would meet with our approval. In this we were well
aware that possible warlike action of Austria-Hungary
1 Despatch of Tschirschky to the Wilhelmstrasse to conversation between
himself, Berchtold, Stiirgh and Tisza, at which Hoyos reported on his mission.
D.D., i., No. 18: also ibid, No. 61 (17 July)
2 See infra, p. 198.
181
against Serbia might bring Russia into the field and
thus involve us in a war according to our treaty obliga-
tions. But recognising the vital interests at stake for
Austria-Hungary, we could neither advise our ally to
yield more than was compatible with her dignity, nor
refuse her our support at so grave a moment. "l And
later it adds, " We therefore left Austria a completely
free hand in her action against Serbia, while taking no
part in the preparations.''
Realising, then, according to their own showing, that
their ally might involve them in war with Russia, and
having been for years obsessed by the further European
consequences which such a war might involve, it would
have shown the last degree of criminal levity if William II,
before leaving for his northern cruise on 6 July, had
not consulted carefully with his political and military
advisers. It is doubtless this assumption which accounts
for the persistent belief in a Crown Council held on 5 July
at Potsdam, and attended not only by the leading German
statesmen and the military and naval chiefs, but also
by the Archduke Frederick, Berchtold, and Conrad von
Hötzendorf. It has by now been conclusively established
that no such Council ever met, and that the three Austrians
did not visit Berlin, is absolutely certain.3 But this
1 Deutsches Weissbuch, pp. 3-4. Herr von Jagow in his post-war Memoirs
{Ursachen und Ausbruch des Weltkrieges, pp. 99-100) quotes this very passage
as exculpatory; I, on the other hand, quote it as incriminating. The reader
must judge.
2 The only concrete evidence in favour of a formal Crown Council having been
held is to be found in the Memoirs of Mi. Morgenthau, American Ambassador
at Constantinople [Secrets of the Bosphorus, p. 54), who tells how his German
colleague Baron Wangenheim, in August 1914, gave him an account of the
meeting, and claimed to have
been
present
himself. It seems probable that
W'angenheim, who was vain, arrogant and impulsive, was exaggerating in order
to impress Morgenthau, and that the Potsdam discussions were of a much less
formal
nature.
Prince
Lichnowsky's
famous
Memorandum
(Meine
Lond
mer
Mission, 1912-14) has also been quoted as a proof of a Crown Council, but his
phrase, " the decisive consultation (entscheidende Besprechung) at Potsdam on
5 July " is ambiguous and does not necessarily prove more than the view expressed
in
the
text.
(It
incidentally
proves
that
Lichnowsky
himself
was
not
there,
though Wangenheim asserted that all the chief
Ambassadors attended ) This
view coincides with that of Sir Charles Oman, in his Outbreak of the War,
pp. 16-17, who quotes Sir Horace Rumbold, British Charge d'Affaires at Berlin
at the time, and Sir Maurice de Bunsen, in the same sense.
183
fact so triumphantly proclaimed by German apologists
does not in the slightest degree serve to exculpate
Germany from the responsibility for provoking war. On
the contrary, from a memorandum prepared in 1917
inside the German Foreign Office for the use of the Under-
Secretary, Zimmermann,1 and also from the reminiscences
of Admiral von Tirpitz himself,2 we learn that on 5 July
the Emperor William summoned to Potsdam the War
Minister, Falkenhayn, representatives of the General Staff,
the chief of the Military Cabinet, Admiral von Capelle
(in
Tirpitz's
absence),
and
Captain
Zenker
for the
Admiralty Staff, and that as a result of their discussion
" it was decided for all events to take preparatory
measures for a war. Orders were then issued in this
1 Written by Baron von dem Bussche; first published by Karl Kautsky;
Wie der Weltkrieg entstand, p. 49, afterwards published as appendix viii. in
D.D., iv., p. 171.
2 Tirpitz, Erinnerungen, p. 209; Kautsky, Wie der Weltkrieg entstand, p. 50.
Tirpitz hirnseif was in Switzerland till 27 July (see his evidence in Official German
Documents, Carnegie Endowment, vol. i., p. 73).
