in Bosnia was undermined,
condemning the anti-Serb excesses, but insisting that
the enquiry was still being conducted. The holding of a
Crown Council was officially explained by the need for
discussing the internal situation in Bosnia. The semi-
official Pester Lloyd, however, wrote of " the projected
diplomatic demarche at Belgrade," and, while affirming
that it would not take a form " which could offend the
amour propre or dignity of Serbia," added significantly
that it expected the Government of Belgrade " to ex-
terminate this nest of rats," since otherwise good relations
with Vienna would be impossible.
Meanwhile, though the minutes of the Joint Council
show that a severe diplomatic " humiliation " of Serbia
was the minimum aim, care was taken by the Ballplatz
Press Bureau to spread abroad an exactly contrary
impression. For instance, on 9 July the Neues Wiener
Tagblatt published an obviously inspired statement that
any step which might be taken at Belgrade " will not
imply any interference with the sovereign rights of
Serbia," and that as " nothing will be exacted which
could be interpreted as affront or humiliation," Belgrade
may be expected to comply with all demands.
THE GRADUAL CONVERSION OF TISZA
In the week that followed the Council concentrated
efforts were made upon Tisza from all sides, and in
particular by Berchtold and the German Ambassador.
Tisza himself had lost no time in submitting to the
Emperor-King a
second
memorandum1
in which
he
elaborated the views upheld by him at the Council.
Its main tenor was that " despite the highly satisfactory
1 8 July, D.A., i., No. 12, pp. 41-6.
189
news from Berlin " he could not approve an armed attack
such as would " in all human probability " provoke
Russian intervention and " consequently the world war,"
and in which Roumanian neutrality (" despite all op-
timism in Berlin ") would be highly doubtful. An
infinitely preferable course would be to create a new
political constellation in the Balkans by " a logical and
active policy "; and this, he contended, would meet the
views of Conrad and the General Staff, who held that
the race of armaments would " in the next few years "
work
out
to
the
disadvantage
of
Austria-Hungary.1
Tisza would readily bear responsibility for war if the
Monarchy's " just demands " were rejected, but held
that Serbia must be " given the possibility of avoiding
war, though, of course, by way of a severe diplomatic
defeat." These demands should be couched in concrete
form, and " in measured, not threatening, tone ";
for such tactics might hold back both Russia and Rou-
mania, lead to British pressure upon the Entente, and
give free rein to the Tsar's fear of anarchic and anti-
dynastic tendencies. Moreover, an assurance that the
Monarchy " will not annihilate, much less annex, Serbia,"
was necessary, in order to prevent complications with
Italy, to assure British sympathy, and to enable Russia
to
remain
a
spectator.
Austria-Hungary
should
rest
content with a strong rebuff (Knickung) to Serbian
arrogance, but should then take prompt and energetic
steps to win over Bulgaria and the other Balkan States.
It was only natural that Tisza should look at the
whole question from a Magyar angle, and should thus be
influenced not only by the same ingrained fear of Russia
and distaste for new Slav fellow-citizens as had weighed
with his father in the 'seventies, but also by anxiety
regarding Roumania's attitude. It is to be remembered
that the negotiations conducted by Tisza himself with
l" Eher zu unseren Ungunsten." D.A., i., p. 42; Conrad, Aus Meiner
Dienstzeit, iv., p. 55.
190
the Roumanian leaders in Transylvania had only very
recently broken down; and we now know that the
whole Roumanian problem, in its internal and external
bearings, was at this time a foremost preoccupation both
of Berlin and Vienna, and had been fully discussed by
Francis Ferdinand and William at Konopistë, and by
Conrad and Moltke at Karlsbad.1 Tisza, according to
Conrad, was convinced that Roumania would invade
Transylvania in the event of an Austro-Russian war.
Meanwhile Berchtold was in consultation with Tschir-
schky, who drew the conclusion that Tisza was " the
retarding element," and to whom Berchtold confided
his intention of urging upon the Emperor that the
demands addressed to Serbia should in any case be "so
framed that their acceptance should seem out of the
question."4 The result of their talk was a special
memorandum of Berchtold to Tisza, in which he reported
William II's urgent instructions to Tschirschky to inform
Vienna " that Berlin expects action by the Monarchy
against Serbia, and that it would not be understood in
Germany if we let the opportunity afforded us pass by
without striking a blow."* Tschirschky had also reported
Berlin's conviction that
its urgent representations
in
Bucarest had removed all danger of Roumanian inter-
vention. " From the Ambassador's further remarks,"
added Berchtold, " I could see that for us to bargain
with Serbia would be regarded in Germany as a con-
fession of weakness, which could not but react on our
position in the Triple Alliance and upon Germany's
future policy." Information of such consequence (Trag-
weite) would, he hoped in conclusion, "be of influence "
on Tisza's " final decisions."
On 9 July Berchtold had an audience with Francis
Joseph at Ischl, the gist of which he repeated to Tschir-
schky next day. The Emperor, he said, had been very
1 cf. Conrad, op. cit. iii., p. 668.
2Tschirschky to Berlin, 8 July, D.D., i., No. 19.
3 D.A., i., No. 10.
191
calm, expressed his gratitude towards William II and
his Government, and agreed with their view that " a
decision must now be come to "1; he felt that "perhaps
the conflict could be bridged over," but, on the whole,
inclined towards " concrete demands to Serbia."2 Com-
menting upon this to Tschirschky, Berchtold admitted
the advantage of this method, since it would avoid putting
Austria-Hungary in the wrong, and would make it easier
for Roumania, and also for Britain, to remain neutral.
