Sarajevo
Page 28
Tisza said to Tschirschky, " We'll now together look the
future calmly and firmly in the face " — a phrase which
drew from William the characteristic comment, " A man
after all! "'
It
has
sometimes
been
contended
that
Berchtold
delayed action from the very praiseworthy motive of
accumulating full judicial evidence against Serbia. But
the minutes of the Joint Council show that in reality
this was due solely to the desire to make quite sure of
German support and to Tisza's opposition until there
could no longer be any doubt on this essential point.
As we have seen/ Wiesner's report from Sarajevo tended
to exculpate rather than convict Serbia, and, therefore,
was simply laid aside by Berchtold and not allowed to
deflect him from his policy of war.
Berchtold and Tisza in Agreement
On the same day Tschirschky was summoned by
Berchtold, who informed him how a general agreement
had been reached regarding the terms of the Note, and
how Tisza " had even imparted a stiffening in various
1 See supra, p. 187. It is also interesting to note that the German Ambassador
in Constantinople, Baron Wangenheim,
confidentially
told
his Italian
colleague,
Marquis Garroni, on 15 July, that the ultimatum would be so drafted as to render
war inevitable. This fact was made public by Signor Barzilai, then a member
of the Italian Cabinet, in his speech of 26 September, 1915, at Naples.
In this connection we may note that on 23 July the Bulgarian Minister in
Petrograd
informed
Sofia
that
Prince
Hohenlohe
(Austro-Hungarian
Military
Attaché) had just stated that the Vienna Cabinet would that afternoon present
a very sharp Note in Belgrade, " in which there are entirely unacceptable points
for Serbia." See Bulgarian Diplomatic Documents, i., No. 201.
2 Na doch mal ein Mann.
3 Supra, p. 117.
195
points."1 Berchtold explained that it was technically
impossible to have the Note ready by the 16th or 18th;
that its text had to be finally approved by a Joint Council
of Ministers on the 19th and sanctioned by the Emperor
on the 2 ist; but that he could vouch ("er stehe ein ")
for that consent, and that the Note would therefore be
delivered at Belgrade on the 25th [sic]. Both he and Tisza,
he added, wished Berlin to realise that the sole reason
for delay was Poincaré's impending visit to St. Petersburg,
it being considered unwise to let the first news reach
that capital while the Tsar and Sazonov were under the
influence of such " agitators "«as Poincaré and Izvolsky.
Berlin might rest assured that there would be "no
hesitation or indecision " in Vienna.
This
telegram
of
Tschirschky
affords
invaluable
evidence in two directions. In the first place, it proves
even more conclusively than that of the same day that
Berlin knew beforehand Vienna's whole plan of campaign
against Belgrade, knew also that Berchtold's aim was
to prevent a peaceful issue by impossible demands, yet,
having weighed the consequence in Europe, did nothing
to stay her ally's hands. In the second place, it explodes
the theory which Magyar controversialists have sought
to construct — that Tisza and his Government were
opposed to war, and hence that Hungary, having no
share in the responsibility, has been unjustly treated
at the peace settlement. The documents already quoted
show quite conclusively that Tisza, though reluctant to
commit his country to a rash adventure, was only too
ready to embark upon war when once the full backing
of Germany had been secured. Meanwhile the whole
Hungarian Press, official and unofficial, was full of
provocative articles against Serbia, which, as we shall
see, were answered day by day by the gutter journals
1 Sogar in manche Punkte eine Verschärfung hineingebracht." — Tschirschky
to Betbmann Hollweg, 14 July; D.D., i., No. 50.
2 Hetzer — Berchtold to Szögyény (15 July); D.A., i., No. 21.
196
of Belgrade, thus envenoming public opinion in both
countries. The semi-official Pester Lloyd made a practice
of
publishing
elaborate
extracts,
under
the
heading
" From the Serbian Witches' Cauldron " from periodicals
whose existence it had hitherto quite properly ignored,
and some of which were entirely without any signifi-
cance.
On 16 July, in answer to a lengthy interpellation of
the clerical deputy Szmrecsányi on Panserb propaganda,
Tisza delivered a speech in the Hungarian Parliament
in which he declared that " the affair with Serbia must
under all circumstances be cleared up," but declined as
yet to say how. " The Government," he said, " is not
of opinion that this clarification must necessarily lead
to warlike complications. . . . War is a very sad
ultima ratio, to which one must not resort until all other
possible solutions have been exhausted, but for which
naturally every nation and every state must be capable
and willing, if it wishes to remain a nation and a state."