In the evidence given before the German Parliamentary Committee of Enquiry
by General von Falkenhayn, then War Minister, and Count Waldersee, Acting
C.G.S., it is admitted that Falkenhayn himself and Generals von Plessen, von
Lyncker and von Bertrab were received by the Emperor at Potsdam on the
afternoon of 5 July, but it is denied that military preparations were made " before
the ultimatum to Serbia " (ibid., p. 64). Even Falkenhayn, however, says that
William, after reading to him portions of Francis Joseph's letter and memorandum
(see p. 173), pointed out "the very serious consequences " which might arise from
Austro-Hungaiian action, and then asked " whether the army was ready for all
contingencies
";
while
Waldersee
states
that
Bertrab
was
ordered
to
inform
the C.G.S., Count Moltke, that the Emperor had promised Francis Joseph " to
stand by him in his difficulties with Serbia " (ibid., p. 65). Admiral Behncke
gave evidence that the Emperor on the same day saw and warned him of possible
complications, and that he and Admiral von Capelle then decided "that no measures
were to be taken that could occasion any uneasiness " [author's italics — R. W. S. W.],
and that " only immaterial preparations " [italics in original] should be made,
to meet the possibility of war (ibid., p. 66). These and other statements are also
appended to the preface of D.D., i., pp. xiii.-xvi. All these assurances are
intended to prove that Germany made no preparations whatever for war till after
the ultimatum was presented on 23 July. Their value is, however, virtually
destroyed by two documents in the official German collection, viz. (1), D.D., i.,
No. 74, report of Waldersee to Jagow, 17 July, ending, " I remain here ready to
spring (sprungbereit); we are ready at the General Staff, and for the moment
there is nothing for us to order (veranlassen) "; (2) D.D., i., No. 80. Wire of
Count Wedel (Minister in attendance on the Norwegian cruise) to Jagow, 19
July, conveying the Emperor's desire that the directors of the Hamburg-Amerika
and North German Lloyd shipping lines (Ballin and von
Plettenberg) should
be warned of the impe
nding ultimatum, " in strict confidence," through the
Minister in Hamburg.
In point of fact, the German military machine was already schlagfertig at
very
short
notice.
The
evidence
for
financial
and
commercial
preparations
for war belongs elsewhere.
183
sense." According to Tirpitz, these measures were of
such a kind as should not " attract political attention "
or " special expense." In other words, Germany saw
where her ally's action might lead, did nothing to hold
her back, and at once began quietly to prepare for the
worst.
If any proof were still needed that Berlin's attitude
towards the conflict was the determining factor at Vienna,
it is provided by Field-Marshal Conrad's own account
of his audience with Francis Joseph on 5 July.1 The
former at once proceeded to argue that war with Serbia
was now inevitable, and met the Emperor's objection
that this would produce a Russian attack, by a reference
to Germany's backing (Rückendeckung). At this Francis
Joseph, in doubtful tones, asked, " Are you sure of
Germany? " and informed him that the German Emperor
when asked by Francis Ferdinand at Konopiètë for a
pledge of " unreserved " support, had given an evasive
answer. It was to clear up this point, he added, that
a Note * had been despatched to Berlin on the previous
day. " If the answer is that Germany is on our side,"
asked Conrad, " shall we then make war on Serbia? "
" In that case, yes," replied the Emperor. The sequel
shows that Francis Joseph, like Berchtold,2 had his
doubts of Germany; but it is abundantly clear that
even he, though pacific by age and inclination, had made
up his mind for war, and that all depended upon Berlin's
reply.«
In this connection it is of some importance to consider
any further available evidence regarding Francis Joseph's
attitude
to
war.
In
an
audience
accorded
to
the
Ambassador in Constantinople, Marquis Pallavicini, in
the course of June 1914, the Emperor appears to have
said that " he saw in a war the only possibility of escape
1 Aus Meiner Dienstzeit, iv., p. 36.
2 See p. 173.
3 See p. 171.
4 Incidentally this militates against the theory of the famous " Pact of
Konopisté " referred to on p. 98.
185
from the present situation."1 On the eve of actual war,
Field-Marshal Conrad, coming from an audience, describes
Francis Joseph as " deeply embittered and indignant at
the action of Austria-Hungary's enemies, but well aware
of what was at stake, yet convinced of the inevitable
nature of the step so ruthlessly provoked by Serbia."
" If the Monarchy must go down," he said to Conrad,
" it shall at least go down decently." · This was probably
the real man when his pride was touched. Conrad was
a good psychologist, and an anecdote which he tells us
in his memoirs shows that he understood the Emperor.
During a triangular conversation between Berchtold, Con-
rad and Czernin, on 10 October, 1913, the latter insisted
that neither the Emperor nor the Heir-Apparent were for
war, but especially the second whom, with his intimate
personal knowledge, he evidently regarded as not open
to suasion. Conrad did not challenge this, but simply
commented: " In the long run the Emperor can be
brought round."2
On the other hand, the testimony of - Frau Schratt,
the Emperor's faithful Egeria for many years before
his death, may be quoted on this point for what it is
worth. She contended that he had told her, not once
but repeatedly, that he was not at all in agreement with
the ultimatum, and only let it be sent to please Germany.«
This is presumably a feminine overstatement of the fact
that the certainty of Germany's backing was what over-
came his opposition to warlike action. Many people,
however, will doubtless prefer to believe that if age had
not already impaired his full faculties, he would never
have allowed it to come to war, and that his high opinion
of the more than mediocre Berchtold was an obvious
sign of decay.5
1 See report of Military Attaché in Constantinople, dated 20 July, 1914, to
Conrad, quoted by the latter, op. cit., IV., p. 107.