He then invited Berlin's opinion as to the form which
the demands to Serbia should take, and insisted that the
time-limit for Belgrade's reply must be made as short
as possible, since even forty-eight hours would enable
Belgrade to take advice from St. Petersburg.3 He added
that Serbia's full compliance would be a solution " most
unsympathetic to him, and he is considering what de-
mands could be put such as would make an acceptance
entirely impossible for Serbia."
The incident is of capital importance for the whole
question of responsibility; for Berchtold's readiness on
this occasion to accept Berlin's advice and leading — due
perhaps to Tisza's discouraging attitude — represents an
unique opportunity for pacific action. But Berlin, so
far from using this to the full, or taking any exception to
Berchtold's
bellicose
intentions,
as
reported
by
the
Ambassador, replies with an explicit refusal to express
any view whatever, on the ground that " this is Austria's
affair."4 The sole advice offered is that material illustrat-
ing the general tendencies of Panserb agitation should
be collected and published just before the transmission
to Belgrade of " the demands or ultimatum." The fact
1 Tschirschky to Berlin, 10 July; D.D., i., No. 29. William's marginal note
upon this runs thus: " As His Majesty's pro memoria is about a fortnight old,
this is lasting a long time " — a further confirmation of William's impatience.
2
ibid., No. 29, p. 50. Here William comments: „Aber sehr! und unzwei-
deutig I „
3 ibid., p. 50. Here William comments: " Hartwig is dead! " — in other
words, he quite approved.
4 Jagow to Tschirschky, 11 July; D.D., L, No. 31.
192
that Jagow treats an " ultimatum " as one of Vienna's
two alternatives is significant in itself, and must have
served to encourage Berchtold.
When Tschirschky brought this reply to the Ballplatz,
Berchtold endorsed Jagow's view as to the need for a
general exposure of Serbian policy, and added his own
conviction that " very rapid action " was now necessary
— a phrase which, when transmitted to Berlin, was
twice underlined by the Emperor William on his official
copy.1 It is highly important to note that Berchtold
on this occasion (13 July) intimated that he hoped to
reach an agreement next day with Tisza,1 to submit the
Note drafted by them to Francis Joseph at Ischl on the
15 July, and to deliver it at Belgrade before President
Poincaré left Paris for his official visit to the Tsar. In
short, ten days before the actual delivery of the Note
to Serbia, Berlin is officially informed of Vienna's
intended
procedure,
yet
adheres
consistently
to
its
earlier policy of pressing for action rather than holding
back.
Further proof that Berlin, though ignorant of the
Note's actual text, knew at least six or seven days before-
hand all the more salient points which it was to contain,
is provided by the Bavarian Chargé d'Affaires in Berlin,
who on 18 July transmitted to Munich a perfectly accur-
ate summary of these points, as supplied to him by
the Under-Secretary Zimmermann.» This despatch shows
that
the
Wilhelmstrasse
was
kept
fully
posted
by
Tschirschky, and also that Jagow was quibbling in a
highly disingenuous way when, a week later, he tried to
allay Italian annoyance at receiving no previous warning
1 Tschirschky to Berlin, 13 July; D.D., i., No. 40.
2 M. Poincaré in his book Les Origines de la Guerre, p. 195, refers to a telegram
received by Count Szécsen in Paris as early as 11 July {and deciphered at the
Quai d'Orsay during the war) which, if authentic, would show " complete agree-
ment " to have been already reached between Germany and Austria-Hungary
regarding " the situation arising from the murder and all possible consequences."
This telegram is not included in the post-war Austrian Red Book (D.A.).
3 cf. p. 179; D.D., iv., Anhang iv., No. 2.
193
by affirming that Germany also had seen nothing before-
hand. It is from Schoen also that we learn that Berlin
intended to cite the absence of the Emperor, War
Minister, and Chief of General Staff, as conclusive proof
that
" Germany was just as much surprised by Austria's
action as the other Powers."1
On 14 July Tisza duly visited Berchtold, and called
upon the German Ambassador afterwards; and until
Tisza's own papers are given to the world, we are
dependent upon Tschirschky's report to Berlin for a
knowledge of what passed.2 Tisza's language was franker
than ever. Hitherto, he declared, he had always been
the one to advocate caution, " but every day was
strengthening his conviction that the Monarchy must
come to an energetic decision, in order to prove its
vitality and put an end to the intolerable conditions in
the South-East." The language of the Serbian Press and
of Serbian diplomacy was quite insufferable. " It was hard
for me to decide in favour of advising war, but I am now
firmly convinced of its necessity, and shall stand with
all my strength for the greatness of the Monarchy." 3
Complete agreement, he added, had now been reached
among all the leading factors, and Francis Joseph had
been much influenced in his decision by " Germany's
unconditional attitude on the side of the Monarchy."
To those who would fain argue that Berlin did not foresee
the full consequence of granting a free hand to Vienna
it maybe urged that phrases so explicit as these, addressed
by the Ambassador to headquarters, would (unless they
had coincided with the official view) unquestionably have
drawn down upon his head a reprimand still more severe
than that already administered.
Tisza then intimated that the Note to Serbia would
1 ibid., p. 128.
2 Tschhschky to Bethmann Hollweg, 14 July; D.D., L, No. 49.
3 Further confirmation is to be found in a telegram of Szogyény to Berchtold,
16 July, summarising Tschirschky's report on Tisza, " who has now abandoned
all his original objections, and is quite in agreement with energetic action.
D.A., i., No. 23, p. 60.
194
be given its final form on the following Sunday (19 July),
but that it had been decided not to deliver it until
Poincaré had left St. Petersburg. (William IPs comment
on this is, " What a pity! ") Then, unless Serbia's
acceptance
is
unconditional,
Austria-Hungary
will
at
once mobilise. The Note will, however, he added, be
" drawn up in such a way that its acceptance is virtually
excluded," (" so gut wie ausgeschlossen ").1 On leaving,
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