There was an ominous ring about this which reminded
many observers of a speech which he had delivered only
a year before in the same place, vindicating the right of
every Balkan nation (and so, in that instance, of Bulgaria)
to resort to the sword as a last arbitrament — a speech
which
had
materially
contributed
to
provoking
the
second Balkan War.
It is worth adding that in Berlin considerable regret
was expressed " that Tisza, by his statement in Parlia-
ment, has somewhat raised the veil."1 The Wilhelm-
strasse had fully approved the secrecy upheld in Vienna
and regarded the leave of absence granted to the military
chiefs as " skilful."2
What may fairly be said to have clinched matters in
Vienna was the autograph letter addressed by William II
1 This is reported by Herr von Schoen to the Munich Government on 18 July;
D.D., hr.t Anhang iv., No. 2.
2 ibid., p. 126.
197
to Francis Joseph on 14 July from the island of Born-
holm,1 conveying in the most solemn terms — fortified
by a reference to his grandfather's policy of friendship — a
pledge of German support " in hours of gravity. 2 He
expressly declined " to take up any attitude to the
question at issue " between Austria-Η mgary and Serbia,
but the categorical phrases in which he endors 3d the need
of checking " Panslav
agitation " in the Balkans show him
to mean that, on the contrary, he left it to Vienna to
decide what action was necessary, and renounced all
ideas of exercising restraint upon it. Referring to the
Ballplatz memorandum on Balkan policy, he announced
Germany's readiness to combat the formation of a new
Balkan League under Russian patronage, to promote
Bulgaria's adhesion to the Triple Alliance, and to warn
Roumania
against
continued
intimacy
with
Serbia.
Such language could not fail to fortify the Ballplatz in
its warlike designs, and was well calculated to remove the
last hesitation of Francis Joseph himself.
REASONS FOR POSTPONEMENT
During
the
five
days
that
followed
Tschirschky's
conversation with Tisza and Berchtold, Vienna shrouded
itself in complete silence, while pushing on its secret
preparations. In this connection it is interesting to note
that already, on 12 July, Jagow had instructed Tschir-
schky to warn Berchtold that " Russia and Serbia have
confidential
information
that
Austria-Hungary
is
strengthening her garrisons on the Serbian and Russian
frontiers."3 The source is not given, but it obviously
comes from the German Military Intelligence. No com-
ment is added, but the natural inference is that Berlin
wishes Vienna to cover up her tracks more carefully, not
to refrain from military preparations.
1 D.A., I, No. 18.
2 In den Stunden des Ernstes.
3 D.D., i., No. 37.
198
During this interval we find the first and only sign of
nervousness on the part of Berlin in another telegram of
Jagow to Tschirschky (17 July).1 Both Berchtold and
Tisza have disavowed Hoyos's plan of partition,1 he
reminds the Ambassador, but they have not given any
further
clue
to
" their
territorial
claims."
Vienna's
plans might, of course, be modified by the course of events,
but it must " already have formed a general picture of the
aims to be followed." Tschirschky, then, is to ask for
Berchtold's views regarding " Serbia's future shape "
(Gestaltung), but must " avoid the impression of wishing
to block Austrian action or to prescribe certain bounds or
aims. It would merely be of value to us to be in some
degree informed as to whither the way may lead."*
Jagow himself supplies the key to his belated anxiety
by saying that a knowledge of the intended treatment of
Serbia would have a decisive effect upon the attitude of
Italy and of Britain.1 How much this was on his mind
is shown by yet another message of the following day
(18 July), in which, prompted by his own close knowledge
of Italy and her statesmen, he warns Berchtold "to be
under no illusion," but to realise that " an attack of
Austria-Hungary on Serbia will not only be resented,
but perhaps directly opposed, by Italy."6 He suggests
tentatively
that
to
involve
Italy
at
Valona
might
be Austria-Hungary's best way of easing the Serbian
situation; but in any case he regards " a timely
understanding between Vienna and Rome as urgently
necessary."7 This step of Jagow was paralysed by the
obstinacy of Berchtold, who was quite uncompromising
in the matter of Valona/ and refused to admit the very
1 D.D., i., No. 61.
2Supra, p. 180.
3 " Es ware uns nur von Wert, einigermassen darüber orientirt zu sein, wohin
der Weg etwa führen soll."
4 ibid., p. 88.