2 Wenigstens anstandig zugrundegehen, op. cit., iv., p. 162.
3 Man kann schliesslich den Kaiser dazubringen, see op. cit., iii., p. 464.
4 Margutti, Vom Altem Kaiser, p. 394.
5 cf. Szilassy on his last audience {Untergang der Donau-Monarchie, p. 259).
185
THE JOINT COUNCIL OF 7 JULY
Meanwhile the effect of Berlin's attitude upon Vienna
was
immediate. Count Berchtold summoned a Joint
Council of Ministers on 7 July to discuss the whole
position in the light of the information brought back by
Hoyos. Those present were the three Joint Ministers,
Berchtold
(Foreign
Affairs),
Bilinski
(Finance),
and
Krobatin (War), the two Premiers Stürgkh and Tisza,
and Hoyos as secretary, and at times Baron Conrad as
Chief of the General Staff, and Admiral von Kailer as
representing the Navy. The minutes, as published by
the Austrian Republican Government in 1919,1 give a
very clear summary of what occurred. Berchtold pre-
sided, and went straight to the point by defining the
issue as " whether the time had come to make Serbia
permanently innocuous by an exhibition of force "
(Krafläusserung). As this involved diplomatic prepar-
ations, he had consulted Germany, with most satisfactory
results, both Emperor and Chancellor having " most
emphatically " promised the " unreserved support of
Germany . . . in the event of warlike complications with
Serbia." He himself agreed with Berlin that it was
better not to inform Italy or Roumania beforehand, but
to act at once, and to await possible claims of compensa-
tion from them. Again, the danger of a war with Russia
must be faced, but in view of Russia's far-sighted designs
of a Balkan coalition against the Monarchy it seemed to
him more logical to forestall this by " a timely settle-
ment with Serbia," since delay would place Austria-
Hungary in a more and more unfavourable situation.
In the discussion that followed all save one un-
reservedly endorsed Berchtold's policy, Bilinski treat-
ing war with Serbia as sooner or later inevitable, since
only force could bring her to reason, Krobatin arguing
1 D.A., i., No. 8, pp. 25-38; Gooss, op. cit., pp. 50-60.
2 D.A„ I., p. 31-2.
186
that after two lost opportunities1 the lo
ss of a third
would be fatal to the Monarchy's prestige in the South»;
while
Stürgkh
insisted
that
this
was
the
right
psychological moment for war, and put forward the
additional
argument
that
Germany's
attitude
towards
Austria-Hungary would be unfavourably influenced by
a policy of hesitation and weakness.»
Tisza alone remains unconvinced, though even he
begins by admitting that war now seems to him more
probable than it had seemed immediately after the
murder.
Though
the
actual
tactics
of
aggression
favoured by the others are not indicated in the minutes,
it is clear from Tisza's line of argument that the discus-
sion centred round the idea of a " surprise attack on
Serbia,
without
previous
diplomatic
action."2
This
idea Tisza strongly repudiated, on the ground that it
would injure Austria-Hungary before Europe, and would
unite the whole Balkans, excepting exhausted Bulgaria,
against her. Austria-Hungary, he contended, must first
of all put conditions to Serbia " severe but not impossible
of fulfilment "; their acceptance would mean " a striking
diplomatic victory for Austria-Hungary," while, in the
event of their rejection, he too would favour war. But
even in that case he insisted that the aim of war must
be " the diminution, but not the complete annihilation,
of Serbia," for the double reason that Russia would not
surfer
this
without
engaging
upon
a
life-and-death
struggle, and that he himself, as Hungarian Premier,
could not permit such annexations of territory as would
increase the Slavonic element in the Dual Monarchy.
Eventually it was unanimously agreed that an early
decision should be taken, while Tisza carried his point,
that mobilisation should not be ordered till after Serbia
had rejected concrete demands and an ultimatum. All
except Tisza agreed that " a purely diplomatic success,
1 i.e. 1909 and 1912.
2 ibid., pp. 32-3.
3 ibid., p. 30.
4 " As seems to be intended, and was, to his regret, discussed in Berlin also
Sarajevo Page 26