5 D.D., i., No. 68, p. 96.
6 Dringend geboten."
7 Tagesbericht of Berchtold, 20 July; D.A., i., No. 35; Gooss, op. cit., pp.
116-18,
199
idea that an AustroSerbian war could entitle Italy to
compensation under the Triple Alliance.1
If, however, Jagow had some conception of the com-
plications likely to arise in Rome, this did not affect
the general tendency of Berlin to press Vienna for action.
Indeed,
Berchtold
found
it
advisable
to
supplement
the explanations of the delay which he had given
to Tschirschky, by a special message to the German
Chancellor through Szögyény.· To take energetic action
in Belgrade at the very moment when Poincaré was the
guest of the Tsar might, he argued, be interpreted in
St. Petersburg "as a political affront," and so might
throw Nicholas II into the arms of the extremists.
It would therefore be wiser not to deliver the Note until
Poincaré had left Russia, and this would involve another
week's suspense. Szögyény at once notified this, and
Jagow, while accepting the argument, expressed " quite
extraordinary regret at this delay."» It is quite possible
that in the first instance the desire not to affront Russia
was one of Berchtold's real motives for delay; and it
was certainly one which would sound well in Berlin.
But it is abundantly clear that ere long his dominant
motive was to eliminate all possibility of French action
during the crisis, by presenting, at the very moment
when the French President and Premier had started
upon a sea voyage of several days, demands which Serbia
must accept or reject before they could hope to reach
Paris and establish full contact with the diplomatic
world. Berchtold's whole game depended upon secrecy,
and, unless his secret was prematurely betrayed, the
longer he delayed the more completely was he likely
to take Europe by surprise.
1 Article VII. of Treaty of 1912; see infra, pp. 235, 239.
2 Berchtold to Szögyény, 15 July; D.A., i., No. 21.
3 Szögyény to Berchtold, 16 July; D.A., i., No. 23.
200
THE JOINT COUNCIL OF 19 JULY: FINAL DECISIONS
On 19 July, as intimated, a further Joint Council of
Ministers was held at Vienna,1 and approved Berchtold's
motion that the Note to Serbia should be delivered at
5 p.m. on 23 July, with a time-limit of forty-eight hours.
Further delay was considered impossible, in view of
Berlin's impatience and the growing suspicion of Rome.
After a discussion of military measures, Tisza proposed
that a resolution should be passed disclaiming all plans
of conquest against Serbia, and pledging the Monarchy
not to annex any territory save perhaps such frontier
rectifications as strategy might enjoin. To this Berch-
told
raised
objections,
arguing
that
the
Monarchy,
thou
gh it should itself not annex Serbian territory in
the event of victory, must aim at a drastic partition of
Serbia between Bulgaria, Greece, Albania, and perhaps
Roumania.
Besides,
the
Balkan
situation
was
quite
uncertain. Albania could not be relied upon; even
Bulgaria might again become Russophil; and so at the
end of the war " it might no longer be possible not to
annex anything." Tisza, however, adhered to his original
view, justifying it first by Hungarian opposition to the
annexation of more Slavs, and also by his belief that
Russia would
fight
à outrance to prevent Serbia's
destruction.
Stürgkh's suggestion that the case might be met by
expelling the Karagjorgjevic dynasty and forcing Serbia
into subordination to the Monarchy by a military con-
vention does not appear to have won much support. It
was finally resolved that on the outbreak of war, which
all present seem this time to have taken for granted,
Austria-Hungary should convey assurances to the Powers
that she was not conducting a war of conquest, and did
not intend to incorporate Serbia. " Naturally," this
1 See Minutes in D.A., i., No. 26.
201
resolution did not rule out " necessary strategic rectifica-
tions," or " Serbia's curtailment in favour of other
States," or " temporary occupation of Serbian territory."1
A somewhat doubtful light upon the sincerity of such
assurances is thrown by one passage in the minutes,
where Tisza emphasised the good effect which a renuncia-
tion of territorial claims would have upon European
opinion, and where Berchtold replied that he "in any
case had the intention of giving this declaration in Rome,"
though, of course, this conflicted absolutely with the
reservations on which he had just been insisting.1
1 ibid., pp. 66-7.
CHAPTER VIII
THE DUPING OF EUROPE
HITHERTO
our
documentary
sources
have
revealed
Berchtold as persistently bellicose and secretive, but in
the concluding phase of the crisis the quality most in
evidence is his perfidy. Next to his natural desire to
secure Berlin's unreserved support, and following directly
upon it, he appears to have spared no effort to lull Europe
into a false sense of security. That this was done quite
systematically is well shown by the following incident.